The Progressive party and the Progressive movement were two things.
The one was born on a day, lived a stirring, strenuous span of life,
suffered its fatal wound, lingered on for a few more years, and received
its coup de grace. The other sprang like a great river system from
a multitude of sources, flowed onward by a hundred channels, always
converging and uniting, until a single mighty stream emerged to water
and enrich and serve a broad country and a great people. The one was
ephemeral, abortive--a failure. The other was permanent, creative--a
triumph. The two were inseparable, each indispensable to the other. Just
as the party would never have existed if there had been no movement,
so the movement would not have attained such a surpassing measure of
achievement so swiftly without the party.
The Progressive party came into full being at the convention held in
Chicago on August 5, 1912 under dramatic circumstances. Every drama must
have a beginning and this one had opened for the public when, on the
10th of February in the same year, the Republican Governors of West
Virginia, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Wyoming, Michigan, Kansas, and
Missouri addressed a letter to Roosevelt, in which they declared that,
in considering what would best insure the continuation of the Republican
party as a useful agency of good government, they had reached the
conclusion that a large majority of the Republican voters of the country
favored Roosevelt's nomination, and a large majority of the people
favored his election as the next President. They asserted their belief
that, in view of this public demand, he should soon declare whether, if
the nomination came to him unsolicited and unsought, he would accept it.
They concluded their request with this paragraph:
"In submitting this request we are not considering your personal
interests. We do not regard it as proper to consider either the
interest or the preference of any man as regards the nomination for the
Presidency. We are expressing our sincere belief and best judgment as to
what is demanded of you in the interests of the people as a whole. And
we feel that you would be unresponsive to a plain public duty if
you should decline to accept the nomination, coming as the voluntary
expression of the wishes of a majority of the Republican voters of
the United States, through the action of their delegates in the next
National Convention."
The sincerity and whole-heartedness of the convictions here expressed
are in no wise vitiated by the fact that the letter was not written
until the seven Governors were assured what the answer to it would be.
For the very beginning of our drama, then, we must go back a little
farther to that day in late January of 1912 when Theodore Roosevelt
himself came face to face with a momentous decision. On that day he
definitely determined that his duty to the things in which he profoundly
believed--and no less to the friends and associates who shared his
beliefs--constrained him once more to enter the arena of political
conflict and lead the fight.
Roosevelt had come to this conclusion with extreme reluctance. He had no
illusions as to the probable effect upon his personal fortunes. Twice
he had been President once by the hand of fate, once by a great popular
vote. To be President again could add nothing to his prestige or fame;
it could only subject him for four years to the dangerous vagaries
of the unstable popular mood. He had nothing to gain for himself by
entering the ring of political conflict again; the chances for personal
loss were great. His enemies, his critics, and his political adversaries
would have it that he was eaten up with ambition, that he came back from
his African and European trip eager to thrust himself again into the
limelight of national political life and to demand for himself again a
great political prize. But his friends, his associates, and those who,
knowing him at close range, understood him, realized that this was no
picture of the truth. He accepted what hundreds of Progressive leaders
and followers throughout the country--for the man in the ranks had as
ready access to him as the most prominent leader, and received as warm
consideration--asserted was his clear duty and obligation.
A letter which he had written two days before Christmas, 1911, shows
unmistakably how his mind was working in those days of prologue to the
great decision. The letter was entirely private, and was addressed to my
father who was a publisher and a friend and not a politician. There is,
therefore, no reason whatever why the letter should not be accepted as
an accurate picture of Mr. Roosevelt's mind at that time: "Now for the
message Harold gave me, that I should write you a little concerning
political conditions. They are very, very mixed. Curiously enough, my
article on the trusts was generally accepted as bringing me forward for
the Presidential nomination. Evidently what really happened was that
there had been a strong undercurrent of feeling about me, and that the
talk concerning the article enabled this feeling to come to the surface.
