SCENE:—The portico of a temple of Zeus.
[Sidenote: _Eryxias._]
It happened by chance that Eryxias the Steirian was walking
with me in the Portico of Zeus the Deliverer, when there =Steph.= 392
came up to us Critias and Erasistratus, the latter the son of
Phaeax, who was the nephew of Erasistratus. Now Erasistratus
had just arrived from Sicily and that part of the world.
As they approached, he said, Hail, Socrates!
_Soc._ The same to you, I said; have you any good news
from Sicily to tell us?
_Eras._ Most excellent. But, if you please, let us first sit
down; for I am tired with my yesterday’s journey from
Megara.
_Soc._ Gladly, if that is your desire.
[Sidenote: _The nature of wealth._]
[Sidenote: The troublesome Sicilians.]
_Eras._ What would you wish to hear first? he said. What
the Sicilians are doing, or how they are disposed towards our
city? To my mind, they are very like wasps: so long as
you only cause them a little annoyance they are quite unmanageable;
you must destroy their nests if you wish to get
the better of them. And in a similar way, the Syracusans,
unless we set to work in earnest, and go against them with a
great expedition, will never submit to our rule. The petty
injuries which we at present inflict merely irritate them
enough to make them utterly intractable. And now they
have sent ambassadors to Athens, and intend, I suspect, to
play us some trick.—While we were talking, the Syracusan
envoys chanced to go by, and Erasistratus, pointing to one
of them, said to me, That, Socrates, is the richest man in
all Italy and Sicily. For who has larger estates or more
land at his disposal to cultivate if he please? And they
are of a quality, too, finer than any other land in Hellas.
Moreover, he has all the things which go to make up
wealth, slaves and horses innumerable, gold and silver
without end.
I saw that he was inclined to expatiate on the riches of the
man; so I asked him, Well, Erasistratus, and what sort of
character does he bear in Sicily?
[Sidenote: The wicked millionaire.]
_Eras._ He is esteemed to be, and really is, the wickedest of 393
all the Sicilians and Italians, and even more wicked than he
is rich; indeed, if you were to ask any Sicilian whom he
thought to be the worst and the richest of mankind, you
would never hear any one else named.
_Soc._ I reflected that we were speaking, not of trivial matters,
but about wealth and virtue, which are deemed to be of the
greatest moment, and I asked Erasistratus whom he considered
the wealthier,—he who was the possessor of a talent
of silver or he who had a field worth two talents?
_Eras._ The owner of the field.
_Soc._ And on the same principle he who had robes and
bedding and such things which are of greater value to him
than to a stranger would be richer than the stranger?
_Eras._ True.
_Soc._ And if any one gave you a choice, which of these
would you prefer?
_Eras._ That which was most valuable.
[Sidenote: Wealth consists of things which are valuable.]
_Soc._ In which way do you think you would be the
richer?
_Eras._ By choosing as I said.
_Soc._ And he appears to you to be the richest who has
goods of the greatest value?
_Eras._ He does.
[Sidenote: _Is wisdom the most valuable of all things?_]
_Soc._ And are not the healthy richer than the sick, since
health is a possession more valuable than riches to the sick?
Surely there is no one who would not prefer to be poor and
well, rather than to have all the King of Persia’s wealth and
to be ill. And this proves that men set health above wealth,
else they would never choose the one in preference to the
other.
_Eras._ True.
_Soc._ And if anything appeared to be more valuable than
health, he would be the richest who possessed it?
_Eras._ He would.
_Soc._ Suppose that some one came to us at this moment
and were to ask, Well, Socrates and Eryxias and Erasistratus,
can you tell me what is of the greatest value to men?
Is it not that of which the possession will best enable a man
to advise how his own and his friends’ affairs should be
administered?—What will be our reply?
_Eras._ I should say, Socrates, that happiness was the most
precious of human possessions.
_Soc._ Not a bad answer. But do we not deem those men
who are most prosperous to be the happiest?
_Eras._ That is my opinion.
_Soc._ And are they not most prosperous who commit the
fewest errors in respect either of themselves or of other
men?
