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[Illustration: COUNT CZERNIN]
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IN THE WORLD WAR
BY COUNT OTTOKAR CZERNIN
_WITH FOUR PLATES_
CASSELL AND COMPANY, LTD
London, New York, Toronto and Melbourne
Copyright in Great Britain.
PREFACE
It is impossible in a small volume to write the history of the World
War in even a partially exhaustive manner. Nor is that the object of
this book.
Rather than to deal with generalities, its purpose is to describe
separate events of which I had intimate knowledge, and individuals
with whom I came into close contact and could, therefore, observe
closely; in fact, to furnish a series of snapshots of the great drama.
By this means the following pages may possibly present a conception of
the war as a whole, which may, nevertheless, differ in many respects
from the hitherto recorded, and possibly faulty, history of the war.
Everyone regards people and events from his own point of view; it is
inevitable. In my book, I speak of men with whom I was in close touch;
of others who crossed my path without leaving any personal impression
on me; and finally, of men with whom I was often in grave dispute. I
endeavour to judge of them all in objective fashion, but I have to
describe people and things as I saw them. Wherever the description
appears to be at fault, the reason will not be due to a prematurely
formed opinion, but rather, probably, to a prevailing lack of the
capacity for judging.
Not everything could be revealed. Much was not explained, although it
could have been. Too short a period still separates us from those
events to justify the lifting of the veil from all that happened.
But what remains unspoken can in no way change the whole picture,
which I describe exactly as imprinted on my mind.
OTTOKAR CZERNIN.
CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
1. INTRODUCTORY REFLECTIONS 1
2. KONOPISCHT 34
3. WILLIAM II 52
4. ROUMANIA 77
5. THE U-BOAT WARFARE 114
6. ATTEMPTS AT PEACE 134
7. WILSON 188
8. IMPRESSIONS AND REFLECTIONS 195
9. POLAND 200
10. BREST-LITOVSK 211
11. THE PEACE OF BUCHAREST 258
12. FINAL REFLECTIONS 271
APPENDIX 275
LIST OF PLATES
COUNT CZERNIN _Frontispiece_
FACING PAGE
THE ARCHDUKE FRANZ FERDINAND 48
COUNT TISZA 128
GENERAL HOFFMANN 240
IN THE WORLD WAR
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTORY REFLECTIONS
1
The bursting of a thunderstorm is preceded by certain definite
phenomena in the atmosphere. The electric currents separate, and the
storm is the result of atmospheric tension which can no longer be
repressed. Whether or no we become aware of these happenings through
outward signs, whether the clouds appear to us more or less
threatening, nothing can alter the fact that the electric tension is
bound to make itself felt before the storm bursts.
For years the political barometer of the European Ministries of
Foreign Affairs had stood at "storm." It rose periodically, to fall
again; it varied--naturally; but for years everything had pointed to
the fact that the peace of the world was in danger.
The obvious beginnings of this European tension date back several
years: to the time of Edward VII. On the one hand England's dread of
the gigantic growth of Germany; on the other hand Berlin's politics,
which had become a terror to the dwellers by the Thames; the belief
that the idea of acquiring the dominion of the world had taken root in
Berlin. These fears, partly due merely to envy and jealousy, but
partly due also to a positive anxiety concerning existence; these
fears led to the encircling policy of Edward VII., and thus was
started the great drive against Germany. It is well known that Edward
VII. made an attempt to exercise a direct influence on the Emperor
Francis Joseph to induce him to secede from the Alliance and join the
Powers encircling Germany. It is likewise known that the Emperor
Francis Joseph rejected the proposal, and that this decided the fate
of Austria-Hungary. From that day we were no longer the independent
masters of our destiny. Our fate was linked to that of Germany;
without being conscious of it, we were carried away by Germany through
the Alliance.
I do not mean absolutely to deny that, during the years preceding war,
it would still have been possible for Germany to avert it if she had
eradicated from European public opinion all suspicion respecting her
dream of world dominion, for far be it from me to assert that the
Western Powers were eager for war. On the contrary, it is my firm
conviction that the leading statesmen of the Western Powers viewed the
situation as such, that if they did not succeed in defeating Germany,
the unavoidable result would be a German world domination. I mention
the Western Powers, for I believe that a strong military party in
Russia, which had as chief the Grand Duke Nicholas, thought otherwise,
and began this war with satisfaction. The terrible tragedy of this,
the greatest misfortune of all time--and such is this war--lies in the
fact that nobody responsible willed it; it arose out of a situation
created first by a Serbian assassin and then by some Russian generals
keen on war, while the events that ensued took the monarchs and
statesmen completely by surprise. The Entente group of Powers is as
much to blame as we are. As regards this, however, a very considerable
difference must be made between the enemy states. In 1914 neither
France nor England desired war. France had always cherished the
thought of revenge, but, judging from all indications, she had no
intention of fighting in 1914; but, on the contrary--as she did fifty
years ago--left the decisive moment for entering into war to the
future. The war came quite as a surprise to France. England, in spite
of her anti-German policy, wished to remain neutral and only changed
her mind owing to the invasion of Belgium. In Russia the Tsar did not
know what he wanted, and the military party urged unceasingly for
war. As a matter of fact, Russia began military operations without a
declaration of war.
The states that followed after--Italy and Roumania--entered into the
war for purposes of conquest, Roumania in particular. Italy also, of
course, but owing to her geographical position, and being exposed to
pressure from England, she was less able to remain neutral than
Roumania.
But the war would never have broken out had it not been that the
growing suspicion of the Entente as to Germany's plans had already
brought the situation to boiling point. The spirit and demeanour of
Germany, the speeches of the Emperor William, the behaviour of the
Prussians throughout the world--whether in the case of a general at
Potsdam or a _commis voyageur_ out in East Africa--these Prussian
manners inflicting themselves upon the world, the ceaseless boasting
of their own power and the clattering of swords, roused throughout the
whole world a feeling of antipathy and alarm and effected that moral
coalition against Germany which in this war has found such terribly
practical expression. On the other hand, I am fairly convinced that
German, or rather Prussian tendencies have been misunderstood by the
world, and that the leading German statesmen never had any intention
of acquiring world dominion. They wished to retain Germany's place in
the sun, her rank among the first Powers of the world; it was
undoubtedly her right, but the real and alleged continuous German
provocation and the ever-growing fears of the Entente in consequence
created just that fatal competition in armaments and that coalition
policy which burst like a terrible thunderstorm into war.
It was only on the basis of these European fears that the French plans
of revenge developed into action. England would never have drawn the
sword merely for the conquest of Alsace-Lorraine; but the French plan
of revenge was admirably adapted to suit the policy inaugurated by
King Edward, which was derived not from French but from English
motives.
Out of this dread of attack and defence arose that mad fever for
armaments which was characteristic of pre-war times. The race to
possess more soldiers and more guns than one's neighbour was carried
to an absurd extreme. The armaments which the nations had to bear had
become so cumbersome as to be unbearable, and for long it had been
obvious to everyone that the course entered upon could no longer be
pursued, and that two possibilities alone remained--either a voluntary
and general disarmament, or war.
