CHAPTER XIV.

THE GREAT RESOURCES OF THE COMMUNE--THE GREAT WEAKNESS OF THE

COUNCIL--NOMINATION OF CLUSERET--DECREE CONCERNING THE

HOSTAGES--THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE--THE BANK.

COMMITTEE--THE BANK.

After an armistice of seventy days, Paris again took up the struggle for

France single-handed. It was no longer the territory only which she

strove for, but the very ground-work of the nation. Victorious, her

victory would not be sterile as those of the battlefield; regenerated,

the people would set to the great work of remaking the social edifice;

vanquished, all liberty would be quenched, the bourgeoisie turn its

whips into scorpions, and a generation glide into the grave.

And Paris, so generous, so fraternal, did not shudder at the impending

civil war. She stood up for an idea that exalted her battalions. While

the bourgeois refuses to fight, saying, "I have a family," the workman

says, "I fight for my children."

For the third time since the 18th March Paris had but one soul. The

official despatches, the hireling journalists established at Versailles,

pictured her as the pandemonium of all the black-legs of Europe,

recounted the thefts, the arrests _en masse_, the endless orgies,

detailed sums and names. According to them, honest women no longer dared

venture into the streets; 1,500,000 persons oppressed by 20,000 ruffians

were offering up ardent prayers for Versailles. But the traveller

running the risk of a visit to Paris, found the streets and boulevards

tranquil, presenting their usual aspect. The pillagers had only pillaged

the guillotine, solemnly burnt before the mairie of the eleventh

arrondissement. From all quarters the same murmur of execration rose

against the assassination of the prisoners and the ignoble scenes at

Versailles. The incoherence of the first acts of the Council was hardly

noticed while the ferocity of the Versaillese was the topic of the day.

Persons coming full of indignation against Paris, seeing this calm, this

union of hearts, these wounded men crying "Vive la Commune!" these

enthusiastic battalions; there Mont-Valerien vomiting death, here men

living as brothers, in a few hours caught the Parisian malady.

This was a fever of faith, of blind devotion, and of hope--of hope above

all. What rebellion had been thus armed? It was no longer a handful of

desperate men fighting behind a few pavements, reduced to charging their

muskets with slugs or stones. The Commune of 1871, much better armed

than that of 1793, possessed at least 60,000 men, 200,000 muskets, 1,200

cannon, five forts; an enceinte covered by Montmartre, Belleville, the

Pantheon overtowering the whole city, munitions enough to last for

years, and milliards at her bidding. What else is wanted to conquer?

Some revolutionary instinct. There was not a man at the Hotel-de-Ville

who did not boast of possessing it.

The sitting of the 3rd April during the battle was stormy. Many

inveighed against this mad sortie. Lefrancais, indignant at having been

deceived, withdrew from the Commission, which, called upon to explain,

threw all the blame upon the generals. The friends of the latter took up

their defence, demanded that news should be waited for. Soon the

disastrous tidings were brought, and they could not hesitate any longer.

For such a usurpation of authority there was but one atonement possible.

Flourens and Duval had made it voluntarily. The others ought to have

followed. Thus the dead would have been appeased, similar follies once

for all cut short, and the authority of the Commune brought home to the

most refractory.

But the men at the Hotel-de-Ville were not of such inflexibility. Many

had fought, plotted together under the Empire, lived in the same

prisons, identified the Revolution with their friends. And besides, the

generals, were they alone guilty? So many battalions could not have

bestirred themselves all the night without the Council being informed

thereof. Though blind or deaf, they were none the less responsible. In

order to be just they ought to have decimated themselves. They felt

this, no doubt, and did not dare strike the generals.

They might at least have dismissed them. They contented themselves with

replacing them on the Executive Commission, and notified this measure

most respectfully. "The Commune was desirous to leave them all liberty

in the conduct of the military operations; it was as far from wishing to

disoblige them as from wishing to weaken their authority." And yet their

heedlessness, their incapacity, had been mortal. Their ignorance only

saved them from the suspicion of having betrayed. This indulgence was

big with promises for the future.

This future meant Cluseret. From the first days he had beset the Central

Committee, the Ministries, in quest of a generalship, his hands full of

war plans against the mayors. The Committee would have nothing to do

with him. He then clung to the Executive Commission, which on the 2nd

April, at seven o'clock in the evening, appointed him delegate at war,

with the order to enter upon his duties immediately.[115] The rappel was

being beaten at that moment for the fatal sortie. Cluseret took good

care not to take possession of his post, allowed the generals to ruin

themselves, and on the 3rd appeared before the Council to denounce their

"_gaminerie_." It was this military pamphlet-monger, with no pledge but

his decoration, won against the Socialists of 1848, who had played the

marionette in three insurrections, whom the Socialists of 1871 charged

with the defence of their Revolution.

