ESTCOURT AND FRERE.
'Great men are not always wise: neither do the aged understand
judgment.'--_Job_, xxxii. 9.
The stay at Estcourt (November 3rd to 26th) was a period of great
anxiety and hard work. That there was cause for anxiety may be easily
understood when the state of affairs is remembered. The Army Corps had
not yet arrived from England, nor could any fresh troops be expected
before the 10th. The Boers had invaded Natal, had shut up in Ladysmith
the only British army in the field, and could still afford to send
five or six thousand men against Maritzburg. The Estcourt garrison
alone stood in their way.
There were necessarily many outposts, and tours were long and
frequent. Thunderstorms, Natal thunderstorms, visited the town with
painful regularity, and rendered piquet work even more uncomfortable
than usual. It was a period of strained waiting, when every one
wondered whether a Boer commando or a British brigade would be the
first arrival. Reliable news was scarce, though rumours of every kind
were rife.
The battalion was encamped in the market square, while the officers
inhabited a small room encumbered with planks. Trenches covered the
town to the north and north-east, and were pushed forward some two
miles on the Weenen road. The citadel, so to speak, was the sugar-loaf
hill, on which Lieutenant James, R.N., constructed, towards the middle
of the month, emplacements for his two naval twelve-pounders. These
guns arrived on November 14th, a welcome addition to the garrison,
which had been strengthened on the 13th by the West Yorkshire
Regiment. These reinforcements came at an opportune moment, for the
Boers had at last moved forward and on November 14th their patrols
were close to Estcourt. Their approach caused a certain amount of
alarm, and at first the evacuation of the town was proposed. The camp
was even struck, and a great part of the baggage was put on to trains
which were kept ready in the station. Later on other counsels
prevailed, and tents were raised again. It had rained most of the day,
and a general wetting was the chief result of this 'scare.' The Boers
quickly made their presence felt, and the next day inflicted a severe
blow on the garrison.
Our mounted troops had been busily engaged in reconnaissance work, and
in an evil hour it occurred to the authorities that the armoured train
was also an excellent means of gaining news. Captain Hensley had taken
it to Colenso on the 5th and 6th, and on the latter day surprised a
party of Boers engaged in looting the village. The dispatch of the
train, unsupported by any mounted troops, soon became almost a matter
of daily routine. This defiance of common sense could have only one
result. On November 15th, Captain Haldane,[3] of the Gordon
Highlanders, went out in the train with 'A' company and some men of
the Durban Light Infantry. He reached Frere and, learning from a Natal
policeman that the front was clear, pushed on to Chieveley. Here he
saw in the distance a small body of the enemy moving southwards, and,
having telegraphed the information to Estcourt, turned back. But as
the train was running down a steep gradient the Boers suddenly opened
fire with two guns from a ridge to the west of the line. Almost
immediately afterwards the train was derailed by stones placed on the
line, and the leading truck upset, thus stopping the engine.
[Footnote 3: He had been wounded at Elandslaagte, and, being
unable to rejoin his corps in Ladysmith, was attached to the
battalion.]
It was a predicament trying to the nerves of even the bravest. The
Boer shells were well aimed, and came in quick succession. But Captain
Haldane and his men did all that could be done. Lieutenant Frankland
directed from the rear truck a vigorous fire, which kept the enemy at
a respectful distance, and even made them shift their gun. Meanwhile
Mr. Winston Churchill, who had accompanied the expedition as a Press
correspondent, collected some men and set to work to push the derailed
truck off the line. They were exposed to a heavy fire, but eventually
succeeded in their task. The train began to move again; luck did not,
however, favour them, for the coupling between the engine and rear
truck was broken by a shell. Then Captain Haldane ordered the engine
to return to Estcourt with as many wounded men as possible, while he
attempted with the remainder of the force to reach Frere station. The
engine reached Estcourt, but Captain Haldane was not so fortunate. The
men left the trucks and started to run along the line. No sooner did
our rifle-fire cease than the Boers galloped down the hill and, before
Captain Haldane could realise the danger, they were among the men, and
he had no course open but to surrender. The casualties of 'A' company
were three men killed, four or five wounded, and forty-two prisoners.