A slight attempt at the first alternative was made in 1912 through
negotiations between Germany and England respecting naval disarmament,
but never got beyond the first stage. England was no readier for
peace, and no more disposed to make advances than was Germany, but she
was cleverer and succeeded in conveying to the world that she was the
Power endangered by Germany's plans for expansion.
I recollect a very telling illustration of the German and British
points of view, given to me by a prominent politician from a neutral
state. This gentleman was crossing the Atlantic on an American
steamer, and among the other travellers were a well-known German
industrial magnate and an Englishman. The German was a great talker
and preferred addressing as large an audience as possible, expatiating
on the "uprising" of Germany, on the irrepressible desire for
expansion to be found in the German people, on the necessity of
impregnating the world with German culture, and on the progress made
in all these endeavours. He discoursed on the rising prosperity of
German trade in different parts of the world; he enumerated the towns
where the German flag was flying; he pointed out with emphasis how
"Made in Germany" was the term that must and would conquer the world,
and did not fail to assert that all these grand projects were built on
solid foundations upheld by military support. Such was the German.
When my informant turned to the silent, quietly smiling Englishman and
asked what he had to say to it, he simply answered: "There is no need
for me to say anything, for I know that the world belongs to us." Such
was the Englishman. This merely illustrates a certain frame of mind.
It is a snapshot, showing how the German and the English mentality was
reflected in the brain of a neutral statesman; but it is symptomatic,
because thousands have felt the same, and because this impression of
the German spirit contributed so largely to the catastrophe.
The Aehrenthal policy, contrary to what we were accustomed to on the
Ballplatz, pursued ambitious plans for expansion with the greatest
strength and energy, thereby adding to the suspicions of the world
regarding us. For the belief gained credence that the Vienna policy
was an offshoot of that of Berlin, and that the same line of action
would be adopted in Vienna as in Berlin, and the general feeling of
anxiety rose higher. Blacker and blacker grew the clouds; closer and
closer the meshes of the net; misfortune was on the way.
2
I was in Constantinople shortly before the outbreak of war, and while
there had a lengthy discussion of the political situation with the
Markgraf Pallavicini, our most efficient and far-seeing ambassador
there. He looked upon the situation as being extremely grave. Aided by
his experience of a decade of political observations, he was able to
put his finger on the pulse of Europe, and his diagnosis was as
follows: that if a rapid change in the entire course of events did not
intervene, we were making straight for war. He explained to me that he
considered the only possibility of evading a war with Russia lay in
our definitely renouncing all claims to influence in the Balkans and
leaving the field to Russia. Pallavicini was quite clear in his own
mind that such a course would mean our resigning the status of a Great
Power; but apparently to him even so bitter a proceeding as that was
preferable to the war which he saw was impending. Shortly afterwards I
repeated this conversation to the Archduke and heir, Franz Ferdinand,
and saw that he was deeply impressed by the pessimistic views of
Pallavicini, of whom, like everyone else, he had a very high opinion.
The Archduke promised to discuss the question as soon as possible with
the Emperor. I never saw him again. That was the last conversation I
had with him, and I do not know whether he ever carried out his
intention of discussing the matter with the monarch.
The two Balkan wars were as summer lightning before the coming
European thunderstorm. It was obvious to anyone acquainted with Balkan
conditions that the peace there had produced no definite result, and
the Peace of Bucharest in 1913, so enthusiastically acclaimed by
Roumania, carried the germ of death at its birth. Bulgaria was
humiliated and reduced; Roumania and, above all, Serbia, enlarged out
of all proportion, were arrogant to a degree that baffles description.
Albania, as the apple of discord between Austria-Hungary and Italy,
was a factor that gave no promise of relief, but only of fresh wars.
In order to understand the excessive hatred prevailing between the
separate nations, one must have lived in the Balkans. When this hatred
came to an outburst in the world war the most terrible scenes were
enacted, and as an example it was notorious that the Roumanians tore
their Bulgarian prisoners to pieces with their teeth, and that the
Bulgarians, on their part, tortured the Roumanian prisoners to death
in the most shocking manner. The brutality of the Serbians in the war
can best be described by our own troops. The Emperor Francis Joseph
clearly foresaw that the peace after the second Balkan war was merely
a respite to draw breath before a new war. Prior to my departure for
Bucharest in 1913 I was received in audience by the aged emperor, who
said to me: "The Peace of Bucharest is untenable, and we are faced by
a new war. God grant that it may be confined to the Balkans." Serbia,
which had been enlarged to double its size, was far from being
satisfied; but, on the contrary, was more than ever ambitious of
becoming a Great Power.
Apparently the situation was still quiet. In fact, a few weeks before
the catastrophe at Sarajevo the prevailing state of affairs showed
almost an improvement in the relations between Vienna and Belgrade.
But it was the calm before the storm. On June 28 the veil was rent
asunder, and from one moment to the next a catastrophe threatened the
world. The stone had started rolling.
At that time I was ambassador to Roumania. I was therefore only able
from a distance to watch developments in Vienna and Berlin.
Subsequently, however, I discussed events in those critical days with
numerous leading personalities, and from all that I heard have been
able to form a definite and clear view of the proceedings. I have no
doubt whatever that Berchtold, even in his dreams, had never thought
of a world war of such dimensions as it assumed; that he, above all,
was persuaded that England would remain neutral; and the German
Ambassador, Tschirsky, confirmed him in the conviction that a war
against France and Russia would inevitably end in victory. I believe
that the state of mind in which Count Berchtold addressed the
ultimatum to Serbia was such that he said to himself, either--and this
is the most favourable view--Serbia will accept the ultimatum, which
would mean a great diplomatic success; or she will refuse it, and
then, thanks to Germany's help, the victorious war against Russia and
France will effect the birth of a new and vastly stronger Monarchy. It
cannot for a moment be denied that this argument contained a series of
errors; but it must be stated that, according to my convictions, Count
Berchtold did not intend to incite war by the ultimatum, but hoped to
the very last to gain the victory by the pen, and that in the German
promises he saw a guarantee against a war in which the participators
and the chances of victory were equally erroneously estimated.
Berchtold could not have entertained any doubt that a Serbian war
would bring a Russian one in its train. At any rate, the reports sent
by my brother, who was a business man in Petersburg, left him in no
doubt on the matter.
Serbia's acceptance of the ultimatum was only partial, and the Serbian
war broke out. Russia armed and joined in. But at this moment
extremely important events took place.
On July 30, at midday, Tschirsky spoke in the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, and communicated to Berchtold the contents of a telegram
received from Lichnowsky. This important telegram contained the
following: He (Lichnowsky) had just returned from seeing Grey, who was
very grave, but perfectly collected, though pointing out that the
situation was becoming more and more complicated. Sassonoff had
intimated that after the declaration of war he was no longer in a
position to negotiate direct with Austria-Hungary, and requested
England to resume proceedings, the temporary cessation of hostilities
to be taken for granted. Grey proposed a negotiation between four, as
it appeared possible to him (Grey) that Austria-Hungary, after
occupying Belgrade, would state her terms.