I do not think it amounts to anything. It merely means that a great many
people do not get the leadership they are looking for from any of the
prominent men in public life, and that under the circumstances they
grasp at any one; and as my article on the McNamaras possessed at least
the merit of being entirely clearcut and of showing that I knew my own
mind and had definite views, a good many plain people turned longingly
to me as a leader. Taft is very weak, but La Follette has not developed
real strength east of the Mississippi River, excepting of course in
Wisconsin. West of the River he has a large following, although there is
a good deal of opposition to him even in States like Kansas, Washington,
and California. East of the Mississippi, I believe he can only pick up
a few delegates here and there. Taft will have most of the Southern
delegates, he will have the officeholders, and also the tepid and
acquiescent, rather than active, support of the ordinary people who do
not feel very strongly one way or the other, and who think it is the
usual thing to renominate a President. If there were a strong candidate
against him, he would I believe be beaten, but there are plenty of men,
many of the leaders not only here but in Texas, for instance, in Ohio,
in New Hampshire and Illinois, who are against him, but who are even
more against La Follette, and who regard themselves as limited to the
alternative between the two. There is, of course, always the danger that
there may be a movement for me, the danger coming partly because the
men who may be candidates are very anxious that the ticket shall be
strengthened and care nothing for the fate of the man who strengthens
it, and partly because there is a good deal of honest feeling for me
among plain simple people who wish leadership, but who will not
accept leadership unless they believe it to be sincere, fearless, and
intelligent. I most emphatically do not wish the nomination. Personally
I should regard it as a calamity to be nominated. In the first place, I
might very possibly be beaten, and in the next place, even if elected I
should be confronted with almost impossible conditions out of which to
make good results. In the tariff, for instance, I would have to face
the fact that men would keep comparing what I did, not with what the
Democrats would or could have done but with an ideal, or rather with a
multitude of entirely separate and really incompatible ideals. I am
not a candidate, I will never be a candidate; but I have to tell the
La Follette men and the Taft men that while I am absolutely sincere in
saying that I am not a candidate and do not wish the nomination, yet
that I do not feel it would be right or proper for me to say that under
no circumstances would I accept it if it came; because, while wildly
improbable, it is yet possible that there might be a public demand which
would present the matter to me in the light of a duty which I could not
shirk. In other words, while I emphatically do not want office, and have
not the slightest idea that any demand for me will come, yet if there
were a real public demand that in the public interest I should do a
given job, it MIGHT be that I would not feel like flinching from the
task. However, this is all in the air, and I do not for one moment
believe that it will be necessary for me even to consider the matter. As
for the Democrats, they have their troubles too. Wilson, although still
the strongest man the Democrats could nominate, is much weaker than he
was. He has given a good many people a feeling that he is very ambitious
and not entirely sincere, and his demand for the Carnegie pension
created an unpleasant impression. Harmon is a good old solid Democrat,
with the standards of political and commercial morality of twenty years
ago, who would be eagerly welcomed by all the conservative crowd. Champ
Clark is a good fellow, but impossible as President.
"I think a good deal will depend upon what this Congress does. Taft may
redeem himself. He was fairly strong at the end of the last session, but
went off lamentably on account of his wavering and shillyshallying on so
many matters during his speaking trip. His speeches generally hurt
him, and rarely benefit him. But it is possible that the Democrats in
Congress may play the fool, and give him the chance to appear as the
strong leader, the man who must be accepted to oppose them."
This was what Roosevelt at the end, of December sincerely believed would
be the situation as time went on. But he underestimated the strength and
the volume of the tide that was rising.
The crucial decision was made on the 18th of January. I was in the
closest possible touch with Roosevelt in those pregnant days, and I
know, as well as any but the man himself could know, how his mind was
working. An entry in my diary on that date shows the origin of the
letter of the seven governors:
"Senator Beveridge called on T. R. to urge him to make a public
statement soon. T. R. impressed by his arguments and by letters just
received from three Governors, Hadley, Glasscock, and Bass. Practically
determined to ask these Governors, and Stubbs and Osborne, to send him a
joint letter asking him to make a public statement to the effect that
if there is a genuine popular demand for his nomination he will not
refuse-in other words to say to him in a joint letter for publication
just what they have each said to him in private letters. Such joint
action would give him a proper reason--or occasion--for making a public
declaration. T. R. telegraphed Frank Knox, Republican State Chairman of
Michigan and former member of his regiment, to come down, with intention
of asking him to see the various governors. H. H., at Ernest Abbott's
suggestion, asked him not to make final decision till he has had
conference--already arranged--with editorial staff. T. R. agrees, but
the inevitableness of the matter is evident."
