‘Never would a bad son have sprung from a good sire, for 96
he would have heard the voice of instruction; but not by
teaching will you ever make a bad man into a good one.’
And this, as you may remark, is a contradiction of the other.
_Men._ Clearly.
[Sidenote: How can they be teachers who are so inconsistent with
themselves?]
_Soc._ And is there anything else of which the professors are
affirmed not only not to be teachers of others, but to be ignorant
themselves, and bad at the knowledge of that which they
are professing to teach? or is there anything about which even
the acknowledged ‘gentlemen’ are sometimes saying that
‘this thing can be taught,’ and sometimes the opposite? Can
you say that they are teachers in any true sense whose ideas
are in such confusion?
_Men._ I should say, certainly not.
_Soc._ But if neither the Sophists nor the gentlemen are
teachers, clearly there can be no other teachers?
_Men._ No.
_Soc._ And if there are no teachers, neither are there disciples?
_Men._ Agreed.
[Sidenote: _Knowledge and Opinion._]
_Soc._ And we have admitted that a thing cannot be taught of
which there are neither teachers nor disciples?
_Men._ We have.
[Sidenote: If there are no teachers and no scholars, virtue cannot be
taught.]
_Soc._ And there are no teachers of virtue to be found anywhere?
_Men._ There are not.
_Soc._ And if there are no teachers, neither are there scholars?
_Men._ That, I think, is true.
_Soc._ Then virtue cannot be taught?
_Men._ Not if we are right in our view. But I cannot believe,
Socrates, that there are no good men: And if there are, how
did they come into existence?
[Sidenote: But were we not mistaken in our view? There may be another
guide to good action as well as knowledge.]
_Soc._ I am afraid, Meno, that you and I are not good for
much, and that Gorgias has been as poor an educator of you
as Prodicus has been of me. Certainly we shall have to
look to ourselves, and try to find some one who will help
in some way or other to improve us. This I say, because
I observe that in the previous discussion none of us remarked
that right and good action is possible to man under other
guidance than that of knowledge (ἐπιστήμη);—and indeed if
this be denied, there is no seeing how there can be any good
men at all.
_Men._ How do you mean, Socrates?
_Soc._ I mean that good men are necessarily useful or
profitable. Were we not right in admitting this? It must 97
be so.
_Men._ Yes.
_Soc._ And in supposing that they will be useful only if they
are true guides to us of action—there we were also right?
_Men._ Yes.
_Soc._ But when we said that a man cannot be a good guide
unless he have knowledge (φρόνησις), in this we were wrong.
_Men._ What do you mean by the word ‘right’?
_Soc._ I will explain. If a man knew the way to Larisa, or
anywhere else, and went to the place and led others thither,
would he not be a right and good guide?
_Men._ Certainly.
_Soc._ And a person who had a right opinion about the way,
but had never been and did not know, might be a good guide
also, might he not?
_Men._ Certainly.
_Soc._ And while he has true opinion about that which the
other knows, he will be just as good a guide if he thinks the
truth, as he who knows the truth?
_Men._ Exactly.
[Sidenote: _The images of Daedalus._]
[Sidenote: Right opinion is as good a guide to action as knowledge.]
_Soc._ Then true opinion is as good a guide to correct action
as knowledge; and that was the point which we omitted in
our speculation about the nature of virtue, when we said that
knowledge only is the guide of right action; whereas there is
also right opinion.
_Men._ True.
_Soc._ Then right opinion is not less useful than knowledge?
_Men._ The difference, Socrates, is only that he who has
knowledge will always be right; but he who has right
opinion will sometimes be right, and sometimes not.
_Soc._ What do you mean? Can he be wrong who has
right opinion, so long as he has right opinion?
_Men._ I admit the cogency of your argument, and therefore,
Socrates, I wonder that knowledge should be preferred to
right opinion—or why they should ever differ.
_Soc._ And shall I explain this wonder to you?
_Men._ Do tell me.
_Soc._ You would not wonder if you had ever observed the
images of Daedalus[12]; but perhaps you have not got them in
your country?
_Men._ What have they to do with the question?
_Soc._ Because they require to be fastened in order to keep
them, and if they are not fastened they will play truant and
run away.
_Men._ Well, what of that?
[Sidenote: _Recapitulation of the argument._]
[Sidenote: But right opinions are apt to walk away, like the images of
Daedalus.]
_Soc._ I mean to say that they are not very valuable possessions
if they are at liberty, for they will walk off like
runaway slaves; but when fastened, they are of great value,
for they are really beautiful works of art. Now this is an
illustration of the nature of true opinions: while they abide 98
with us they are beautiful and fruitful, but they run away out
of the human soul, and do not remain long, and therefore
they are not of much value until they are fastened by the
tie of the cause; and this fastening of them, friend Meno,
is recollection, as you and I have agreed to call it. But
when they are bound, in the first place, they have the
nature of knowledge; and, in the second place, they are
abiding. And this is why knowledge is more honourable
and excellent than true opinion, because fastened by a chain.