To this Grey added a private comment, calling Lichnowsky's attention
to the fact that a war between Russia and Austria-Hungary would
facilitate England's neutrality, but that the conditions would
inevitably change in the event of Germany and France being involved.
Public opinion in England, which after the assassination was very
favourable to Austria, was now beginning to fluctuate, as it was
difficult to understand Austria's obstinacy.
Lichnowsky also added that Grey had told the Italian Ambassador that
he thought Austria would receive every satisfaction on accepting
negotiation. In any case the Serbians would be punished. Even without
a war Austria would receive a guarantee for the future.
Such were the contents of the communication from London sent by
Tschirsky, to which Bethmann added that he urgently requested the
Vienna Cabinet to accept the negotiation. On receiving this
information, Berchtold conveyed the news to the Emperor. His position
was this: that Russia was already at war with the Monarchy on the
evening of the same day on which the order for general mobilisation
was to be submitted to the Emperor, and it appeared doubtful to him
whether a postponement of their own mobilisation would be possible in
view of the Russian attack. He had also to take into consideration the
different parties prevailing in Russia, and no guarantee was
obtainable that those who were in favour of negotiation would gain the
day. Any postponement of mobilisation might in this case lead to
incalculable military consequences. Obviously hostilities had begun
without the knowledge and against the wishes of the Tsar; if they
were also to be carried on against his wish, then Austria-Hungary
would be too late.
I have never discussed this phase with Berchtold, but the material
placed at my disposal leaves no doubt that he felt bound to inquire
into this side of the question and then leave the decision to the
Emperor Francis Joseph.
On the following day, July 31, therefore, Tschirsky, at the Ballplatz,
communicated the contents of a telegram from King George to Prince
Henry of Prussia. It ran as follows:--
"Thanks for telegram. So pleased to hear of William's efforts to
concert with Nicky to maintain peace. Indeed, I am earnestly
desirous that such an irreparable disaster as a European war
should be averted. My Government is doing its utmost, suggesting
to Russia and France to suspend further military preparations if
Austria will consent to be satisfied with occupation of Belgrade
and the neighbouring Serbian territory as a hostage for
satisfactory settlement of her demands, other countries meanwhile
suspending their war preparations. Trust William will use his
great influence to induce Austria to accept this proposal, thus
proving that Germany and England are working together to prevent
what would be an international catastrophe. Pray assure William I
am doing and shall continue to do all that lies in my power to
preserve peace of Europe.
GEORGE."
Both the telegrams cited were received in Vienna on July 31, subject
to certain military precautions, a proceeding that did not satisfy
London.
In London, as in Berlin, an effort was made to confine the conflict to
Serbia. Berchtold did the same. In Russia there was a strong party
working hard to enforce war at any price. The Russian invasion was an
accomplished fact, and in Vienna it was thought unwise to stop
mobilisation at the last moment for fear of being too late with
defence. Some ambassadors did not keep to the instructions from their
Governments; they communicated messages correctly enough, but if their
personal opinion differed they made no secret of it, and it certainly
weighed in the balance.
This added to the insecurity and confusion. Berchtold vacillated, torn
hither and thither by different influences. It was a question of hours
merely; but they passed by and were not made use of, and disaster was
the result.
Russia had created strained conditions which brought on the world war.
Some months after the outbreak of war I had a long conversation on all
these questions with the Hungarian Prime Minister, Count Stephen
Tisza. He was decidedly opposed to the severe ultimatum, as he foresaw
a war and did not wish for it. It is one of the most widely spread
errors to stigmatise Tisza to-day as one of the instigators of the
war. He was opposed to it, not from a general pacifist tendency, but
because, in his opinion, an efficiently pursued policy of alliance
would in a few years considerably strengthen the powers of the
Monarchy. He particularly returned to the subject of Bulgaria, which
then was still neutral and whose support he had hoped to gain before
we went to war. I also obtained from Tisza several details concerning
the activities of the German Government as displayed by the German
Ambassador immediately preceding the war. I purposely made a
distinction between the German Government and the German diplomat, as
I was under the impression that Herr von Tschirsky had taken various
steps without being instructed so to do, and when I previously have
alluded to the fact that not all the ambassadors made use of the
language enjoined by their Governments, I had Herr von Tschirsky
specially in my mind; his whole temperament and feelings led him to
interfere in our affairs with a certain vehemence and not always in
the most tactful way, thus rousing the Monarchy out of its lethargy.
There is no doubt whatever that all Herr von Tschirsky's private
speeches at this time were attuned to the tone of "Now or Never," and
it is certain that the German Ambassador declared his opinion to be
"that at the present moment Germany was prepared to support our point
of view with all her moral and military power, but whether this would
prove to be the case in future if we accepted the Serbian rebuff
appears to me doubtful." I believe that Tschirsky in particular was
firmly persuaded that in the very near future Germany would have to go
through a war against France and Russia, and he considered that the
year 1914 would be more favourable than a later date. For this reason,
because first of all he did not believe in the fighting capacity of
either Russia or France, and secondly because--and this is a very
important point--he was convinced that he could bring the Monarchy
into this war, while it appeared doubtful to him that the aged and
peace-loving Emperor Francis Joseph would draw the sword for Germany
on any other occasion where the action would centre less round him, he
wished to make use of the Serbian episode so as to be sure of
Austria-Hungary in the deciding struggle. That, however, was his
policy, and not Bethmann's.
This, I repeat, is the impression produced on me by lengthy
conversations with Count Tisza--an impression which has been confirmed
from other sources. I am persuaded, however, that Tschirsky, in
behaving as he did, widely overstretched his prescribed sphere of
activity. Iswolsky was not the only one of his kind. I conclude this
to be so, since Tschirsky, as intimated in a former dispatch, was
never in a position to make an official declaration urging for war,
but appears only to have spoken after the manner of diplomatic
representatives when anxious to adapt the policy of their Government
to their own point of view. Undoubtedly Tschirsky transmitted his
instructions correctly and loyally, nor did he keep back or secrete
anything. An ambassador attains more or less according to the energy
expended by him in carrying out the instructions of his Government;
and the private opinion of the ambassador is, under certain
circumstances, not easy to distinguish from his official one. At all
events, the latter will be influenced by the former, and Tschirsky's
private opinion aimed at a more vigorous policy.
In complete ignorance of impending events, I had arrived at Steiermark
a few days before the ultimatum in order to establish my family there
for the summer. While there I received a message from Berchtold to
return to my post as quickly as possible. I obeyed at once, but before
leaving had one more audience with the Emperor Francis Joseph at
Ischl. I found the Emperor extremely depressed. He alluded quite
briefly to the coming events, and merely asked me if, in case of a
war, I could guarantee Roumania's neutrality. I answered in the
affirmative, so long as King Carol was alive; beyond that any
guarantee was impossible.
3
Certain extremely important details relating to the period immediately
preceding the outbreak of war can only be attributed to the influence
of the group represented by Tschirsky. It is incomprehensible why we
granted to our then allies, Italy and Roumania, facilities for playing
the part of seceders by presenting them with an ultimatum before
action was completed, instead of winning them over and involving them
also.