After that day, things moved rapidly. Two days later the diary contains
this record: "Everett Colby, William Fellowes Morgan, and Mark
Sullivan call on T. R. All inclined to agree that time for statement is
practically here. T. R.--The time to use a man is when the people want
to use him." M. S.--"The time to set a hen is when the hen wants to
set." Frank Knox comes in response to telegram. Nat Wright also present
at interview where Knox is informed of the job proposed for him. Gifford
Pinchot also present at beginning of interview while T. R. tells how
he views the situation, but leaves (at T. R.'s suggestion) before real
business of conference begins. Plan outlined to Knox, who likes it, and
subsequently, in H. H.'s office, draws up letter for Governors. Draft
shown to T. R., who suggests a couple of added sentences emphasizing
that the nomination must come as a real popular demand, and declaring
that the Governors are taking their action not for his sake, but for the
sake of the country. Knox takes copy of letter and starts for home, to
go out to see Governors as soon as possible.
On the 22d of January the Conference with The Outlook editorial staff
took place and is thus described in my diary:
"T. R. had long conference with entire staff. All except R. D. T.
[Mr. Townsend, Managing Editor of The Outlook] and H. H. inclined to
deprecate a public statement now. T. R.--'I have had all the honor the
American public can give me. If I should be elected I would go back not
so young as I once was, with all the first fine flavor gone, and take up
the horrible task of going in and out, in and out, of the same hole over
and over again. But I cannot decline the call. Too many of those
who have fought with me the good fight for the things we believe in
together, declare that at this critical moment I am the instrument that
ought to be used to make it possible for me to refuse. I BELIEVE I SHALL
BE BROKEN IN THE USING. But I cannot refuse to permit myself to be used.
I am not going to get those good fellows out on the end of a limb and
then saw off the limb.' R. D. T. suggested that it be said frankly that
the Governors wrote the joint letter at T. R.'s request. T. R. accepted
like a shot. Went into H. H.'s room, dictated two or three sentences to
that effect, which H. H. later incorporated in letter. [This plan was
later given up, I believe on the urging of some or all of the Governors
involved.] T. R.--'I can't go on telling my friends in private letters
what my position is, but asking them not to make it public, without
seeming furtive.' In afternoon H. H. suggests that T. R. write first
draft of his letter of reply soon as possible to give all possible time
for consideration and revision. T. R. has two inspirations--to propose
presidential primaries in order to be sure of popular demand, and to use
statement made at Battery when he returned home from Europe."
The next day's entry reads as follows:
"Sent revised letter to Knox. T. R. said, "Not to make a public
statement soon would be to violate my cardinal principle--never hit if
you can help it, but when you have to, hit hard. NEVER hit soft. You'll
never get any thanks for hitting soft." McHarg called with three men
from St. Louis. T. R. said exactly the same thing as usual--he would
never accept the nomination if it came as the result of an intrigue,
only if it came as the result of a genuine and widespread popular
demand. The thing he wants to be sure of is that there is this
widespread popular demand that he "do a job," and that the demand is
genuine."
Meanwhile Frank Knox was consulting the seven Governors, each one of
whom was delighted to have an opportunity to say to Roosevelt in this
formal, public way just what they had each said to him privately and
forcefully. The letter was signed and delivered to T. R. On the 24th
of February Roosevelt replied to the letter of the seven Governors in
unequivocal terms, "I will accept the nomination for President if it is
tendered to me, and I will adhere to this decision until--the convention
has expressed its preference." He added the hope that so far as possible
the people might be given the chance, through direct primaries, to
record their wish as to who should be the nominee. A month later, in a
great address at Carnegie Hall in New York, he gave voice publicly to
the same thought that he had expressed to his friends in that editorial
conference: "The leader for the time being, whoever he may be, is but
an instrument, to be used until broken and then cast aside; and if he
is worth his salt he will care no more when he is broken than a soldier
cares when he is sent where his life is forfeit that the victory may
be won. In the long fight for righteousness the watchword for all is,
'Spend and be spent.' It is of little matter whether any one man fails
or succeeds; but the cause shall not fail, for it is the cause of
mankind."
The decision once made, Roosevelt threw himself into the contest for
delegates to the nominating convention with his unparalleled vigor and
forcefulness. His main opponent was, of course, the man who had been
his friend and associate and whom he had done more than any other single
force to make President as his successor. William Howard Taft had
the undivided support of the national party organization; but the
Progressive Republicans the country over thronged to Roosevelt's support
with wild enthusiasm. The campaign for the nomination quickly developed
two aspects, one of which delighted every Progressive in the Republican
party, the other of which grieved every one of Roosevelt's levelheaded
friends. It became a clean-cut conflict between progress and reaction,
between the interests of the people, both as rulers and as governed,
and the special interests, political and business. But it also became
a bitter conflict of personalities between the erstwhile friends. The
breach between the two men was afterwards healed, but it was several
years after the reek of the battle had drifted away before even formal
relations were restored between them.
