persuasion that a writer ought to content himself with the use
of common words in their common sense, and feel a repugnance to
technical terms and arbitrary rules of phraseology, as pedantic
and troublesome, it is soon found by the student of any branch
of science that, without technical terms and fixed rules, there
can be no certain or progressive knowledge. The loose and
infantine grasp of common language cannot hold objects steadily
enough for scientific examination, or lift them from one stage
of generalization to another. They must be secured by the rigid
mechanism of a scientific phraseology. This necessity has been
felt in all the sciences, from the earliest periods of their
progress.
WHEWELL.
Ideas and existences are represented by terms and phrases;
and as terms and phrases are representative of thoughts and
things, and are the means which enable us to speak about them,
the definitions, descriptions, and explanations of terms form
a very necessary part of science; and he who would understand
science must learn the meaning of the special terms employed in
it.
GORE.
VI
TECHNICAL TERMS AS INSTRUMENTS OF THOUGHT
[Sidenote: Technical terms.]
[Sidenote: Their value.]
Some teachers are very much afraid of technical terms. They teach
their pupils to say name-word instead of noun, action-word instead
of verb, and bring over instead of transpose. There is no end to the
phrases they invent for the sake of avoiding technical terms. Acting
on the maxim that a pupil shall never be allowed to use a word without
comprehending its meaning, they prefer to use compound words and phrases
to denote the fundamental ideas of the various branches of study. This
fear of technical terms is a natural result of the reaction against
rote teaching. So much has been said and written against the teaching
of mere words, especially big words, against parrot-like recitations
of definitions, rules, principles, and forms of statement given in the
text-book or wrought out by the teacher, that many people fail to see the
value of technical terms as instruments of thought. A separate chapter
is necessary to point out their function in scientific thinking and
instruction. In common parlance the use of technical terms should be
avoided. Do we say that Nebuchadnezzar had a long noun or a long name?
Noun is a technical term; name is the word in ordinary use. Do we say
that a man broke his femur or his leg? The doctors who set the limb will
probably use the technical term in their conferences. In talking with
the common people they use the common names, unless they wish to awe
the multitudes by a show of learning. Often, indeed, men use big words
to hide their ignorance. In physiology the investigations are carried
as far as possible, and then a term is coined to cover the unknown.
Often high-sounding words are strung together to cover a lack of ideas
or to establish a reputation for erudition. These are tricks to which a
genuine teacher has no occasion to resort. It is his duty to ascertain
the educational value of the technical terms of science, and to use these
terms for the purpose of fixing scientific ideas in the mind and of
causing the pupil to think clearly and exactly.
[Sidenote: Basal concepts.]
At the basis of every science, as we have seen, there are certain ideas
which cannot be conveyed to other minds by the use of the corresponding
technical terms. These basal concepts must be built up in the learner’s
mind by skilful teaching, sometimes by the very process by which the
race acquired or discovered them. It may require a trip to the field, to
the museum, or to the mine; or an experiment in the laboratory may be
necessary. Perhaps a development lesson is needed to enable the pupil to
grasp the idea clearly and fully. It is very certain that if the idea is
hazy and ill-defined, the subsequent thinking will be loose, obscure,
and unsatisfactory. The glib use of technical terms may often hide from
the teacher the defects of the pupil’s thinking, and it may require
an examination to reveal the points wherein the teacher has failed.
Questions which require a pupil to look at his knowledge from a new point
of view are helpful; an examination abounding in such questions may be
an intellectual blessing to both teacher and pupil. The examiner should,
of course, avoid puzzling catch-questions, for these are calculated to
embarrass the pupil and confuse his thinking.
[Sidenote: Popular lectures.]
A clear thinker can always make his ideas intelligible to those who
have acquired the basal concepts of the things, principles, and laws
with which he deals. Lecturers on popular science avoid the abstruse
questions of advanced science and the technical terms which do not convey
a definite meaning to the average hearer. They select topics which can be
discussed in the language of common life, and often state the results of
scientific research without leading the audience through the successive
steps by which these results are obtained. The popular lecture requires
special gifts that are not in the possession of every scientist. Huxley
was one of the most gifted men of the century; yet he says of himself,—
[Sidenote: Huxley.]
