At an early hour next morning I returned to the city, and found that
the face of affairs had undergone a complete revolution. No more
melancholy countenances, no closed shops and vacant streets were now to
be seen; all was bustle and rejoicing, bells ringing, carriages
rattling along, flags flying, and guns firing. The solemnity of
Good-Friday ends, it appeared, at ten o’clock on Saturday morning, and
from that time the merriments of Easter have their commencement.
The whole of this day I spent in strolling over the different walks and
points of view from whence the town and surrounding country may be seen
to most advantage; and I certainly must pronounce it to be by far the
most magnificent colonial capital which I have visited. The streets are
in general wide, clean, and airy; the houses, except in the suburbs,
are composed entirely of stone, and being occasionally intermingled
with convents, churches, and other public buildings, produce a very
striking and handsome effect. Though surrounded by a rampart, Havannah
has little of the confined and straitened appearance by which fortified
towns are generally disfigured. The works being of great extent, have
left within their circumference abundant room for the display of
elegance and neatness in its construction, an advantage which has not
been neglected; whilst from their situation they command as glorious a
prospect as can well be imagined.
When you ascend a bastion which overhangs the harbour, the city, with
all its towers and spires, lies immediately and distinctly beneath your
gaze. Beyond it, again, you perceive a winding of the bay, which washes
three sides of the promontory where the city stands; numerous fields of
sugar-cane and Indian corn succeed, intersected by groves of orange and
other fruit trees, which extend for some miles in a sort of inclined
plane, and are at length bounded by lofty and rugged mountains. On your
left, again, is the creek or entrance to the bay, separating you from
the Moro, a line of castles remarkable for their strength and extent.
Behind sweep the waters of the Gulf of Mexico; and on the right is
another view much resembling that which lies before you, only that it
is more narrowed; the high ground bearing in this direction closer upon
the city. On the whole I do not remember to have been more forcibly
struck by any scenery than that which I beheld from this bastion; so
well were town and country, castles and convents, land and water, hill
and valley combined.
Having spent some hours in wandering through the city, I endeavoured to
make my way into the forts, and to examine the state of the works. But
in both of these attempts I was interrupted. Without an order from the
Governor, I was informed, that none, even of the natives, are permitted
to enter the Moro, and all applications on the part of foreigners are
uniformly refused. There was a degree of jealousy in this, as needless
as it was illiberal; but indeed the whole conduct of the Spanish
authorities gave proof of their reluctance to admit their old allies,
even to the common rites of hospitality. From the moment we entered the
harbour the militia of the island were called out, many of the guns
which commanded our shipping were shotted, and artillerymen with
lighted fuzes stood constantly beside them. An order was likewise
issued, prohibiting more than two persons to land at the same time from
each vessel, and many other precautions were taken, little
complimentary to the good faith of those to whom Spain must feel that
she owes her very existence. In spite of these drawbacks, however, I
contrived to spend a week in this city with much satisfaction. The
opera and theatre opening on Easter Sunday, and continuing open during
the remainder of our stay, furnished sufficient amusement for the
evenings, whilst in walking or riding about, in examining the different
churches and chapels, and in chatting with nuns through the grate, or
monks within their cells, my mornings passed away more quickly than I
desired.
At length our victualling and watering being complete, on the 9th of
April we bade adieu to the shores of Cuba, and running along with the
Gulf-stream, took our course towards Bermuda. The wind favoured us
greatly, and on the 17th we again reached these islands; where we
delayed till the 23rd, when, once more setting sail, we steered
directly for England. During the remainder of the voyage nothing of
importance occurred till the 7th of May, when, reaching in towards the
shores of Brest, we were astonished by beholding the tri-coloured flag
floating from the citadel. Of the mighty events which had taken place
in Europe, we were as yet in perfect ignorance. Though surprised,
therefore, at the first view of that beacon of war, we naturally
concluded it to be no more than a signal, and passed on without
inquiry. As we ascended the channel, however, we were hailed by a
schooner, which professed to communicate some news concerning
Buonaparte; but the wind being high, we could not distinctly tell what
was said; nor was it till the 9th, when we had anchored off Spithead,
that the reappearance of that wonderful man was made known.
The effect of this intelligence it would be difficult to describe. At
first it was received with acclamations, but by and bye those who had
dreamed of home began to perceive in it the destruction of their
visions. Yet we considered that we were soldiers, and certainly no
regret was experienced when we were ordered to re-embark, and sail for
the Downs.