_Eras._ Certainly.
_Soc._ And they who know what is evil and what is
good; what should be done and what should be left undone;—these
behave the most wisely and make the fewest 394
mistakes?
Erasistratus agreed to this.
_Soc._ Then the wisest and those who do best and the most
fortunate and the richest would appear to be all one and
the same, if wisdom is really the most valuable of our
possessions?
[Sidenote: Of what use would wisdom be, if a man had not the necessaries
of life?]
Yes, said Eryxias, interposing, but what use would it be if
a man had the wisdom of Nestor and wanted the necessaries
of life, food and drink and clothes and the like? Where
would be the advantage of wisdom then? Or how could he
be the richest of men who might even have to go begging,
because he had not wherewithal to live?
[Sidenote: _Comparative claims of wisdom and of riches._]
I thought that what Eryxias was saying had some weight,
and I replied, Would the wise man really suffer in this way,
if he were so ill-provided; whereas if he had the house of
Polytion, and the house were full of gold and silver, he
would lack nothing?
_Eryx._ Yes; for then he might dispose of his property and
obtain in exchange what he needed, or he might sell it for
money with which he could supply his wants and in a moment
procure abundance of everything.
[Sidenote: The wisdom of Nestor better and even more saleable than the
house of Polytion.]
[Sidenote: And in the arts is not wisdom better than riches?]
_Soc._ True, if he could find some one who preferred such a
house to the wisdom of Nestor. But if there are persons
who set great store by wisdom like Nestor’s and the advantages
accruing from it, to sell these, if he were so disposed,
would be easier still. Or is a house a most useful and
necessary possession, and does it make a great difference in
the comfort of life to have a mansion like Polytion’s instead
of living in a shabby little cottage, whereas wisdom is of small
use and it is of no importance whether a man is wise or
ignorant about the highest matters? Or is wisdom despised
of men and can find no buyers, although cypress wood and
marble of Pentelicus are eagerly bought by numerous purchasers?
Surely the prudent pilot or the skilful physician,
or the artist of any kind who is proficient in his art, is more
worth than the things which are especially reckoned among
riches; and he who can advise well and prudently for himself
and others is able also to sell the product of his art, if he so
desire.
Eryxias looked askance, as if he had received some unfair 395
treatment, and said, I believe, Socrates, that if you were
forced to speak the truth, you would declare that you were
richer than Callias the son of Hipponicus. And yet, although
you claimed to be wiser about things of real importance, you
would not any the more be richer than he.
[Sidenote: Eryxias is supposed to reply that arguments can prove anything
and convince no one.]
[Sidenote: _The triangular argument of Socrates, Eryxias, Critias._]
I dare say, Eryxias, I said, that you may regard these arguments
of ours as a kind of game; you think that they have
no relation to facts, but are like the pieces in the game of
draughts which the player can move in such a way that his
opponents are unable to make any countermove[77]. And perhaps,
too, as regards riches you are of opinion that while
facts remain the same, there are arguments, no matter
whether true or false, which enable the user of them to prove
that the wisest and the richest are one and the same, although
he is in the wrong and his opponents are in the right.
There would be nothing strange in this; it would be as if
two persons were to dispute about letters, one declaring that
the word Socrates began with an S, the other that it began with
an A, and the latter could gain the victory over the former.
[Sidenote: Eryxias disclaims the answer which is attributed to him.]
Eryxias glanced at the audience, laughing and blushing at
once, as if he had had nothing to do with what had just been
said, and replied,—No, indeed, Socrates, I never supposed
that our arguments should be of a kind which would never
convince any one of those here present or be of advantage to
them. For what man of sense could ever be persuaded that
the wisest and the richest are the same? The truth is that
we are discussing the subject of riches, and my notion is that
we should argue respecting the honest and dishonest means
of acquiring them, and, generally, whether they are a good
thing or a bad.
[Sidenote: The argument is renewed from a fresh point of view. Eryxias
declares riches to be a good; Critias maintains that they are sometimes
an evil.]