A complicating factor in the campaign was the candidacy of Senator La
Follette of Wisconsin. In July, 1911, La Follette had begun, at the
earnest solicitation of many Progressive leaders in Congress and out, an
active campaign for the Republican nomination. Progressive organizations
were perfected in numerous States and "in less than three months," as La
Follette has written in his Autobiography, his candidacy "had taken on
proportions which compelled recognition." Four months later a conference
of some three hundred Progressives from thirty States, meeting in
Chicago, declared that La Follette was, because of his record, the
logical candidate for the Presidency. Following this conference he
continued to campaign with increasing vigor, but concurrently the
enthusiasm of some of his leading supporters began to cool and their
support of his candidacy to weaken. Senator La Follette ascribes this
effect to the surreptitious maneuvering of Roosevelt, whom he credits
with an overwhelming appetite for another Presidential term, kept in
check only by his fear that he could not be nominated or elected. But
there is no evidence of any value whatever that Roosevelt was conducting
underground operations or that he desired to be President again. The
true explanation of the change in those Progressives who had favored the
candidacy of La Follette and yet had gradually ceased to support him,
is to be found in their growing conviction that Taft and the reactionary
forces in the Republican party which he represented could be defeated
only by one man--and that not the Senator from Wisconsin. In any event
the La Follette candidacy rapidly declined until it ceased to be
a serious element in the situation. Although the Senator, with
characteristic consistency and pertinacity, stayed in the fight till the
end, he entered the Convention with the delegates of but two States, his
own Wisconsin and North Dakota, pledged to support him.
The pre-convention campaign was made unusually dramatic by the fact
that, for the first time in the history of Presidential elections,
the voters of thirteen States were privileged not only to select the
delegates to the Convention by direct primary vote but to instruct them
in the same way as to the candidate for whom they should cast their
ballots. There were 388 such popularly instructed delegates from
California, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New
Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and
Wisconsin. It was naturally in these States that the two candidates
concentrated their campaigning efforts. The result of the selection
of delegates and of the preferential vote in these States was the best
possible evidence of the desire of the rank and file of the party as to
the Presidential candidate. Of these 388 delegates, Senator La Follette
secured 36; President Taft 71--28 in Georgia, 2 in Illinois, 18 in
Massachusetts, 14 in Ohio, and 9 in Pennsylvania; and Roosevelt 281--26
in California, 56 in Illinois, 16 in Maryland, 18 in Massachusetts,
16 in Nebraska, 28 in New Jersey, 34 in Ohio, 10 in Oregon, 67 in
Pennsylvania, and 10 in South Dakota. Roosevelt therefore, in those
States where the voters could actually declare at primary elections
which candidate they preferred, was the expressed choice of more than
five times as many voters as Taft.
When the Republican convention met in Chicago an interesting and
peculiar situation presented itself. There were 1078 seats in the
Convention. Of the delegates elected to those seats Taft had committed
to him the vast majority of the delegates from the States which have
never cast an electoral vote for a Republican candidate for President
since there was a Republican party. Roosevelt had in support of him
the great majority of the delegates from the States which are normally
Republican and which must be relied upon at election time if a
Republican President is to be chosen. Of the 1078 seats more than 200
were contested. Aside from these contested seats, neither candidate had
a majority of the delegates. The problem that confronted each side was
to secure the filling of a sufficient number of the disputed seats with
its retainers to insure a majority for its candidate. In the solution
of this problem the Taft forces had one insuperable advantage. The
temporary roll of a nominating convention is made up by the National
Committee of the party. The Republican National Committee had been
selected at the close of the last national convention four years before.
It accordingly represented the party as it had then stood, regardless
of the significant changes that three and a quarter years of Taft's
Presidency had wrought in party opinion.
In the National Committee the Taft forces had a strength of more than
two to one; and all but an insignificant number of the contests were
decided out of hand in favor of Mr. Taft. The temporary roll of the
Convention therefore showed a distinct majority against Roosevelt.
From the fall of the gavel, the Roosevelt forces fought with vigor and
determination for what they described as the "purging of the roll" of
those Taft delegates whose names they declared had been placed upon it
by fraud. But at every turn the force of numbers was against them; and
the Taft majority which the National Committee had constituted in
the Convention remained intact, an impregnable defense against the
Progressive attack.
