Female Honour.—Agreement among Women.—Penalty of Exclusion.—Law of
Honour.—False Dignity.—New Penalty.—Compact against
Duelling.—Ruffians and Calumniators.—Association against
Duelling.—Court of Honour.—Abolition of Duelling.
“That public opinion, if rightly directed, is capable,” continued Mr.
Adamson, “of completely affecting the desired object without the duel,
even better than with it, which is what we of the present day are so
happy as to know by experience, these reformers anticipated partly from
the enforcement among ladies of the laws of female honour before that
absurd ordeal had been instituted. Women moving in circles of good
society had kept up its character, it was observed, at least as well
before the ordeal came into use, and quite as well as men of a
corresponding class maintained the laws of masculine honour; and this
was effected simply by a tacit agreement among women of character not to
associate with any woman who was known to have violated these rules.
‘If, therefore,’ said they, ‘ladies will return to this system, and
gentlemen will adopt a corresponding one, the rules of good society,
whatever they may be that it thinks fit to impose, will be enforced by
the simple expedient of denouncing exclusion against the violators of
them, absolutely, and without offering the alternative of a duel.’
“It was remarked, indeed, by some of you,” said Mr. Adamson, “that in
Europe the ladies, and also some other classes of persons who are
exempted from the liability to a duel, are apt to avail themselves of
this exemption by a less scrupulous adherence to truth and to courtesy
of language, or by throwing such aspersions on their neighbours as would
involve in personal danger those not so privileged; and such instances
of falsehood, insolence, and calumny were attributed by some of you to
the absence of the salutary check of the duel.
“As to the precise state of the fact, indeed, you appeared not to be
quite agreed: but admitting the most unfavourable representation to be
true, you may perceive, even from what comes under your own experience,
without resorting to ours, that the inference drawn is not correct; for
it appears by your own account that the English women, of the higher
classes at least, though all kinds of duel are unknown among them, yet
keep up the character of their society in respect of female purity. And,
as this is effected through the direct influence of public opinion,—by
simply enforcing the penalty of exclusion on any female of blemished
reputation,—it is evident that if in respect of veracity, integrity, or
any other point, they fall short of what is required of gentlemen, this
must arise from the standard of _honour_ being different in the two
sexes. I collect that among you the character of ‘an honest woman’ does
not coincide with that of ‘an honest man,’—and that even the word
‘virtue’ has a somewhat different signification in reference to women
and to men. It cannot be therefore that public opinion is insufficient
to enforce the laws of honour without the intervention of duels, since
modest women do succeed in maintaining the purity of the society in
which they move; but the laws of honour are themselves not the same
among ladies and among gentlemen. The fact is, few persons, either men
or women, will venture to incur infamy; and _that_ is the penalty
_which_ society may denounce against the violation of its rules, be
those rules what they may. Let society determine what shall be the point
of honour for each sex, or class of persons, or for all, and denounce
the penalty of exclusion against such as violate its rules; and that
those rules will be generally observed, without the intervention of
duelling, is proved by the very circumstance that women enforce their
own law of honour as successfully as men do theirs!
“By acting on these principles,” continued Mr. Adamson, “you would have
the additional advantage of imposing a restraint on those females, and
others, who, you complain, are disposed to take advantage of their
exemption from danger of a challenge by indulging in defamatory or
insolent language, &c.; for, as I just now observed, conduct of this
kind is regarded among you with somewhat the less of unmixed disgust and
contempt, from the very circumstance that among laymen of a certain
station it may lead to a duel. It is considered as in some degree a mark
of ‘spirit.’ The courage which braves death, even when disapproved as a
brutal kind of courage, yet shelters its possessor from the last extreme
of ignominy. Now, though the degree of false dignity with which insolent
behaviour is thus invested _ought_ certainly to be at least confined to
those who actually do run a risk in displaying it,—though women and
clergymen, for instance, since they run no risk, and consequently
display no courage by such behaviour as would expose a layman to
personal danger, should properly be considered base as well as
unmannerly when they are guilty of it,—yet this distinction is one which
we cannot expect will be carefully kept in view and uniformly observed.
A kind of association of ideas is created in people’s minds between what
is called ‘spirited behaviour,’ ‘strong language,’ &c. and ‘manly
boldness;’ and this association continues to affect their judgment even
in cases where no boldness is really displayed, because no danger is
encountered. Thus, such conduct, in a woman for instance, or in a
clergyman, as would otherwise incur unmixed contempt, is likely to be,
if not altogether honoured or approved, at least in some degree
tolerated.
“But let the system be changed, and the tone of manners in _all_ classes
would be raised. When duels are unheard of, such offences as are now
regarded with a mitigated disapprobation on account of the personal
intrepidity which they are supposed sometimes to imply in the offenders,
would become the subject of unmixed disgust; the only danger braved
being that of the disesteem of reputable people. And _this_ kind of
penalty extending to _all_ classes and both sexes alike, (at least among
the gentry,) would of course tend to restrain all of them alike within
the rules of honour and politeness. There may be some reason why, among
you, a woman should not be called out to _fight_; but there could be
none, why she should not incur, as well as a gentleman, the penalty,
when that was the _sole_ penalty for both sexes alike, of _exclusion_
from good society if she transgressed its rules: a penalty which in fact
actually _is_ enforced, with unrelenting strictness, for a violation of
the rules of what is now accounted feminine honour.