Very good, I said, and I am obliged to you for the hint:
in future we will be more careful. But why do not you yourself,
as you introduced the argument, and do not think that
the former discussion touched the point at issue, tell us
whether you consider riches to be a good or an evil?
I am of opinion, he said, that they are a good. He was
about to add something more, when Critias interrupted him:—Do
you really suppose so, Eryxias?
Certainly, replied Eryxias; I should be mad if I did not:
and I do not fancy that you would find any one else of a contrary
opinion.
And I, retorted Critias, should say that there is no one
whom I could not compel to admit that riches are bad for
some men. But surely, if they were a good, they could not 396
appear bad for any one?
[Sidenote: _The irony of Socrates._]
[Sidenote: Socrates encourages the two disputants to follow up the
argument.]
Here I interposed and said to them: If you two were
having an argument about equitation and what was the best
way of riding, supposing that I knew the art myself, I should
try to bring you to an agreement. For I should be ashamed
if I were present and did not do what I could to prevent
your difference. And I should do the same if you were
quarrelling about any other art and were likely, unless you
agreed on the point in dispute, to part as enemies instead of
as friends. But now, when we are contending about a thing
of which the usefulness continues during the whole of life,
and it makes an enormous difference whether we are to
regard it as beneficial or not,—a thing, too, which is esteemed
of the highest importance by the Hellenes:—(for parents,
as soon as their children are, as they think, come to years of
discretion, urge them to consider how wealth may be acquired,
since by riches the value of a man is judged):—When,
I say, we are thus in earnest, and you, who agree in
other respects, fall to disputing about a matter of such
moment, that is, about wealth, and not merely whether
it is black or white, light or heavy, but whether it is a
good or an evil, whereby, although you are now the dearest
of friends and kinsmen, the most bitter hatred may arise
betwixt you, I must hinder your dissension to the best of my
power. If I could, I would tell you the truth, and so put an
end to the dispute; but as I cannot do this, and each of you
supposes that you can bring the other to an agreement, I am
prepared, as far as my capacity admits, to help you in solving
the question. Please, therefore, Critias, try to make us
accept the doctrines which you yourself entertain.
_Crit._ I should like to follow up the argument, and will ask
Eryxias whether he thinks that there are just and unjust
men?
_Eryx._ Most decidedly.
_Crit._ And does injustice seem to you an evil or a good?
_Eryx._ An evil.
_Crit._ Do you consider that he who bribes his neighbour’s
wife and commits adultery with her, acts justly or unjustly,
and this although both the state and the laws forbid?
_Eryx._ Unjustly.
[Sidenote: Wealth may furnish the opportunity of crime.]
_Crit._ And if the wicked man has wealth and is willing to 397
spend it, he will carry out his evil purposes? whereas he
who is short of means cannot do what he fain would, and
therefore does not sin? In such a case, surely, it is better
that a person should not be wealthy, if his poverty prevents
the accomplishment of his desires, and his desires are evil?
Or, again, should you call sickness a good or an evil?
_Eryx._ An evil.
_Crit._ Well, and do you think that some men are intemperate?
[Sidenote: _The argument of Critias._]
_Eryx._ Yes.
_Crit._ Then, if it is better for his health that the intemperate
man should refrain from meat and drink and other pleasant
things, but he cannot owing to his intemperance, will it not
also be better that he should be too poor to gratify his lust
rather than that he should have a superabundance of means?
For thus he will not be able to sin, although he desire never
so much.
[Sidenote: Eryxias takes offence at Critias, whose argument, as Socrates
pretends, is only the repetition of which one had been used by Prodicus
of Ceos on the day before, and had been refuted by an impertinent youth.]
Critias appeared to be arguing so admirably that Eryxias,
if he had not been ashamed of the bystanders, would
probably have got up and struck him. For he thought that
he had been robbed of a great possession when it became
obvious to him that he had been wrong in his former opinion
about wealth. I observed his vexation, and feared that they
would proceed to abuse and quarrelling: so I said,—I heard
that very argument used in the Lyceum yesterday by a wise
man, Prodicus of Ceos; but the audience thought that he
was talking mere nonsense, and no one could be persuaded
that he was speaking the truth. And when at last a certain
talkative young gentleman came in, and, taking his seat,
began to laugh and jeer at Prodicus, tormenting him and
demanding an explanation of his argument, he gained the ear
of the audience far more than Prodicus.
