MOHAMMEDANS, SLAVE-RAIDING, AND DOMESTIC SERVITUDE
It has been truly remarked that more permanent good can be accomplished
“by tact and gold with Mohammedan chiefs in West Africa than by the
Maxim and the rifle.” That is a policy which has had much to do with our
great and striking success in India. Its application to Afghanistan has
within recent years been amply justified by results. Why should it not be
followed in Northern Nigeria? Which is cheaper, an output of £5000 per
annum in subsidies, or the expenditure of much larger sums in military
operations? What is more likely to conduce to the prosperity of a vast
densely populated tropical estate where the white man cannot settle, to
gain your own ends peaceably, albeit not so speedily as might be desired,
or to use force and face the dislocation of the existing social system
which violent measures entail? Few people, if they will but calmly
consider the matter, can fail to endorse the quotation given above. In
Northern Nigeria the question is not merely one of expediency; it affects
the honour of England.
When MacGregor Laird started on his pioneering expedition up the Niger
which laid the foundations of British trade in the Upper River, his
instructions from the Government ran as follows: “It is most desirable to
impress upon the chiefs that you are there as traders, not as colonists,
not as acquirers of land, but simply as traders and for the protection of
trade.” When Lord John Russell despatched Captain Trotter and Commander
William Allen up the Niger in 1840, he recognised the advisability of
subsidising the native chiefs: “he himself (the chief) shall have for
his own share, and without any payment on his part, a sum not exceeding
one-twentieth part value of every article of British merchandise brought
by British ships and sold in his dominions.” When Mr. Joseph Thomson
concluded in 1884, on behalf of the National African Company, a treaty of
amity and friendship with Umoru, Emir of Sokoto, “King of the Mussulmans
of the Sudan,” he undertook on behalf of the Company to pay the Emir 3000
bags of cowries (roughly £1500) per annum. When that treaty was confirmed
with the Emir on behalf of the Royal Niger Company (the designation of
the National African Company when it received its charter) in 1890,
and again with the Emir’s successor in 1894, the payment of the annual
subsidy was confirmed. It was distinctly stipulated in those treaties
that the Royal Niger Company “received” its power from the Queen of Great
Britain and that “they (the Company) are her Majesty’s representatives
to me.” In the eyes of the Emir, therefore, the Company was just as much
“Great Britain” as a consular representative, or a High Commissioner.
In exchange for this annual subsidy, the Emir of Sokoto transferred “to
the above people (the Company) _or other with whom they may arrange_,
my entire rights to the country on both sides of the River Benue and
rivers flowing into it throughout my dominions for such distance from its
and their banks as they may desire.” The Emir also bound himself not to
“recognise any other white nation, because the Company are my help.” In a
letter dated April 27, 1894, the Prime Minister of Sokoto repudiated any
intention of treating “with any other from the white man’s country except
with the Royal Niger Company, Limited.” Separate subsidies were also
paid by “her Majesty’s representatives (the Niger Company)” to Gandu,
as well as to the rulers of Nupe, Adamawa, and other important vassals
of the Emir of Sokoto. That, at any rate, was a well-defined political
relationship. By it the Royal Niger Company were able to secure this vast
and populous country to Great Britain, and by it peace was, with the
exception of Nupe[75] and Ilorin, preserved. Whatever may be said of
the merits and demerits of the Royal Niger Company as an administrative
body, it must be readily granted that a coherent policy was here applied,
and that its results were, from the Imperial standpoint, exceedingly
satisfactory. The nature of the bargain was precise. The Emir of Sokoto
and his vassals conferred extensive rights upon England’s representatives
and agreed to treat with no other country but England on the basis of a
subsidy of £1500 per annum in the case of Sokoto, and sums varying in
importance in the case of Sokoto’s vassals. The bargain was—according
to the terms of the treaty—binding upon the Niger Company and its
successors. The Emir of Sokoto kept to his share of it, and at a time
when France endeavoured, through Colonel Monteil, to upset the Company’s
treaty, the Emir loyally observed his obligations.[76] The Company no
less loyally observed theirs. It is humiliating to have to confess it,
but the British Government has been less loyal than the Company, and less
loyal than the African chief whose loyalty enabled England at a critical
moment to uphold the claims of her representatives to political influence
over Sokoto. The Crown, it seems, has declined to fulfil the obligations
imposed on England by these treaties, while reaping to the full the
advantages which the existence of the treaties confers. The first public
intimation that the Imperial Government had broken faith with the Emir of
Sokoto was made by the Rev. J. A. E. Richardson, already alluded to. His
statement ran as follows: “The yearly payment in form of gifts which was
made to the Emir of Sokoto by the Niger Company has not been continued
