CONCLUSION
§ 1. Can our Absolute Experience be properly called the “union of
Thought and Will”? The Absolute is certainly the final realisation
of our intellectual and our practical ideals. But (1) it includes
aspects, such as, _e.g._ æsthetic feeling, pleasure, and pain, which
are neither Thought nor Will. (2) And it cannot possess either
Thought or Will _as such_. Both Thought and Will, in their own
nature, presuppose a Reality which transcends _mere_ Thought and
_mere_ Will. § 2. Our conclusion may in a sense be said to involve
an element of Agnosticism, and again of Mysticism. But it is only
agnostic in holding that we do not know the precise nature of the
Absolute Experience. It implies no distrust of the validity of
knowledge, so far as it goes, and bases its apparently agnostic
result on the witness of knowledge itself. Similarly, it is mystical
in transcending, not in refusing to recognise, the constructions of
understanding and will. § 3. Metaphysics adds nothing to our
information, and yields no fresh springs of action. It is finally
only justified by the persistency of the impulse to speculate on the
nature of things as a whole.
§ 1. It seems advisable, in bringing this work to a conclusion, to bring
together by way of recapitulation a few important consequences of our
general principle which could not receive all the notice they deserve in
the course of our previous exposition. Our main contention, which it may
be hoped our discussion of special problems has now confirmed, was that
the whole of Reality ultimately forms a single infinite individual
system, of which the material is psychical matter of fact, and that the
individuality of this system lies ultimately in a teleological unity of
subjective interest. Further, we saw that all subordinate reality is
again in its degree individual, and that the contents of the Absolute
thus form a hierarchy of ascending orders of reality and individuality,
and that in this way, while all finite individual existence is, as
finite, appearance and not ultimate Reality, appearances, themselves are
of varied degrees of worth, and that, apart from the appearances, there
is no reality at all. And finally, we learned that all the aspirations
of finite individuals must be somehow met and made good in the ultimate
Reality, though not necessarily in the form in which they are
consciously entertained by the finite aspirant.
This last conclusion naturally suggests the question, whether it would
be a correct description of the ultimate Reality to call it the “union
of Thought and Will.” I will briefly indicate the reasons why such a
description appears to be misleading. (1) The Absolute may no doubt be
called the “union of Thought and Will,” in the sense that its complete
individual structure corresponds at once to our logical ideal of
systematic interconnection, and our ethico-religious ideal of realised
individual purpose. But it must be added that the Absolute appears to
possess aspects which cannot fairly be brought under either of these
heads. Æsthetic feeling, for instance, and the æsthetic judgments based
upon it, must somehow be included as an integral aspect in the absolute
whole of experience; yet æsthetic feeling cannot properly be regarded
either as thought or as will. And the same objection might be raised in
the case of pleasure. However closely pleasure may be connected with
conative efforts towards the retention or renewal of the pleasant
experience, it seems quite clear that the “pure” pleasures[235] are not
forms of conscious “conation,” and that even in those “mixed” pleasures,
which depend in part for their pleasantness upon relief from the tension
of precedent craving or desire, analysis enables us to distinguish two
elements, that of direct pleasure in the new experience, and that of the
feeling of relief from the craving. Hence, if it be admitted that the
Absolute contains pleasure, it must also be admitted that it contains
something which is neither thought nor will. The same argument would
hold good, I think, even if we held with the pessimists, that the
Absolute contains a balance of pain over pleasure. For, intimate as the
connection is between pain and thwarted conation, it seems a
psychological monstrosity to maintain that felt pain is always and
everywhere an experience of the frustration of actual conscious effort;
and unless this monstrosity can be maintained, we must recognise in pain
too a fundamental experience-quality irreducible to thought or will.
Thus, at best, the description of the Absolute, as the union of thought
and will, would be incomplete.