_Men._ What you are saying, Socrates, seems to be very
like the truth.
_Soc._ I too speak rather in ignorance; I only conjecture.
And yet that knowledge differs from true opinion is no
matter of conjecture with me. There are not many things
which I profess to know, but this is most certainly one
of them.
_Men._ Yes, Socrates; and you are quite right in saying so.
_Soc._ And am I not also right in saying that true opinion
leading the way perfects action quite as well as knowledge?
_Men._ There again, Socrates, I think that you are right.
_Soc._ Then right opinion is not a whit inferior to knowledge,
or less useful in action; nor is the man who has right opinion
inferior to him who has knowledge?
_Men._ True.
_Soc._ And surely the good man has been acknowledged by
us to be useful?
_Men._ Yes.
_Soc._ Seeing then that men become good and useful to
states, not only because they have knowledge, but because
they have right opinion, and that neither knowledge nor
right opinion is given to man by nature or acquired by
him—(do you imagine either of them to be given by nature?
_Men._ Not I.)
_Soc._ Then if they are not given by nature, neither are the
good by nature good?
_Men._ Certainly not.
_Soc._ And nature being excluded, then came the question
whether virtue is acquired by teaching?
_Men._ Yes.
_Soc._ If virtue was wisdom [or knowledge], then, as we
thought, it was taught?
_Men._ Yes.
_Soc._ And if it was taught it was wisdom?
_Men._ Certainly.
[Sidenote: _Diviners and divine men._]
_Soc._ And if there were teachers, it might be taught; and
if there were no teachers, not?
_Men._ True.
_Soc._ But surely we acknowledged that there were no
teachers of virtue?
_Men._ Yes.
_Soc._ Then we acknowledged that it was not taught, and
was not wisdom?
_Men._ Certainly.
_Soc._ And yet we admitted that it was a good? 99
_Men._ Yes.
_Soc._ And the right guide is useful and good?
_Men._ Certainly.
[Sidenote: If virtue and knowledge cannot be taught, the only right
guides of men are true opinions.]
_Soc._ And the only right guides are knowledge and true
opinion—these are the guides of man; for things which
happen by chance are not under the guidance of man: but
the guides of man are true opinion and knowledge.
_Men._ I think so too.
_Soc._ But if virtue is not taught, neither is virtue knowledge.
_Men._ Clearly not.
_Soc._ Then of two good and useful things, one, which is
knowledge, has been set aside, and cannot be supposed to
be our guide in political life.
_Men._ I think not.
_Soc._ And therefore not by any wisdom, and not because
they were wise, did Themistocles and those others of whom
Anytus spoke govern states. This was the reason why they
were unable to make others like themselves—because their
virtue was not grounded on knowledge.
_Men._ That is probably true, Socrates.
[Sidenote: Right opinion is in politics what divination is in religion;
diviners, prophets, poets, statesmen, may all be truly called ‘divine
men.’]
_Soc._ But if not by knowledge, the only alternative which
remains is that statesmen must have guided states by right
opinion, which is in politics what divination is in religion;
for diviners and also prophets say many things truly, but
they know not what they say.
_Men._ So I believe.
_Soc._ And may we not, Meno, truly call those men ‘divine’
who, having no understanding, yet succeed in many a grand
deed and word?
_Men._ Certainly.
[Sidenote: _The conclusion._]
_Soc._ Then we shall also be right in calling divine those
whom we were just now speaking of as diviners and prophets,
including the whole tribe of poets. Yes, and statesmen
above all may be said to be divine and illumined, being
inspired and possessed of God, in which condition they say
many grand things, not knowing what they say.
_Men._ Yes.
_Soc._ And the women too, Meno, call good men divine—do
they not? and the Spartans, when they praise a good
man, say ‘that he is a divine man.’
_Men._ And I think, Socrates, that they are right; although
very likely our friend Anytus may take offence at the word.
_Soc._ I do not care; as for Anytus, there will be another
opportunity of talking with him. To sum up our enquiry—the
result seems to be, if we are at all right in our view, that
virtue is neither natural nor acquired, but an instinct given
by God to the virtuous. Nor is the instinct accompanied 100
by reason, unless there may be supposed to be among statesmen
some one who is capable of educating statesmen. And
if there be such an one, he may be said to be among the
living what Homer says that Tiresias was among the dead,
‘he alone has understanding; but the rest are flitting shades;’
and he and his virtue in like manner will be a reality among
shadows.
_Men._ That is excellent, Socrates.
[Sidenote: Virtue comes by the gift of God.]
_Soc._ Then, Meno, the conclusion is that virtue comes to
the virtuous by the gift of God. But we shall never know
the certain truth until, before asking how virtue is given,
we enquire into the actual nature of virtue. I fear that
I must go away, but do you, now that you are persuaded
yourself, persuade our friend Anytus. And do not let him be
so exasperated; if you can conciliate him, you will have done
good service to the Athenian people.