VENTER'S SPRUIT.
'Now no chastening for the present seemeth to be joyous, but
grievous.'--_Heb._ xii. 11.
The greater part of December 16th was spent in burying the dead. At
nightfall orders were received to strike camp, and the brigade marched
back to Frere, which was reached in the early morning of the 17th,
when we occupied our former camping-ground.
Another weary wait followed. Frere at the best of times is an
uninteresting spot, but it became absolutely repulsive as the grass
disappeared and mud and flies reigned supreme. Life in the camp was
monotonous, only slightly preferable to the long tours of outpost
duty, and a bathe in the river, varied by a walk round the lines,
formed the only amusement.
General Hart did not relax any of his precautions, and his command
still stood to arms every morning. The rest of the army assembled at
Frere seemed, so far as could be seen, to rely on the 5th Brigade, for
no other unit followed the latter's example.
Our listlessness was broken on January 6th, when the thunder of the
guns around Ladysmith was so distinct that it seemed as if Chieveley
must be attacked. Everybody soon learned that the Boers were making a
desperate attempt to capture the town, and there was naturally some
anxiety as to the result.
A few days afterwards, signs of another forward movement became
apparent. One cheerful omen was the arrival of the doctors, whose duty
it was to convey the wounded back to the base, and of a large body of
civilian stretcher-bearers. General Warren's Division, fresh from
England, marched in, and the second effort to relieve Ladysmith was
begun.
The 5th Brigade left Frere at daybreak on January 11th, and, covered
by the 'Royals,' took the Springfield road. It had been raining
heavily, and the road, never good, soon became execrable. The column
was followed by a long line of waggons carrying baggage, supplies,
ammunition, pontoons, &c. On arriving at Pretorius' Farm, the brigade
halted and pitched camp. The battalion found the outposts, which were
especially ordered to protect themselves by building 'sangars' or
digging trenches.
Meanwhile the apparently endless line of waggons had been blocked by a
bad drift below the camp, and the brigade was called upon to help. The
road was somewhat improved by throwing into the soft mud stones
obtained from a wall, and many waggons had to be hauled by ropes
through the spruit. For over forty-eight hours did that collection of
vehicles continue to cross and require help.
On Thursday, January 12th, the 4th Brigade and General Warren's
Division passed through the camp and went straight on to Springfield,
since the cavalry had ascertained that there were no Boers south of
the Tugela in that direction. The 5th Brigade followed on the
afternoon of the 15th, crossing the Little Tugela by a foot
trestle-bridge made of spars cut by the Engineers from trees on the
bank. As the battalion approached Springfield, the sound of
artillery-fire greeted it, and our shrapnel could be seen bursting
against a hill which was evidently on the left bank of the Tugela. It
was clear that the army was again in touch with the enemy, but nobody
knew what Sir Redvers Buller had decided upon, although everybody, of
course, dogmatised on what he ought to do.
On the afternoon of the 16th, orders were issued for the brigade to
march that night, although nothing was stated regarding its
destination. Vigorous operations were plainly intended, since the
force was to move as lightly as possible. No tents or blankets were
allowed, and the great-coats were carried by the regimental transport,
in which officers were permitted to pack twenty pounds of baggage. Six
days' rations were also taken.
The army moved from Springfield at dusk, leaving the camp standing in
charge of a few details (cooks, &c.), who had strict orders to light
fires and walk about, so that the vigilant burgher might not discover
that the army had slipped away. The general direction of the march was
north-west. It was a bright moonlight night, but the column moved
slowly, for the numerous waggons took up the centre of the road, while
the troops moved on the side. About midnight it began to rain, which
made everybody cold and uncomfortable, especially as halts were long
and frequent. It was not easy to see where the army was going,
although the Tugela could not be far off. Nobody knew the plan of
operations, which, however, evidently aimed at a surprise crossing of
the river, and it seemed as if the enemy must hear the noise of the
creaking transport and tramping men.