(2) But, further, the description, if taken to mean that the Absolute
itself has thought and will, _as such_, would be not only incomplete but
false. For actual thought and actual will can easily be shown to be
essentially finite functions, neither of which could ever reach its goal
and become finally self-consistent, without ceasing to be mere thought
or mere will. Thus actual thought always involves an aspect of
discrepancy between its content and reference. It is always thought
_about_ a reality which falls, in part, outside the thought itself, is
only imperfectly represented by the thought’s content, and for that very
reason is a not-self to the thought for which it is an object. And the
whole process of thinking may be described as a series of attempts on
the part of thought to transcend this limitation. So long as the content
of the thought is not adequate to the reality which it thinks, so long,
that is, as there is anything left to know about the reality, thought
restlessly presses forward towards an unreached consummation. But if the
correspondence _ideae cum ideato_ ever became perfect, thought’s object
would cease to contain anything which went beyond thought’s own content.
It would no longer be an “other” or “not-self” to the thought which knew
it, and thus thought and its object would have become a single thing.
But in this consummation thought would have lost its special character
as an actual process, just as the object would have lost its character
of a something, partly at least, “given” from without. Both mere thought
and mere existence, in becoming one, would cease to have the character
which belongs to them in finite experience precisely in virtue of our
failure completely to transcend the chasm between them.
The same is the case with will. If, indeed, by will we mean a genuine
actual process of volition, this result is already included in our
criticism of the claim of thought as such to persist unchanged in the
Absolute. For all genuine will implies possession of and actuation by an
idea which is entertained explicitly as an unrealised idea, and is thus
inseparable from thought. (This, I may incidentally observe once more,
is why we carefully avoided speaking of the “subjective interest” we
found in all experience-processes as “will.”) But even if we improperly
widen the interpretation of the term “will” to include all conative
process, the general conclusion will remain the same. For all such
processes imply the contrast between existence as it comes to us in the
here and now of actual feeling, and existence as it should be, and as we
seek to make it, for the satisfaction of our various impulses, cravings,
and desires. It is the felt, even when not explicitly understood,
discrepancy between these two aspects of a reality, which is ultimately
one and harmonious under the discrepancy, that supplies all actual
conative process with its motive force. And hence we seem driven to hold
that conation as such, _i.e._ as actual striving or effort, can find no
place in an experience in which the aspects of ideality and real
existence are once for all finally united.
If we cannot avoid speaking of such an experience in terms of our own
intellectual, and again of our own volitional processes, we must at
least remember that while such language is true in the sense that the
all-embracing harmonious experience of the Absolute is the unattainable
goal towards which finite intellect and finite volition are alike
striving, yet each in attaining its consummation, if it ever could
attain it, would cease to be itself as we know it, and pass into a
higher and directer form of apprehension, in which it could no longer be
distinguished from the other. In the old mediæval terminology, the
Absolute must be said to contain actual intellect and actual volition,
not _formaliter_ but _eminenter_.[236]
§ 2. It follows from all this that, just because the absolute whole is
neither mere thought nor mere will, nor an artificial synthesis of the
two, mere truth for the intellect can never be quite the same thing as
ultimate Reality. For in mere truth we get Reality only in its
intellectual aspect as that which affords the highest satisfaction to
thought’s demand for consistency and systematic unity in its object.
And, as we have seen, this demand can never be quite satisfied by
thought itself. For thought, to remain thought, must always be
something less than the whole reality which it knows. The reality must
always contain a further aspect which is not itself thought, and is
not capable of being apprehended in the form of a thought-content. Or,
what is the same thing, while all reality is individual, all the
thought-constructions through which we know its character must remain
general. We are always trying in our thought to grasp the individual
as such, and always failing. As individual, the reality never becomes
the actual content of our thought, but remains a “transcendent” object
to which thought _refers_, or which it _means_. And hence our truest
thought can at best give us but an imperfect satisfaction for its own
demand of congruence, between thought’s content and its object. The
reality can never be ultimately _merely_ what it is for our thought.
And this conclusion obviously lends a certain justification both to
the agnostic and to the mystic. It is important to understand how far
that justification extends.