I am no accurate judge of the events in Rome, but King Carol in
Roumania had certainly tried everything to induce Serbia to yield. In
all probability he would not have succeeded, as Serbia had no idea of
renouncing her plans for a Greater Serbia; but presumably an anxious
feeling would have arisen between Bucharest and Belgrade, which would
strongly have influenced further Roumanian policy in our favour.
Bucharest has made enormous capital out of the diplomatic proceedings.
Before the first decisive Cabinet Council Baron Fasciotti, the Italian
Ambassador, harangued all the members in this spirit, and declared
that the situation in Roumania and Italy was similar, and in each case
there was no reason for co-operation, as neither Rome nor Bucharest
had previously come to an understanding regarding the ultimatum. His
efforts were crowned with success.
On August 1, 1914, I sent the following telegram to Berchtold:
"The Prime Minister has just notified me the result of the Cabinet
Council. After a warm appeal from the King to bring the treaty
into force, the Cabinet Council, with one exception, declared that
no party could undertake the responsibility of such action.
"The Cabinet Council has resolved that _as Roumania was neither
notified nor consulted concerning the Austro-Hungarian action in
Belgrade no casus foederis exists_. The Cabinet Council further
resolved that military preparations for the safety of the frontier
be undertaken, which would be an advantage for the
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, as several hundred miles of its
frontiers would thereby be covered.
"The Prime Minister added that he had already given orders to
strengthen all military posts, after which by degrees general
mobilisation would follow.
"The Government intends only to publish a short communiqué
relating to the military measures taken for the safety of the
country."
Secondly, it appears incomprehensible why the ultimatum was drawn up
as it was. It was not so much a manifestation of Berchtold's wish for
war, as of other influences, above all that of Tschirsky. In 1870
Bismarck also desired war, but the Ems telegram was of quite a
different character.
In the present case it appears incomprehensible why a Note should have
been selected which by its wording gave umbrage to many who hitherto
were favourably disposed towards us.
Had we, before the ultimatum and after the assassination, secretly and
confidentially furnished proofs to the Great Powers who were not
inimical to us, and especially to England, that trouble was impending
over a political murder staged at Belgrade, we should have evoked a
very different frame of mind in those Governments. Instead, we flung
the ultimatum at them and at the whole of Europe.
It was feared probably at the Ballplatz that any communication to the
Powers would result in their intervention in the form of a new
conference of ambassadors, and that stagnation would ensue. But in the
year 1914 the case was very different from former days--before the
ultimatum right was so undoubtedly on our side.
At all events, the Tschirsky group dreaded such an insipid solution,
and had insisted, therefore, on drastic action. In 1870 Bismarck was
the attacking party, and he succeeded in interchanging the parts. We
also succeeded, but in an opposite sense.
4
Then came our greatest disaster: the German entry into Belgium.
Had England remained neutral we should not have lost the war. In his
book, "Ursachen und Ausbruck des Krieges," page 172, Jagow tells how
on August 4, towards the close of the Reichstag session, the English
Ambassador appeared there and again asked whether Germany would
respect Belgium's neutrality. At that time German troops were already
on Belgian soil. On hearing that, the Ambassador retired, but,
returning in a few hours, demanded a declaration, to be handed in
before midnight, that the further advance of the German troops into
Belgium would cease, otherwise he was instructed to ask for his
passport and England would then protect Belgium. Germany refused, and
the consequence was a declaration of war by England.
That England on the same day sent word to Belgium that she would
resist with her utmost strength any violation of her neutrality is
fully in accordance with the steps taken at Berlin by the English
Ambassador.
Two days before, on August 2, the English Cabinet certainly gave
France the assurance that, in addition to the protection of Belgian
neutrality, she had demanded that there should be no naval action
against France. The contradiction between both points of view is
clearly visible. It appears to me, however, that the only explanation
is that on August 4 England no longer adhered to her standpoint of
August 2, for the German acceptance of the English ultimatum on the
evening of August 4 had wrested from England the moral possibility of
making further claims. If England, on August 4, had sought a pretext
for war, she would have put forward, besides the Belgian demand, also
that referring to the abstention from naval action. But she did not do
so, and confined her ultimatum to the Belgian question, thereby tying
her own hands in the event of Germany accepting the ultimatum. _On
the night of August 4, between the hours of nine and midnight, the
decision as to whether England would remain neutral or no lay with
Germany._
Germany kept to her resolve to violate Belgian neutrality in spite of
the certainty of the English declaration of war resulting therefrom.
That was the first fateful victory of the militarists over the
diplomats in this war. The former were naturally the motive power.
The German military plan was to overrun France and then make a furious
onslaught on Russia. This plan was shattered on the Marne.
In more respects than one, German policy foundered on the heritage
left by Bismarck. Not only was the conquest of Alsace-Lorraine a
lasting obstacle to friendly relations with France, perpetually
forcing the latter into the arms of every anti-German coalition, but
Bismarck's heritage became Germany's curse, because the Germans,
though desirous of following in his footsteps, had no one sufficiently
competent to lead them therein.
Bismarck created the German Empire out of Düppel, Königgrätz and
Sedan. His policy was one of "blood and iron"--and for fifty years
that policy of violence and violent means had been engrained in the
mind of every German schoolboy as the gospel of diplomatic art--but
Bismarck was not able to bequeath to the German people his genial
efficiency, wisdom and prudence in the use of his violent means.
Bismarck carefully prepared the wars of 1866 and 1870, and struck when
he held good cards in his hand. The Germany of William II. had no
desire for war, but one day plunged headlong into it, and during the
first week had already created political situations which were beyond
her power to cope with. Belgium and Luxembourg were treated on the
Bismarckian principle of "Might before Right," and the world rose
against Germany. I say world, because England's power extended over
the world.
At the beginning of the war England stood at "order arms." It would
have been entirely true to her traditional policy to allow Germany to
fight against France and Russia and mutually weaken each other, then
at a given moment to intervene and enjoin peace. England was forced to
join in by Germany threatening to establish herself in Belgium. How
far the German invasion of Belgium can morally be extenuated owing to
a French purpose to do likewise has still not been made clear--but
this argument does not apply to Luxembourg, and the breach of right
remains the same whether the country where it occurs be large or
small.
The invasion of Belgium and Luxembourg was a stroke of the Bismarckian
policy of violence, not carried out by politicians but by generals who
were devoid of Bismarck's power of calculating the devastating
consequences.
Later on, during the course of the war, the German Supreme Command
made repeated use of violent means, which were more detrimental than
useful to us, though subsequently these means were morally justifiable
and comprehensible; in fact, were directly forced on us, seeing that
Germany was fighting for her existence, and her adversaries, who would
not come to an understanding, left her no choice of means. The use of
noxious gas, aerial attacks on open towns and the U-boat warfare were
means used in desperation against a merciless enemy, who left women
and children to die of starvation and declared day by day that Germany
must be annihilated.
When war was declared, that murderous element was lacking, and it was
only the entry into neutral territory that fostered an atmosphere of
such terrible hatred and vengeance and stamped the struggle as a war
of annihilation.
England's policy concerning Napoleon III. was more of a diplomatic
than a military nature, and everything tends to show that in the
present case England originally had no intention of joining in the
conflagration, but was content to see Germany weakened by her own
confederates.
