THE ENEMY REACH MONTEVIDEO—GEN. RIVERA'S MOVEMENT ON
THEIR LEFT FLANK—GEN. PAZ COMMANDS IN THE
CITY—SERVICES BY THE FRENCH AND ITALIAN CORPS
—TREACHERY—MISMANAGEMENT—GEN. PACHECO CORRECTS
IT—ATTACK ON THE BESIEGERS—ITALIAN LEGION
DISTINGUISHED—ANZANI—SERVICES OF THE FLOTILLA—A
PROVIDENTIAL EVENT—COMMODORE PURVIS—BRITISH
INTERVENTION—NEGOTIATION.
It was now the 16th of February, 1843. The fortifications of the city
had hardly had time to be completed, and to allow a few cannons to be
placed, when the enemy's army made its appearance on the surrounding
heights. General Rivera, at the head of the cavalry, although not strong
enough to be able to fight them, had gone out and taken the field,
turning the left flank of the enemy, and placing himself in their rear.
That manœuvre, performed in a masterly manner, placed him again in a
state to carry on the war with advantage. General Paz remained in
command of the forces in the capital, which were numerous compared with
the extent of wall which was to be defended. If, however, we regard the
materials of which they were composed, who were raw recruits, and the
pernicious elements at work, they could not be considered powerful. The
constancy of the General, however, was displayed to the utmost, who
sustained with them the first and most dangerous battles of the siege;
and notwithstanding the generous spirit displayed by the people, there
was no want of disturbers, cowards, and traitors. Vidal, then the
Minister-General, had robbed the treasury, and run away. Antuña, colonel
of a corps, and head of the police, deserted to the enemy, with many
other civil and military officers. A corps, called Aguerridos, composed
of foreigners hired by the Republic, in various affairs, had almost
entirely deserted; and one night, when they occupied an advanced post,
by their treachery they greatly exposed the security of the city. Such
examples also were imitated by single individuals, who, from various
motives, abandoned the files of the defenders, to pass over to the
enemy.
Affairs did not go on well at first. I never knew why Ourives, who must
have been well acquainted with occurrences, did not take advantage of
such distrust and the bad state of the fortifications, to make a
vigorous attack upon the place. He did nothing but make reconnaissances
and false attacks by night. In the meantime foreign legions were
organized and armed. In whatever way the spirit of the French and
Italian legions may be viewed, it must not be denied that the first call
to arms was answered by a generous rising, to repel the invasion of
their adopted country: but afterwards individuals were introduced, whose
interested views were quite on the contrary side. The organizing and
arming of those corps, however, certainly availed in securing the safety
of the city. The French, being more numerous and more excited by
military display, soon had two thousand six hundred men under arms. The
Italians assembled, in number five hundred; and, although they might
seem few in proportion to the number in the country, and their
education, I was surprised at seeing so many, considering their habits.
They were afterwards increased, but never exceeded seven hundred.
General Paz, profiting by the increase of forces, established an
exterior line, at the distance of a cannon-shot beyond the walls. From
that time the system of defence was settled, and the enemy were no more
able to approach the city.
While I had charge of the flotilla, with the organizing of which I was
proceeding, Angelo Mancini was placed in command of the legion—a man of
infamous memory; and he was accepted. The flotilla performed its first
service in a sortie; and, as might be supposed, made no favorable
figure. Italian bravery was despised, and I consequently burned with
shame. The Legion was appointed to form part of an expedition to the
Cerro; and I was to accompany it. General Bauza, an experienced and good
soldier, but an old man, had the command. He appeared in the presence of
the enemy, marching and counter-marching, without accomplishing any
effect. It was, perhaps, prudent not to attack an enemy, who, if not
more numerous, were more experienced and warlike. I endeavored to excite
the veteran general, but in vain, when fortune sent General Pacheco from
Montevideo, who was then Minister of War. His appearance gratified me
very much, as I knew him to be an enterprising and brave man. We were
soon acquainted, and I was treated by the new chief with confidence and
familiarity. I requested leave to drive the enemy from a position beyond
a ditch, which then served as a dividing line to the besiegers. He not
only assented, but ordered General Bauza to support the movement of the
Italian Legion. We attacked the left wing of the enemy, who fearlessly
awaited us with a firm front and a terrible volley of musketry. But the
Italian Legion was victorious that day. Although numbers fell wounded,
their comrades pressed on fearlessly, and at length charged with
bayonets, when the enemy fled, and were pursued to a considerable
distance. The centre and right were also victorious, and took forty-two
prisoners, besides killed and wounded.
That action, although of little importance in itself, was of very great
value in its effects,—greatly strengthening the spirit of the Republican
army, and diminishing that of the enemy, while it established, from that
day, the military character of the Italian Legion. It was also the
precursor of many great deeds performed by that corps, which was never
conquered.
The next day the Italian Legion was in the principal square of the
metropolis, in view of the whole population, receiving the praises of
the Minister of War and the acclamations of all the people. The
impressive words of General Pacheco had resounded among the multitude. I
had never heard words more adapted to rouse a nation.