First, then, a word as to the limits of justifiable Agnosticism. Our
conclusion warranted us in asserting that Reality must contain aspects
which are not thought, and again must combine thought with these other
aspects in a unity which is not itself merely intellectual. In other
words, we had to confess that we cannot understand the concrete
character of the Infinite Experience, or, to put it in a more homely
way, we do not know how it would feel to be “God.” And if this is
Agnosticism, we clearly shall have to own that we too are agnostics. But
our result gave us no ground for doubting our own general conviction as
to the place which intellect and truth hold in the Absolute. On the
other hand, it left us with every reason for trusting that conviction.
For our conclusion that mere truth cannot be the same thing as ultimate
Reality was itself based upon the principle that only harmonious
individuality is finally real, and this is the very principle employed
by the intellect itself whenever it judges one thought-construction
relatively higher and truer than another.
Thus _our_ Agnosticism, if it is to be called so, neither discredits our
human estimate of the relative truth of different theories about the
real, nor lends any support to the notion that “Knowledge is relative”
in the sense that there may conceivably be no correspondence between
Reality and the scheme of human knowledge as a whole. It is based not on
the distrust of human reason, but upon the determination to trust that
reason implicitly, and it claims, in declaring mere truth to fall short
of Reality, to be expressing reason’s own verdict upon itself. Hence it
does not, like vulgar Agnosticism, leave us in the end in pure
uncertainty as to the ultimate structure and upshot, so to say, of the
world, but definitely holds that we have genuine and trustworthy
knowledge of the type of that structure and the nature of its materials.
And it is upon this positive knowledge, and not upon an uncritical
appeal to unknown possibilities, that it rests its denial of the simple
identity of Reality with thought itself. For all we know, says the
common Agnosticism, our thought is sheer illusion, and therefore we must
confess that we have in the end no notion what the reality of the world
may be. Thought is not illusory, says our systematic Idealism, and
therefore its own witness that Reality is an individual whole of
experience which is more than thought is a positive contribution to our
knowledge. Between these two positions there may be a superficial
resemblance, but there is an essential difference in principle.
So again with the mystical element in our result. In holding that all
genuine individuality, finite or infinite,[237] involves a type of
immediate felt unity which transcends reduction to the relational
categories of thought and will, we may fairly be said to have reached a
conclusion which, in a sense, is mystical. But our result is not
Mysticism, if by Mysticism is meant a doctrine which seeks ultimate
Reality in mere unanalysed immediate feeling as such. The results of
intellectual and volitional construction have not been treated by us as
illusory and as a sort of intellectual and moral mistake. On the other
hand, we urged that the ultimate unity of the real must transcend, and
not merely fall short of, the rational scheme of thought and will. And
we consequently insisted that our result, so far as it is a mystical
one, can only be justified by following out the constructions of the
logical intellect and the ethical will to their final consequence, and
showing that each of them itself demands completion in an individual
Reality which includes and transcends both. To quote the admirable words
of Dr. McTaggart: “A Mysticism which ignored the claims of the
understanding would no doubt be doomed. None ever went about to break
logic, but in the end logic broke him. But there is a Mysticism which
starts from the standpoint of the understanding, and only departs from
it in so far as that standpoint shows itself not to be ultimate, but to
postulate something beyond itself. To transcend the lower is not to
ignore it.” And it is only in this sense that philosophy is justified in
asserting “above all knowledge and volition one all-embracing unity,
which is only not true, only not good, because all truth and all
goodness are but shadows of its absolute perfection.”[238]
§ 3. The reader who has persevered to the conclusion of this volume may
perhaps, on laying it down, experience a certain feeling of
dissatisfaction. Our investigations, it might be complained, have added
nothing to our stock of scientific information about the contents of the
world, and have supplied no fresh practical incentives towards the
strenuous pursuit of an elevated moral or religious ideal. I must at
once admit the justice of this hypothetical criticism, and dispute its
relevancy. Quite apart from the defects due to personal shortcomings and
confusions, it is inherent in the nature of metaphysical study that it
can make no positive addition to our information, and can of itself
supply no motives for practical endeavour. And the student who turns to
our science as a substitute for empirical Physics or Psychology, or for
practical morality, is bound to go away disappointed. The reason of this
we have already had occasion to see. Metaphysics has to presuppose the
general principles of the various sciences and the general forms of
practical experience as the materials upon which it works. Its object as
a study is not to add to or to modify these materials, but to afford
some coherent and systematic satisfaction for the intellectual curiosity
which we all feel at times as to the general nature of the whole to
which these various materials belong, and the relative truth and
clearness with which that general nature is expressed in the different
departments of experience. Its aim is the organisation, not the
enlargement of knowledge. Hence for the student whose interests lie more
in the enlargement of human knowledge by the discovery of new facts and
laws, than in its organisation into a coherent whole, Metaphysics is
probably undesirable, or desirable only as a protection against the
intrusion of unrecognised and uncriticised metaphysical assumptions into
the domain of empirical service. And similarly for the practical man
whose interests in life are predominantly ethical, the main, if not the
sole, value of metaphysical study lies in its critical function of
exposing false metaphysical assumptions, which, if acted upon, might
impair the vigour of spontaneous moral effort.