REMARKS.
Having thus brought my narrative to a conclusion, I cannot lay aside my
pen without offering a few remarks upon the events of this busy year,
and the nature of an American war in general. In doing so, I shall
begin with the unfortunate attack upon New Orleans, and endeavour, in
as few words as possible, to assign the true causes of its failure.
From the account which I have given of this affair, it will appear
that, from its very commencement, it was replete with error, and gave
promise of no better result than actually occurred. I do not here
allude to the spot fixed upon for landing, because that was as
appropriate as could be chosen. Neither do I refer to the groundless
rumours brought in by deserters; for to such all assailants are liable;
but the error lay in the steps subsequently taken; in the unhappy
advance of the first division from a place of concealment into the open
country, without pushing forward to the extent required. The fact is,
that having reached the main land in safety, one out of two plans might
have been selected by General Keane; which, in all probability, would
have been equally attended with success. Either he might have remained
in the morass till the whole army was assembled, or, if this were
deemed too dangerous, he ought to have advanced upon the city with the
first division alone. If it be objected that a force of 1600 men was
incompetent for an undertaking so important as the latter, I reply that
there could be no more hazard in it than in the course actually
pursued. New Orleans is not a regular fortification requiring a large
army and a powerful battering train for its reduction. In obtaining
possession of such a place there would have been no difficulty, because
it has since been ascertained that the American troops were, at the
time of our landing, some miles above the city; and surely it would not
have been more difficult to repulse an attack within a town than in the
open country. But neither of these courses was adopted. The advance was
drawn from concealment, and halted just where it became most exposed,
as if it had been our design to warn the American General of his
danger; the consequence of which was a well-directed attack upon our
bivouac, and an immediate commencement of those works which afterwards
resisted and repelled all our efforts.
The second error evident in this business was the selection of the
schooner instead of the ship for destruction. Had the latter, which lay
farther up the stream been destroyed, the former never could have
passed our battery, nor been of further annoyance to us; whereas, the
schooner being burnt, the ship was only removed out of the reach of
danger, and posted where she could be infinitely more advantageous to
her friends and detrimental to her enemies. This in itself was a grave
error, which beyond all doubt contributed, in some degree, to our
repulse on the 29th of December.
The third error, and one which continued to exert its influence
throughout the whole campaign, was the delay in bringing on a general
action. Why our troops fell back on the 29th I confess is to me a
mystery. It was not to be supposed that an officer who had shown so
much judgment as the American General, Jackson, in his first endeavours
to check our advance, would lose the advantage which the nature of his
position afforded. That he would fortify the neck of land, indeed, was
exactly what might have been expected: and, therefore, every hour
during which an attack was deferred, contributed so much to his
strength and to our weakness. It is true that we should have suffered,
and perhaps suffered severely; but our chances of suffering were
certainly not diminished by delay. We ought, therefore, instead of
falling back, to have pursued our operations with vigour on that day;
because the American lines, being then incomplete, would have assisted
rather than retarded our progress.
It has been said, and perhaps truly, that the movement on the 29th was
never intended for more than a reconnoissance: and that the scheme
subsequently adopted, of overpowering the enemy’s fire by a superior
artillery brought from the fleet, was a wise one. All this may be true;
but as we did not succeed in silencing the enemy’s batteries, who, on
the contrary, put ours to silence, either the project was faulty in its
design, or some grievous error was committed in its execution. As far
as our position was affected by it, the results were these:—Three days
more were lost in making preparations, which ended in nothing; while,
by the enemy, these same days were judiciously and indefatigably
employed to improve their deficiency and recruit their force.