by the Imperial Government, and quite recently the Emir flatly refused to
allow the erection of a British telegraph line.” No official announcement
has been made on the subject, nor has any member of Parliament taken the
trouble to inquire. But there is not, I think, any doubt whatever that
the Imperial Government has, in point of fact, done this thing. I have
made careful inquiries in quarters likely to be well informed, and it
seems that it was considered _infra dig._ for a Government to politically
subsidise a West African chief. That is an extraordinary doctrine. Since
when has it been considered _infra dig._ for Englishmen to keep their
word with native potentates? Since when has it been thought a criterion
of Imperial rule to show native rulers that England’s promise is not
worth the paper upon which it is written? Is that what has been called
the “new Imperialism”? Is it astonishing that the Emir of Sokoto should,
in the face of such a repudiation of treaty obligations, “flatly refuse”
to allow the erection of a telegraph-line or anything else? Is it not a
terrible handicap upon the professed intentions of the most well-meaning
administrator, to be confronted at the outset with so powerful a cause of
native suspicion and hostility?
Let us observe, for a moment, how the successive stages of British action
on the Niger must appear to the native rulers of the country. We start
off by saying that we have come to the country as merchants and nothing
more, not as acquirers of land, but simply as traders. In 1870 the Emir
of Nupe, Maroba, is found co-operating with Bishop Crowther—an earnest
and godly man—to facilitate the operations of merchants at Lokoja. In
1884 Mr. Joseph Thomson is able, without any show of pomp or power,
to induce the Emir of Sokoto, supreme ruler of the whole country, to
sign a treaty of enormous importance, which practically amounts to a
Protectorate, in exchange for a yearly subsidy. Sixteen years later a
British Government ceases the subsidy, and follows up that performance by
initiating a policy of active interference in the Emir’s dominions. As
this costs money, the next step will very probably be that the Emir and
his subjects will be expected to contribute towards the up-keep of the
Administration, and England, having agreed through her representatives to
subsidise the Emir in return for advantages conferred, will end by making
the Emir pay for permission to remain in his own country. “It seems
really incredible,” remarked the _Morning Post_ the other day, commenting
upon the fighting with the Emir of Kontagora,[77] “that a great Empire
administering savage countries should have no other weapon save an
appeal to arms.” It has other weapons, and the most potent of them is
the one upon which the Indian Empire has been reared. That weapon may be
described thus, “Keep to your plighted word.”
The cause of the repeated military expeditions of which Northern
Nigeria is the scene, is said to be slave-raiding. “Slave-raiding” is
an evil which no one can possibly defend. It leads to great misery, to
depopulation and devastation. Its agency is violence. To suppress it is
the duty of every European Government. On those points there can be no
difference of opinion. The difference comes in when the means adopted
to do away with “slave-raiding” are examined. At present but one remedy
has been devised and put into practice in Nigeria. It consists in
opposing violence by violence. It has the merit of simplicity, but at
best it is but a crude way of procedure, and its efficacy as a reforming
agent is open to doubt. “The very foundation,” says Carl Schurz, “of
all civilization consists in the dispensation of justice by peaceable
methods, instead of the rule of brute force,” and he adds a sentence
well worth thinking over: “Although a course of warlike adventure may
have begun with the desire to liberate and civilise certain foreign
populations, it will be likely to develop itself, unless soon checked,
into a downright and reckless policy of conquest with all the criminal
aggression and savagery such a policy implies.” It is impossible not to
feel the force and the truth of this sentence when the history of British
East Africa is studied. These “nigger hunts,” to use the term, not of
a “deluded philanthropist” or “impracticable sentimentalist,” two of
the many choice epithets with which people who do not believe in the
practical advantages of “nigger hunts” are consistently assailed, but of
a specially gifted officer, have worked incalculable mischief, and have
put back the hands of the clock for many years. “Some of the wars and the
punitive expeditions of the past few years,” remarks Professor Gregory
in his admirable and impartial work,[78] “have been no doubt inevitable
and just. They have been the ‘Cruel wars of peace.’ But some of the
military expeditions in East Africa have been simply criminal in their
folly and thoughtlessness.” Yet the Home Authorities defended all these
expeditions, and covered the perpetrators of blunders with its sheltering
wing, to the detriment not only of the general interests of the Empire,
but of the efficiency of the public service, by discouraging officials
who had a different conception of the duties of their position, but who
saw, by experience, that to get up a row with the natives, to fight some
brilliant action and get their “heroism” talked about, was the surest way
to obtain promotion. That, I am afraid, is in West Africa also a motive
power to advancement.