The choice was execrable, the very idea of naming a delegate faulty. The

Council had just decided to keep on the defensive. To guard the lines,

regularise the services, provision and administer the battalions, the

best delegate would have been common sense. A commission, composed of a

few active and laborious men, would have offered all guarantees of

security.

Moreover, the Council failed to point out what sort of defence they had

in view. The defence of the forts, of the redoubts, of the accessory

positions, required thousands of men, experienced officers, a war with

the mattock as well as the musket. The National Guard was not qualified

for such soldiership. Behind the ramparts, on the contrary, it became

invincible. It would have sufficed to blow up the forts of the south, to

fortify Montmartre, the Pantheon, and the Buttes-Chaumont, to strongly

arm the ramparts, to create a second, a third enceinte, to render Paris

inaccessible or untenable to the enemy. The Council did not indicate

either of these systems, but allowed its delegates to dabble with the

two, and finally annulled the one by the other.

If they wished by the appointment of a delegate to concentrate the

military power, why not dissolve the Central Committee? The latter

acted, spoke more boldly and much better than the Council which had

excluded it from the Hotel-de-Ville. The Committee had installed itself

in the Rue de l'Entrepot, behind the Customs House, near its cradle.

Thence on the 5th April it launched a fine proclamation: "Workmen, do

not deceive yourselves about the import of the combat. It is the

engagement between parasitism and labour, exploitation and production.

If you are tired of vegetating in ignorance and wallowing in misery, if

you want your children to be men enjoying the benefit of their labour,

and not mere animals trained for the workshop and the battlefield, if

you do not want your daughters, whom you are unable to educate and

overlook as you yearn to do, to become instruments of pleasure in the

arms of the aristocracy of money, if you at last want the reign of

justice, workmen, be intelligent, rise!"

The Committee certainly declared in another placard that it did not

pretend to any political power, but power in times of revolution of

itself belongs to those who define it. For eight days the Council had

not known how to interpret the Commune, and its whole baggage consisted

in two insignificant decrees. The Central Committee, on the contrary,

very distinctly set forth the character of this contest, that had become

a social one, pointed out behind the struggle for municipal liberties

that devouring sphinx the question of the proletariat.

The Council might have profited by the lesson, endorsed if necessary

that manifesto, and then, referring to the protestations of the

Committee, obliged it to dissolve itself. This was all the more easy

that the Committee, much weakened by the elections, only existed thanks

to four or five members and its eloquent mouthpiece, Moreau. But the

Council contented itself with mildly protesting at the sitting of the

5th, and as usual letting things get along as best they could.

It was already drifting from weakness to weakness; and yet, if ever it

believed in its own energy it was that day. The savagery of the

Versaillese, the assassination of the prisoners, of Flourens and Duval,

had excited the most calm. They had been there full of life three days

ago, these brave colleagues and friends. Their empty places seemed to

cry out for vengeance. Well, then, since Versailles waged a war of

cannibals, they would answer an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.

Besides, if the Council did not act, the people, it was said, would

perhaps revenge itself, and more terribly. They decreed that any one

accused of complicity with Versailles would be judged within forty-eight

hours, and if guilty, retained as a hostage. The execution by Versailles

of a defender of the Commune would be followed by that of a hostage--by

three said the decree, in equal or double number said the proclamation.

These different readings betrayed the troubled state of their minds. The

Council alone believed in having frightened Versailles. The bourgeois

journals certainly shouted "Abomination!" and M. Thiers, who shot

without any decrees, denounced the ferocity of the Commune. At bottom

they all laughed in their sleeves. The reactionists of any mark had long

since fled; there only remained in Paris the small fry and a few

isolated men, whom, if needs be, Versailles was ready to sacrifice.[116]

The members of the Council, in their childish impetuosity, had not seen

the real hostages staring them in the face--the bank, the civil

register, the domains and the suitors' fund. These were the tender

points by which to hold the bourgeoisie. Without risking a single man,

the Commune had only to stretch out its hand and bid Versailles

negotiate or commit suicide.

The timid delegates of the 26th March were not the men to dare this. In

allowing the Versaillese army to file off, the Central Committee had

committed a heavy fault; that of the Council was incomparably more

damaging. All serious rebels have commenced by seizing upon the sinews

of the enemy--the treasury. The Council of the Commune was the only

revolutionary Government that refused to do so. While abolishing the

budget of public worship, which was at Versailles, they bent their knees

to the budget of the bourgeoisie, which was at their mercy.