But for those in whom the speculative desire to form some coherent
conception of the scheme of things to which we belong as a whole is
strong, Metaphysics has a higher importance. In such minds the impulse
to reflect on the nature of existence as a whole, if debarred from
systematic and thorough gratification, is certain to find its outlet in
unsystematic and uncriticised imaginative construction. Metaphysics they
will certainly have, and if not conscious and coherent, then unconscious
and incoherent Metaphysics. The soul that is not at rest in itself
without some “sight of that immortal sea which brought it hither,” if
hindered from beholding the object of its quest through the clear glass
of rational reflection, will none the less seek to discern it amid the
distorting hazes and mists of superstition. It is in such seekers after
the Infinite that Metaphysics has its natural and proper followers, and
for them the study is its own justification and its own reward. If a
work like the present should prove of any help to such students, whether
by offering positive suggestions which they can accept, or by assisting
them to know definitely why they reject its conclusions, it will perhaps
have achieved as much as its writer could reasonably expect.
_Consult further_:—F. H. Bradley, _Appearance and Reality_, chap. 27; J.
E. McTaggart, _Studies m Hegelian Cosmology_, chap. 9.
-----
-----
Footnote 235:
I use the epithet in its familiar Platonic sense. The “pure” pleasure
is that which is not dependent, in whole or in part, for its
pleasantness upon a previous ἔνδεια, or actual experience of craving
or desire. I do not mean, as Plato possibly did, that a “mixed”
pleasure, preceded by such ἔνδεια, is a contrast-effect without
positive quality of its own.
Footnote 236:
Compare the argument of _Appearance and Reality_, chap. 26, pp.
469-485 (1st ed.), and the famous scholium to Prop. 17 of part 1 of
Spinoza’s _Ethics_, where it is contended that “if intellect and
volition belong to the eternal essence of God, each of these
attributes must at least be understood in a different sense from the
current.”
Footnote 237:
I say “finite or infinite” advisedly. The mystic’s condemnation of the
relational scheme as inadequate to express the full nature of the
real, holds good just as much in application to actual finite
experience as in application to the ultimate whole. We may say not
only of “God,” but of human persons, that they are much more than the
“union of thought and will” as such. And in personal human love, no
less than in the saint’s “beatific vision” or the philosopher’s
“intellectual love of God,” we have a type of experience which may for
some psychological purposes be analysed into a combination of
ideational and volitional processes, but emphatically does not, in its
concrete existence, consist of a synthesis of actual ideas and actual
volitions. See _ante_, p. 152.
Footnote 238:
_Studies in Hegelian Cosmology_, p. 292.
-----
------------------------------------------------------------------------
INDEX
Absolute, meaning of, 53 ff.;
general character of, 60 ff.;
not unknowable, 71 ff.;
not a “self,” 343 ff.;
is it a society? 100, 347 ff.;
a spiritual individual, 98 ff.;
not necessarily the same as “God,” 399 ff.;
not “union of thought and will,” 409 ff.