In his report Sir Frederick Lugard shows that he is alive to the abuses
which a too constant “appeal to arms” may give rise to, and how the
designation of “slave-raiding” can be converted into a mere excuse to
justify acts of injustice and oppression. “Though force,” he says, “must
be occasionally applied to bands of recalcitrant robbers, I am convinced
that a few such lessons will suffice, and that the district officer,
with tact and patience, aided by sufficient civil police, can achieve
the pacification of the country effectively, and that parsimony in the
appointment of these officers, and of their native staff of police, &c.,
would be a policy of false economy, resulting in unnecessary bloodshed.”
And again, “It is my conviction that throughout Africa—East and West—much
injustice and oppression have been unwittingly done by our forces acting
on crude information, and accusations of slave-raiding, &c., brought by
enemies of the accused to procure their destruction.”
What is the genesis of this slave-raiding we hear so much about? In the
first place, it must be obvious to all who have studied the history
of inland Western Africa with any degree of attention, that a great
deal of what is called “slave-raiding” is not “slave-raiding” at all,
but military operations undertaken by the rulers of Mohammedan States
for the suppression of risings against their authority, rendered
weak by ineffective organisation, and by the absence of adequate
means of communication. Sir Frederick Lugard has thrown useful light
upon other circumstances which may lead to wrongful accusations of
slave-raiding.[79] But, taking the first case, how often may not an
expedition entered upon by a Mohammedan Emir against his pagan subjects
in West Africa be as justifiable, if reckoned by the same standard, as
the chastisement of a tribe by the representatives of a European Power
for resisting a tax enforced by that Power, and considered by the tribe
excessive and unjust? The only fair and rational interpretation of
slave-raiding, properly so-called, is the incursion of an armed band,
without previous provocation of any kind, into a peaceful district,
followed by the capture of a number of prisoners of war who are
subsequently sold into slavery by the victors. That is a condition of
affairs by no means peculiar to West Africa. It prevailed in Europe
and in Great Britain at a period when civilisation was infinitely more
advanced than it is at present in West Africa.
The motive forces to which slave-raiding is due in Nigeria are: (1)
economic necessities, or, in other words, the revenue needs of native
rulers, requiring many prisoners of war who, as has been well said, serve
the double purpose of cheque-book and beast of burden; (2) the incidental
effect of conquest; (3) the direct incitement given to intertribal wars
by white men on the West Coast of Africa for a period extending over
several centuries, a system which, by the way, prevailed not farther back
than slightly over fifty years ago on the Niger; witness Richardson’s
and Barth’s representations to the Government of the day. Those three
causes are common to, or have been common to, West Africa as a whole. To
them must be added, in the case of Northern Nigeria and other countries
in West Africa converted to Islam by the sword, religious zeal. Let us
take those causes severally one by one and examine them.
[Illustration: A MOHAMMEDAN CHIEF AND HIS STANDARD-BEARER]
With regard to the first, it must be patent to all who can look at the
matter with unprejudiced eyes that, until native rulers in Northern
Nigeria are able to count upon a source of revenue replacing that which
they lose by the disappearance of raiding operations for slaves, and
until a portable currency can be introduced into the country to take
the place of the human currency—that is, slaves—the economic _raison
d’être_ of raids will remain; and that is why, apart from any other
considerations, a subsidy to the native rulers on the part of the
European “over-lord” cannot but prove itself an instrument for good,
pending the slower but certain modifications which the creation of
roads, railways, the development of trade which should ensue from their
creation, and the introduction of an easily portable currency—such as
silver coinage—cannot fail to bring with them. When in course of time
such development takes place, matters should be so arranged that the
rulers of the country benefit by the growth of trade in their respective
districts, or, in other words, that a portion of the revenue derived
by the Administration from trade in a given district should accrue to
the ruler of that district, and be expended in the improvement of that
district.