About 2 a.m. there came a halt on the top of a ridge, where General
Hart formed up his brigade. Each regiment deployed into line, and then
lay down one behind the other in the following order: Royal
Inniskilling Fusiliers, Connaught Rangers, Royal Dublin Fusiliers, and
Border Regiment. Fatigued by a long night-march, every one soon fell
asleep. Unfortunately, however, the slumbers of the brigade were
disturbed by an incident which shows how easily confusion can arise in
night operations. A horse from somewhere in front broke loose and
galloped over the veld, straight into the ranks of the sleeping
regiments. For a moment everything was in confusion, and a general
panic nearly took place. Luckily the first glimmer of dawn had come,
and the company officers soon regained control of their men, but it
might have been a different tale had darkness still prevailed.
When daylight came, it showed the army to be on the top of a hill
overlooking Trichardt's Drift. On the other side of the river the
ground rose to a long ridge flanked on the east by a steep mountain,
and on the west by a bastion-like hill. Nobody then knew the country,
but that mountain was Spion Kop, and the ridge lying so calmly in the
morning light was to be the scene of six days' continuous fighting. At
dawn of January 17th, however, the ridge, which the natives called
Tabanyama, seemed deserted, and not a Boer was to be seen.
It was now learnt that Sir Redvers Buller had divided his forces,
sending two brigades, under General Lyttelton, to Potgieter's Drift,
while the remainder of the army, under General Warren, was assembled
ready to cross the river at Trichardt's Drift.
The battalion breakfasted quietly, and then 'H' company was sent down
to the drift in order to help in the construction of a bridge. As the
company descended the steep slope, the artillery from the heights
began to shell a farm on the far side of the river, whence a Boer
patrol had been sniping. The Engineers had massed the pontoon waggons
round a farm by the drift, and were looking for a suitable point for
the bridge. The pontoons were launched, and by 11.30 a.m. the first
bridge was ready. The infantry immediately began to cross, but the
artillery and transport had to wait for a second bridge, which was not
completed until after dark.
The 5th Brigade marched down to the river at 2 p.m. and crossed. On
reaching the left bank the battalion deployed into line, with four or
five paces between the men, and slowly moved up the slope in support
of the widely-extended lines of the Lancashire Brigade. Except for an
occasional shot from the artillery at Potgieter's Drift, everything
was still and peaceful; although, as the army moved away from the
river, most of the officers expected to be greeted by the familiar
'pick-pock' of the enemy's mausers.
The brigade in front eventually halted on the top of a minor ridge,
some three thousand yards or more from the crest-line of Tabanyama,
and separated from it by open and gently-sloping ground. The Dublin
Fusiliers formed quarter-column immediately behind the Lancashire
Brigade, and prepared to bivouac. Many of the officers strolled higher
up in order to look at the country through their glasses. The main
crest-line was evidently occupied, for men could be seen busily
digging. It was somewhat trying to think that precious time was being
wasted, while the burghers were preparing a defensive position.
Our transport was still on the other side of the Tugela, and
consequently we had to do without blankets, great-coats, and kettles.
The officers' mess was saved by a subaltern, who succeeded in
procuring a Kaffir cooking-pot and some very tough fowls, which
Captain Hensley boiled with great skill. The night was unpleasant, for
khaki drill is but an inefficient protection against the cold and
heavy dew. The experience proved too much for Major Butterworth,
R.A.M.C., who had to go on the sick list soon afterwards. He had been
with the battalion since Ladysmith, and his coolness and devotion at
the battle of Colenso had made him popular with all ranks.
The next day, January 18th, was spent in idleness, and the different
corps remained in their bivouacs. There was nothing to do except watch
the Boers still digging on the crest-line, and the shells fired by the
guns of General Lyttelton, who was apparently making a reconnaissance.
The greater part of General Warren's artillery crossed to the left
bank and took up a position close to the battalion.
On the 19th the regiment took part in the movement which was
initiated with the evident purpose of turning the Boer right by the
Acton Holmes road. Leaving the artillery and the Lancashire Brigade on
the ridge, the remainder of the army descended into the plain, and
moved up the left bank of the Tugela. The column marched along the
base of the main ridge, and was carefully watched by the Boer patrols
from Bastion Hill.
