Is public opinion responsible for my mistakes? Am I less good, less

just, less loyal because unshackled by imitation, lack of originality,

and affectation? Why, then, should I deprive myself of honest happiness

for fear opinion should turn against me?

Why should I bow to circumstances which I have not created? Why, once

more, should I not be myself?

The desire for general approbation is a sign of weakness, a defect of

the mind and conscience. It is allowing someone else to know your duty

better than yourself and force upon you preconceived notions, neutral,

limited ideas of action and thought.

Woe betide those who fall under such influence. They resign themselves

to an existence of mental wretchedness, painfully dragging out their

days in hesitation and spiritual cowardice, never able to realise that

public opinion has no moral worth, but, though varying according to

country, conditions, and training, is nevertheless intolerant, mean, and

arbitrary everywhere.

The careless judgments given by public opinion always assume too much,

and are not the result of harmony between conduct and principle on the

part of those who form them. We should show ourselves fearlessly for

what we are, speak our own language with sincerity, express our thought

directly to-day, to-morrow, the day after to-morrow. Even if we

contradict ourselves on certain points, that is but a proof of our

readiness to be better, more just. To be true to oneself is the great

secret of personality, and prevents all fear of our neighbour.

A matured, steadfast spirit, a sound brain given to meditation, a

conscience sharpened by training, constitute a character which can

afford to despise public opinion, and command an entrance for itself to

all the paths of life.

This state of individualism does not imply systematic opposition to the

customs of the day. It is not hostile to society, but it enables one to

shake off the yoke of public opinion, and assert with sweetness his

personality.

PREJUDICES

Prejudices, or preconceived opinions adopted at random, subsist

indefinitely. Like creeds, they are a malady of weak minds which

unquestioningly accept relative moral laws, formulas which the reason

cannot admit, and errors which live and propagate faster than truths.

Those are persons without judgment or discernment who profess to do as

all the world does, because they have not the force to form an

independent opinion, undergo the discipline of thought, examine their

own actions, and confess the absurdity of their own weaknesses.

It is not to be denied that minds trained by mental gymnastics have

little to say to prejudices. Their judgment being independent, they

require perfect freedom of action, and they cannot permit a host of

trifling considerations to hinder them in their way of living and

thinking.

Prejudices--a form of mental aberration--are a standard by which the

least intelligent claim to estimate the capacities of others. And those

prejudices which proceed from stupid customs, absurd fears, silly

superstitions, have led to the most annoying assertions.

It is a matter of general belief, for instance, that the number 13 is

unlucky, that the song of a black bird is a sign of death, that three

lights bring misfortune; and the belief is not less general that persons

of high birth are inevitably lacking in great intelligence. It has been

decided once for all that they are unfit for intellectual work, and

capable only of being pleasant company, as superficial as useless. If

these persons take up any intellectual pursuit, be it the publishing of

books, or devoting themselves to art, they are misjudged, there is an

outcry at the unreality, the gross impossibility; for it has been

decided that high birth should be a patent of incapacity.

Prejudice thus destroys beforehand the proof of intelligence and

tarnishes reputation. At the same time, in the form of conventional,

generally-received opinions, it overawes timid spirits.

It is in frivolous society that prejudices are most ineradicable. They

creep into conversation, obtrude themselves in all their bareness and

ugliness into the midst of chatter and compliments.

Even if some strong personality appears, and disposes of some prejudice,

it shoots up again directly the disturber is gone. Born of folly and

fear, prejudices are parasitic plants whose roots are in the brain, and

which are transmitted, like an heirloom of ignorance, from one century

to another.

Prejudices, so numerous in these days, fall foul of everything: art,

science, law, the liberty of the individual, conscience, truth.

Is it not regarded as a fact, in certain circles, that the Jew is

incapable of fine intelligence? Now, for the last twenty-five years

dramatic art has given the lie flatly to such an assertion. Has not the

man of science, in spite of every proof of his capacity, been attacked

by prejudiced people who see in him an insulter of the Divinity?

Is not the education of the people regarded in many cases as a danger to

society? Is not the creation of new laws, designed for ensuring the

rights of all, considered monstrous? Now that human consciousness has

developed, now that the will is being trained to righteousness, now that

personal responsibility has entered our life conditions, and moral

education has become rational, it is really strange to see people who

claim intelligence, and who pass for well informed, accept the absurd

prejudices in vogue.

Women, it must be said, are for the most part hostile to progress.

Through heredity, through habit, they take up prejudices with a fervour

that deludes their superficial minds. Two pernicious elements, jealousy

and envy, conduce to this. Prejudiced men are no less dangerous, for,

being incapable of thinking for themselves, and not willing to think

through others, they are unable to correct their own errors.

My conclusion is that all slaves of prejudice should be compelled to

live together, separated from the living and thinking world, until the

day comes when, being no longer satisfied with themselves, they will

begin to be endurable to others.