At last came the idea of digging a canal from the lakes to the river,
by means of which a portion of our army might be thrown to the other
side; a project which is said to have been suggested by Sir Alexander
Cochrane; but which, wheresoever originating, was at once bold and
judicious. The canal was accordingly formed; not, however, with
sufficient attention to the rules of art in like cases, as was shown by
the falling in of the banks, and the consequent impossibility of
bringing up boats to transport the whole detachment. Still there it
was, and 350 men, instead of 1400, made good their landing on the right
bank of the river. It is deeply to be regretted that Sir Edward
Pakenham did not delay his own advance with the main body till this
fact had been ascertained. His plan of battle was to carry the enemy’s
works on the right bank, to turn their own guns from that flank against
themselves, and to alarm them for their communications, ere he should
attack the main position on the left. Nor can it be doubted, that had
the detached corps arrived at the hour first named, an easy triumph
would have been achieved. But Pakenham was too fiery to restrain his
troops, after they had assumed their ground on his own side. Instead,
therefore, of causing the columns to fall back out of gun-shot, and
wait quietly till the battle began on the left, he hurried them into
action as soon as the day dawned; and they became exposed to the whole
of that volume of fire which it was one main object of his movement
across the Mississippi to destroy. Moreover, from all the moral effects
of a partial defeat the enemy were saved; and I need not say how
serious such things are to irregular and undisciplined bodies. I do not
mean to assert that, in spite of all this, the American lines ought not
to have been carried. On the contrary, had every officer and man done
his duty, the victory would have been complete, though purchased,
beyond a doubt, at a severe cost. Yet it is absurd to deny that,
speaking of the movement as an operation of war, the attack on the
right ought to have been withheld till that on the left had either
failed or succeeded. So far, therefore, the General is liable to
censure; and chivalrous and high-minded as he was, it is just that he
should receive it. But there were other causes of defeat than this;
among which, the gross misconduct of one individual deserves to be
especially noticed.
To Lieutenant-Colonel Mullens, with the 44th regiment, of which he was
in command, was intrusted the arduous and therefore honourable duty of
carrying the fascines and ladders. The orders were given in good time
over night; and Colonel Mullens received them as if they had conveyed a
sentence of death. He stated, in the hearing of the private soldiers,
that his corps was devoted to destruction; and conducted himself, in
every respect, like a condemned criminal on the night previous to his
execution. When the troops got under arms, instead of bringing his
battalion to the redoubt, where he had been instructed to find the
ladders, he marched directly past it, and led them into the field
without a single ladder or fascine. When the day dawned, and he was
sent back for these instruments, he headed his corps in its retrograde
movement, but left it to return as it could to the front; and when
sought for to guide the attack, he was nowhere to be found. That a
regiment thus abused and deserted by its commanding officer should fall
into confusion, cannot occasion any surprise; it would have been
surprising indeed, had a different result ensued. But the melancholy
effect of such confusion was, that other regiments were likewise
broken; and before order could be restored, all the Generals were borne
dead or wounded from the field. A large share, therefore, of the blame
attachable to this failure must rest where fidelity of narration has
obliged me to place it.
Again, the recall of the victorious detachment from the left to the
right bank of the Mississippi, and the consequent abandonment of that
complete command of the river which this partial success had obtained,
was a military error of the gravest kind. Great as our numerical loss
had been in the principal action of the 8th, the advantages of position
were at the close of the day so decidedly with us, that for General
Jackson to maintain himself any longer in front of New Orleans was
physically impossible. His own dispatch, indeed, addressed to the
Secretary-at-War, shows that he felt the truth so forcibly, that he had
actually issued orders for a retreat, when the removal of the English
from his menaced flank was reported to him; and his battalions, which
had begun to get under arms, were directed to resume their places. It
is, however, but just to state, that such was the miserable condition
of our commissariat, that the fleet contained not provisions enough to
feed the people on half rations during a quick passage to Cuba; and
General Lambert did not feel that he would be justified in risking the
total loss of his army, which, had the campaign been prolonged another
fortnight, must under such circumstances have taken place. That he
erred in this supposition is certain; but his was probably an error
into which most men similarly circumstanced would have fallen.
But the primary cause of all our disasters may be traced to a source
even more distant than any yet mentioned; I mean, to the disclosure of
our designs to the enemy. How this occurred I shall not take it upon me
to declare, though several rumours bearing at least the guise of
probability have been circulated. The attack upon New Orleans was
professedly a secret expedition; so secret, indeed, that it was not
communicated to the inferior officers and soldiers in the armament till
immediately previous to our quitting Jamaica. To the Americans,
however, it appears to have been known long before; and hence it was
that, instead of taking them unawares, we found them fully prepared for
our reception. Nor is this all. It appears difficult to account for the
degree of negligence which affected the naval heads of the present
expedition, as far as the providing a competent number of boats and
small craft to transport the troops is concerned. Throughout the whole
fleet, barges enough to carry one-half of the army could not be found;
whereas there ought to have been a sufficient quantity to contain not
only the entire force, but all its stores and ammunition. To this
neglect, indeed, more perhaps than to any other circumstances, is the
failure of the attempt to be attributed; since not a doubt can exist
that, if General Keane had been enabled to bring the whole of his army
to land on the morning of the 23rd, he would have reached New Orleans,
without firing a shot, before nightfall. But the opportunity is past,
it cannot be recalled, and therefore to point out errors on the part of
my countrymen can serve no good end. That the failure is to be lamented
no one will deny, since the conquest of New Orleans would have proved
beyond all comparison the most valuable acquisition that could be made
to the British dominions throughout the whole western hemisphere. In
possession of that post we should have kept the entire southern trade
of the United States in check, and furnished means of commerce to our
own merchants of incalculable value.