“I have not been one of those fortunate persons who are able to regard
a popular lecture as a mere _hors d’œuvre_ unworthy of being ranked
among the serious efforts of a philosopher, and who keep their fame as
scientific hierophants unsullied by attempts—at least of the successful
sort—to be understanded by the people. On the contrary, I have found that
the task of putting the truths learned in the field, the laboratory,
and the museum into language which, without bating a jot of scientific
accuracy, shall be generally intelligible, taxed such scientific and
literary faculty as I possessed to the uttermost; indeed, my experience
has furnished me with no better corrective of the tendency to scholastic
pedantry, which besets all those who are absorbed in pursuits remote from
the common ways of men, and become habituated to think and speak in the
technical dialect of their own little world, as if there were no other.”
[Sidenote: Exact thinking.]
There is an error, on the other hand, into which practical men fall when
they object to the technical language of the scientist. There are many
things in science which cannot be made plain to the non-scientific
mind. The difficulty lies not in the terminology employed, but in the
lack of the basal concepts necessary for the advanced thinking which
must be employed. Says Robert Galloway, “Words when employed in science,
unlike their employment in common use, have a meaning steadily fixed and
precisely determined; this precision in the meaning of scientific terms
necessarily requires on the part of those who can make proper use of them
_accurate habits of thought_; this is an indispensable qualification for
attainment in any science; there is no dispensing with it, consequently
one who does not know the language of a science, and who has not been
taught to think accurately with respect to it, cannot understand properly
what may be told or shown him about the facts or principles of that
science.”
[Sidenote: De Quincey.]
From this point of view it is easy to see the use which the teacher
should make of technical terms. Circumlocutions and explanatory phrases
may be helpful in developing fundamental ideas, but the corresponding
technical terms should be associated with the ideas as soon as these
assume clear, definite shape. Language is the atmosphere in which
thinking lives; technical language is as necessary to the scientific
thought as the air we breathe is to the physical life. In one of his
letters to a young man whose education had been neglected, De Quincey
renders an important service to the science of teaching. “In assigning
to the complex notion X the name transcendental, Kant was not simply
transferring a word which had previously been used by the school-men to
a more useful office; he was bringing into the service of the intellect
a new birth; that is, drawing into a synthesis, which had not existed
before as a synthesis, parts or elements which exist and come forward
hourly in every man’s mind. I urge this upon your attention, because you
will often hear such challenges thrown out as this (or others involving
the same error): ‘Now, if there be any sense in this Mr. Kant’s writings,
let us have it in good old mother English.’ That is, in other words,
transfer into the unscientific language of life scientific notions which
it is not fitted to express. The challenger proceeds upon the common
error of supposing all ideas fully developed to exist _in esse_ in all
understandings, ergo, his own; and all that are in his own he thinks we
can express in English. Thus the challenger, in his own notions, has
you in a dilemma, at any rate; for, if you do not translate it, then it
confirms his belief that the whole is jargon; if you do (as, doubtless,
with the help of much periphrasis, that will be intelligible to a man
who already understands the philosophy), then where was the use of the
terminology? But the way to deal with this fellow is as follows: My good
sir, I shall do what you ask; but before I do it I beg you will oblige
me by (1) translating this mathematics into the language of chemistry;
(2) translating this chemistry into the language of mathematics; (3)
both into the language of cookery, and, finally, solve me the Cambridge
problem, Given the captain’s name, the year of our Lord, to determine the
longitude of the ship? This is the way to deal with such fellows.”
[Sidenote: Images.]
[Sidenote: Higher forms of thinking.]
Technical terms are very helpful in dealing with that which cannot be
imaged or visualized. When Francis Galton began his inquiries into the
power possessed by different minds to conceive the breakfast table, to
recall vividly the various dishes and the way in which they are placed
upon the table, many men of scientific habits of thought declared that
there is no such human faculty. On the other hand, the educational
reformer whose early training did not make him familiar with the
thought-processes of higher mathematics may honestly declare that he
cannot conceive an abstract number, and, as a matter of course, he can
have no adequate conception of the value of the higher forms of thinking
in symbols. Dr. W. T. Harris has well said that the mind can think ideas
which cannot be pictorially conceived or made to stand before the mind
in thought-images. In thinking this class of ideas, technical terms are
indispensable as instruments of thought.
[Sidenote: Symbols classified.]
[Sidenote: Suggestive symbols.]
The value of technical terms as instruments of thought is seen in a still
clearer light if we try to classify the various uses of the signs and
symbols which are employed as aids in thinking. Many of these have no
office beyond that of _suggesting_ the things or ideas for which they
stand. To this class belong the marks which suggest to the tramp a cross
dog or a good meal. As soon as he has seen them, they could be erased;
the train of thought which they started in his mind can go on without
them. Of a similar character are the devices by which the merchant marks
the buying and the selling prices of goods, the red and blue lights used
on railways and ocean steamers, the secret signs and signals employed by
the signal corps of an army, and the steps, grips, signs, countersigns,
and passwords employed by secret societies as a means of identification.
