Of the functions and position of women--in most countries, he remarks,

that of idiot children--he speaks often, shrewdly indeed, yet with

peculiar sympathy. The most important expression of his opinions

on sexual morality is contained in the “Supplément au Voyage de

Bougainville.” Bougainville, the first Frenchman to sail round the

world, had visited the lovely island of Tahiti, and brought back a

strange and vivid picture of the idyllic innocence and frank license

that existed there. Diderot was aroused to set forth his views on

sexual questions with that union of fiery enthusiasm, uncompromising

thoroughness, and saving grace of humorous good sense which always

characterizes him. He imagines a dialogue between the chaplain of

Bougainville’s expedition and Orou, a Tahitian, who is anxious to know

why the chaplain refuses to conform to the customs of the country.

The worthy chaplain represents the morality of civilized Europe, and

Orou, with a few questions concerning this morality, easily succeeds

in confounding him and in pouring keen ridicule on the inconsistencies

of European morals. With reference to rules of conduct which vary

with the country and the time, Diderot makes Orou say, “We must have

a surer rule, and what shall this rule be? Do you know any other than

the good of the community and the advantage of the individual?” “You

were unhappy,” he remarks again to the chaplain, “when I presented

to you last night my two daughters and my wife; you exclaimed, ‘But

my religion! my office!’ Do you wish to know what in every time and

place is good and bad? Concern yourself with the nature of things and

of actions, and with your relations to your fellows. Consider the

influence of your conduct on yourself and on the community. You are

mad if you think that there is anything in the universe, above or

below, which can add to or take from the laws of nature.” That rule,

he explains, is the polar star on the path of life, and the invention

of crimes, punishments, and remorse will only obscure it. “In founding

morality on the relationships which must always exist between men, the

religious law becomes perhaps superfluous; and the civil law should

only be the enunciation of the law of nature, which we bear engraved

on our hearts, and which must always be the strongest.” At the end

Diderot intervenes with a counsel of moderation and practical wisdom:

“What shall we do, then? We will protest against foolish laws until

they are reformed: meanwhile we will submit. He who by his private

authority breaks a bad law, authorizes others to break good laws. There

is less inconvenience in being mad with the mad than in being wise by

oneself. Let us say to ourselves, let us proclaim incessantly, that

shame, punishment, and ignominy have been attached to actions which

in themselves are innocent. But do not let us commit them; for shame,

punishment, and ignominy are themselves the worst of evils.”

“Every century has its own spirit; that of ours seems to be liberty.”

So in 1776, when men were beginning to say that it was time to burn

philosophers instead of their books, and a boy of eighteen was actually

burned, Diderot wrote to Voltaire, in the famous letter in which he

announced that in spite of all he would stay in Paris, among the

enemies of liberty, to carry on his own mission. Timidity in political

matters was excusable in Diderot’s day, and existed even among the men

of his own set. Helvetius, for instance, advocated the advantages of

paternal government and benevolent despotism; with his usual keen and

vigorous good sense, Diderot shows how unreal these advantages are.

When we give a ruler absolute power to do good, we cannot prevent

him assuming also an absolute power to do evil. Moreover, as Diderot

insisted, it is not possible to make people good against their wills,

nor is it desirable to treat men like sheep. “If they say, ‘We are well

enough here,’ or if, even, they say, ‘We are not well here, but we

will stay,’ let us try to enlighten them, to undeceive them, to bring

them to saner views by persuasion, but never by force.” “The arbitrary

government of a just and enlightened prince is always bad.” He insists,

again and again, that we must never let our pretended masters do good

to us against our wills. “Whenever you see the sovereign authority in

a country extending beyond the region of police, you may say that that

country is badly governed.” Diderot, Goethe, Adam Smith, Beccaria,

Mill, to mention but a few typical names, threw all the weight of

their influence, sometimes with passionate emphasis, on the side

of individuality and freedom, and their teaching reached its final

consecration when Darwin accepted as his central theory the fruitful

idea of Malthus. They felt, and rightly felt, that they were taking

the step that was most needed. Those who advocated solidarity and

social co-operation mostly went to the wall. Now it is the turn of the

social instincts, and we must expect them to work themselves out to the

utmost. We have to see to it that the truth to which Diderot and the

rest fought their way is not meanwhile lost. The general will is itself

to-day in danger of becoming a benevolent despotism, and perhaps the

time will never arrive when such warnings as these will be quite out

of date. When it is a question of the oppression of our fellows, we

cannot always afford to wait until the offender listens to the voice of

persuasion; him, at least, we must bring within “the region of police:”

beyond that lies danger.