“Such nearly,” continued Mr. Adamson, “was the train of argument, as far
as applicable to the then-existing condition of society among us, which
was strenuously urged, and assiduously circulated by the association
against duels which I have alluded to. The novelty of the arguments
contributed, along with their intrinsic force, and the high character of
those who urged them, to excite a general and serious attention; and the
judicious course pursued by the authors of the undertaking secured them
ultimate success. The members of the association bound themselves, by a
solemn compact with each other, never to give or accept a challenge to
any kind of duel, whether by the ordeal, or by single combat; never to
behave in such a manner as might otherwise have afforded occasion for a
duel; and not to countenance or receive into their society any one who
should violate either of the above rules. In cases of personal assault,
they were at liberty to defend themselves by force on the spot; but not
to seek any subsequent satisfaction, except by an appeal to the laws,
and by agreeing to shun the society of the offender as of a ruffian.
They were to defend themselves against slander by _living it down_—by
giving the false accuser the lie in their conduct; but they were to seek
no other redress (unless they thought fit to bring a legal action for
defamation) than by excluding calumniators from their society.
“And the same in respect of rude and insolent language: into _their_
society, no daring ruffian, however expert in snuffing a candle with a
bullet, could, as formerly, _fight_ his way, by inducing those who
really thought him no fit company for gentlemen, by a tacit appeal to
their personal fears to admit him as an associate; each inwardly wishing
all the while that one of the others would undertake the perilous task
of tying the bell round his neck. Every such person, and every one in
any way of exceptionable character, was under the ban of hopeless
exclusion. It was useless to challenge the excluders, since they had
proclaimed that they would not fight. From personal violence they
appealed to the law: insolent vituperation was unavailing; since being
directed against men who had abjured duels, it was understood to imply
no personal risk, and consequently to give no proof of courage. From
well-founded accusations, their blameless life and decorous behaviour
secured them; unfounded charges only proclaimed the authors of them to
be themselves liars.
“Very early in the history of this association, a question arose among
its members, on the decision of which, probably, their final success
turned. It was at first designed that they should continue formally to
enrol as members as many unexceptionable persons as could be induced to
join their society. Some of their number, however, objected that this
would be likely to impede their progress in the reformation they were
aiming at. A jealousy, they said, would be likely to arise in the minds
of some persons against the pretensions, real or supposed, of an
association of which they were not themselves the founders or leaders.
They would therefore be apt perversely to refuse joining it, as
disdaining to follow in the wake of others; and would then set about
justifying their conduct by exciting suspicion and organizing
opposition, as against a party combining to set up themselves as
arbiters of good manners,—guides to the rest of the world,—a
self-constituted tribunal, &c.
“These representations prevailed; and a resolution was adopted, and
publicly announced, (accompanied with a frank statement of the reasons
for it,) not to admit formally from thenceforth any more persons as
members, except such as might have been actually engaged in a duel, and
were desirous of thus solemnly and publicly proclaiming their
renunciation of a practice to which they had thus once lent their
countenance. But all other persons of respectable character, it was
declared, should be thenceforth regarded as virtually members of the
association, without any formal admission or engagement, so long as they
should continue in practice to comply with the fundamental rules of the
society, by abstaining from duels, and from everything calculated to
provoke a challenge, and by shunning the company of those who acted
otherwise. If any should in practice violate these regulations, or
should openly proclaim his determination not to adhere to them, then,
and then only, he was to be regarded as excluded from the number of the
associates.
“In all cases of dispute arising between one gentleman or lady and
another, the cause was to be referred to the decision, not of any
self-appointed tribunal, nor of any formally-elected court of honour
(either of which might have furnished occasion for jealousy), but of a
committee of the neighbours meeting for the purpose, with the
stipulation only that they should be persons received in good society
and adverse to duelling. Of such persons, each of the parties chooses
(for the custom was adopted, and still exists among us,) one or two of
his acquaintance,—each of whom again names two or three others as
assessors,—and the judges thus nominated privately hear and try the
cause, calling in, in case of much difficulty or disagreement, the
assistance of others. It is seldom that the parties do not readily
acquiesce in the decision; and the public in general are, as you may
suppose, fully prepared to think that this must be at least more likely
to approach to a right judgment than a pistol-ball or a blast of
choke-damp.
“In this way it was that the custom of duels gradually, and not very
slowly, went out of fashion among us. It has been wholly extinct for
more than a century; for my father, who, as I mentioned just now,
remembered as a boy the final prevalence of this reform, was born nearly
one hundred and thirty years ago.
“If the same reform,” he added, “is not effected by the gentry of
Europe, when they have only to _will_ that it should be so, their claims
to a high degree of civilization and refinement (to say nothing of
humanity or morality) can hardly be admitted. For example, as it is, any
one who offers an affront to another, and on being challenged refuses to
fight, is excluded from the pale of good society; unless it be a woman—a
clergyman—a quaker—a person bound over to keep the peace, under the
penalty of forfeiting a sum of money—(a curious exemption this!)—or
belonging to some other description of privileged persons. All you have
to do is to resolve that the _offering_ of the affront shall place any
person under the same ban as he is now placed under for refusing, after
being challenged for the affront, to fight. Lay down this rule; and let
there be _no exemptions_ on the ground of sex, profession, or any other
plea whatever, and the object is accomplished.”