These preliminary engagements concerned with the determination of the
final membership of the Convention had occupied several days. Meanwhile
the temper of the Roosevelt delegates had burned hotter and hotter.
Roosevelt was present, leading the fight in person--not, of course,
on the floor of the Convention, to which he was not a delegate, but
at headquarters in the Congress Hotel. There were not wanting in
the Progressive forces counsels of moderation and compromise. It was
suggested by those of less fiery mettle that harmony might be arrived
at on the basis of the elimination of both Roosevelt and Taft and
the selection of a candidate not unsatisfactory to either side. But
Roosevelt, backed by the majority of the Progressive delegates, stood
firm and immovable on the ground that the "roll must be purged" and that
he would consent to no traffic with a Convention whose make-up contained
delegates holding their seats by virtue of fraud. "Let them purge the
roll," he declared again and again, "and I will accept any candidate the
Convention may name." But the organization leaders knew that a yielding
to this demand for a reconstitution of the personnel of the Convention
would result in but one thing--the nomination for Roosevelt--and this
was the one thing they were resolved not to permit.
As the hours of conflict and turmoil passed, there grew steadily and
surely in the Roosevelt ranks a demand for a severance of relations
with the fraudulent Convention and the formation of a new party devoted,
without equivocation or compromise, to Progressive principles. A typical
incident of these days of confusion and uncertainty was the drawing up
of a declaration of purpose by a Progressive alternate from New Jersey,
disgusted with the progress of the machine steam roller and disappointed
at the delayed appearance of a positive Progressive programme of action.
Circulated privately, with the knowledge and approval of Roosevelt,
it was promptly signed by dozens of Progressive delegates. It read as
follows:
"We, the undersigned, in the event that the Republican National
Convention as at present constituted refuses to purge its roll of the
delegates fraudulently placed upon it by the action of the majority
of the Republican National Committee, pledge ourselves, as American
citizens devoted to the progressive principles of genuine popular rule
and social justice, to join in the organization of a new party founded
upon those principles, under the leadership of Theodore Roosevelt."
The first signer of the declaration was Governor Hiram W. Johnson of
California, the second, Governor Robert S. Vessey of South Dakota, the
third, Governor Joseph M. Carey of Wyoming, and farther down the
list were the names of Gifford and Amos Pinchot, James R. Garfield,
ex-Governor John Franklin Fort of New Jersey, with Everett Colby and
George L. Record of the same State, Matthew Hale of Massachusetts,
"Jack" Greenway of Arizona, Judge Ben B. Lindsey of Colorado, Medill
McCormick of Illinois, George Rublee of New Hampshire, and Elon
Huntington Hooker, of New York, who was to become the National Treasurer
of the new party. The document was, of course, a purely informal
assertion of purpose; but it was the first substantial straw to predict
the whirlwind which the masters of the convention were to reap.
When at last it had become unmistakably clear that the Taft forces
were and would remain to the end in control of the Convention, the
Progressive delegates, with a few exceptions, united in dramatic action.
Speaking for them with passion and intensity Henry J. Allen of Kansas
announced their intention to participate no longer in the actions of
a convention vitiated by fraud. The Progressive delegates would, he
declared, remain in their places but they would neither vote nor take
any part whatever in the proceedings. He then read, by permission of
the Convention, a statement from Roosevelt, in which he pronounced the
following indictment:
"The Convention has now declined to purge the roll of the fraudulent
delegates placed thereon by the defunct National Committee, and the
majority which has thus indorsed the fraud was made a majority only
because it included the fraudulent delegates themselves who all sat as
judges on one another's cases.... The Convention as now composed has
no claim to represent the voters of the Republican party.... Any man
nominated by the Convention as now constituted would merely be the
beneficiary of this successful fraud; it would be deeply discreditable
for any man to accept the Convention's nomination under these
circumstances; and any man thus accepting it would have no claim to the
support of any Republican on party grounds and would have forfeited
the right to ask the support of any honest man of any party on moral
grounds."
So while most of the Roosevelt delegates sat in ominous quiet and
refused to vote, the Convention proceeded to nominate Taft for President
by the following vote: Taft 561--21 votes more than a majority;
Roosevelt 107; La Follette 41; Cummins 17; Hughes 2; absent 6; present
and not voting 344.