“Et si j’ai quelque volonté,

C’est que chacun fasse la sienne.”

So Diderot wrote in some impromptu verses at a convivial gathering

over which he once presided; it was a summary of his views on

many matters. “I am convinced,” he wrote, “that there can be no

true happiness for the human race except in a social state in

which there is neither king nor magistrate, nor priest nor laws,

nor _meum_ nor _tuum_, nor property in goods or land, nor vices

nor virtues.” This is the anarchism that stands at the end of

all social progress, but as an attainable social state it is

still certainly, as Diderot adds, “diablement idéal.” He had no

faith in moralization by Act of Parliament. “There will then be

prostitutes?--Assuredly.--Mistresses?--Why not?--Girls seduced?--I

expect there will.--Husbands and wives not always faithful?--I fear

so. But at least,” he adds, “I shall be spared all those vices which

misery, luxury, and poverty produce. The rest may be as it will be.”

Diderot’s robust faith in nature, that finest fruit of the scientific

spirit, comes out again and again, here and elsewhere. “The evil-doer

is one whom we must destroy, not punish”: that is the great truth,

held by a large number of the foremost men to-day, which is not even

yet accepted. “Never to repent and never to reproach others: these

are the first steps to wisdom.” And, again: “In the best and most

happily constituted man there remains always much of the animal; before

becoming a misanthrope, consider whether you have the right.” Not many

men have had so much reason as Diderot for becoming misanthropic; few

men have had in them less of the misanthrope. “My life is not stolen

from me,” he writes; “I give it.... A pleasure which is for myself

alone touches me slightly. It is for myself and for my friends that I

read, that I reflect, that I write, that I meditate, that I hear, that

I observe, that I feel.... I have consecrated to them the use of all

my senses, and that is perhaps the reason why everything is a little

enriched in my imagination and conversation; sometimes they reproach

me, ungrateful as they are. Ungrateful! would I could make hundreds

ungrateful every day!” He never seems to waver in his faith in men,

nor in the determination, with which, indeed, that faith must ever be

bound up, to look every fact of nature squarely in the face. The words

with which his letters to Sophie Voland close seem to be the constant

refrain throughout all his work: “There is nothing good in this world

but that which is true.”

It cannot be said that Diderot performed any one great and

paramount achievement. The most brilliant of his fragments--the

“Rêve de d’Alembert” or “Le Neveu de Rameau”--is but a magnificent

improvisation. He made no memorable contribution to our knowledge of

the world. Nor was his genius of what may be called the wedge-shaped

order--the genius of the man who, with every nerve strained to the

solution of one mystery, never rests until the heart of it is cloven.

His genius was essentially fermentative. He knew by a native instinct

every promising germ of thought, and he knew how to make it fruitful.

He was, as Voltaire called him, Pantophile, the man who loved and was

interested in everything. His extreme sensitiveness to impressions

was the source of his strength and of his weakness. In his sane,

massive, and yet so sensitive temperament, aspirations keen and

lyrical as Shelley’s seem to blend harmoniously with laughter broad

and tolerant as Rabelais’s. The latent elements in him of fantastic

extravagance were held in check by a _bourgeois_ good sense in which

we seem to recognize the shrewd old cutler of Langres. There is a

profound democratic instinct in him; his never-failing faith in nature

and man seems to be a part of this; it is a faith that may possibly be

foolish, but for all those who are born men it is the most reasonable

faith, and it has commended itself most to those who have been oftenest

disillusioned.