JUDGMENT

Judgment is the faculty of discrimination in ideas, of establishing a

connection between the state of our conscience and reality. But as

conscience varies according to the nature of social situations, it does

not seem possible to apply a fixed rule to judgment, though it always

requires affirmation. Whatever be the degree of judgment one possesses,

one cannot exercise it in the case of others without first applying the

precept, “Know thyself”--an ancient utterance which has lost a little in

value since it has been handed down, without sincerity, from generation

to generation. This precept is, nevertheless, held in honour by the

finer spirits, for it is obvious that the appeal to our conscience

should be placed above all others. Without this, as Nicati says, “the

man who forgets to examine himself, and whose personality is effaced

thereby, counts for less than the inert matter whose very resistance

constitutes personality.”

He who lives according to his conscience, and after his own moral laws,

may be satisfied. When he comes to judge himself, he knows that his life

has been passed in the observance of his own personal principles.

We must, then, seek in ourselves a standard of judgment, remembering the

beautiful words of Thomas à Kempis: “Turn thine eyes unto thyself, and

beware thou judge not the deeds of other men. In judging of others, a

man laboureth in vain, often erreth, and easily sinneth; but in judging

and discussing of himself, he always laboureth fruitfully.”

Nevertheless, in self-judgment, it is right to apply severely to

ourselves the rules of reason and virtue so far as our own nature

permits. It is to be noted that witty people, or those with a good

memory, are not the most capable of clear and profound judgment.

Assimilation is prejudicial to reflection; memory is not thought.

When our own ideas are clear to us, we shall not judge others without

due study of their reasons for what they do, the motives by which they

have been governed, the circumstances which may have influenced their

estimate of good and evil. Thus our attitude will be more kindly, and

we shall avoid all the evils springing from injustice and false

judgment.

Our own conscience is not always in the ascendant. We often yield to

weakness, and it is only just that our knowledge of the limitations of

the human will should move us to indulgence towards our fellow-men.

Such indulgence consists in recognising our own weaknesses, and in not

condemning others for what we consider their errors.

The first condition for judging clearly and soundly is the constant

attention to our mental life, acknowledging to ourselves our own changes

of mood, ceaselessly fighting the enemy within us.

From the altruistic point of view, we should picture to ourselves the

person to be judged in the circumstances which have prompted his

action--difficult though it be to perceive the differences between

characters and shades of feeling--according to the numberless cases in

which such action takes place. This is the reason why historians, in the

act of composition, so often pass false judgments on the past. In their

desire to make the characters live again, to call up vanished scenes,

they become partisans, loving or hating those whom they have never

known. Purely in deference to their own opinion, they fail in tolerance

and indulgence. They do not estimate the worth of men of past days

according to the moral tone of the epoch in which they lived; they judge

of a society as a whole in the light of isolated documents, so that the

men of vanished ages cut but a poor figure in their eyes to-day.

Now, the truth is that men are no greater now than in the other ages of

the world. Removed from our own time by twenty-two centuries, the heroes

of Plutarch remain as noble as our heroes of to-day; and in the domain

of science, religion, and philosophy we have but changed names without

changing at all in judgment and logic, without modifying the conditions

of happiness or the outward signs of courage, and without developing the

human “_I_.”

THE FEAR OF RIDICULE

The fear of ridicule is a terrible and powerful weapon in the eyes of

many people. Cleverly handled by those who are slaves to custom and

fashion, this fear of ridicule often prevents our obeying our true

feelings, and leads us to act against our own interests.

Many persons whose social position is uncertain, or whose moral force is

but little developed, have their days embittered by the thought of “what

people will say.”

If these persons could only comprehend that nothing which is _simple_

and _sincere_ can be ridiculous, if vanity and amour-propre would permit

them to understand that criticism is inevitable, that it increases

self-confidence in well-balanced people, and in many cases helps us

towards the end we wish to attain, they would not only cease to fear the

observation of others, but no longer wish to suppress the personality of

a neighbour.

They would say with Emerson: “That which I ought to do concerns my

personality, and not what people think I ought to do.”

They would remember these words of La Bruyère’s: “‘We must do as others

do’ is a suspicious maxim, signifying nearly always ‘We must do wrong’

as soon as it extends beyond the purely outward things which result in

nothing, and which depend upon custom, fashion, and manners.”

