every place; the only passion which can never lie quiet for want of
irritation: its effects therefore are every where discoverable, and its
attempts always to be dreaded.
It is impossible to mention a name which any advantageous distinction
has made eminent, but some latent animosity will burst out. The wealthy
trader, however he may abstract himself from publick affairs, will never
want those who hint, with Shylock, that ships are but boards. The
beauty, adorned only with the unambitious graces of innocence and
modesty, provokes, whenever she appears, a thousand murmurs of
detraction. The genius, even when he endeavours only to entertain or
instruct, yet suffers persecution from innumerable criticks, whose
acrimony is excited merely by the pain of seeing others pleased, and of
hearing applauses which another enjoys.
The frequency of envy makes it so familiar, that it escapes our notice;
nor do we often reflect upon its turpitude or malignity, till we happen
to feel its influence. When he that has given no provocation to malice,
but by attempting to excel, finds himself pursued by multitudes whom he
never saw, with all the implacability of personal resentment; when he
perceives clamour and malice let loose upon him as a publick enemy, and
incited by every stratagem of defamation; when he hears the misfortunes
of his family, or the follies of his youth, exposed to the world; and
every failure of conduct, or defect of nature, aggravated and ridiculed;
he then learns to abhor those artifices at which he only laughed before,
and discovers how much the happiness of life would be advanced by the
eradication of envy from the human heart.
Envy is, indeed, a stubborn weed of the mind, and seldom yields to the
culture of philosophy. There are, however, considerations, which, if
carefully implanted and diligently propagated, might in time overpower
and repress it, since no one can nurse it for the sake of pleasure, as
its effects are only shame, anguish, and perturbation. It is above all
other vices inconsistent with the character of a social being, because
it sacrifices truth and kindness to very weak temptations. He that
plunders a wealthy neighbour gains as much as he takes away, and may
improve his own condition in the same proportion as he impairs
another's; but he that blasts a flourishing reputation, must be content
with a small dividend of additional fame, so small as can afford very
little consolation to balance the guilt by which it is obtained.
I have hitherto avoided that dangerous and empirical morality, which
cures one vice by means of another. But envy is so base and detestable,
so vile in its original, and so pernicious in its effects, that the
predominance of almost any other quality is to be preferred. It is one
of those lawless enemies of society, against which poisoned arrows may
honestly be used. Let it therefore be constantly remembered, that
whoever envies another, confesses his superiority, and let those be
reformed by their pride who have lost their virtue.
It is no slight aggravation of the injuries which envy incites, that
they are committed against those who have given no intentional
provocation; and that the sufferer is often marked out for ruin, not
because he has failed in any duty, but because he has dared to do more
than was required.
Almost every other crime is practised by the help of some quality which
might have produced esteem or love, if it had been well employed; but
envy is mere unmixed and genuine evil; it pursues a hateful end by
despicable means, and desires not so much its own happiness as another's
misery. To avoid depravity like this, it is not necessary that any one
should aspire to heroism or sanctity, but only that he should resolve
not to quit the rank which nature assigns him, and wish to maintain the
dignity of a human being.
No. 184. SATURDAY, DECEMBER 21, 1751.
_Permittes ipsis expendere numinibus, quid
Conveniat nobis, rebusque sit utile nostris_. JUV. Sat. x. 347.
Intrust thy fortune to the pow'rs above;
Leave them to manage for thee, and to grant
What their unerring wisdom sees thee want. DRYDEN.
As every scheme of life, so every form of writing, has its advantages
and inconveniencies, though not mingled in the same proportions. The
writer of essays escapes many embarrassments to which a large work would
have exposed him; he seldom harasses his reason with long trains of
consequences, dims his eyes with the perusal of antiquated volumes, or
burthens his memory with great accumulations of preparatory knowledge. A
careless glance upon a favourite author, or transient survey of the
varieties of life, is sufficient to supply the first hint or seminal
idea, which, enlarged by the gradual accretion of matter stored in the
mind, is by the warmth of fancy easily expanded into flowers, and
sometimes ripened into fruit.