There can be no doubt that the immediate effect of the Revolution of

1789 was to kill the spirit that Diderot represented--the spirit of

scientific advance, active even to audacity, and allied with a firm

faith in man and in social development. The party of progress were

not able to recognize progress in the form of the Revolution, and the

more obviously dominating movement of the century that is now closing

has been the Counter-Revolution, corresponding in many respects to

that Counter-Reformation which dominated Catholic countries during

the seventeenth century. Putting aside a few stray enthusiasts,

like Shelley or Owen, attractive personalities with little grasp

of practical life, the men who have directed European thought,

especially in England, have been men whose imaginations were profoundly

impressed, and their mental equilibrium considerably disturbed, by

that brief convulsion of France; and they developed a curious timidity

and distrust, visible even when they had the courage to adopt a

short-sighted optimism. It is very interesting now to turn back to the

essay in which Carlyle, perhaps the most brilliant and distinguished

representative of the Counter-Revolution, recorded his estimate of

Diderot. How curiously old-fashioned seem to us to-day its mitigated

admiration, its vague mysticism, its sneers at Diderot’s loquacity,

his generosity, his dyspepsia--sneers that, in the light of Carlyle’s

own life, have aroused feelings of pain, and even indignation, among

some who in their youth looked up to Carlyle as to a sort of venerable

prophet--its absolute failure to perceive that here was a man not to be

stifled by a handful of transcendental phraseology. Yet this was at the

time accepted as an adequate and even generous account of the matter.

To-day we are again in the same position as Diderot, and we are able

to see in him the significance, hidden from Carlyle, of the light of

science fearlessly brought to illuminate the whole of life.

When men begin to say that everything has been done, the men come

who say that there has yet nothing been done. We have congratulated

ourselves that many sciences of nature and of man are in the main

settled, but we are always compelled to begin again, and on a larger

and perhaps simpler scale. In many fields of physical and social

knowledge--from electricity at the one end to criminology at the

other--we are now laying anew great foundations, and the walls are

being raised so rapidly that it is sometimes hard to know where we are,

or to realize what is being done. When science is thus renewing itself,

and men are on every hand seeking how, by means of science, they may

enlarge and ennoble life, the spirit that moved Diderot is again making

itself felt. It is worth while to realize his fellowship for a few

moments, and to sun ourselves, if we can bear it, in his inspiring

enthusiasm.

HEINE.

I.

Heine gathers up and focuses for us in one vivid point all those

influences of his own time which are the forces of to-day. He appears

before us, to put it in his own way, as a youthful and militant Knight

of the Holy Ghost, tilting against the spectres of the past and

liberating the imprisoned energies of the human spirit. His interest

from this point of view lies, largely, apart from his interest as a

supreme lyric poet, the brother of Catullus and Villon and Burns; we

here approach him on his prosaic--his relatively prosaic--side.

One hemisphere of Heine’s brain was Greek, the other Hebrew. He was

born when the genius of Goethe was at its height; his mother had

absorbed the frank earthliness, the sane and massive Paganism, of the

Roman Elegies, and Heine’s ideals in all things, whether he would or

not, were always Hellenic--using that word in the large sense in which

Heine himself used it--even while he was the first in rank and the last

in time of the Romantic poets of Germany. He sought, even consciously,

to mould the modern emotional spirit into classic forms. He wrought his

art simply and lucidly, the aspirations that pervade it are everywhere

sensuous, and yet it recalls oftener the turbulent temper of Catullus

than any serener ancient spirit.

For Heine arose early in active rebellion against a merely passive

classicism; in the same way that fiercer and more ardent cries, as

from the East, pierce through the songs of Catullus. The mischievous

Hermes was irritated by the calm and quiet activities of the aged Zeus

of Weimar. And then the earnest Hebrew nature within him, liberated by

Hegel’s favourite formula of the divinity of man, came into play with

its large revolutionary thirsts. Thus it was that he appeared before

the world as the most brilliant leader of a movement of national or

even world-wide emancipation. The greater part of his prose works, from

the youthful “Reisebilder” onwards, and a considerable portion of his

poetic work, record the energy with which he played this part.

But whether the Greek or the Hebrew element happened to be most active

in Heine, the ideal that he set up for life generally was the equal

activity of both sides--in other words, the harmony of flesh and

spirit. It is this thought which dominates “The History of Religion

and Philosophy in Germany,” his finest achievement in this kind. That

book was written at the moment when Heine touched the highest point

of his enthusiasm for freedom and his faith in the possibility of

human progress. It is a sort of programme for the immediate future

of the human spirit, in the form of a brief and bold outline of the

spiritual history of Germany and Germany’s great emancipators, Luther,

Lessing, Kant, and the rest. It sets forth in a fresh and fascinating

shape that Everlasting Gospel which, from the time of Joachim of Flora

downwards, has always gleamed in dreams before the minds of men as the

successor of Christianity. Heine’s vision of a democracy of cakes and

ale, founded on the heights of religious, philosophical, and political

freedom, may still spur and thrill us,--even now-a-days, when we have

wearied of stately bills of fare for a sulky humanity that will not

feed at our bidding, no, not on cakes and ale. Heine is wise enough to

see, however imperfectly, that it is unreasonable to expect the speedy

erection of any New Jerusalem; for, as he expresses it in his own way,

the holy vampires of the Middle Ages have sucked away so much of our

life-blood that the world has become a hospital. A sudden revolution of

fever-stricken or hysterical invalids can effect little of permanent

value; only a long and invigorating course of the tonics of life can

make free from danger the open-air of nature. “Our first duty,” he

asserted in this book, “is to become healthy.”