Can you repeat the discourse to us? said Erasistratus.
_Soc._ If I can only remember it, I will. The youth began
by asking Prodicus, In what way did he think that riches
were a good and in what an evil? Prodicus answered, as
you did just now, that they were a good to good men and to
those who knew in what way they should be employed, while
to the bad and the ignorant they were an evil. The same is
true, he went on to say, of all other things; men make them
to be what they are themselves. The saying of Archilochus
is true:—
‘Men’s thoughts correspond to the things which they meet with.’
Well, then, replied the youth, if any one makes me wise in 398
that wisdom whereby good men become wise, he must also
make everything else good to me. Not that he concerns
himself at all with these other things, but he has converted
my ignorance into wisdom. If, for example, a person teach
me grammar or music, he will at the same time teach me all
that relates to grammar or music, and so when he makes me
good, he makes things good to me.
[Sidenote: _Prodicus corrected._]
Prodicus did not altogether agree: still he consented to
what was said.
And do you think, said the youth, that doing good things
is like building a house,—the work of human agency; or do
things remain what they were at first, good or bad, for all
time?
Prodicus began to suspect, I fancy, the direction which the
argument was likely to take, and did not wish to be put down
by a mere stripling before all those present:—(if they two
had been alone, he would not have minded):—so he
answered, cleverly enough: I think that doing good things
is a work of human agency.
And is virtue in your opinion, Prodicus, innate or acquired
by instruction?
The latter, said Prodicus.
Then you would consider him a simpleton who supposed
that he could obtain by praying to the Gods the knowledge
of grammar or music or any other art, which he must either
learn from another or find out for himself?
Prodicus agreed to this also.
And when you pray to the Gods that you may do well and
receive good, you mean by your prayer nothing else than
that you desire to become good and wise:—if, at least,
things are good to the good and wise and evil to the evil.
But in that case, if virtue is acquired by instruction, it would
appear that you only pray to be taught what you do not
know.
Hereupon I said to Prodicus that it was no misfortune to
him if he had been proved to be in error in supposing that
the Gods immediately granted to us whatever we asked:—if,
I added, whenever you go up to the Acropolis you earnestly
entreat the Gods to grant you good things, although you
know not whether they can yield your request, it is as though
you went to the doors of the grammarian and begged him,
although you had never made a study of the art, to give you
a knowledge of grammar which would enable you forthwith
to do the business of a grammarian.
[Sidenote: _What constitutes wealth?_]
[Sidenote: Prodicus is desired to leave the gymnasium because he is
disturbing the minds of youth.]
While I was speaking, Prodicus was preparing to retaliate
upon his youthful assailant, intending to employ the argument 399
of which you have just made use; for he was annoyed
to have it supposed that he offered a vain prayer to the Gods.
But the master of the gymnasium came to him and begged
him to leave because he was teaching the youths doctrines
which were unsuited to them, and therefore bad for them.
I have told you this because I want you to understand
how men are circumstanced in regard to philosophy. Had
Prodicus been present and said what you have said, the
audience would have thought him raving, and he would
have been ejected from the gymnasium. But you have
argued so excellently well that you have not only persuaded
your hearers, but have brought your opponent to an agreement.
For just as in the law courts, if two witnesses testify
to the same fact, one of whom seems to be an honest fellow
and the other a rogue, the testimony of the rogue often has
the contrary effect on the judges’ minds to what he intended,
while the same evidence if given by the honest man at once
strikes them as perfectly true. And probably the audience
have something of the same feeling about yourself and Prodicus;
they think him a Sophist and a braggart, and regard
you as a gentleman of courtesy and worth. For they do not
pay attention to the argument so much as to the character of
the speaker.