Activity not identical with conation, 55;
and causation, 169;
empirical nature of, 189.
Agnosticism, 68, 69, 71, 72;
how far justifiable, 412.
Appearance and Reality, connection between, 105 ff.
Aristotle, 6, 42, 97, 266, 361, 386.
Attention, selective, 55, 66, 80;
“span” of, 226, 244.
Avenarius, 35, 45, 80, 121, 174, 298 ff. 315.
Baldwin, J. M., 206.
Berkeley, 26, 64 ff., 75, 184, 185, 201 ff.
Body, my own, as describable object, 282.
Body, my own, and others, 203 ff.
Body and Soul, theories of, 313 ff.;
in what sense the same, 332.
Bosanquet, B., 19, 26, 164.
Bradley, F. H., 9, 11, 23, 26, 55, 67, 88, 90, 131, 146, 199, 227, 243,
259, 289, 318, 326, 335, 338, 355, 364, 370, 384, 411.
Causation, 165 ff.;
cause not identical with ground, 166;
causation a postulate, 167 ff.;
popular as distinguished from scientific sense, 169;
causation and the indefinite regress, 177 ff.;
continuity of causation, 171 ff.;
Immanent and Transeunt Causality, 183 ff.;
psychophysical causation, 322 ff.
Causes, Plurality of, 180 ff.
Chance, “pure,” meaning of, 231, 232;
chance and “free-will,” 378.
Change, 158-164.
Character and freedom, 374.
Choice and motives, 373.
Consciousness, a misleading term, 79.
Consequence (_see_ Ground).
Continuity, nature of, 171
(_see_ Causation);
continuity of space and time, 244, 250.
Contradiction, principle of, 19 ff.
Cosmology Rational, nature of, 43-49, 192-197.
Couturat, L., 149, 260.
Dedekind, 116, 149, 171.
Degrees of Reality, 108 ff.
Descartes, 128, 185, 318, 400 ff.
Description, as scientific ideal, 174;
in physical Science, 280 ff.;
in Psychology, 308 ff.
Determinism, 370-376.
Discontinuity of teleological series, 311.
Distance in space and time, 250.
Ends in Nature, 272, 405, 406.
Energy, conservation of, 292;
kinetic and non-kinetic, 291;
doctrine of, and psychophysical interaction, 322 ff.
Epiphenomenalism, 317, 318-320.
Epistemology and Metaphysics, 16.
Evil, problem of, 391 ff., 395 ff.
Evolution, not identical with mere change, 267;
implies real ends, 268 ff.;
is of finite beings only, 274 ff.;
implies real progress and degeneration, 275;
originates new individuals, 276.
Experience, what, 23 ff., 33 ff.;
“pure,” 35, 54.
Feeling, 23 ff., 55;
in the Absolute, 467 ff.
Freedom, meaning of, 359 ff.
Free-will, origins of belief in, 361 ff.
Geulincx, 184, 185, 186, 317.
Gibson, W. R. B., 288, 329, 366.
God, proofs of being of, 400 ff.
Ground and Consequence, meaning of principle of, 164, 165.
Harmony, Pre-established, 187, 317.
Hegel, 40 ff., 42 ff., 391, 401.
Herbart, 39, 42, 68.
Hobhouse, L. T., 74, 137, 138, 199.
Hume, 29, 7, 133, 169, 172, 183, 400 ff.
Identity, Psychophysical, doctrine of, 102, 321, 331, 332.
Identity, a teleological concept, 335.
(_See also_ Unity of Thing).
Imitation, significance of, for personality, 206.
Immanent Causality, 183 ff.
Immediacy, 32.
“Immortality,” 354 ff.
Indeterminism, 376-379.
Individuality, nature of, 57, 98 ff.;
degrees of, 109 ff.;
infinite and finite, 115 ff.
Infinite Regress, 148 ff., 156;
in space and time, 255 ff., 259;
in causal relation, 177.
Infinity, meaning of, 116.
Interaction, Psychophysical, 317, 329-331.