Heine confesses that he too was among the sick and decrepit souls.

In reality he was at no period so full of life and health, so

harmoniously inspired and upborne by a great enthusiasm. He laughs

a little at Goethe; he fails to see that the Phidian Zeus, at whose

confined position he jests, was the greatest liberator of them all;

but for the most part his mocking sarcasm is here silent. It was not

until ten years later, when the subtle seeds of disease had begun to

appear, and when, too, he had perhaps gained a clearer insight into the

possibilities of life, that Heine realized that the practical reforming

movements of his time were not those for which his early enthusiasm

had been aroused. With the slow steps of that consuming disease, and

after the revolution of 1848, he ceased to recognize as of old any

common root for his various activities, or to insist on the fundamental

importance of religion. Everything in the world became the sport of his

intelligence. The brain still functioned brilliantly in the atrophied

body; the swift lightning-like wit still struck unerringly; it spared

not even himself. The “Confessions” are full of irony, covering all

things with laughter that is half reverence, or with reverence that

is more than half laughter--and woe to the reader who is not at every

moment alert! In the romantic, satirical poem of “Atta Troll,” written

at the commencement of the last period, this, his final altitude, is

most completely revealed. It needs a little study to-day, even for a

German, but it is well worth that study. The history of a dancing

bear who escapes from servitude, “Atta Troll” is a protest against

the radical party, with their narrow conceptions of progress, their

tame ideal of _bourgeois_ equality, their little watchwords, their

solemnity, their indignation at the human creatures who smile “even

in their enthusiasm.” All these serious concerns of the tribunes of

the people are bathed in soft laughter as we listen to the delicious

child-like monotonous melody in which the old bear, surrounded by his

family, mumbles or mutters of the future. “Atta Troll” is not, as

many have thought, a sneer at the most sacred ideals of men. It is,

rather, the assertion of those ideals against the individuals who would

narrow them down to their own petty scope. There are certain mirrors,

Heine said, so constructed that they would present even Apollo as a

caricature. But we laugh at the caricature, not at the god. It is well

to show, even at the cost of some misunderstanding, that above and

beyond the little ideals of our immediate political progress, there is

built a yet larger ideal city, of which also the human spirit claims

citizenship. The defence of the inalienable rights of the spirit, Heine

declares, had been the chief business of his life.

In the history of Germany, it was her two great intellectual

liberators, Luther and Lessing, to whom Heine looked up with the most

unqualified love and reverence. By his later vindication of the rights

of the spirit, not less than by his earlier fight for religious and

political progress, he may be said to have earned for himself a place

below, indeed, but not so very far below, those hearty and sound-cored

iconoclasts.

II.

To reach the root of the man’s nature we must glance at the chief facts

of his life. He was born at Düsseldorf, on the Rhine, then occupied

by the French, probably on the 13th of December, 1799. He came, by

both parents, of that Jewish race which is, as he said once, the dough

whereof gods are kneaded. The family of his mother, Betty van Geldern,

had come from Holland a century earlier; Betty herself received an

excellent education; she shared the studies of her brother, who

became a physician of repute; she spoke and read English and French;

her favourite books were Rousseau’s “Emile” and Goethe’s elegies.

For novels or poetry generally she cared little. She preferred logic

to sentiment, and was careful of the precise value of words. Some

letters written during her twenty-fourth year reveal a frank, brave,

and sweet nature; she was a bright, attractive little person, and had

many wooers. In the summer of 1796 Samson Heine, bearing a letter of

introduction, entered the house of the Van Gelderns. He was the son of

a Jewish merchant settled in Hanover, and he had just made a campaign

in Flanders and Brabant, in the capacity of commissary with the rank of

officer, under Prince Ernest of Cumberland. He was a large and handsome

man, with soft blonde hair and beautiful hands; there was something

about him, said his son, a little characterless, almost feminine; “he

was a great child.” After a brief courtship he married Betty, and

settled at Düsseldorf as an agent for English velveteens. Harry (so he

was named after an Englishman) was the first child. From his rather

weak and romantic father came whatever was loose and unbalanced in

Heine’s temperament, and his ineradicable instinct for posing; it was

his mother, with her strong and healthy nature, well developed both

intellectually and emotionally, and her great ambitions for her son,

who, as he himself said, played the chief part in the history of his

evolution.

