Much as the French treaty had done for the Americans, it had by no
means ended the war. There were as many British soldiers as ever on
American soil, and General Howe at Philadelphia and General Clinton
at New York could be trusted to make excellent use of them. Signs of
British activity were already apparent. A large number of transports
had sailed from Philadelphia, but whether they had gone to bring
reinforcements or whether it meant that Philadelphia was being
abandoned and that the Hudson was again to be the main point of attack
Washington did not know. Lafayette was ordered to take some of the best
troops at Valley Forge and find out.
He left camp on the 18th of May with about twenty-two hundred men,
among them six hundred Pennsylvania militia and half a hundred
Iroquois Indians. Crossing the Schuylkill, he established himself on
high ground between that river and the Delaware, twelve miles from
the city, at a hamlet called Barren Hill, whose chief ornament was a
[Pg 105]church with a graveyard. It was an excellent spot for purposes
of observation; for roads ran in various directions, while the abrupt
fall of the land toward the Schuylkill protected his right, and there
were substantial stone buildings in a wood in front which could be used
as forts in case of need. He guarded against surprise on his left,
the direction from which any considerable body of British was likely
to approach, by placing there his large detachment of Pennsylvania
militia. He planted his five cannon in good positions, sent out his
Indian scouts, who wormed themselves several miles nearer the city, had
interviews with promising individuals who were to act as spies, and was
well pleased with himself.
The British were also exceedingly well pleased when their spies brought
in full information of Lafayette's position and numbers. They saw that
he had separated himself from the American army and virtually placed
himself in their hands; and short of Washington himself there was no
officer they would so enjoy capturing. His prominence at home and
his popularity in America made him a shining mark; moreover, he had
fooled them in London before coming to America. It would be a great
satisfaction to take him prisoner gently, without hurting him, treat
him with mock courtesy, and send him back to England, a laughing-stock.
They had force enough to make his capture practically certain, and
set out in great glee, so sure of the result that before leaving town
Generals Howe and Clinton, both of whom were in Philadelphia, sent out
invitations to a reception for the following day "to meet the Marquis
[Pg 106]de Lafayette." Although it was looked upon as something of a
lark, the expedition was deemed sufficiently important for General
Clinton to lead it in person, while General Howe accompanied him,
and the admiral, General Howe's sailor brother, went along as a
volunteer. Taking four men to Lafayette's one, and marching by night,
they approached Barren Hill in a way to cut off the fords across the
Schuylkill and also to intercept any assistance which might be sent
from Valley Forge.
Unconscious that he was in danger, Lafayette was talking, early on the
morning of May 20th, with a young woman who was going into the city as
a spy, when word was brought him that dragoons in red coats had been
seen on the Whitemarsh road. This did not disturb him, for he knew that
among the coats of many colors worn by his Pennsylvania militia some
were red; but he sent out to verify the information, merely as a matter
of routine. Soon the truth was learned--and exaggerated--and his men
set up a cry that they were surrounded by the British.
Fortunately Lafayette had a head which grew steadier in a crisis.
Sending his aides flying in all directions, he found that while the
way to Valley Forge was indeed cut off, one ford still remained open,
though the British were rapidly advancing upon it. He quickly placed a
small number of his men near the church, where the stone wall of the
graveyard would serve as breastworks, stationed a few more near the
woods as if they were heads of columns just appearing, and ordered
[Pg 107]all the rest to drop quietly down the steep side of the hill
until they were out of sight, and then hurry to the ford. The attention
of the enemy was held long enough by the decoy troops to enable the
others to reach the ford or swim across, their heads dotting the water
"like the corks of a floating seine," and Lafayette, who had stayed
behind, brought the last of his men to safety just as two columns of
the British, marching up two sides of Barren Hill, met each other, face
to face, at the top. Lafayette, on the opposite bank of the river,
prepared for defense, but the British were too disgusted to follow.
The real encounter of the serio-comic affair took place between the
most gaudily dressed bands of fighters in the whole Revolution,
Lafayette's Iroquois in their war regalia and Clinton's advance-guard
of Hessian cavalry. As the latter advanced, the Indians rose from their
hiding-places uttering their piercing war-whoops. The horses of the
troopers were terrified by the brilliant, shrieking creatures, and
bolted. But terror was not all upon one side. The Indians had never
seen men like these Hessians, with their huge bearskin shakos and
fierce dyed mustaches. They in their turn were seized with panic and
rushed away, fleeing incontinently from "bad medicine."
Absurd as the affair proved, with little harm done to anything except
the feelings of the British, its consequences might easily have been
serious, both to the Revolution and to Lafayette. The loss of two
thousand of his best men would have dangerously crippled Washington's
[Pg 108]little army; while the capture of Lafayette, on the very first
occasion he was intrusted with a command of any size, must almost
of necessity have ended his military usefulness forever. As it was,
Barren Hill demonstrated that he was quick and resourceful in time
of danger; and these were very valuable qualities in a war like the
American Revolution, which was won largely through the skill of its
generals in losing battles. To realize the truth of this and how well
it was carried out, we have only to recall Washington's masterly work
in the winter campaign in New Jersey, when he maneuvered and marched
and gave way until the right moment came to stand; how General Schuyler
lured Burgoyne to disaster; and how, in a later campaign in the South,
General Greene was said to have "reduced the art of losing battles to a
science." Years afterward, in talking with Napoleon, Lafayette called
our Revolution "the grandest of contests, won by the skirmishes of
sentinels and outposts." About a month after this affair at Barren Hill
the English evacuated Philadelphia and moved slowly northward with a
force of seventeen thousand men and a baggage-train nearly twelve miles
long. The length of this train indicated that it was moving-day for the
British army, which wanted to be nearer the Hudson, but certain other
indications pointed to the opening of an active campaign in New Jersey.