A modern thinker, under the veil of anonymity, remarks wittily: “If one

wishes to be in good society, even with those who are not of it, need

one give up being oneself? Good society, pushed to this excess, is only

folly and trickery. What on earth have you done with your amour-propre

on these occasions? Dare to say what you think, if you _do_ think.” I

add to this: Dare to do what seems to you good, useful, and sensible;

flee preconceived opinions, do not let yourself be influenced by the

ideas of others, keep your independence in the face of new suggestions,

convince yourself of your own value, call your perceptions into play,

suppress your self-love--in a word, get rid of the fear of ridicule,

which, carried to excess by people, has spoilt fine careers, ruined the

noblest hopes; destroyed for one his dawning happiness, for another

possible fortune. Why this mean respect for _what is done_, and absurd

fear of _what is not done_? Why this foolish imitation, this holding

back of your real self? Why don’t you eat and drink what you like? Why

spoil your behaviour in public by hypocrisy? Where is the sense of this

perpetual dressing up of things which ties you down to convention not in

keeping with the real impulses of your heart and mind?

There is so much fear of ridicule in the world that one may see a man

miss an interview which might be morally or materially useful to him

because he is afraid to appear unfashionably dressed, because he has not

the latest hat, or the shoes which snobbism has decreed the correct

thing.

Women, in whom the fear of ridicule is so strong, so intimately linked

with the taste of the moment, will willingly risk their health rather

than go down in the estimation of others.

If, for example, fashion decrees thin summer clothing, a woman will

brave bronchitis and the after-effects to wear it; and she acts in a

similar spirit with regard to winter fashions, because it is not the

right thing to think with one’s own mind, feel with one’s own heart, or

live according to one’s own means, nerves, or senses!

This passive life by rule is a curious thing, and Montaigne was

right--for folly belongs to all periods--in thus speaking of it for his

own epoch: “In some sort all the opinions we have are taken on

authority, or on credit, ... Everyone is richer than he thinks, but we

go about borrowing and seeking; it suits us better to make use of others

than of ourselves.... We neither essay nor know our own faculties; we

invest in those of others, and let our own lie idle....”

Yes, truly, the fear of ridicule is one of the worst shortcomings of

education, for it destroys character, leads all our impulses towards

folly, and often incites to irreparable wrong.

How many marriages which might have been happy are prevented because of

difference in fortune, age, or birth! The fear of ridicule brings a

disintegrating element even into the quest after happiness, which is a

law of Nature.

It is the same with the fear of ridicule as with morality; everyone

should base his individual action on some good to be gained, get rid of

all constraint--in a word, be himself without depending on custom and

outward circumstances; preserving the balance between his conscience,

trained by experience and reason, and his personal faculties.

MORAL COURAGE

Moral courage is that energy of character which leads us to confess and

uphold what we think and believe. This quality, one of the rarest in

man, is nevertheless indispensable to whomsoever uses his faculties in

any public capacity, whether he be a statesman, a soldier, an artist, or

a writer; that is to say, everyone who has to take responsibility,

making nothing of opinion or criticism.

I have often heard it said that moral courage corresponds to physical

development. That is true, provided that the physical development be

attended by good health. We often see men insignificant in appearance

gifted with moral courage which athletes lack. It is because, in spite

of their physical slightness, these men possess health so robust as to

save them from mental weakness and give them perfect balance.

But there is something besides. Although there is still much to learn

about character, it is certain that we can cultivate the moral courage

which springs from instinct and temperament by the choice of our own

ideas and actions.

Never has the need of character-forming made itself felt so much as in

our days. Character is becoming rare because intellects are in disorder.

Dilettantism kills reason, æstheticism strays without direction through

the mind, ready-made opinions take the place of thought, and the caprice

of the moment serves for moral or material interests and weakens the

will.

The sign of the individual, the dominant feature of his personality, is

character, and character gives birth to moral courage. Dr. Ferrand says:

“Character assumes considerable importance in the life of the individual

and in the life of all the natural or social groups which individuals

form amongst themselves; it is, accordingly to Smiles, one of the

greatest motive powers in the world. By the unity of direction which he

impresses upon all his actions, the man of character is not only master

of himself, though that is much, but he bears naturally upon the

activity of others, and

[Illustration: THE INFANTA EULALIA AND HER TWO SONS

_Photograph by Boissonnas & Taponier, Paris._]

draws them after him, as a mighty ship draws into its track all the

craft it encounters in its course.”

There is yet another consideration. By the side of the intellectual

element, by which we estimate our thoughts and actions, there is

feeling; that is, the sensibility which modifies the judgment and

enlightens the deep thought determining our responsibility. He who obeys

feeling, when the latter is not subject to the control of thought,

commits many errors of judgment and lets himself be guided by moods

which may lead him into injustice and breach of trust. Let us not forget

that justice is truth applied to the things of life. Now, it is

precisely the absence of this idea of justice in the modern

consciousness which brings us daily face to face with a sort of failure

in moral courage, both as regards attack and defence.

Politics during the last few years have furnished us with sad examples

of this weakness; letters and the arts have also given us instances, and

they are very regrettable from every point of view.

Literary and musical criticism is to be noted particularly for many

lapses; science itself is not exempt from dealings which reason

disapproves, and it is not even to lack of education that this

shortcoming is due. And we find this lack of moral courage in

communities which have blindly turned liberty to a revolting slavery.