Introjection, meaning of, 81;
origin of, 81, 299 ff.;
justification of, 301 ff.
James, W., 53, 91, 318, 370, 383, 390, 400.
Kant, 11, 24, 39, 43, 69, 134, 188, 242 ff., 259, 359, 366, 387, 400
ff.
Law, meaning of, 218 ff.
Laws in Nature, 196, 229.
Leibnitz, 68, 82, 86, 91 ff., 117, 187 ff., 317, 366, 401, 404.
Locke, 128, 136, 200, 318, 353, 365, 366.
Lotze, 41, 42, 133, 224, 289.
Mach, E., 174, 175, 192, 223, 228, 283, 290.
Machine, nature of a, 236, 237.
McTaggart, J. E., 345, 357, 391, 398, 413.
Malebranche, 184, 185, 317.
Mass, definition of, 289;
conservation of, 290;
a relative concept, 290, 291.
Matter, meaning of, 198 ff.
Mechanical view of Nature, 233 ff., 237 ff., 283 ff.;
postulates of, 284, 292 ff.
Mechanism, meaning of, 196, 237 ff.
Method of Metaphysics, 38 ff.
Mill, J. S., 24, 180 ff., 370.
Monadism, 86, 91, 94.
Monism, 85.
Münsterberg, H., 45, 67, 198, 283, 303 ff., 315, 318, 321, 324, 329.
Mysticism, 14, 33, 153;
in what sense justifiable, 413.
Necessity and causal relation, 183.
Newton, 128, 200.
Nietzsche, 276.
Number-series, 151 ff., 248-250, 259.
Occasionalism, 184, 317.
Ontology, character of, 42.
Order, a teleological concept, 118;
order in space and time, 251.
Organism, nature of a, 96.
Parallelism, Psychophysical, 317, 320-329.
Pearson, K., 75, 290.
Phenomenalism, 10, 136.
Physical order, nature of the, 194 ff., 198, 208, 282.
Plato, 3, 55, 77, 95, 276, 366, 386, 393, 398, 409.
Pleasure-pain, 55, 344.
Plotinus, 398.
Pluralism, 86 ff.
Position not a principle of individuation, 58;
relativity of, 253.
Pragmatism, 317.
Prediction in science, 219 ff.
Progress not infinite, 387-389.
Psychical order, nature of the, 298 ff.
Psychology, character of, as a science, 296 ff.
Psychology and Physiology, 303 ff.
Psychology, Rational, nature of, 43 ff.
Purpose, nature of, 55 ff.
Qualities, primary and secondary, 128 ff.
Quality and relation, 140 ff.
Quality and substance, 128 ff.
Quality, spatial and temporal, 244.
Rashdall, H., 347, 393, 400.
Realism, Agnostic, 68, 71, 72;
Dogmatic, 69, 72-75.
Relation and quality, 140 ff.
Relations and relatedness, 155.
Religion, metaphysical presuppositions of, 389 ff.
Responsibility and the self, 335.
Royce, J., 13, 33, 51, 56, 76, 116, 145, 148 ff., 206, 226, 239, 263,
270, 277, 307, 398.
Russell, B., 36, 58, 91, 142, 189, 243, 250, 253, 404.
Self, 98, 107;
nature of, 334-340;
a teleological concept, 335;
temporal character of, 341, 342.
Self-consciousness, genuine and fictitious, 79.
Sidgwick, H., 130, 359, 370.
Space, perceptual, 243-245;
conceptual genesis of, 245-249;
infinity of, 247;
divisibility of, 248;
continuity of, 248, 250;
homogeneity of, 251;
relativity of, 251;
is it one or many? 253, 257;
is not ultimate, 254-257;
antinomies of, 259 ff.;
of what is it phenomenal? 260.
Spencer, H., 40, 68.
Spinoza, 62, 101 ff., 318, 399, 411.
Stout, G. F., 33, 67, 135, 154 ff., 208, 247, 318, 324, 332, 378.
Subjectivism, what, 75;
fallacy of, 76-81, 204 ff.