In all communities where the ethical standard of the people has not
been influenced by the Christian ideal, the enslavement of prisoners of
war has existed from time immemorial. The moral standard of the Fulani
Chieftains of to-day is not lower than that of Imperial Rome, and for
many, many centuries after the tragedy of Golgotha, men enslaved one
another in England and in Europe as the natural sequel to warfare.
As for the heavy load of responsibility which England shares—and to a
very large extent—with other Powers towards the native of West Africa in
her actual _rôle_ of inculcator of the higher principles of morality, it
cannot too often be called to mind. It is not so very long ago—a mere
nothing in the history of nations—that Englishmen hounded on these native
chiefs against one another, supplied them with arms and ammunition,
excited their fiercest passions, pandered to their worst vices, and all
for what? To secure, under circumstances of cruelty more aggravated
because more protracted, those very slaves which Englishmen to-day are
but too ready to liberate, by killing the descendants of the chiefs who
formerly supplied them with the objects of their desire!
Religious fanaticism has ever been attended with outrages upon humanity,
sometimes directly, sometimes indirectly. In considering the case of
the Fulani conquerors of Nigeria, we must, if we are just, recollect
how relative good and evil are in matters of this kind, how dependent
upon those hundred and one things which make up hereditary instincts and
environment. Have the Fulani committed more atrocities than Christian
Europe (although far behind Christian Europe of those days) perpetrated
upon the Jews? Can we turn over the pages of Gibbon and condemn to the
death penalty these wanderers in Darkest Africa, when we read of the
deeds of Christians amid “civilised” surroundings, where art and crafts,
the ease and luxuries of life, culture and refinement had reached,
comparatively, so high a stage—a stage which West Africa had never known?
Are the episodes of Saint Bartholomew and the persecutions of “bloody”
Mary not vividly within our recollection? Do not the lessons of history
suggest that “civilisation” would best fulfil its mandate, and rise to
the level of its claims, by drawing upon an abundant store of patience
in dealing with the evil of “slave-raiding” in Nigeria and elsewhere in
West Africa? And if there be a fair prospect, as there undoubtedly is,
of removing the causes, economical and otherwise, which produce slave
raids, by peaceful methods, to employ the ways of peace rather than the
sword, although the process be a slower one, we can have made but very
few real strides in the last two thousand years if statesmanship be not
equal to the task. This is sentimentalism, you will say. Well, it is
easy to call names, but the following passage indicates, at least, that
a British Government was not ashamed once upon a time to preach much the
same doctrine:
“While you describe the power and wealth of your country, you
will, in all your interviews with the African chiefs and with
other African natives on the subject of the suppression of the
slave trade, abstain carefully from any threat or intimidation
that hostilities upon their territory will be the result of
their refusal to treat.... You will allow for any hardness of
feeling you may witness in them on the subject of the slave
trade, a hardness naturally engendered by the exercise of that
traffic, and in some cases increased by intercourse with the
lowest and basest of Europeans. You will endeavour to convince
them by courtesy, by kindness, by patience, and forbearance of
your most persevering desire to be on good terms with them.”[80]
At what period, and under what circumstances, has this persevering desire
to establish friendly terms, as a basis upon which to work to do away
with the internal slave-trade of Nigeria by the exercise of courtesy,
kindness, patience, and forbearance been consistently applied, or been
given a fair chance? We should be hard put to it to supply even one
instance, in a given district.[81]
So much for the moral aspect of the question. There is another aspect to
which the most unsentimental of mortals will not deny the attributes of
severest practicability. I refer to the effect of these wars, nominally
undertaken for the suppression of slave-raiding and the upsetting
of priestly theocracies in West Africa, upon the well-being of the
inhabitants and upon the prosperity of the Colonies themselves. Those who
may be inclined to look into the matter may peruse with advantage that
very able volume, “Ashanti and Jaman,” by Dr. Richard Austin Freeman, one
time Assistant Colonial Surgeon and Anglo-German Boundary Commissioner of
the Gold Coast.[82] Sir Frederick Lugard in his report writes: “Already,
with the removal of the fear of the Fulani, each petty village is
claiming its ancient lands, or raiding those of its weaker neighbour, and
interminable feuds are the result.” That passage entirely confirms Dr.