The Italian Legion had now fought for the first time and by itself, and
there was that same Captain Giacomo Minuto who was afterwards captain of
cavalry in Rome, and there received a wound in the breast from a ball,
and died in consequence of loosening the bandages at the news of the
entrance of the French.
Major Pedro Rodriguez also displayed much bravery.
From that day until the appearance of Anzani in the Legion, I absented
myself but little from the corps, although engaged at sea most of the
time. About that period Anzani was at Buenos Ayres, where, receiving an
invitation from me, he came to Montevideo. The acquisition of Anzani to
the Legion was extremely valuable, especially for instruction and
discipline. Although he was much opposed by Manceni and by the second
chief, who could not submit to acknowledge his superior merit, being
perfect in military knowledge and direction, he systematized the corps
on as regular a footing as circumstances would permit.
The flotilla, although of little importance, did not fail to be worth
something to the defence of the place. Posted at the left extremity of
the line of defence, it not only effectually covered it, but threatened
the right flank of the enemy whenever it attempted an attack. It served
as a link between the important position of the Cerro and the Island of
Libertad, by greatly facilitating and coöperating in the attempts which
were continually made upon the right of the enemy, who were besieging
the Cerro. The Island of Libertad had been watched by the enemy, who
laid a plan to get possession of it. Their squadron, under command of
General Brown, was prepared to invade it and gain possession. It was
determined that artillery should be placed upon it, and I transported to
it two cannon, eighteen pounders.
About ten at night, that operation having been performed, I left the
island with a company of my countrymen, and returned towards Montevideo.
Then happened one of those unforeseen and important events which, I love
to say, are evidently brought about by the hand of Providence. The
Island of Libertad, placed in advance of the coast of the Cerro at the
distance of less than a cannon-shot, is less than three miles from
Montevideo. The wind blew from the South, and caused some agitation of
the sea in the bay in proportion to its force, and especially in that
passage between the island and the mole. I had embarked in a launch,
purchased by the government, and had with me sailors enough to perform
the service just executed, and the large lighter in tow, in which the
artillery had been transported. Between the waves rolling in from the
south and the weight of the boat, which was also exactly square in
shape, we proceeded slowly, drifting considerably towards the north end
of the bay, when, all at once, several vessels of war were discovered to
the leeward, and so near that the sentinels were heard calling to the
men, "Keep quiet!" It was doubtless the enemy's squadron.
We wonderfully escaped being captured by them; but the principal cause
of our safety was, that the small vessels and the boats of the enemy had
gone to attack the island, and there was nothing left that could pursue
us. If this had not been the case, we should doubtless have been taken:
but, more than this, the enemy did not fire a shot, though they might
easily have sunk our little vessels, for fear of alarming their troops
who had gone to the island, to surprise it. But what an escape it
appeared to me when I reached the mole, and began to hear a terrible
discharge of musketry on the Island of Libertad! I immediately reported
the proceedings to the government, and then went on board my little
vessels, to prepare them to go in aid of the troops on the island. They
were only about sixty there, not well armed, and with but little
ammunition. I set sail at dawn of day, with only two small vessels,
called _yates_; the third, and only remaining one of the flotilla, not
being fit for use at that time. We proceeded, and soon entered between
the island and the Cerro, uncertain whether the enemy had got possession
or not in their night attack. But the brave Italians, although taken
unexpectedly, had fought with bravery, and had not only repulsed the
enemy, but driven them back with much loss; and the corpses of Rosas'
soldiers floated about in the waters of the harbor several days after.
Having sent a skiff to the island to ascertain its fate, I soon received
welcome intelligence of the successful resistance. I speedily landed the
munitions, and one of my officers with some men to serve the guns; and
this had hardly been accomplished when the enemy opened their fire, and
the island replied with its two cannon. I then, with my two boats, got
to windward of the enemy's vessels, and did all I could against them.
But the combat was unequal in the extreme. I had against me two
brigantines and two schooners, and one of the former had sixteen guns.
The cannons on the island had platforms, and were ill-supplied with
ammunition, and therefore did not fire well, or produce much effect. Had
they been better provided for, they might have done good service.
Although the sea was not very rough, it was sufficiently so to prevent
the guns of my two little vessels from firing with precision; and, in
short, it seemed impossible that the engagement could fail to be to the
enemy successful. But once more God provided for us!
Commodore Purvis, then commander of the British station at Montevideo,
sent a messenger to Brown, on account of which he ceased firing. From
that moment the affairs turned to negotiation. The enemy's squadron left
the harbor, and the island did not again fall into the power of another.
Whatever the reasons of the Commodore may have been, it is undeniable
that some degree of chivalrous generosity towards an unfortunate but
courageous people entered into the sympathies and into the act of the
philanthropic son of Albion. From that moment Montevideo knew that she
had in the English Commodore not only a friend, but a protector.
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