After fording Venter's Spruit the battalion halted about 2 p.m. on
some rising ground, whence a good view of the surrounding country was
obtained. As there seemed every prospect of a long halt, the men began
to take off their boots and putties, in order to dry them, but they
had to put them on again hurriedly enough, since the guns suddenly
opened fire. At first everybody imagined that the Boers were attacking
the artillery and Lancashire Brigade. Soon, however, it was seen that
the latter were making a reconnaissance. Not much opportunity for
looking at the spectacle was afforded, since we received an order to
recross Venter's Spruit and bivouac. The movement by Acton Holmes had
been given up for some reason which was unknown, and it was not
difficult to see that the alternative was a frontal attack on the
position which everybody had watched being fortified.
The battalion halted close to Venter's Spruit, and had a piquet ('H'
company) on the Trichardt's Drift road. The transport succeeded in
reaching the brigade that night, and the men were thus able to have
their great-coats. Not much sleep was, however, allowed. At a very
early hour, long before daylight, on the 20th, the brigade was
aroused. Great-coats were again packed on the waggons, and then,
without breakfast or any opportunity of issuing rations, the battalion
fell in and marched off. Owing to darkness and the rough track by
which the column marched, progress was at first very slow. When the
feeble light of early dawn enabled the country to be seen, the
regiment was crossing a spruit near Fairview Farm, lying at the foot
of the ridge. It then ascended a small valley leading to Three Tree
Hill, where the Field Artillery had concentrated.
The latter soon afterwards opened the battle, and fired on the Boer
trenches, which stood out more prominently than usual on the crest of
the ridge. The enemy's artillery did not reply, although a vigorous
rifle-fire was directed on the skirmishers of the Lancashire Brigade.
The Connaught Rangers had been temporarily detached on escort duty,
and General Hart now moved his three remaining battalions to the left
in line of quarter-columns. It was a hot day, and the men, who had
eaten nothing that morning, suffered some discomfort from such a close
formation. The ground, too, was broken and covered with long grass and
scrub, so that it was no easy matter to satisfy the General's
injunctions in the matter of 'dressing.' The brigade moved in full
view of the enemy, and so compact a body of men must have been a great
temptation to the Boer gunners, who, however, were either not ready or
exercised much self-restraint. After scrambling through a remarkably
steep valley, the brigade halted in a gentle depression, where it was
safe from the random bullets that were falling near. A long pause
ensued, and the men were able to obtain some much-needed water.
It was past noon before the infantry, in this part of the field,
advanced in earnest. Then the York and Lancaster Regiment and
Lancashire Fusiliers were sent forward as the firing-line against the
centre of the Boer position, and were supported by the Borders and 2nd
Royal Dublin Fusiliers. The formation adopted by General Hart for the
support was two lines. The first line, which was two deep, consisted
of the right half-battalions of the two regiments, the Borders being
on the right, and was followed at a distance of about two hundred
yards by a similar line, composed of the left half-battalions.
On emerging from the depression where it had been resting, the support
came under rifle-fire. The range must, however, have been a long one,
and the casualties were few. The attack was moving astride of a spur
which ran from the Boer position to the Tugela, a little distance to
the west of Three Tree Hill. At first this spur was broad, forming
almost a plateau, but further on it narrowed, and consequently the
left of the two lines advanced up a narrow valley, which afforded
excellent cover.
Led by General Hart, the brigade advanced at a steady pace and, after
a time, closed up on the firing-line. It then halted, and from a
slight elevation opened fire in order to support the Lancashire
Regiments, who, having taken the enemy's advanced position, found that
some thousand yards of very open and almost-level ground lay between
them and the Boer trenches, which lined the northern edge of the
summit of the ridge. The attack could now only advance slowly, since
it was exposed to a cross-fire from both flanks. Hitherto it had only
faced rifle-fire, but about 1.45 p.m. the Boer guns, posted somewhere
near Spion Kop, came into action. They were able to rake the whole
assaulting line, and, in fact, many officers thought at first that the
shells were 'short' ones from our own artillery. The Boers on this
occasion managed to burst their shrapnel with some accuracy, and it
was fortunate that the attack could find good cover.