Then the Taft delegates went home to meditate on the fight which they
had won and the more portentous fight which they must wage in the coming
months on a broader field. The Roosevelt delegates, on the other
hand, went out to Orchestra Hall, and in an exalted mood of passionate
devotion to their cause and their beloved leader proceeded to nominate
Theodore Roosevelt for the Presidency and Hiram Johnson for the
Vice-Presidency. A committee was sent to notify Roosevelt of the
nomination and when he appeared in the hall all precedents of
spontaneous enthusiasm were broken. This was no conventional--if the
double entendre may be permitted--demonstration. It had rather the
quality of religious exaltation.
Roosevelt made a short speech, in which he adjured his hearers to go to
their several homes "to find out the sentiment of the people at home and
then again come together, I suggest by mass convention, to nominate for
the Presidency a Progressive on a Progressive platform that will enable
us to appeal to Northerner and Southerner, Easterner and Westerner,
Republican and Democrat alike, in the name of our common American
citizenship. If you wish me to make the fight I will make it, even if
only one State should support me."
Thus ended the first act in the drama. The second opened with the
gathering of some two thousand men and women at Chicago on August 5,
1912. It was a unique gathering. Many of the delegates were women; one
of the "keynote" speeches was delivered by Miss Jane Addams of Hull
House. The whole tone and atmosphere of the occasion seemed religious
rather than political. The old-timers among the delegates, who found
themselves in the new party for diverse reasons, selfish, sincere,
or mixed, must have felt astonishment at themselves as they stood and
shouted out Onward Christian Soldiers as the battle-hymn of their new
allegiance. The long address which Roosevelt made to the Convention he
denominated his "Confession of Faith." The platform which the gathering
adopted was entitled "A Contract with the People." The sessions of the
Convention seethed with enthusiasm and burned hot with earnest devotion
to high purpose. There could be no doubt in the mind of any but the most
cynical of political reactionaries that here was the manifestation of a
new and revivifying force to be reckoned with in the future development
of American political life.
The platform adopted by the Progressive Convention was no less a
novelty. Its very title--even the fact that it had a title marked it
off from the pompous and shopworn documents emanating from the usual
nominating Convention--declared a reversal of the time-honored view of
a platform as, like that of a street-car, "something to get in on, not
something to stand on." The delegates to that Convention were perfectly
ready to have their party sued before the bar of public opinion
for breach of contract if their candidates when elected did not do
everything in their power to carry out the pledges of the platform.
The planks of the platform grouped themselves into three main sections:
political reforms, control of trusts and combinations, and measures of
"social and industrial justice."
In the first section were included direct primaries, nation-wide
preferential primaries for the selection of candidates for the
Presidency, direct popular election of United States Senators, the
short ballot, the initiative, referendum and recall, an easier method
of amending the Federal constitution, woman suffrage, and the recall
of judicial decisions in the form of a popular review of any decision
annulling a law passed under the police power of the State.
The platform in the second place opposed vigorously the indiscriminate
dissolution of trusts and combinations, on the ground that combination
in the business field was not only inevitable but necessary and
desirable for the promotion of national and international efficiency. It
condemned the evils of inflated capitalization and unfair competition;
and it proposed, in order to eliminate those evils while
preserving the unquestioned advantages that flow from combination, the
establishment of a strong Federal commission empowered and directed
to maintain permanent active supervision over industrial corporations
engaged in interstate commerce, doing for them what the Federal
Government now does for the national banks and, through the Interstate
Commerce Commission, for the transportation lines.
Finally in the field of social justice the platform pledged the party to
the abolition of child labor, to minimum wage laws, the eight-hour day,
publicity in regard to working conditions, compensation for industrial
accidents, continuation schools for industrial education, and to
legislation to prevent industrial accidents, occupational diseases,
overwork, involuntary unemployment, and other injurious effects incident
to modern industry.
To stand upon this platform and to carry out the terms of this "contract
with the people," the Convention nominated without debate or dissent
Theodore Roosevelt for President and Hiram W. Johnson of California for
Vice-President. Governor Johnson was an appropriate running mate for
Roosevelt. In his own State he had led one of the most virile and fast
moving of the local Progressive movements. He burned with a white-hot
enthusiasm for the democratic ideal and the rights of man as embodied
in equality of opportunity, freedom of individual development, and
protection from the "dark forces" of special privilege, political
autocracy and concentrated wealth. He was a brilliant and fiery
campaigner where his convictions were enlisted.
So passed the second act in the drama of the Progressive party.