A majority of the American officers, including Gen. Charles Lee, who
was second in command, argued against an attack because both in numbers
and organization the British force was superior to their own. General
[Pg 109]Lee went so far as to say that, instead of trying to interfere
with General Clinton's retreat, it ought to be aided in every possible
way, "even with a bridge of gold." Subsequent developments proved
that it was not fear of a British victory, but sympathy with British
plans, which prompted this view. Several other officers, however,
Washington himself, Gen. Anthony Wayne, who was always ready to fight,
General Greene, General Cadwallader, and Lafayette, were in favor
of following and attacking at the earliest opportunity. It was this
course that Washington chose, in spite of the majority of votes against
it. It seemed to him that the difficulty Clinton must experience in
maneuvering his army over the roads of that region, and the fact that
almost half of his force would need to be employed in guarding the
unwieldy baggage-train, justified the expectation of success. His plan
was to throw out a strong detachment ahead of the main army to harass
the British flanks and rear and to follow this up so closely that the
main army would be ready to go to its support in case Clinton turned to
fight.
The command of the advanced detachment was the post of honor, and to
this Lee was entitled because of his rank. He refused it and Washington
offered it to Lafayette, who accepted joyously. He had already begun
his march when Lee reconsidered and sent Washington word that he
desired the command, after all, appealing at the same time to Lafayette
with the words, "I place my fortune and my honor in your hands; you
are too generous to destroy both the one and the other." Lee was
[Pg 110]one of the few men Lafayette did not like, though he had no
suspicion of his loyalty. He thought him ugly in face and in spirit,
full of avarice and ambition. But Lee was his superior officer, and
Lafayette was a soldier as well as a gentleman. He relinquished the
command at once and offered to serve under Lee as a volunteer.
It would have been better had he found it in his heart and in the
military regulations to refuse, for on that sultry unhappy 28th of
June when the two armies met and the battle of Monmouth Court House
was fought, General Lee's indecision and confusion of orders, to give
his conduct no harsher name, turned the advance of the Americans,
who were in the best of spirits and eager to fight, into what their
generals admitted was "a disgraceful rout." Officer after officer came
to Lee beseeching him to let them carry out their original instructions
and not to give orders to fall back; but he did everything to hinder
success, answering stubbornly, "I know my business."
At Lafayette's first intimation that things were going wrong, he sent
a message to Washington, who was with the main army, some miles in the
rear. Whether he learned the news first from this messenger or from a
very scared fifer running down the road, Washington could not believe
his eyes or his ears. Hurrying forward, he found Lee in the midst of
the retreating troops and a brief but terrible scene took place between
them; Washington in a white heat of anger, though outwardly calm,
[Pg 111]Lee stammering and stuttering and finally bursting out with
the statement that the whole movement had been made contrary to his
advice. Washington's short and scorching answer ended Lee's military
career. Then, turning away from him as though from a creature unworthy
of further notice, the Commander-in-chief took up the serious task at
hand. The soldiers responded to his presence instantly. With those on
the field he and Lafayette were able to make a stand until reserves
came up and a drawn battle was fought which lasted until nightfall. The
conditions had been unusually trying, for the heat was so oppressive
that men died of that alone, without receiving a wound. Both armies
camped upon the field, Washington meaning to renew the contest next
morning; but during the night the enemy retired to continue the march
toward New York.
[Illustration: THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH, JUNE 28, 1778]
Lee was tried by court martial and suspended from any command in the
armies of the United States for the period of one year. Afterward
Congress dismissed him altogether. The judgment of history is that he
deserved severer punishment and that his sympathies were undoubtedly
with the British. He was of English birth, and from the beginning
of his service in the American army he tried to thwart Washington.
Lafayette was convinced that, though his name does not appear
prominently in the doings of the Conway cabal, it was he and not
General Gates who would have profited by the success of that plot.
Since the British were able to continue their march as planned, they
[Pg 112]claimed Monmouth as a victory. Washington also continued
northward and, crossing the Hudson, established himself near White
Plains, which brought the British and American forces once more into
the relative positions they had occupied two years earlier, after the
battle of Long Island.
Monmouth proved to be the last engagement of consequence fought that
year, and the last large battle of the Revolution to be fought in the
Northern states. Very soon after this the British gave up their attempt
to cut the rebellion in two by opening the Hudson, and substituted for
it the plan of capturing the Southern states one by one, beginning with
Georgia and working northward. They continued to keep a large force
near New York, however, and that necessitated having an American army
close by. These two forces were not idle; some of the most dramatic
incidents of the whole war occurred here, though the main contest raged
elsewhere, and in a larger sense, these armies were only marking time.
[Pg 113]XIII