Very many of the artificial devices used in systems of mnemonics have no
higher function than that of suggesting what otherwise might be forgotten.
[Sidenote: Symbols as substitutes.]
Very different are the signs and symbols which mathematics employs as
substitutes for the quantities to be considered. In adding a column
in the ledger or in a statistical table the mind thinks the figures
without reference to the concrete objects which they denote. In the
solution of a problem in algebra the unknown quantities are represented
by symbols like _x_ and _y_, the known quantities by the first letters
of the alphabet or by numerical expressions; the relations between
the quantities are indicated by equations; there is no thought of the
quantities themselves while the mind is engaged in manipulating the
symbols according to well-defined rules of operation, and only when the
result is to be interpreted do the quantities reappear in the field of
consciousness. The substitute symbol is a device for temporarily dropping
an idea until it is needed for interpretation; the suggestive symbol is
a means of bringing an idea or thought into the domain of consciousness.
The latter furnishes or recalls material for the mind to act upon; the
former lightens the burden which the mind would otherwise have to carry.
The arithmetical solution of an age question in which the mind constantly
carries the thought of A’s age and his wife’s age as compared with the
algebraic solution of the same question in which A and his wife, as
well as their ages, sink temporarily out of sight, shows the value of
substitute signs and symbols in mathematical thinking, and explains why
algebraic methods are so far superior to the clumsy and involved methods
of arithmetical analysis.
[Sidenote: Expressive symbols.]
Different from either of these is the class of symbols used in expressing
ideas. This class includes not only the words of written and spoken
language, but also the natural signs of gesture language and the
conventional signs of manual language taught to deaf mutes. The language
is full of faded metaphors indicating the office of common words. They
are said to express meaning, to convey thought, to embody ideas, to
enshrine content. They may be likened to window-panes through which one
sees what is back of them. Sometimes the window-panes, like spectacles
when first worn, attract more attention from the person looking than the
objects seen through them,—a parallel to what occurs when the articulate
speech, or its rhetorical adornment, attracts more attention than the
thought expressed. But if that which is seen through the window-pane
is on the order of a Santa Claus loaded with toys and Christmas-gifts,
then no notice is taken of the medium through which the object is seen.
Hence the very best teaching—that which rivets attention upon the thought
conveyed—always fails to teach the spelling of words incidentally.
Furthermore, the instruction which frequently stops to draw attention to
the grammar of the sentences, the spelling of the words or their mode of
utterance, interferes with the formation of logical habits of thinking
and divests the words of their function as expressive signs. When the
word itself becomes an object of thought the mind is not thinking by
means of that word. It has been well said that we may fail to apprehend
the meaning of what a person is saying because the tone of his voice
arrests our attention through its resemblance to that of some one else
in whom we feel an interest; that so far as signs thus attract notice
on their own account, they fail to fulfil their function as a means of
attending to something other than themselves. For this very pertinent
observation credit is due to Mr. G. F. Stout, who (“Mind,” lxii. page 18)
has very clearly drawn the distinction between the three classes of signs
or symbols used as helps in thinking. He says,—
[Sidenote: G. F. Stout.]
“Suggestive signs serve only to bring something to mind; they are not
a means of minding it when once recalled. An expressive sign, on the
contrary, is a means of attending to its signification.... Expressive
signs differ from substitutes in a manner exactly the inverse of that
in which they differ from suggestive signs. A suggestive sign has
fulfilled its purpose and becomes of no further avail so soon as it has
suggested its meaning. A substitute sign is a counter which takes the
place of its meaning; so long as it fulfils its representative function
it renders useless all reference to that which it represents. The
counters are manipulated according to certain rules of operation until a
certain result is reached, which is then interpreted. The operator may
be actually unable to interpret the intermediate steps. Algebraical and
arithmetical symbols are to a great extent used as mere substitute signs.
The same is true of the symbols employed in formal logic. It is possible
to use signs of this kind whenever fixed and definite rules of operation
can be derived from the nature of the things symbolized, so as to be
applied in manipulating the signs without further reference to their
signification. A word is an instrument for thinking about the meaning
which it expresses; a substitute sign is a means of not thinking about
the meaning which it symbolizes.”
[Sidenote: Fixing concepts.]