Substance, concept of, 128 ff.;
and quality, 128-140.
Sufficient Reason, principle of, 164.
Teleological description not impossible, 309.
Teleological series, discontinuity of, 311.
Teleology, nature of, 55, 99, 125, 287, 371 ff.;
in Psychology, 305 ff.;
in Biology, 308;
and Psychophysical Parallelism, 326 ff.
Thought and the Absolute, 61;
not ultimate, 409.
Time, perceptual, 243-245;
conceptual, genesis of, 245-249;
infinity of, 247;
divisibility of, 248;
continuity of, 248, 250;
homogeneity of, 251;
relativity of, 251;
is it one or many? 253, 257;
not ultimate, 254-257;
antinomies of, 259 ff.;
of what is it phenomenal? 262;
time and the self, 341, 344.
Truth, degrees of, 214.
Uniformities, statistical, 220 ff.
Uniformity in physical nature, 222, 227.
Unity of things teleological, 123-128.
Ward, J., 45, 64, 174, 225, 228, 289 318, 324, 326-328.
Whole and Part, category of, 96.
Will, nature of, 61, 118;
not ultimate, 410.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Transcriber’s Note
Two words on the first line of p. 70 of this edition (noted below) were
missing (blank). They have been supplied from the 5th edition, published
in 1920.
On p. 226, a footnote at (226.42) refers to Mr. H. G. Wells’s tale, _The
New Accumulator_, which is certainly a reference to his 1901 tale “The
New Accelerator”.
On p. 340, the first paragraph refers to ‘two points’, and prefaces the
first with ‘(a)’. But there is no ‘(b)’ to denote the second point. It
seems likely that ‘(b)’ should precede the next paragraph, or perhaps
following the introductory ‘Further’.
The Index reference to p. 467 for ‘Feeling in the Absolute’ cannot be
verified. The page does not exist, and no other page can be identified
with certainty.
Errors deemed most likely to be the printer’s have been corrected, and
are noted here. The references are to the page and line in the original.
The most common error is missing punctuation: 6.14 purpose[.], 38.29
inquiry[.], 44.12 periphery[.], 44.41 other[.], 56.47 failure[.], 58.27
theory[.], 62.39 “purposive[”], 67.17 life[.], 67.19 subject[.], 79.46
“matter[”], 82.13 it[.], 88.40 exclusive[.], 89.41 facts[.], 99.13
purpose[.], 108.24 admitted[.], 128.23 [“]substance”, 143.19 arisen[.],
215.10 [“]Nature, 224.22 purpose[.], 236.14 based[.], 251.45 series[.],
274.16 advance[.], 320.32 _fatum_[.], 361.22 considerations[.], 390.5
“temperament[”], 410.22 thing[.]
The name of Professor Hugo Münsterberg is spelled variably as
Münsterberg, Munsterberg, and occasionally with a partial umlaut. The
spelling has been rendered as Münsterberg to facilitate text searches at
215.5, 305.15, 315.8, 329.40, 418.3.
Other corrected errors are:
xviii.11 to a[s]certain Inserted.
xxiii.12 The concept of _[e]volution_ Restored.
37.9 carry out ou[t/r] programme Replaced.
46.46 _Grundz[u/ü]ge der Psychologie_ Replaced.
66.44 on which it “works.[’/”] Replaced.
70.1.1 a modification of your [experience]. Restored.
70.1.2 to ask what [you] mean Restored.
82.22 to know your own meaning[./,] Replaced.
134.42 too diffuse and technical[,/.] Replaced.
136.24 does no[t] destroy Restored.
149.12 in our illustration 1^2, [2^3/2^2], 3^2 ... Replaced.
180.46 increases indefinitely[)]. Removed.
215.6 _Grundz[u/ü]ge der Psychologie_ Replaced.
215.12 [“]J. Ward Removed.
229.16 deal only with the problem[,/.] Replaced.
306.4 the physical order was const[r]ucted Inserted.
318.8 H[o/ö]ffding Replaced.