[Sidenote: Socrates jesting professes to be in earnest.]
But truly, Socrates, said Erasistratus, though you may be
joking, Critias does seem to me to be saying something
which is of weight.
_Soc._ I am in profound earnest, I assure you. But why,
as you have begun your argument so prettily, do you not go
on with the rest? There is still something lacking, now
you have agreed that [wealth] is a good to some and an evil
to others. It remains to enquire what constitutes wealth;
for unless you know this, you cannot possibly come to an
understanding as to whether it is a good or an evil. I am
ready to assist you in the enquiry to the utmost of my power:
but first let him who affirms that riches are a good, tell us
what, in his opinion, is wealth.
_Eras._ Indeed, Socrates, I have no notion about wealth
beyond that which men commonly have. I suppose that
wealth is a quantity of money[78]; and this, I imagine, would
also be Critias’ definition.
[Sidenote: _Different kinds of money._]
[Sidenote: What is money? It is observed that different kinds of money
pass current in different countries,—Carthage, Lacedaemon, Ethiopia,
Scythia.]
_Soc._ Then now we have to consider, What is money? Or
else later on we shall be found to differ about the question.
For instance, the Carthaginians use money of this sort.
Something which is about the size of a stater is tied up in a 400
small piece of leather: what it is, no one knows but the makers.
A seal is next set upon the leather, which then passes into
circulation, and he who has the largest number of such
pieces is esteemed the richest and best off. And yet if any one
among us had a mass of such coins he would be no wealthier
than if he had so many pebbles from the mountain. At
Lacedaemon, again, they use iron by weight which has been
rendered useless: and he who has the greatest mass of such
iron is thought to be the richest, although elsewhere it has
no value. In Ethiopia engraved stones are employed, of
which a Lacedaemonian could make no use. Once more,
among the Nomad Scythians a man who owned the house of
Polytion would not be thought richer than one who possessed
Mount Lycabettus among ourselves. And clearly those things
cannot all be regarded as possessions; for in some cases the
possessors would appear none the richer thereby: but, as I
was saying, some one of them is thought in one place to be
money, and the possessors of it are the wealthy, whereas in
some other place it is not money, and the ownership of it
does not confer wealth; just as the standard of morals varies,
and what is honourable to some men is dishonourable to
others. And if we wish to enquire why a house is valuable to
us but not to the Scythians, or why the Carthaginians value
leather which is worthless to us, or the Lacedaemonians find
wealth in iron and we do not, can we not get an answer in
some such way as this: Would an Athenian, who had a
thousand talents weight of the stones which lie about in the
Agora and which we do not employ for any purpose, be
thought to be any the richer?
_Eras._ He certainly would not appear so to me.
_Soc._ But if he possessed a thousand talents weight of some
precious stone, we should say that he was very rich?
_Eras._ Of course.
[Sidenote: _Wealth must be useful._]
_Soc._ The reason is that the one is useless and the other
useful?
_Eras._ Yes.
_Soc._ And in the same way among the Scythians a house
has no value because they have no use for a house, nor
would a Scythian set so much store on the finest house in
the world as on a leather coat, because he could use the
one and not the other. Or again, the Carthaginian coinage
is not wealth in our eyes, for we could not employ it, as we
can silver, to procure what we need, and therefore it is of no
use to us.
_Eras._ True.
[Sidenote: Wealth is useful, but other things are useful besides wealth.]
_Soc._ What is useful to us, then, is wealth, and what is
useless to us is not wealth?
But how do you mean, Socrates? said Eryxias, interrupting.
Do we not employ in our intercourse with one another 401
speech and violence (?) and various other things? These
are useful and yet they are not wealth.