In addition to these three purposes the technical term may serve still
another important end. It helps to fix the new concept or notion after
it has been developed by skilful instruction. Its association therewith
makes it a suggestive sign whenever occasion requires the recurrence
of the concept or thought for which it stands. The train of thought is
facilitated and made possible by the use of technical terms as expressive
signs. And if the idea denoted by it can be accurately defined, so
that the definition becomes a triumph of intellect, or if it can be
quantified, so as to become a unit of measure like the volts, ohms,
ampères, and watts in applied electricity, the technical term may even
serve a purpose analogous to the substitute signs in sciences like formal
logic and mathematics.
[Sidenote: Proper use of technical terms.]
The foregoing analysis indicates the proper method of teaching technical
terms. First, the basal concept should be carefully developed and
clearly presented; it should then be fixed in the mind by association
with the corresponding technical term; finally, the union should be
made permanent by frequently causing the two to appear together in
the domain of thought, by treating them as welcome guests when they
appear together in the citadel of mind. Divorce of one from the other
should be as impossible as in the case of the two parties to a suitable
marriage. On the _fête_ days of science they should appear together,
each suggesting the presence of the other, the technical term serving
as a helpmeet to the idea, and as its representative when, in the
charmed circle of scientific investigation, the presence of the idea
is not absolutely required. Circumlocutions, like name-word for noun,
quality-word for adjective, and relation-word for preposition, may be
helpful in presenting the idea or in introducing the technical term; they
may be tolerated, like a third party in the making of a match; but when
the match has been made, and the wedding has been solemnized, they should
drop out of sight as of no further use. The figure of speech could easily
be pressed too far; for many objects known to science have a common as
well as a technical designation. Each has its proper place in the realm
of thought,—the common name in ordinary conversation, the technical term
when scientific precision is required.
VII
THOUGHT AND LANGUAGE
It seems to me quite certain that we can and do think things
without thinking of any sound or words. Language seems to me
to be necessary to the progress of thought, but not at all
necessary to the mere act of thinking. It is a product of
thought: a vehicle for the communication of it, a channel for
the conveyance of it, and an embodiment which is essential
to its growth and continuity. But it seems to be altogether
erroneous to represent it as an inseparable part of cogitation.
Donkeys and dogs are without true thought, not because they
are speechless, but they are speechless because they have
no abstract ideas, and no true reasoning powers. In parrots
the power of mere articulation exists sometimes in wonderful
perfection. But parrots are not so clever as many other birds
which have no such power.
Man’s vocal organs are correlated with his brain. Both are
equally mysterious, because they are co-operative, and yet
separable, parts of “one plan.”
ARGYLL.
That the language may be fitted for its purpose, not only
should every word perfectly express its meaning, but there
should be no important meaning without its word. Whatever we
have occasion to think of often, and for scientific purposes,
ought to have a name appropriated to it.
J. S. MILL.
VII
THOUGHT AND LANGUAGE
[Sidenote: Three possible contingencies.]
In the development of intellectual life three contingencies are possible.
1. The growth of the vocabulary may be more rapid than the acquisition of
ideas.
2. The accumulation and development of ideas may exceed the ability to
express them in language.
3. The acquisition of ideas and words, of thought and language, may be
simultaneous.
Without doubt, these possibilities in mental growth exist for wise and
beneficent purposes.
[Sidenote: Words without ideas.]
The tendency to acquire words without the corresponding ideas is, in
at least one direction, a source of gain rather than loss. The pert
phrases, profane words, and other objectionable language which the child
accidentally hears from the lips of older persons, and at times uses to
the unspeakable annoyance of parents and teachers, would be an occasion
for far more serious alarm if the meaning were fully understood. Were it
a law of our mental life that the hearing and learning of a profane or
obscene word necessarily carried with it a clear grasp of the meaning,
the resulting harm to the inner life of the soul would be immeasurably
greater, and the stain upon the character would be vastly more difficult
to remove. The objectionable language may mirror the habits of thought
and speech into which those in charge of the child have fallen, awaken
in them a new sense of their responsibility, and cause them to be more
careful of what they say; or it may prove an index to the kind of company
into which the child is drifting, and thus serve as a danger-signal to
parent and teacher. When the mind has not learned to think the thought
expressed, a simple warning against the use of such ugly words generally
suffices to eradicate them from the child’s vocabulary; and in such
instances it is a blessing in disguise that the learning of the words
was not accompanied by the acquisition of their meaning. The loss to the
intellectual life is more than balanced by the gain in moral training.
[Sidenote: Thinking without words.]