So far as I am in a position to review the situation no blame for the
wrongly estimated English attitude can be attached to our ambassadors
in London. Their predictions and warnings were correct, and the final
decision respecting the previously mentioned English ultimatum was
taken in Berlin and not in London. Moreover, the German Foreign
Office would never voluntarily have consented to the acts of violence,
but the military party, who cared neither for diplomatic reports nor
political complications, carried everything before them.
It will always be particularly difficult in a war to define the limits
of military and political spheres of action. The activities of both
encroach to so great an extent on each other as to form one whole, and
very naturally in a war precedence is given to military needs.
Nevertheless, the complete displacement of politicians into
subordinate positions which was effected in Germany and thereby made
manifest the fact that the German Supreme Military Command had
possessed itself of all State power of command, was a misfortune. Had
the politicians at Berlin obtained a hearing there would never have
been any invasion of Belgium, nor yet the ruthless U-boat warfare, the
abstention from which would in both cases have saved the life of the
Central Powers.
From the very first day the Emperor William was as a prisoner in the
hands of his generals.
The blind faith in the invincibility of the army was, like so much
else, an heirloom from Bismarck, and the "Prussian lieutenant,
inimitable save in Germany," became her doom. The entire German people
believed in victory and in an Emperor who flung himself into the arms
of his generals and took upon himself a responsibility far surpassing
the normal limit of what was bearable. Thus the Emperor William
allowed his generals full liberty of action, and, to begin with, their
tactics seemed to be successful. The first battle of the Marne was a
godsend for the Entente in their direst need. But, later, when the war
long since had assumed a totally different character, when the troops
were made stationary by the war of position and fresh enemies were
constantly rising up against us, when Italy, Roumania, and finally
America appeared on the scene, then did the German generals achieve
miracles of strategy. Hindenburg and Ludendorff became gods in the
eyes of the German people; the whole of Germany looked up to them and
hoped for victory through them alone. They were more powerful than
the Emperor, and he, therefore, less than ever in a position to oppose
them.
Both the generals drew the wellnigh unlimited measure of their power
direct from the Entente, for the latter left the Germans in no doubt
that they must either conquer or die. The terrified and suffering
people clung, therefore, to those who, as they believed, alone could
give them victory.
5
Anglo-German competition, the increasing decadence of the Monarchy,
and the consequent growing lust of conquest evinced by our neighbours
had prepared the soil for war. Serbia, by the assassination, brought
about an acute state of tension, and Russia profited thereby to fling
herself on the Central Powers.
That appears to me to be briefly an objective history of the beginning
of the war. Faults, errors and omissions from the most varied sources
may occur in it, but can neither alter nor affect the real nature of
the case.
The victorious Entente gives a different interpretation of it. They
maintain that Germany let loose the war, and the terrible peace of
Versailles is the product of that conception, for it serves as
punishment.
A neutral court of justice, as proposed by Germany, was refused. Their
own witnesses and their own judges suffice for them. They are judge
and prosecutor in one. In Dr. Bauer, the German-Austrian Secretary of
State, they have certainly secured an important witness for their view
of the case. In the winter of 1918 the latter openly declared that
"three Austro-Hungarian counts and one general had started the
war."[1]
Were that true, then Germany would also have to bear a vast amount of
blame. For the four "guilty ones" could not have incited to war
without being sure of having Germany at their back, and were it true,
there could only have been a question of some plot laid by the
Austro-Hungarian and the German Governments, in which case Germany,
being the vastly superior military element, would undoubtedly have
assumed the rôle of leader.
Bauer's statement shows that they who inflicted the punitive peace
were right.
6
While the war was going on, a separate peace on our side that would
have delivered up Germany would have been treachery. But had attempts
at peace failed owing to the claims put forward by Germany, we should
have been morally justified in breaking away from them, as we were
united together in a war of defence and not in a war of conquest.
Although the German military party both dreamed and talked incessantly
of conquest, which doubtless gave rise to a misunderstanding of the
situation, that was by no means the exclusive reason why peace could
not be attained. It simply was because on no consideration could the
Entente be induced to pardon Germany. I have already mentioned this in
my speech of December 11, 1918,[2] in which I discoursed on politics
in the world war: "Ludendorff is exactly like the statesmen of France
and England. None of them wishes to compromise, they only look for
victory: in that respect there is no difference between them." As long
as I was in office the Entente would never come to an agreement with
Germany _inter pares_, thereby directly forcing us to assume the part
of a war of defence. Had we succeeded in what we so often attempted to
do, namely to make the Entente pronounce the saving word; and had we
ever been able to make the Entente state that they were ready to
conclude a _status quo_ peace with Germany, we would have been
relieved of our moral obligations. Against this may be quoted: "_Salus
rei publicas supreme lex_"--in order to save the Monarchy Germany
would have to be given up, and therefore the other question must be
inquired into as to whether the "physical possibility" of a separate
peace really did exist. I also mentioned this matter in the aforesaid
speech, and expressly stated then, and withdraw nothing, that after
the entry of England, then of Italy, Roumania, and finally of America
into the war, I considered a victory peace on our side to be a Utopian
idea. But up to the last moment of my official activities, I cherished
the hope of a _peace of understanding_ from month to month, from week
to week, even from day to day, and believed that the possibility would
arise of obtaining such a peace of understanding, however great the
sacrifices. Just as little as anyone else could I foresee the end
which practically has arrived, nor yet the present state of affairs. A
catastrophe of such magnitude and such dimensions was never what I
feared. This is confirmed in the published report of my aforesaid
speech, where I say: "A victory peace was out of the question; we are
therefore compelled to effect a peace with sacrifice." The Imperial
offer to cede Galicia to Poland, and, indirectly, to Germany, arose
out of this train of thought, as did all the peace proposals to the
Entente, which always clearly intimated that we were ready for
_endurable_ sacrifices.
It had always been obvious that the Entente would tear the Monarchy in
shreds, both in the event of a peace of understanding and of a
separate peace. It was quite in keeping with the terms of the Pact of
London of April 26, 1915.
The resolutions passed at that congress which prepared for Italy's
entry into the war, determined the further course of the war, for they
included the division of the Monarchy, and forced us, therefore, into
a desperate war of defence. I believe that London and Paris, at times
when the fortune of war was on our side, both regretted the
resolutions that had been adopted, as they prevented the dwellers on
both the Seine and the Thames from making any temporarily desired
advances to us.
As far back as 1915 we received vague news of the contents of this
strictly secret London agreement; but only in February, 1917, did we
obtain the authentic whole, when the Russian revolutionary Government
published a protocol referring to it, which subsequently was
reproduced in our papers.
I add this protocol to the appendix of the book,[3] as, in spite of
its being so eminently important, it has not received adequate
attention on the part of the public.
According to the settlements, which were binding on the four
States--England, France, Russia, and Italy--the last-named was awarded
the Trentino, the whole of South Tyrol as far as the Brenner Pass,
Trieste, Gorizia, Gradisca, the whole of Istria with a number of
islands, also Dalmatia.