_Soc._ Clearly we have not yet answered the question,
What is wealth? That wealth must be useful, to be wealth
at all,—thus much is acknowledged by every one. But what
particular thing is wealth, if not all things? Let us pursue
the argument in another way; and then we may perhaps
find what we are seeking. What is the use of wealth,
and for what purpose has the possession of riches been
invented,—in the sense, I mean, in which drugs have been
discovered for the cure of disease? Perhaps in this way we
may throw some light on the question. It appears to be clear
that whatever constitutes wealth must be useful, and that
wealth is one class of useful things; and now we have to
enquire, What is the use of those useful things which constitute
wealth? For all things probably may be said to be
useful which we use in production, just as all things which
have life are animals, but there is a special kind of animal
which we call ‘man.’ Now if any one were to ask us, What
is that of which, if we were rid, we should not want medicine
and the instruments of medicine, we might reply that this
would be the case if disease were absent from our bodies
and either never came to them at all or went away again as
soon as it appeared; and we may therefore conclude that
medicine is the science which is useful for getting rid of
disease. But if we are further asked, What is that from
which, if we were free, we should have no need of wealth?
can we give an answer? If we have none, suppose that we
restate the question thus:—If a man could live without food
or drink, and yet suffer neither hunger nor thirst, would he
want either money or anything else in order to supply his
needs?
[Sidenote: _Wealth is what is wanted:_]
_Eryx._ He would not.
[Sidenote: If the body had no wants or feelings there would be no need of
money.]
_Soc._ And does not this apply in other cases? If we did
not want for the service of the body the things of which we
now stand in need, and heat and cold and the other bodily
sensations were unperceived by us, there would be no use in
this so-called wealth, if no one, that is, had any necessity for
those things which now make us wish for wealth in order
that we may satisfy the desires and needs of the body in
respect of our various wants. And therefore if the possession
of wealth is useful in ministering to our bodily wants, and
bodily wants were unknown to us, we should not need
wealth, and possibly there would be no such thing as
wealth.
_Eryx._ Clearly not.
_Soc._ Then our conclusion is, as would appear, that wealth
is what is useful to this end?
Eryxias once, more gave his assent, but the small argument
considerably troubled him.
_Soc._ And what is your opinion about another question:—Would 402
you say that the same thing can be at one time useful
and at another useless for the production of the same result?
_Eryx._ I cannot say more than that if we require the same
thing to produce the same result, then it seems to me to be
useful; if not, not.
_Soc._ Then if without the aid of fire we could make a brazen
statue, we should not want fire for that purpose; and if we
did not want it, it would be useless to us? And the argument
applies equally in other cases.
_Eryx._ Clearly.
_Soc._ And therefore conditions which are not required for
the existence of a thing are not useful for the production of it?
_Eryx._ Of course not.
[Sidenote: _and when ceasing to be wanted ceases to be wealth._]
_Soc._ And if without gold or silver or anything else which
we do not use directly for the body in the way that we do
food and drink and bedding and houses,—if without these we
could satisfy the wants of the body, they would be of no use
to us for that purpose?
_Eryx._ They would not.
_Soc._ They would no longer be regarded as wealth, because
they are useless, whereas that would be wealth which enabled
us to obtain what was useful to us?
_Eryx._ O Socrates, you will never be able to persuade me
that gold and silver and similar things are not wealth. But
I am very strongly of opinion that things which are useless
to us are not wealth, and that the money which is useful for
this purpose is of the greatest use; not that these things
are not useful towards life, if by them we can procure
wealth.
[Sidenote: The arts too are wealth, for by them the needs of life are
satisfied.]
_Soc._ And how would you answer another question? There
are persons, are there not, who teach music and grammar
and other arts for pay, and thus procure those things of
which they stand in need?
_Eryx._ There are.
_Soc._ And these men by the arts which they profess, and in
exchange for them, obtain the necessities of life just as we do
by means of gold and silver?
_Eryx._ True.
_Soc._ Then if they procure by this means what they want
for the purposes of life, that art will be useful towards life?
For do we not say that silver is useful because it enables us
to supply our bodily needs?
_Eryx._ We do.
_Soc._ Then if these arts are reckoned among things useful,
the arts are wealth for the same reason as gold and silver are,
for, clearly, the possession of them gives wealth. Yet a little
while ago we found it difficult to accept the argument which
proved that the wisest are the wealthiest. But now there 403
seems no escape from this conclusion. Suppose that we
are asked, ‘Is a horse useful to everybody?’ will not our
reply be, ‘No, but only to those who know how to use a
horse?’