This artillery and the increased rifle-fire on the right flank caused
the line to swing round in that direction, but any further advance was
suspended by superior orders soon after 4.30 p.m. The Borders, who had
pushed ahead, were ordered back, and the other regiments took cover
among the rocks, and maintained a vigorous fire. The rattle of
musketry gradually died away as the light failed, until after
nightfall the battalion assembled behind a wall and bivouacked.
By great efforts the regimental transport had succeeded in getting
touch with the battalion, which was thus able to obtain rations. But
it was not until 8 p.m. that the men could get anything to eat.
Thus ended the fight of January 20th. It had cost the regiment one of
its most efficient officers, Captain Hensley, who was mortally
wounded.[4] Major English had been hit in the leg--he was back within
a fortnight--and of the rank and file four were killed and twenty
wounded--among the former being Lance-Sergeant Taylor, a most
excellent N.C.O. Although the opposing forces were so close, the night
passed quietly. With daylight (January 21st), however, the rifle-fire
at once broke out. The battalion had just managed to have a scratch
meal when orders were received to move to the support of the 2nd
Brigade, which was away to the left. General Hart ordered Colonel
Cooper to move by the straightest line, first down a ravine across a
spruit, and then over a hill. While climbing the latter, the battalion
was in full view of the enemy, who at once opened fire with guns and
rifles. Each company extended in succession, and doubled, so far as
possible, over the exposed ground. Once over the hill a region of
comparative safety was reached, and General Hart finally formed up his
command behind a rocky ridge overlooking the position held by the 2nd
Brigade. The latter were having a rifle duel with the Boer trenches
but did not advance. The 5th Brigade played a very passive part, and
spent the day behind the rocks. Bullets continually whistled overhead,
and the hostile artillery near Spion Kop burst an occasional shrapnel
along the position. Otherwise there was no excitement.
[Footnote 4: Poor Hensley was not only one of the most
popular officers in the regiment, but also one of the best
and bravest. All his life he had been devoted to field
sports, and his fame as a plucky big-game hunter and skilful
shot was well known in many a Central Indian village and
Cashmere valley. Educated at the Canadian Military College,
he was a master of his profession, while the long months
spent in Indian jungles had turned him into a handy man
indeed. Wonderful and varied were the uses to which he could
put an empty paraffin-tin or biscuit-box, and excellent were
the stews he could produce out of a mess-tin. On one occasion
in India a wounded panther was mauling one of his beaters.
His rifle was empty, but without a moment's hesitation he
dashed in, and drove the animal away by beating it over the
head. Alas! poor Hensley, we could spare him ill, but, after
all, we know he died the death he would have chosen.]
Towards evening, the regiment received orders to move some few hundred
yards to the right, and bivouac. Colonel Cooper directed the companies
to close in succession, and march from the rocks to the new position.
This movement almost escaped the notice of the Boer artillery, and it
was not until the last company ('H') moved that two shells were fired.
They fell to the right and in front of the leading fours, and did no
damage. The battalion assembled in a narrow amphitheatre just below
the southern crest, and at the head of a valley leading to Fairview
Farm. Although the bivouac could not be seen by the enemy, except from
Spion Kop, it was not altogether sheltered from fire, for every now
and then a bullet would clear the crest-line and strike the ground
below.
In this amphitheatre we perforce remained for three days, having a far
from pleasant time. From sunrise to sunset the rattle of musketry
practically never ceased, only at intervals the hum of the passing
bullets was drowned by the clang of bursting shrapnel. The Boer guns,
posted both directly in front and on the right flank, burst their
shells just over the crest, and fired intermittently all day. There
were four battalions crowded in the amphitheatre, and each one
occupied in turn the crest, whence an uninterrupted fire was directed
on the Boer trenches opposite. The enemy's marksmen had the range of
this crest-line, and it was a dangerous matter to stand up even for a
minute. Stone sangars were built and the companies relieved each other
by the men crawling up the slope. The enemy's artillery near Spion Kop
could rake the line of sangars, thus necessitating numerous
traverses. When not in the firing line, we lay behind the slope in
column, each company being protected by a parapet of earth or stone.