In the course of the war the Entente had further made binding promises
to the Roumanians and Serbians, hence the need for the dissolution of
the Monarchy.
Having made these statements, I wish to explain why a separate peace
was a sheer impossibility for us. In other words, what were the
reasons that prevented us from ending the war and becoming
neutral--reasons which only left one possibility open to us: to change
our adversary, and instead of fighting the Entente, together with
Germany, to join the Entente and with her fight against Germany? It
must, above all, be kept in mind that up to the last days that I held
office the Eastern front was manned by Austro-Hungarian and German
troops all mixed together, and this entire army was under the Imperial
German Command. We had no army of our own in the East--not in the true
sense of the word, as it had been merged into the German army. That
was a consequence of our military inferiority. Again and again we
resorted to German aid. We called repeatedly for help in Serbia,
Roumania, Russia, and Italy, and were compelled to purchase it by
giving up certain things. Our notorious inferiority was only in very
slight degree the fault of the individual soldier; rather did it
emanate from the general state of Austro-Hungarian affairs. We entered
the war badly equipped and sadly lacking in artillery; the various
Ministers of War and the Parliaments were to blame in that respect.
The Hungarian Parliament neglected the army for years because their
national claims were not attended to, and in Austria the Social
Democrats had always been opposed to any measures of defence, scenting
therein plans for attack and not defence.
Our General Staff was in part very bad. There were, of course,
exceptions, but they only prove the rule. What was chiefly wanting was
contact with the troops. These gentlemen sat with their backs turned
and gave their orders. Hardly ever did they see the men at the front
or where the bullets whistled. During the war the troops learned to
_hate_ the General Staff. It was very different in the German army.
The German General Staffs exacted much, but they also achieved much;
above all, they exposed themselves freely and set an example.
Ludendorff, sword in hand, took Liége, accompanied by a couple of men!
In Austria archdukes were put into leading posts for which they were
quite unsuited. Some of them were utterly incompetent; the Archdukes
Friedrich, Eugen, and Joseph formed three exceptions. The first of
these in particular very rightly looked upon his post not as that of a
leader of operations, but as a connecting link between us and Germany,
and between the army and the Emperor Francis Joseph. He always acted
correctly and with eminent tact, and overcame many difficulties. What
was left of our independence was lost after Luck.
To return, therefore, to the plan developed above: a separate peace
that would have contained an order for our troops on the Eastern front
to lay down their arms or to march back would immediately have led to
conflict at the front. Following on the violent opposition that such
an order would naturally have aroused in the German leaders, orders
from Vienna and counter-orders from Berlin would have led to a state
of complete disorganisation, even to anarchy. Humanly speaking, it was
out of the question to look for a peaceful and bloodless unravelment
at the front. I state this in order to explain my firm conviction that
the idea that such a separating of the two armies could have been
carried out in mutual agreement is based on utterly erroneous
premises, and also to prove that we have here the first factor
showing that we would not have ended the war by a separate peace, but
would, on the contrary, have been entangled in a new one.
But what would have been enacted at the front would also, and in
aggravated fashion, have been repeated throughout the entire country:
a civil war would have been inevitable.
I must here explain a second misunderstanding, resulting also from my
speech of December 11, which is due to my statement that "if we came
out Germany could not carry on the war." I admit that this statement
is not clearly expressed, and was interpreted as though I had intended
to say that if we came out the immediate collapse of Germany was a
foregone conclusion. I did not intend to say that, nor did I say or
mean it. I meant to say that our secession from Germany would render
impossible a victorious ending of the war, or even a lasting
successful continuance of the war; that Germany through this would be
faced by the alternative of either submitting to the dictates of the
Entente or of bringing up her supremest fighting powers and
suppressing the Monarchy, preparing for her the same fate as Roumania
met with. I meant to say that Austria-Hungary, if she allowed the
Entente troops to enter, would prove such a terrible danger to Germany
that she would be compelled to use every means to forestall us and
paralyse the move. Whoever imagines that the German military leaders
would not have seized the latter eventuality knows them but badly, and
has a poor opinion of their spirit. In order to be able to form an
objective judgment of this train of thought one should be able to
enter into the spirit of the situation. In April, 1916, when I sent in
my resignation for other reasons, Germany's confidence in victory was
stronger than ever. The Eastern front was free: Russia and Roumania
were out of action. The troops were bound westward, and no one who
knew the situation as it was then can repudiate my assertion that the
German military leaders believed themselves then to be nearer than
ever to a victory peace; that they were persuaded they would take both
Paris and Calais and force the Entente to its knees. It is out of the
question that at such a moment and under such conditions they could
have replied to the falling away of Austria-Hungary otherwise than by
violence.
All who will not admit the argument, I would refer to a fact which it
would be difficult to evade. Six months afterwards, when there was
already clear evidence of the German collapse, when Andrassy declared
a separate peace, the _Germans, as a matter of fact, threw troops into
the Tyrol_. If they, when utterly exhausted, defeated, and ruined,
with revolution at their back, still held firmly to this decision and
endeavoured to make a battlefield on Austrian territory, how much more
would they have done that six months earlier, when they still stood
full of proud defiance and their generals dreamed of victory and
triumph? What I, secondly, also would maintain is that the immediate
consequence of a separate peace would have been the conversion of
Austria-Hungary into a theatre of war. The Tyrol, as well as Bohemia,
would have become fields of battle.
If it be maintained now that the great exhaustion from the war that
prevailed throughout the Monarchy before April, 1917, had caused the
entire population of the former Monarchy to rally round the Minister
who had concluded the separate peace, it is a conscious or unconscious
untruth. Certainly the Czechs were decidedly against Germany, and it
would not have been reasons of political alliance that would have
prevented them from agreeing. But I would like to know what the Czech
people would have said if Bohemia had been turned into a theatre of
war and exposed to all the sufferings endured by this and all other
peoples, and when to it had been added the devastation of the
fatherland, for, let there be no doubt about it, the troops advancing
with flying colours from Saxony would have made their way to Prague
and penetrated even farther. We had no military forces in Bohemia; we
should not have been able to check the advance, and quicker than
either we or the Entente could have sent troops worth mentioning to
Bohemia, the Germans, drawing troops from their wellnigh
inexhaustible reserves, would have marched either against us or
against the Entente on our territory. The German-Austrian public would
not have been in agreement with such a Minister; the German
Nationalists and the German _bourgeoisie_ have no say in the matter.
On October 28 the German Nationalists published their own particular
point of view in the following manner:
"The members of the German Nationalist parties were highly
indignant at the way in which Count Andrassy answered Wilson's
Note. Count Andrassy came from Hungary, and neither came to any
agreement with the Imperial German Government nor with the
representatives of the Executive Committee before drawing up the
Note. Although the peace negotiations were most warmly welcomed
and considered most necessary, still the one-sided action of Count
Andrassy in dispatching the Note to Wilson without previous
arrangement with the German Empire has roused the greatest
indignation in the German parties. A few days ago a delegation
from the German Executive Committee was in Berlin and was
favourably received by the German Imperial Government in the
matter of providing for German-Austria. Although German soldiers
fought by the side of ours in the Alps and the Carpathians, the
alliance has now been violated by this effort to approach Wilson
without the consent of the German Empire, as is expressly stated
in the Note. Besides which, no previous agreement with the
representatives of the German Executive Committee was sought for.