_Eryx._ Certainly.
[Sidenote: _Wealth is wealth when we know how to use it._]
_Soc._ And so, too, physic is not useful to every one, but
only to him who knows how to use it?
_Eryx._ True.
_Soc._ And the same is the case with everything else?
_Eryx._ Yes.
_Soc._ Then gold and silver and all the other elements
which are supposed to make up wealth are only useful to the
person who knows how to use them?
_Eryx._ Exactly.
_Soc._ And were we not saving before that it was the business
of a good man and a gentleman to know where and how
anything should be used?
_Eryx._ Yes.
[Sidenote: The good only know how to use things.]
_Soc._ The good and gentle, therefore, will alone have profit
from these things, supposing at least that they know how to
use them. But if so, to them only will they seem to be
wealth. It appears, however, that where a person is ignorant
of riding, and has horses which are useless to him, if some
one teaches him that art, he makes him also richer, for what
was before useless has now become useful to him, and in
giving him knowledge he has also conferred riches upon
him.
_Eryx._ That is the case.
_Soc._ Yet I dare be sworn that Critias will not be moved a
whit by the argument.
_Crit._ No, by heaven. I should be a madman if I were. But
why do you not finish the argument which proves that gold
and silver and other things which seem to be wealth are not
real wealth? For I have been exceedingly delighted to hear
the discourses which you have just been holding.
_Soc._ My argument, Critias (I said), appears to have given
you the same kind of pleasure which you might have derived
from some rhapsode’s recitation of Homer; for you do not
believe a word of what has been said. But come now, give
me an answer to this question. Are not certain things useful
to the builder when he is building a house?
_Crit._ They are.
[Sidenote: _The elements of wealth are infinite._]
_Soc._ And would you say that those things are useful which
are employed in house building,—stones and bricks and
beams and the like, and also the instruments with which the
builder built the house, the beams and stones which they
provided, and again the instruments by which these were
obtained?
_Crit._ It seems to me that they are all useful for building.
_Soc._ And is it not true of every art, that not only the
materials but the instruments by which we procure them and
without which the work could not go on, are useful for
that art?
_Crit._ Certainly.
_Soc._ And further, the instruments by which the instruments
are procured, and so on, going back from stage to stage _ad 404
infinitum_,—are not all these, in your opinion, necessary in
order to carry out the work?
_Crit._ We may fairly suppose such to be the case.
[Sidenote: A sophism. Gold and silver would be useless if they were not
needed to obtain food: and things cannot be at one time useless, at
another time useful, in the same actions.]
_Soc._ And if a man has food and drink and clothes and the
other things which are useful to the body, would he need
gold or silver or any other means by which he could procure
that which he now has?
_Crit._ I do not think so.
_Soc._ Then you consider that a man never wants any of
these things for the use of the body?
_Crit._ Certainly not.
_Soc._ And if they appear useless to this end, ought they not
always to appear useless? For we have already laid down
the principle that things cannot be at one time useful and
another time not, in the same process.
_Crit._ But in that respect your argument and mine are the
same. For you maintain if they are useful to a certain end,
they can never become useless; whereas I say that in order
to accomplish some results bad things are needed, and good
for others.
_Soc._ But can a bad thing be used to carry out a good
purpose?
_Crit._ I should say not.
_Soc._ And we call those actions good which a man does for
the sake of virtue?
_Crit._ Yes.
_Soc._ But can a man learn any kind of knowledge which is
imparted by word of mouth if he is wholly deprived of
the sense of hearing?
[Sidenote: _Good ends may be attained by bad means._]
_Crit._ Certainly not, I think.
_Soc._ And will not hearing be useful for virtue, if virtue is
taught by hearing and we use the sense of hearing in giving
instruction?
_Crit._ Yes.
[Sidenote: There are indirect means towards ends.]
_Soc._ And since medicine frees the sick man from his
disease, that art too may sometimes appear useful in the
acquisition of virtue, e. g. when hearing is procured by the
aid of medicine.