The fact, however, is, that when we look back upon the whole series of
events produced by the late American war, we shall find little that is
likely to flatter our vanity or increase our self-importance. Except a
few successes in Canada at its very commencement, and the brilliant
inroad upon Washington, it will be found that our arms have been
constantly baffled or repulsed on shore; whilst at sea, with the
exception of the capture of the Chesapeake and one or two other affairs
towards its conclusion, we have been equally unsuccessful. From what
cause does this proceed? Not from any inferiority in courage or
discipline, because in these particulars British soldiers and sailors
will yield to none in the world. There must, then, be some other cause
for these misfortunes, and the cause is surely one which has
continually baffled all our plans of American warfare.
We have long been habituated to despise the Americans as an enemy
unworthy of serious regard. To this alone it is to be attributed that
frigates half manned were sent out to cope with ships capable of
containing them within their hulls; and to this also the trifling
handfuls of troops dispatched to conduct the war by land. Instead of
fifteen hundred, had ten thousand men sailed from the Garonne under
General Ross, how differently might he have acted! There would have
been then no necessity for a reembarkation after the capture of
Washington, and consequently no time given for the defence of
Baltimore; but, marching across the country, he might have done to the
one city what he did to the other. And it is thus only that a war with
America can be successfully carried on. To penetrate up the country
amidst pathless forests and boundless deserts, and to aim at permanent
conquest, is out of the question. America must be assaulted only on her
coasts. Her harbours destroyed, her shipping burned, and her seaport
towns laid waste, are the only evils which she has reason to dread; and
were a sufficient force embarked with these orders, no American war
would be of long continuance.
A melancholy experience has now taught us that such a war must not be
entered into, unless it be conducted with spirit; and there is no
conducting it with spirit, except with a sufficient numerical force. To
the plan proposed of making desert the whole line of coast, it may be
objected, that by so doing we should distress individuals, and not the
Government. But they who offer this objection, forget the nature both
of the people whose cause they plead, and of the Government under which
they live. In a democratical Government, the voice of the people must
at all times prevail. The members of the House of Representatives are
the very persons who, from such proceedings, would suffer most
severely, and we all know how far private suffering goes to influence a
man’s public opinions. Besides, the principle upon which the advocates
for the sacredness of private property proceed, is erroneous. Every one
will allow that, in absolute monarchies, where war is more properly the
pastime of kings than the desire of subjects, non-combatants ought to
be dealt with as humanely as possible. Not so, how ever, in States
governed by popular assemblies. By compelling the constituents to
experience the real hardships and miseries of warfare, you will compel
the representatives to a vote of peace; and surely that line of conduct
is, upon the whole, most humane, which puts the speediest period to the
cruelties of war. There are few men who would not rather endure a
raging fever for three days, than a slow and lingering disease for
three months. So it is with a democracy at war. Burn their houses,
plunder their property, block up their harbours, and destroy their
shipping in a few places; and before you have time to proceed to the
rest, you will be stopped by entreaties for peace. Whereas, if you do
no mischief that can be avoided, if you only fight their fleets and
armies wherever you meet them, and suffer the inhabitants to live in
undisturbed tranquillity, they will continue their hostilities till
they have worn out the means of one party, and greatly weakened those
of both.
Should another war break out between Great Britain and America, this is
the course to be adopted by the former. Besides which, I humbly
conceive that a second attempt might be hazarded upon New Orleans,
because the importance of the conquest would authorise almost any
sacrifice for its attainment; and once gained, it could easily be
defended. The neck of land, upon which it is built, extends in the same
form above as below the town; and the same advantages which it holds
out to its present defenders would, of course, be afforded to us. A
chain of works thrown across from the river to the marsh would render
it inaccessible from above; whilst by covering the lakes and the
Mississippi with cruisers, all attacks from below would be sufficiently
guarded against.
THE END.