They were ignored and the answer was sent to Wilson. The German
Nationalist parties strongly protest against such an
_unqualifiable act_ and will insist in the German Executive
Committee that German-Austria's right of self-determination be
unconditionally upheld and peace be secured in concert with the
German Empire."
Neither would the German-Austrian Social Democrats have been a party
to such a movement.
A conscious and intended misrepresentation of fact lies before us if
it be maintained to-day that either the National Assembly or the
Austrian Social Democrats would have approved of and supported such
policy. I again have in mind the Andrassy days.
On October 30 the National Assembly took up its position for action.
Dr. Sylvester drew up the report and pointed out the following:
"It was, however, neither necessary nor desirable to make the
attempt in such a way as to create an incurable rupture between
German-Austria and the German Empire that would endanger the
future of our people. The German-Austrian National Assembly
asserts that the Note of October 27 from the Royal and Imperial
Minister for Foreign Affairs was drawn up and dispatched to
President Wilson without in any way coming to an agreement with
the representatives of the German-Austrian people. The National
Assembly protests all the more insistently against this proceeding
as the nation to which the present Minister for Foreign Affairs
belongs has expressly refused any joint dealings. The National
Assembly states that it and its organs alone have the right to
represent the German-Austrian people in all matters relating to
foreign affairs and particularly in all peace negotiations."
The protest met with no opposition in the National Assembly.
Afterwards the chairman, Dr. Ellenbogen, the Social Democrat, spoke as
follows:
"Instead of now telling the German Emperor that his remaining in
office is the greatest obstacle to peace" (loud applause from the
Social Democrats), "and if there ever were an object in Curtius's
famous leap, it would be comprehensible now were the German
Emperor to copy it to save his people, this coalition now seizes
the present moment to break away from Germany and in doing so
attacks German democracy in the rear. Those gentlemen arrived too
late to gain any profit from the peace. What now remains is the
_bare and shameful breach of faith_, the thanks of the House of
Austria, so styled by a celebrated German poet." (Applause from
the Social Democrats and the German Radicals.)
It was the attack on the separate peace that furnished the exceptional
opportunity for Social Democrats and German Radicals to unite in
common applause, probably the first instance of such a thing in all
these years of war.
If that could happen at a moment when it already was obvious that
there was no longer a possibility of making a peace of understanding
together with Germany--what would have happened, I ask, at a time
when this was by no means so clear to the great majority of the
population; at a time when it was still far from certain, or, at
least, not to be proved mathematically, that we in time and together
with Germany might still be able to conclude a peace of understanding?
Disbandment at the front, where all would be fighting against all,
civil war in the interior--such would have been the result of a
separate peace. And all that in order finally to impose on us the
resolutions passed in London! For never--as I shall presently
show--had the Entente given up their decision, as they were bound to
Italy, and Italy would allow of no change. Such a policy would have
been as suicide from the sheer fear of death.
In 1917 I once discussed the whole question with the late Dr. Victor
Adler, and pointed out to him the probabilities ensuing from a
separate peace.
Dr. Adler replied: "For God's sake, do not plunge us into a war with
Germany!" After the entry of Bavarian troops into the Tyrol (Adler was
then a secretary in the Foreign Affairs department) he reminded me of
our conversation, and added: "The catastrophe we spoke of then has
arrived. The Tyrol will become a theatre of war."
Everyone in Austria wished for peace. No one wanted a new war--and a
separate peace would have brought about not peace, but a new war with
Germany.
In Hungary, Stephen Tisza ruled with practically unlimited powers; he
was far more powerful than the entire Wekerle Ministry put together.
As applied to Hungary, a separate peace would also have meant the
carrying out of the Entente aims; that is, the loss of the largest and
richest territories in the north and south of Czecho-Slovakia,
Roumania and Serbia. Is there anyone who can honestly maintain that
the Hungarians in 1917 would have agreed to these sacrifices without
putting up the bitterest resistance? Everyone who knows the
circumstances must admit that in this case Tisza would have had the
whole of Hungary behind him in a fierce attack on Vienna. Soon after I
took office I had a long and very serious conversation with him on
the German and the peace questions. Tisza pointed out that the Germans
were difficult to deal with; they were arrogant and despotic; yet
without them we could not bring the war to an end. The proposal to
cede Hungarian territory (Transylvania) and also the plan to enforce
an internal Hungarian reform in favour of the subject nationalities
were matters that were not capable of discussion. The congress in
London in 1915 had adopted resolutions that were quite mad and never
could be realised, and the desire for destruction prevailing in the
Entente could only be suppressed by force. In all circumstances, we
must keep our place by the side of Germany. In Hungary are many
different currents of feeling--but the moment that Vienna prepared to
sacrifice any part of Hungary, the whole country would rise as one man
against such action. In that respect there was no difference between
him--Tisza--and Karolyi. Tisza alluded to Karolyi's attitude before
the Roumanian declaration of war, referred to the attitude of
Parliament, and said that if peace were to be made behind Hungary's
back she would separate from Austria and act independently.
I replied that there was no question either of separating from Germany
or of ceding any Hungarian territory, but that we must be quite clear
as to what we had to guard should we be carried further through the
German lust of conquest.
Thereupon Tisza pointed out that the situation was different. It was
not known for certain what had been determined at the conference in
London (the protocol had not then been published), but that Hungarian
territory was promised to Roumania was just as certain as that the
Entente was planning to intervene in Hungarian internal affairs, and
both contingencies were equally unacceptable. Were the Entente to give
Hungary a guarantee for the _status quo ante_ and to desist from any
internal interference it would alter the situation. Until then he must
declare against any attempt at peace.
The conversation as it proceeded became more animated, owing
particularly to my accusing him of viewing all politics from a
Hungarian point of view, which he did not deny, though he maintained
that the dispute was a mere platonic one, as the Entente peace terms
appeared to be such that Austria would be left with much less than
Hungary. I was also first to state the terms under which we could make
peace; then only would it be seen whether extreme pressure brought to
bear on Germany were advisable or not. There was no sense in Germany's
advocating peace if she intended to continue fighting. For Germany was
fighting above all for the integrity of the Monarchy, which would be
lost the moment Germany laid down her arms. Whatever German
politicians and generals said was of little consequence. As long as
England remained bent on satisfying her Allies with our territory,
Germany was the only protection against these plans.
Tisza had no desire for conquest beyond a frontier protection from
Roumania, and he was decidedly opposed to the dismemberment of new
states (Poland); that would be to weaken not to strengthen Hungary.
After a lengthy discussion we agreed to bind ourselves to the
following policy:
(1) So long, as the determination made at the conference in
London, i.e. the destruction of the Monarchy, continues to
be the Entente's objective, we must fight on in the certain
hope of crushing that spirit of destruction.
(2) But as our war is purely a defensive war, it will on no
account be carried on for purposes of conquest.
(3) Any semblance of the weakening of our allied relations must be
avoided.