_Crit._ Very likely.
_Soc._ But if, again, we obtain by wealth the aid of medicine,
shall we not regard wealth as useful for virtue?
_Crit._ True.
_Soc._ And also the instruments by which wealth is procured?
_Crit._ Certainly.
[Sidenote: Wealth may be gained discreditably, but spent in the
acquisition of virtue.]
_Soc._ Then you think that a man may gain wealth by bad
and disgraceful means, and, having obtained the aid of medicine
which enables him to acquire the power of hearing, may
use that very faculty for the acquisition of virtue?
_Crit._ Yes, I do.
_Soc._ But can that which is evil be useful for virtue?
_Crit._ No.
_Soc._ It is not therefore necessary that the means by which
we obtain what is useful for a certain object should always be
useful for the same object: for it seems that bad actions may
sometimes serve good purposes? The matter will be still 405
plainer if we look at it in this way:—If things are useful
towards the several ends for which they exist, which ends
would not come into existence without them, how would you
regard them? Can ignorance, for instance, be useful for
knowledge, or disease for health, or vice for virtue?
_Crit._ Never.
_Soc._ And yet we have already agreed—have we not?—that
there can be no knowledge where there has not previously
been ignorance, nor health where there has not been disease,
nor virtue where there has not been vice?
_Crit._ I think that we have.
[Sidenote: Difference between causes and antecedents.]
_Soc._ But then it would seem that the antecedents without
which a thing cannot exist are not necessarily useful to it.
[Sidenote: _Is he who needs most or who needs least the happier?_]
Otherwise ignorance would appear useful for knowledge,
disease for health, and vice for virtue.
Critias still showed great reluctance to accept any argument
which went to prove that all these things were useless.
I saw that it was as difficult to persuade him as (according to
the proverb) it is to boil a stone, so I said: Let us bid
‘good-bye’ to the discussion, since we cannot agree whether
these things are useful and a part of wealth or not. But
what shall we say to another question: Which is the
happier and better man,—he who requires the greatest quantity
of necessaries for body and diet, or he who requires only
the fewest and least? The answer will perhaps become more
obvious if we suppose some one, comparing the man himself
at different times, to consider whether his condition is better
when he is sick or when he is well?
_Crit._ That is not a question which needs much consideration.
[Sidenote: Health is a better condition than disease; and it needs less.]
_Soc._ Probably, I said, every one can understand that
health is a better condition than disease. But when have we
the greatest and the most various needs, when we are sick or
when we are well?
_Crit._ When we are sick.
_Soc._ And when we are in the worst state we have the
greatest and most especial need and desire of bodily
pleasures?
_Crit._ True.
[Sidenote: So he is best off who has fewest desires.]
_Soc._ And seeing that a man is best off when he is least in
need of such things, does not the same reasoning apply to
the case of any two persons, of whom one has many and
great wants and desires, and the other few and moderate?
For instance, some men are gamblers, some drunkards, and
some gluttons: and gambling and the love of drink and
greediness are all desires?
_Crit._ Certainly.
_Soc._ But desires are only the lack of something: and
those who have the greatest desires are in a worse condition
than those who have none or very slight ones?
_Crit._ Certainly I consider that those who have such 406
wants are bad, and that the greater their wants the worse
they are.
_Soc._ And do we think it possible that a thing should be
useful for a purpose unless we have need of it for that
purpose?
[Sidenote: _The richest are those who are most in want._]
_Crit._ No.
_Soc._ Then if these things are useful for supplying the
needs of the body, we must want them for that purpose?
_Crit._ That is my opinion.
_Soc._ And he to whom the greatest number of things are
useful for his purpose, will also want the greatest number of
means of accomplishing it, supposing that we necessarily feel
the want of all useful things?
_Crit._ It seems so.
_Soc._ The argument proves then that he who has great
riches has likewise need of many things for the supply of the
wants of the body; for wealth appears useful towards that
end. And the richest must be in the worst condition, since
they seem to be most in want of such things.