Private Kavanagh afterwards received the Distinguished Conduct Medal
for his gallantry on this occasion. The sound of the Boer guns could
be distinctly heard at Estcourt, and great anxiety was felt. A little
group of officers assembled in the trenches to the west of the
station, and eagerly scanned the country through their glasses.
Nothing could be seen, and the firing had ceased. Suddenly through the
air rang the shrill whistle of an engine, and at the sound every one
gave a sigh of relief. It was the armoured train, and all was well.
Another whistle, and round a sharp curve steamed the engine--but,
alas! without the trucks. It was evident that a disaster had occurred,
although particulars were not received until late in the afternoon;
while it was weeks later before the list of casualties could be
ascertained. Luckily this mishap occurred when the situation had in
other respects improved. The Army Corps was landing, and troops were
being pushed forward as quickly as possible. On the 16th, Estcourt was
reinforced by the 2nd Queen's and 2nd East Surreys of General
Hildyard's brigade, and General Barton's Fusilier brigade was
assembling at Mooi River.
The Boers were thus too late, and so lost the opportunity of capturing
Maritzburg. Although they doubtless knew of the arrival of fresh
troops, they still advanced, and, moving round Estcourt, appeared on
the hills to the north-west of Mooi River station. A detachment
reconnoitred Estcourt on the 18th, but a couple of shells from
Lieutenant James's naval guns induced them to stay at a distance.
The telegraph line south of the town was interrupted on the 22nd, and
for a brief period the garrison was cut off from the rest of the
world. But the action of Willow Grange, in which the battalion took no
part, caused a retirement of the enemy, who retreated through Weenen
on the 24th.
Their retreat was in no degree molested by our troops; but on November
26th the long-desired advance took place. It was an exhilarating
feeling to leave Estcourt, and lose sight of those hills and trenches,
the scene of so many weary vigils. The army did not, however, make a
big stride forward. The advance was only to Frere, some ten miles
nearer the Tugela.
As the column started at 8 a.m. there seemed every prospect of an easy
day. But on active service it is never safe to assume anything.
Although no opposition was met with, and the mounted troops hardly saw
a Boer, the progress was very slow, and sunset found the rear of the
column still three miles distant from Frere. The battalion had the
ill-luck to be in the rearguard, behind a seemingly interminable line
of transport. Then the inevitable drift intervened, and waggon after
waggon broke down. Finally, part of the transport decided to halt till
the morning, and the unfortunate rearguard was obliged to form a line
of outposts. As the battalion transport was some distance in front,
this meant no blankets, no food, nothing save a limited amount of
Natal water. The men were not allowed to consume the emergency
rations, and therefore had to suffer from cold and hunger. The night
passed somehow, however, and with the break of day we marched into
Frere, to find our waggons and obtain food.
Another monotonous fortnight was spent at Frere, the only excitement
being the arrival of fresh troops and the building of a temporary
railway bridge over the Blaukranz. The arrival of Sir Redvers Buller
and his staff gave hopes of an early advance, and everybody discussed
what our General ought to do, strategical plans becoming as numerous
as sandstorms.
Since leaving Ladysmith, the 2nd Dublin Fusiliers had not been
attached to a brigade, and now that the Army Corps had come there were
not wanting pessimists who foretold that as the battalion was nobody's
child it would be sent to guard the lines of communication. Early in
December, however, it was assigned to General Hart's 5th, or Irish,
Brigade, in place of the 1st Battalion. The latter was ordered to send
three companies, with a total strength of 287 men, to make up for the
wastage of six weeks' operations. These companies, which were
commanded by Major Tempest Hicks, arrived on December 7th, and were
allowed at first to maintain a separate organization, so that the 2nd
Battalion had eleven companies.
[Illustration: Capt. C. F. ROMER (standing) and Capt. E.
FETHERSTONHAUGH.]
The 5th Brigade was encamped close behind the ridge which lies to the
north-west of the railway station. General Hart utilised the fortnight
at Frere in making his battalions accustomed to his methods. Every
day the whole brigade stood to arms an hour before dawn, and advanced
up the slope of the ridge, where it stayed until scouts had reported
the front all clear. The General was also very particular about the
cleanliness of the camp, and made it a rule to go through the lines
every morning.