(4) No concession of Hungarian territory may take place without
the knowledge of the Prime Minister.
(5) Should the Austrian Ministry agree with the Foreign Minister
respecting a cession of Austrian territory, the Hungarian
Prime Minister will naturally acquiesce.
When the conference in London and the destruction of the Monarchy came
into question, Tisza was entirely in the right, and that he otherwise
to the end adhered to his standpoint is proved on the occasion of his
last visit to the Southern Slavs, which he undertook at the request of
the Emperor immediately before the collapse, and when in the most
marked manner he showed himself to be opposed to the aspirations of
the Southern Slavs.
Whoever attempts to judge in objective fashion must not, when looking
back from to-day, relegate all that has since happened to former
discernible facts, but should consider that, in spite of all pessimism
and all fears, the hopes of a reasonable peace of understanding, even
though involving sacrifices, still existed, and that it was impossible
to plunge the Monarchy into a catastrophe at once for fear of its
coming later.
If the situation is described to-day as though the inhabitants of the
Monarchy, and especially the Social Democrats, were favourably
disposed for any eventuality, even for a separate peace, I must again
most emphatically repudiate it. I bear in mind that Social Democracy
without doubt was the party most strongly in favour of peace, and also
that Social Democracy in Germany, as with us, repeatedly stated that
there were certain limits to its desire for peace. The German Social
Democrats never agreed that Alsace-Lorraine ought to be given up, and
never have our Social Democrats voted for ceding Trieste, Bozen and
Meran. This would in any case have been the price of peace--and also
the price of a separate peace--for, as I have already pointed out, at
the conference in London, which dates back to 1915, binding
obligations had been entered into for the partition of the Monarchy,
while all that had been promised to Italy.
The fall of the Monarchy was quite inevitable, whether through the
separation from Germany or through the vacillation in the Entente
ranks--for the claims of the Italians, the Roumanians, the Serbians,
and the Czechs had all been granted. In any case the Monarchy would
have fallen and German-Austria have arisen as she has done now; and I
doubt whether the part played by that country during the proceedings
would have recommended it to the special protection of the Entente.
It is a very great mistake, whether conscious or unconscious, to
believe and to maintain that the population of German-Austria, and
especially the present leaders of Social Democracy, are devoid of any
strong national feeling. I refer to the part played by the Austrian
Social Democracy in the question of union. It was the motive power in
the union with Germany, and the papers repeated daily that no material
advantages which the Entente could offer to Austria could alter the
decision. How, therefore, can this same Social Democracy, whose entire
political views and aims are subordinate to the desire for a union
with Germany--how can this Social Democracy demand a policy which,
without doubt, must lead not only to a separation from Germany, but to
a fratricidal war with the German nation? And why condemn the
upholding of allied relations when Andrassy was abused for doing the
opposite?
But what was the situation in March, 1918, shortly before my
resignation? Germany stood at the height of her success. I do not
pretend to say that her success was real. In this connection that is
of no moment; but the Germans were persuaded that they were quite near
a victorious end, that after leaving the Eastern front they would
throw themselves on to the Western front, and that the war would end
before America had time to come in. Their reckoning was at fault, as
we all know to-day. But for the German generals the will to victory
was the leading spirit, and all decisions arrived at by Germany
against the defection of Austria-Hungary proceeded from that dominant
influence.
As already mentioned, I stated in my speech of December 11, on foreign
policy, that neither the Entente nor Germany would conclude a peace of
renunciation. Since then I have had opportunity to speak with several
men of the Entente, and consequent on the views that I obtained, I
feel I must formulate my previous opinion in still stronger terms. I
came to the firm conclusion that the Entente--England above all--from
the summer of 1917 at any rate, had formed an unbending resolve to
shatter Germany.
From that time onwards England, with the obstinacy which is her chief
characteristic, appears to have been determined not to treat further
with Germany, nor to sheathe her sword until Germany lay crushed to
earth. It makes no difference in the matter that the German military
party--though for other reasons--from a total misconception of their
chances of victory, steadily refused a peace involving sacrifice at a
time when it might have been possible. This is an historical fact, but
as an upholder of truth I must distinctly state that I doubt whether
concessions would have changed the fate of Germany. _We_ could have
gone over to the enemy--in 1917 and also in 1918; we could have fought
against Germany with the Entente on Austro-Hungarian soil, and would
doubtless have hastened Germany's collapse; but the wounds which
Austria-Hungary would have received in the fray would not have been
less serious than those from which she is now suffering: she would
have perished in the fight against Germany, as she has as good as
perished in her fight allied with Germany.
_Austria-Hungary's watch had run down._ Among the few statesmen who in
1914 wished for war--like Tschirsky, for instance--there can have been
none who after a few months had not altered and regretted his views.
They, too, had not thought of a world war. I believe to-day,
nevertheless, that even without the war the fall of the Monarchy would
have happened, and that the assassination in Serbia was the first
step.
The Archduke Heir Apparent was the victim of Greater Serbia's
aspirations; but these aspirations, which led to the breaking away of
our Southern Slav provinces, would not have been suppressed, but, on
the contrary, would have largely increased and asserted themselves,
and would have strengthened the centrifugal tendencies of other
peoples within the Monarchy.
Lightning at night reveals the country for a second, and the same
effect was produced by the shots fired at Sarajevo. It became obvious
that the signal for the fall of the Monarchy had been given. The bells
of Sarajevo, which began to toll half an hour after the murder,
sounded the death knell of the Monarchy.
The feeling among the Austrian people, and especially at Vienna, was
very general that the outrage at Sarajevo was a matter of more
importance than the murder of an Imperial prince and his wife, and
that it was the alarm signal for the ruin of the Habsburg Empire.
I have been told that during the period between the assassination and
the war, warlike demonstrations were daily occurrences in the Viennese
restaurants and people's parks; patriotic and anti-Serbian songs were
sung, and Berchtold was scoffed at because he could not "exert himself
to take any energetic steps." This must not be taken as an excuse for
any eventual mistakes on the part of the leaders of the nation, for a
leading statesman ought not to allow himself to be influenced by the
man in the street. It is only to prove that the spirit developed in
1914 appears to have been very general. And it may perhaps be
permitted to add this comment: how many of those who then clamoured
for war and revenge and demanded "energy," would, now that the
experiment has totally failed, severely criticise and condemn
Berchtold's "criminal behaviour"?
It is, of course, impossible to say in what manner the fall of the
Monarchy would have occurred had war been averted. Certainly in a less
terrible fashion than was the case through the war. Probably much more
slowly, and doubtless without dragging the whole world into the
whirlpool. We were bound to die. We were at liberty to choose the
manner of our death, and we chose the most terrible.
Without knowing it, we lost our independence at the outbreak of war.
We were transformed from a subject into an object.
This unfortunate war once started, we were powerless to end it. At the
conference in London the death sentence had been passed on the Empire
of the Habsburgs and a separate peace would have been no easier a form
of death than that involved in holding out at the side of our Allies.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Supposed to be the Counts Berchtold, Tisza and Stürgkh and General
Conrad von Hohendorf.
[2] See Appendix, p. 325.
[3] See page 275.