The most frequent difficulty by which the authors of these petty
compositions are distressed, arises from the perpetual demand of novelty
and change. The compiler of a system of science lays his invention at
rest, and employs only his judgment, the faculty exerted with least
fatigue. Even the relator of feigned adventures, when once the principal
characters are established, and the great events regularly connected,
finds incidents and episodes crowding upon his mind; every change opens
new views, and the latter part of the story grows without labour out of
the former. But he that attempts to entertain his reader with
unconnected pieces, finds the irksomeness of his task rather increased
than lessened by every production. The day calls afresh upon him for a
new topick, and he is again obliged to choose, without any principle to
regulate his choice.
It is indeed true, that there is seldom any necessity of looking far, or
inquiring long for a proper subject. Every diversity of art or nature,
every publick blessing or calamity, every domestick pain or
gratification, every sally of caprice, blunder of absurdity, or
stratagem of affectation, may supply matter to him whose only rule is to
avoid uniformity. But it often happens, that the judgment is distracted
with boundless multiplicity, the imagination ranges from one design to
another, and the hours pass imperceptibly away, till the composition can
be no longer delayed, and necessity enforces the use of those thoughts
which then happen to be at hand. The mind, rejoicing at deliverance on
any terms from perplexity and suspense, applies herself vigorously to
the work before her, collects embellishments and illustrations, and
sometimes finishes, with great elegance and happiness, what in a state
of ease and leisure she never had begun.
It is not commonly observed, how much, even of actions, considered as
particularly subject to choice, is to be attributed to accident, or some
cause out of our own power, by whatever name it be distinguished. To
close tedious deliberations with hasty resolves, and after long
consultations with reason to refer the question to caprice, is by no
means peculiar to the essayist. Let him that peruses this paper review
the series of his life, and inquire how he was placed in his present
condition. He will find, that of the good or ill which he has
experienced, a great part came unexpected, without any visible
gradations of approach; that every event has been influenced by causes
acting without his intervention; and that whenever he pretended to the
prerogative of foresight, he was mortified with new conviction of the
shortness of his views.
The busy, the ambitious, the inconstant, and the adventurous, may be
said to throw themselves by design into the arms of fortune, and
voluntarily to quit the power of governing themselves; they engage in a
course of life in which little can be ascertained by previous measures;
nor is it any wonder that their time is passed between elation and
despondency, hope and disappointment.
Some there are who appear to walk the road of life with more
circumspection, and make no step till they think themselves secure from
the hazard of a precipice, when neither pleasure nor profit can tempt
them from the beaten path; who refuse to climb lest they should fall, or
to run lest they should stumble, and move slowly forward without any
compliance with those passions by which the heady and vehement are
seduced and betrayed.
Yet even the timorous prudence of this judicious class is far from
exempting them from the dominion of chance, a subtle and insidious
power, who will intrude upon privacy and embarrass caution. No course of
life is so prescribed and limited, but that many actions must result
from arbitrary election. Every one must form the general plan of his
conduct by his own reflections; he must resolve whether he will
endeavour at riches or at content; whether he will exercise private or
publick virtues; whether he will labour for the general benefit of
mankind, or contract his beneficence to his family and dependants.
This question has long exercised the schools of philosophy, but remains
yet undecided; and what hope is there that a young man, unacquainted
with the arguments on either side, should determine his own destiny
otherwise than by chance?
When chance has given him a partner of his bed, whom he prefers to all
other women, without any proof of superior desert, chance must again
direct him in the education of his children; for, who was ever able to
convince himself by arguments, that he had chosen for his son that mode
of instruction to which his understanding was best adapted, or by which
he would most easily be made wise or virtuous?
Whoever shall inquire by what motives he was determined on these
important occasions, will find them such as his pride will scarcely
suffer him to confess; some sudden ardour of desire, some uncertain
glimpse of advantage, some petty competition, some inaccurate
conclusion, or some example implicitly reverenced. Such are often the
first causes of our resolves; for it is necessary to act, but impossible
to know the consequences of action, or to discuss all the reasons which
offer themselves on every part to inquisitiveness and solicitude.
Since life itself is uncertain, nothing which has life for its basis can
boast much stability. Yet this is but a small part of our perplexity. We
set out on a tempestuous sea in quest of some port, where we expect to
find rest, but where we are not sure of admission, we are not only in
danger of sinking in the way, but of being misled by meteors mistaken
for stars, of being driven from our course by the changes of the wind,
and of losing it by unskilful steerage; yet it sometimes happens, that
cross winds blow us to a safer coast, that meteors draw us aside from
whirlpools, and that negligence or errour contributes to our escape from
mischiefs to which a direct course would have exposed us. Of those that,
by precipitate conclusions, involve themselves in calamities without
guilt, very few, however they may reproach themselves, can be certain
that other measures would have been more successful.