Immediately below the amphitheatre the ground fell steeply, forming a
ravine in which the cooks set up their field kitchens in comparative
security. It was characteristic of the British soldier that whereas
during the greater part of the day he crouched behind his cover, the
sight of a fatigue party with the kettles made him forget the shells
and bullets, and he dashed off for his food regardless of danger.
On Tuesday night (January 22nd) the proposed assault on Spion Kop was
announced, and every one hoped that a general advance would be the
result.
The morning of January 23rd dawned with a thick white mist, which hid
everything from view. It was our turn to occupy the ridge, and the
companies lay there for nearly an hour before the usual exchange of
rifle-fire began. No news of the capture of Spion Kop had reached the
amphitheatre, but the fact could be guessed from the absence of the
Boer guns in that direction. Only the artillery in front of the
battalion's position fired in the morning, and even that ceased during
the afternoon. The enemy was evidently concentrating the greater part
of his forces against Spion Kop, and parties of mounted burghers could
be seen moving from their extreme right. On Spion Kop hung the white
clouds of bursting shrapnel, and the stuttering sound of the pompom
scarcely ceased for a moment, but the 5th Brigade made no advance. The
companies behind the sangars fired hundreds of rounds at the Boer
trenches, while their comrades below ate and slept.
At dawn of the 25th, glasses and telescopes were turned on to the
summit of the mountain, and it was a bitter blow when the moving
figures there were seen to be Boers. It was not until late in the
forenoon, however, that the evacuation of Spion Kop was officially
communicated. But the renewal of the Boer artillery fire against the
crest-line had been a sufficiently eloquent announcement of the fact.
As there seemed no reason why the regiment should remain in the
amphitheatre when it was not required to man the sangars, Colonel
Cooper obtained permission that afternoon to move down the valley
below Bastion Hill. The new bivouac was more sheltered, although an
occasional Boer shell still fell near.
It was now evident that the second attempt to relieve Ladysmith had
failed, and that the army would have to recross the Tugela. On the
afternoon of the 25th, fatigue parties were sent by the battalion to
improve the track leading to Fairview Farm, and it was rumoured that
the retreat would take place that night. At 10.30 p.m. 'H' company was
sent to the farm, with orders to hold it during the retirement. But
the army did not move until Friday night, January 26th. At 10 p.m. on
that date, General Hart's command began to descend the valley in heavy
rain, which rendered the track extremely greasy.
Only a short distance had been covered when there was an outburst of
rifle-fire from the rearguard, which was still holding the sangars.
For a moment it seemed as if the Boers had anticipated the retreat and
were attacking. The battalion halted, but the firing soon ceased, and
the march was continued, the men stumbling down the track as quickly
as the many boulders would permit. At Fairview Farm the column halted
for a considerable period, in order to let the rearguard close up. By
this time every one was wet to the skin, and the enforced rest was
somewhat trying, owing to the cold.
However, after a wait of about an hour, the retirement was resumed.
The track was marked by orderlies and tins, but even with this help it
was difficult to find the way in the utter darkness. The surface of
the road, too, had become so slippery that falls were frequent.
Altogether, progress was painfully slow and the march a very
fatiguing one. It was past 4 a.m., January 27th, before the pontoon
bridge at Trichardt's Drift was reached. The column had another
prolonged wait here, and so tired were the men that many of them
dropped to the ground and slept in the mud. Early dawn had come when
the brigade recrossed the Tugela and toiled up the steep slope on the
other side. A Boer gun sent a parting shell just as the column reached
the summit.
It was a great relief to look back towards Tabanyama, where the
discarded biscuit tins were gleaming in the morning light, and say
good-bye to that long line of sangars and trenches. The men's spirits
were, moreover, cheered up by the sight of the 'Scotch' cart with the
kettles and rations. Breakfasts were cooked, and after a short rest
the brigade moved to the camping-ground selected for it. But it
arrived only to find that the position was within view and artillery
range of Spion Kop. So once more it had to trudge over the veld,
General Hart moving it in line of quarter-columns, and being as
particular about the 'dressing' as if he were on Laffan's Plain. His
command hardly appreciated this smartness at the time. But all were
finally rewarded by the arrival of the transport with tents and
baggage, and every one spent the night in comparative luxury.