Freeman’s opinion with regard to the forcible splitting up of the Ashanti
confederation after the Wolseley expedition. The latter part of it is
almost word for word that of a letter which lies before me at the present
moment, and which I received from an Englishman in the Niger shortly
after Sir George Goldie’s brilliant but inconclusive campaign against
Nupe. “The whole country is confused”—wrote my correspondent—“the central
authority having been suppressed; each man raids on his own.” In point
of sober fact, almost every war waged in West Africa has a deteriorating
effect, unless it be followed immediately by constructive action, which
in the vast majority of cases is impossible owing to the vastness of the
country. We read of a chief falling foul of the British Authorities and
being deposed. If captured, he is marched off to the coast and deported;
if he succeeds in escaping, the chances are he will rally some followers
round him and prove a source of trouble for a considerable time. However
that may be, he is at any rate replaced by some other individual who may
or may not have, according to local custom, a right to the chieftainship.
A resident with a small escort may or may not be left in the capital.
Now, bearing in mind that in Nigeria a district over which a particular
chief holds at least a nominal sway is sometimes as large as Wales or
larger, no great amount of imagination is required to picture what but
too often happens. Let us, for the sake of argument, consider Wales an
inland kingdom, and imagine it under the feudal system, the King aided
by his barons ruling the country, with many abuses no doubt, but still
ruling it after a fashion and able to make his power felt. At a given
moment the King quarrels with a neighbour. The neighbour enters the
country, defeats the King’s armies, marches on the capital, captures
it and the King together. The King is taken away a prisoner and the
conqueror remains in the capital with a small force, ignorant of the
language of the people, of their history, traditions, customs and laws.
He will not be attacked because it is known that his soldiers possess
weapons which kill easily at 300 yards, which mow down men in heaps, and
which it is as futile to attempt to face as it is to stand against the
roaring tornado hurtling through the forest. But for obvious reasons
it is also known that he cannot effectively hold the country. Result
number one: all semblance of authority within gun-shot of the capital has
disappeared. Result number two: every ambitious baron develops schemes of
aggrandisement, starts foraging in the property of his neighbours, who
do ditto with religious unanimity; another party remains faithful to the
deposed King and intrigues to get him back; another may take the part of
the dummy appointed by the conqueror, presuming that step to have been
adopted. Sequel: disorganisation, widening of area of disturbance, social
chaos, impoverishment of the country.
This is not, indeed, the exception but the rule in West Africa. The
facts are on record. I have quoted two eminent authorities in specific
instances and mentioned one other case. But the examples are numerous,
and were it necessary one might amplify them considerably. Sometimes
the effect is chiefly commercial, as in the case of Nana, ex-chief of
Lower Benin.[83] Since his removal after the war in that district the
volume of trade has fallen considerably, which has been a bad thing,
of course, all round, from the point of view of both revenue and
commerce. Speaking generally, the only logical outcome of a punitive
expedition in West Africa is the replacing of what has been pulled down
by something else which shall answer to the needs of the people in the
same way, or a military occupation of every yard of the country. West
Africa being what it is, the thing cannot be done, and the consequence
of punitive expeditions in that part of the world, no matter what the
motives, alleged or real, may have been, is ninety times out of every
hundred reactionary, sterile, and morally destructive. Hence, whether it
be a matter of slave-raiding or fetishism, or disputes about land, or
difficulties about trade, punitive expeditions are things to be avoided,
and the Administrator who avoids them is the type of man which West
Africa needs most.
A reference to the question of slave-raiding in Nigeria would be
incomplete without mention being made of domestic slavery, or more
properly termed domestic servitude. I remember assisting, not so
long ago, at a lecture by a missionary on Northern Nigeria. With
great impressiveness the lecturer announced that a large proportion,
four-fifths I think he said, of Hausas in Nigeria are slaves. There was
no doubt of the effect of the statement upon the audience, composed
of benevolent, well-meaning people, who conjured up at once the
most horrible visions. The mere enunciation of the fact, or alleged
fact—because, from what I have been able to ascertain, the estimate
is widely exaggerated—is calculated to horrify a public ignorant of
the nature and characteristics of domestic slavery in West Africa, and
there can be as little doubt that such is the deliberate and perfectly
sincere intention of the individuals who make these bald statements, as
that their after consequences upon the public mind are harmful. All are
agreed that the intestine warfare which results in the capture of many
prisoners and their conveyance over large distances always involves great
hardships and sorrow, and very often fearful sufferings upon the victims.