Harry was a quick child; his senses were keen, though he was not

physically strong; he loved reading, and his favourite books were “Don

Quixote” and “Gulliver’s Travels.” He used to make rhymes with his

only and much-loved sister Lotte, and at the age of ten he wrote a

ghost-poem which his teachers considered a masterpiece. At the Lyceum

he worked well, at night as well as by day. Only once, at the public

ceremony at the end of a school year, he came to grief; he was reciting

a poem, when his eyes fell on a beautiful, fair-haired girl in the

audience; he hesitated, stammered, was silent, fell down fainting.

So early he revealed the extreme cerebral irritability of a nature

absorbed in dreams and taken captive by visions. It was not long after

this, at the age of seventeen, when his rich uncle at Hamburg was

trying in vain to set him forward on a commercial career, that Heine

met the woman who aroused his first and last profound passion, always

unsatisfied except in so far as it found exquisite embodiment in his

poems. He never mentioned her name; it was not till after his death

that the form standing behind this Maria, Zuleima, Evelina of so many

sweet, strange, or melancholy songs was known to be that of his cousin,

Amalie Heine.

With his uncle’s help he studied law at Bonn, Göttingen, and Berlin. At

Berlin he fell under the dominant influence of Hegel, the vanquisher

of the romantic school of which Schelling was the philosophic

representative. Heine afterwards referred to this period as that in

which he “herded swine with the Hegelians;” it is certain that Hegel

exerted great and permanent influence over him. At Berlin, in 1821,

appeared his first volume of poems, and then he began to take his true

place.

At this period he is described as a good-natured and gentle youth,

but reserved, not caring to show his emotions. He was of middle height

and slender, with rather long light brown hair (in childhood it was

red, and he was called “Rother Harry”) framing the pale and beardless

oval face, the bright, blue, short-sighted eyes, the Greek nose,

the high cheek bones, the large mouth, the full--half cynical, half

sensual--lips. He was not a typical German; like Goethe, he never

smoked; he disliked beer, and until he went to Paris he had never

tasted _sauerkraut_.

For some years he continued, chiefly at Göttingen, to study law. But

he had no liking and no capacity for jurisprudence, and his spasmodic

fits of application at such moments as he realized that it was not good

for him to depend on the generosity of his rich and kind-hearted uncle

Solomon, failed to carry him far. A new idea, a sunny day, the opening

of some flower-like _lied_, a pretty girl--and the Pandects were

forgotten.

Shortly after he had at last received his doctor’s diploma he went

through the ceremony of baptism in hope of obtaining an appointment

from the Prussian Government. It was a step which he immediately

regretted, and which, far from placing him in a better position,

excited the enmity both of Christians and Jews, although the Heine

family had no very strong views on the matter; Heine’s mother,

it should be said, was a Deist, his father indifferent, but the

Jewish rites were strictly kept up. He still talked of becoming an

advocate, until, in 1826, the publication of the first volume of

the “Reisebilder” gave him a reputation throughout Germany by its

audacity, its charming and picturesque manner, its peculiarly original

personality. The second volume, bolder and better than the first,

was received with delight very much mixed with horror, and it was

prohibited by Austria, Prussia, and many minor states. At this period

Heine visited England; he was then disgusted with Germany and full of

enthusiasm for the “land of freedom,” an enthusiasm which naturally

met with many rude shocks, and from that time dates the bitterness

with which he usually speaks of England. He found London--although,

owing to a clever abuse of uncle Solomon’s generosity, exceedingly

well supplied with money--“frightfully damp and uncomfortable;” only

the political life of England attracted him, and there were no bounds

to his admiration of Canning. He then visited Italy, to spend there

the happiest days of his life; and having at length realized that

his efforts to obtain any government appointment in Germany would be

fruitless, he emigrated to Paris. There, save for brief periods, he

remained until his death.

The New Spirit Third Edition · 第 4 / 15 段