Consider parliaments, study castes, look closely at groups of

individuals served by opinion, and you will see that real characters

worthy to inspire the good, the beautiful, and the true are overwhelmed

in the host occupied in ruining the popular conscience.

Individual moral courage is what makes the greatness of a people. This

form of courage tends to disappear more and more, because everyone is

losing the idea of his own responsibility, and, inspired by selfishness,

troubles himself not at all to make justice and virtue respected.

How few men we see use their authority to repair an error, punish a lie

or any villainy whatsoever! Weakness, hesitation, doubt, lack of

initiative, indifference, have taken the place of moral courage, and

that through the lack of character-training. As Emerson says: “No change

of circumstances can repair a fault of character.... What have I gained

... if I quake at opinion, the public opinion, as we call it; or at the

threat of assault, or contumely, or bad neighbours, or poverty, or

mutilation, or at the rumour of revolution, or of murder? If I quake,

what matters it what I quake at?”

Each of us, then, should in his own sphere of action become conscious of

what is right, and not hesitate to struggle, even to the detriment of

his private interests, against all false judgment attacking honour,

every opinion concealing baseness, every action which is an insult to

reason and to the liberty of the individual.

TRADITIONS

Tradition is a link of the present with the past, the transmitting of

legendary memories from century to century--memories based on real

facts, exaggerated or deformed by the popular mind in quest of the

ideal.

Traditions of pagan or religious essence are multiform. In most cases

they denote blind reverence, unconscious veneration for creeds turned

into customs; they are a sign of the passivity of the human mind, whose

chief weakness is superstition.

Whether as regards action or thought, tradition appeals to the special

organisation of certain temperaments of a primitive order, or which are

purely dogmatic.

The desire to maintain tradition implies uncontrolled deference to

custom together with the need for moral or sectarian order, and for this

reason it is detrimental to the gradual change of thought on which

progress depends.

In all ages of the world, since the period when oral narration was

handed down from generation to generation, traditions have been accepted

as truths. Now, that which was truth at the exact moment when a certain

thing occurred is no longer truth after a long lapse of time, because of

changes with regard to the original fact and the false interpretations

put upon it by the crowd.

Locke says with much truth: “A man worthy of belief bringing testimony

of a thing known to him affords a good proof; but if another man equally

worthy of credence testifies on the report of that man, his witness is

weaker; while that of a third who attests a hearsay is still less to be

considered; so that in truths that come by tradition each degree of

remoteness from the original source weakens the force of the proof; and

in proportion as a tradition passes successively through more hands, it

has ever less force and evidence.”

This is the reason that traditions, from whatsoever source they come,

constitute false propositions all the more dangerous because to many

they appear incontestable. After Christianity was established, tradition

had all the value of an idealism capable of inspiring individual

action; under different aspects it induced respect for great moral

acts, linked up more closely familiar ties (the festival of

Christmas--Noël or Yule--is a case in point), it cemented friendships,

gave value to the idea of good rewarded and evil punished, created an

atmosphere of justice and fear, inward joy and hope.

But with time, as the sense of personality developed and social friction

became more frequent, it came about that traditions were divided into

different camps, some being simply a consolation for the afflicted,

others becoming authoritative in the hands of priests and judges.

Centuries passed, changing names and beliefs, modifying desires and

interests; then tradition weakened and altered in character and

significance.

Even in our own day, however, many ancient traditions are rigorously

observed both in town and country. Still, as the social movement has

become more accentuated, more conscious, they have so weakened that they

are more like a list of festival days in the calendar than anything

else. In spite of castes which, by holding together, still maintained

tradition, the evolution of the masses gradually brought about, through

force of circumstances, the destruction of such as was useless. This is

good because, I repeat, tradition is hostile to progress in that it

makes error in the guise of custom predominate over science and

altruistic duty.

The weakening of pagan or religious traditions is very noticeable

to-day. For instance, the observance of the anniversaries of the dead is

falling into desuetude. One scarcely sees, except in the Latin countries

where civilisation is backward, the relatives in deep black coming at a

fixed date to mourn their dead from midnight to midnight. This

traditional custom, besides, has lost so much of its ancient solemnity

that the mourners do not hesitate to dance and feast directly the time

of forced grief is over. This anomaly is frequent in Spain nowadays. As

soon as the “accessories” of the tradition disappear, the tradition

itself will vanish in its turn.

Go through the villages and you will note the disappearance of numbers

of customs to which the inhabitants were slaves not long ago. Where,

to-day, are the processions in the open fields, the patronal festivals,

the inquiries at fountains, all the traces of ancient beliefs? Where, as

in Rome in times past, is the lachrymatory, in which, on days of

funerals, everyone collected his tears?

The thread of life · 第 4 / 6 段