But the weight of evidence is decidedly against the supposition, still
so widely entertained, that domestic slavery in West Africa is what the
unscientific advocates of its hasty abolition, regardless of the obvious
political objections to such a course, would have the public believe.
[Illustration: MANDINGO MUSLIMS]
Nay more, while it may be fully admitted that a condition of servitude
is indicative of a state of society which we happily have grown out
of, and which in itself is essentially opposed to the moral law, no
impartial student will be prepared to deny that the condition of tens of
thousands of toilers in this country is infinitely worse than anything
which prevails under the West African native system, where poverty at
least is normally non-existent. The latter, it is true, are technically
free, but to them actual freedom would, if exercised, lead to starvation
pure and simple. They are bound in chains more enduring than any forged
by native blacksmiths in Nigeria. The “White Slaves of England” was an
appropriate title to a series of terrible articles published a short time
ago in a popular London magazine, the absolute accuracy of which has
since been acknowledged. “The West African slave”—a celebrated French
explorer and administrator has said—“is not so unhappy as many people
who live round us and whom _we will not see_.” That is the simple truth.
Between the domestic servitude of Nigeria—where any form of paid labour
is unknown as a native institution—and plantation slavery under European
supervision there is all the difference in the world. Compared with the
latter, the former is relative bliss. Degradation was the keynote of
the one. The other permits and frequently leads to equality between the
owner and the servant. Under the European system the slave was a dog and
worse than a dog; under the West African system the slave is part and
parcel of the social life of the people, a member, and not unfrequently
an honoured member, of the family.[84] With the second generation, the
distinction between the owning and serving class in West Africa is less
pronounced, and with the third generation, if it has not already been
practically effaced, the distinction is simply theoretical. Slaves then
own slaves of their own, while still theoretically remaining slaves
themselves. Once a slave is incorporated in a household he usually
remains a fixture, is decently treated, and, if his conduct is good,
his material prosperity rapidly increases. It is the commonest thing in
the world for a slave to rise high in his master’s favour, and even to
hold lucrative and responsible positions. All the relations of domestic
life in three-fourths of the Niger territories are based upon the system
of domestic slavery, and there is no question which requires to be
approached by the authorities with greater breadth of comprehension, with
greater largeness of views, with a more sincere resolve to resolutely
set aside all appeals, by whomsoever uttered, to bigotry, passion, or
prejudice.
The harm which hasty legislation tending to violently interfere with the
entire social fabric of a people and with a custom centuries old entails
cannot be exaggerated. It spells utter disorganisation, and has already
worked incalculable mischief in the British West African possessions by
destroying the authority and influence of the chiefs and breaking up the
whole labour of the country. The lesson has been learned rather late in
the day, and there is hope that it will bear fruit, but the influences on
the side of error are very strong at home, and it never seems to occur to
those amongst us whose profession in life is the inculcation of the moral
virtues, that we have no greater right to destroy or abolish domestic
slavery without compensation of some sort, if only that of substituting
railway transport and portable currency in West Africa, than we had in
the West Indies or in South Africa. Why should West Indian planters and
Cape Colonists receive compensation for the loss of their slaves, and
the African chief nothing—except bullets? The policy of the sword and
the application of twentieth-century legislation to twelfth-century
conditions, however good the intentions, are, in the main, Imperial
mistakes, for which England may indirectly pay, but whom the present
generation of natives and the generations which come afterwards do—and
will—suffer in their persons. “It is understood”—cabled Reuter’s agent on
the Binue on September 21, 1901, subsequent to the capture of Yola—“that
Government will not interfere for the present with domestic slavery, the
evil effects of such a policy being still felt in the provinces of Nupe
and Ilorin. It upset the internal economy of the whole country, and the
male slaves, instead of working on their master’s farms, became rogues
and vagabonds, and the women something worse.” What a biting satire upon
the notion that immemorial customs can be changed by a stroke of the pen
without breeding disorder and social chaos! The question of domestic
slavery in Nigeria may best be approached by once again recalling
that great truth, “God’s design in the perfecting of man’s mind is
evolutionary and not revolutionary.”