Then followed a scene of high comedy, if one could laugh at negligence

that has caused so much bloodshed. Since the 19th March the governors of

the bank lived like men condemned to death, every day expecting the

execution of their treasure. Of removing it to Versailles they could not

dream. It would have required sixty or eighty vans and an army corps. On

the 23rd, its governor, Rouland, could no longer stand it, and fled. The

sub-governor, De Ploeuc, replaced him. From his first interview with

the delegates of the Hotel-de-Ville he had seen through their timidity,

given battle, then seemed to soften, yielded little by little, and doled

out his money franc by franc. The bank, which Versailles believed almost

empty, contained: coin, 77 millions;[117] bank-notes, 166 millions;

bills discounted, 899 millions; securities for advances made, 120

millions; bullion, 11 millions; jewels in deposit, 7 millions; public

effects and other titles in deposit, 900 millions; that is, 2 milliards

180 million francs: 800 millions in bank-notes only required the

signature of the cashier, a signature easily made. The Commune had then

three milliards in its hands, of which over a milliard realised, enough

to buy all the generals and functionaries of Versailles; as hostages,

90,000 depositors of titles, and the two milliards in circulation whose

guarantee lay in the boxes in the Rue de la Vrilliere.

On the 29th March old Beslay presented himself before the tabernacle. De

Ploeuc had mustered his 430 clerks, armed with muskets without

cartridges. Beslay, led through the lines of these warriors, humbly

prayed the governor to be so kind as to supply the pay of the National

Guard. De Ploeuc answered superciliously, spoke of defending himself.

"But," said Beslay, "if, to prevent the effusion of blood, the Commune

appointed a governor." "A governor! never!" said De Ploeuc, who

understood his man; "but a delegate! If you were that delegate we might

come to an understanding." And, doing the pathetic, "Come, M. Beslay,

help me to save this. This is the fortune of your country; this is the

fortune of France."

Beslay, deeply moved, hurried off to the Executive Commission, repeated

his lesson all the better that he believed it and prided himself on his

financial lore. "The bank," he said, "is the fortune of the country:

without it, no more industry, no more commerce. If you violate it, all

its notes will be so much waste-paper."[118] This trash circulated in

the Hotel-de-Ville, and the Proudhonists of the Council, forgetting

that their master put the suppression of the bank at the head of his

revolutionary programme, backed old Beslay. At Versailles itself, the

capitalist stronghold had no more inveterate defenders than those of the

Hotel-de-Ville. If some one had at least proposed, "Let us at least

occupy the bank," but the Executive Commission had not the nerve to do

this, and contented itself with commissioning Beslay. De Ploeuc

received the good man with open arms, installed him in the nearest

cabinet, even persuading him to sleep at the bank, made him his hostage,

and once more breathed freely.

Thus since the first week the Assembly of the Hotel-de-Ville showed

itself weak towards the authors of the sortie, weak towards the Central

Committee, weak towards the bank, trifling in its decrees, in the choice

of its delegate to the War Office, without a military plan, without a

programme, without general views, and indulging in desultory

discussions. The Radicals who had remained in the Council saw whither it

was drifting, and, not inclined to play the martyrs, they sent in their

resignations.

O Revolution! thou dost not await the well-timed day and hour. Thou

comest suddenly, blind and fatal as the avalanche. The true soldier of

the people accepts the combat wherever hazard may place him. Blunders,

defections, compromising companions do not dishearten him. Though

certain of defeat, he struggles still; his victory looms in the future.

FOOTNOTES:

[115] Such is the text of the decree.

[116] M. Barthelemy St. Hilaire, M. Thiers' secretary, answered Barral

de Montaut, who spoke of the possibility of a massacre in the prisons:

"The hostages! the hostages! But we can do nothing. What should we do?

So much the worse for them."--_Enquete sur le 18 Mars_, vol. ii. p. 271.

[117] M. Beslay, in his book _Mes Souvenirs_, Paris, 1873, says: "The

cash in hand was forty and some odd millions." These "some odd" were no

less than 203 millions. They presented the good man fictitious

statements, with which they gulled him. In his evidence and the annexes

(_Enquete sur le 18 Mars_, vol. iii. errata, p. 488), M. de Ploeuc has

given the true statements.

[118] These were all the reasons he could ever allege, even in his book

written in Switzerland, whither M. de Ploeuc himself went to deposit him

after the fall of the Commune. Besides his life being saved, he, later

on, received a judicial ordinance to the effect that no further judicial

proceedings were to be taken against him.

History of the Commune of 1871 · 第 14 / 37 章