In this state of universal uncertainty, where a thousand dangers hover
about us, and none can tell whether the good that he pursues is not evil
in disguise, or whether the next step will lead him to safety or
destruction, nothing can afford any rational tranquillity, but the
conviction that, however we amuse ourselves with unideal sounds, nothing
in reality is governed by chance, but that the universe is under the
perpetual superintendance of Him who created it; that our being is in
the hands of omnipotent Goodness, by whom what appears casual to us, is
directed for ends ultimately kind and merciful; and that nothing can
finally hurt him who debars not himself from the Divine favour.
No. 185. TUESDAY, DECEMBER 24, 1751.
_At vindicta bonum vita jucundius ipsa,
Nempe hoc indocti.--
Chrysippus non dicet idem, nec mite Thaletis
Ingenium, dulcique senex vicinus Hymetto,
Qui partem adceptæ sæva inter vincla Cicutæ
Adcusatori nollet dare.--
--Quippe minuti
Semper et infirmi est animi exiguique voluptas
Ultio_. JUV. Sat. xiii. 180.
_But O! revenge is sweet_.
Thus think the crowd; who, eager to engage,
Take quickly fire, and kindle into rage.
Not so mild Thales nor Chrysippus thought,
Nor that good man, who drank the poisonous draught.
With mind serene; and could not wish to see
His vile accuser drink as deep as he:
Exalted Socrates! divinely brave!
Injur'd he fell, and dying he forgave!
Too noble for revenge; which still we find
The weakest frailty of a feeble mind. DRYDEN.
No vicious dispositions of the mind more obstinately resist both the
counsels of philosophy and the injunctions of religion, than those which
are complicated with an opinion of dignity; and which we cannot dismiss
without leaving in the hands of opposition some advantage iniquitously
obtained, or suffering from our own prejudices some imputation of
pusillanimity.
For this reason scarcely any law of our Redeemer is more openly
transgressed, or more industriously evaded, than that by which he
commands his followers to forgive injuries, and prohibits, under the
sanction of eternal misery, the gratification of the desire which every
man feels to return pain upon him that inflicts it. Many who could have
conquered their anger, are unable to combat pride, and pursue offences
to extremity of vengeance, lest they should be insulted by the triumph
of an enemy.
But certainly no precept could better become him, at whose birth _peace_
was proclaimed _to the earth_. For, what would so soon destroy all the
order of society, and deform life with violence and ravage, as a
permission to every one to judge his own cause, and to apportion his own
recompense for imagined injuries?
It is difficult for a man of the strictest justice not to favour himself
too much, in the calmest moments of solitary meditation. Every one
wishes for the distinctions for which thousands are wishing at the same
time, in their own opinion, with better claims. He that, when his reason
operates in its full force, can thus, by the mere prevalence of
self-love, prefer himself to his fellow-beings, is very unlikely to
judge equitably when his passions are agitated by a sense of wrong, and
his attention wholly engrossed by pain, interest, or danger. Whoever
arrogates, to himself the right of vengeance, shews how little he is
qualified to decide his own claims, since he certainly demands what he
would think unfit to be granted to another.
Nothing is more apparent than that, however injured, or however
provoked, some must at last be contented to forgive. For it can never be
hoped, that he who first commits an injury, will contentedly acquiesce
in the penalty required: the same haughtiness of contempt, or vehemence
of desire, that prompt the act of injustice, will more strongly incite
its justification; and resentment can never so exactly balance the
punishment with the fault, but there will remain an overplus of
vengeance which even he who condemns his first action will think himself
entitled to retaliate. What then can ensue but a continual exacerbation
of hatred, an unextinguishable feud, an incessant reciprocation of
mischief, a mutual vigilance to entrap, and eagerness to destroy.
Since then the imaginary right of vengeance must be at last remitted,
because it is impossible to live in perpetual hostility, and equally
impossible that of two enemies, either should first think himself
obliged by justice to submission, it is surely eligible to forgive
early. Every passion is more easily subdued before it has been long
accustomed to possession of the heart; every idea is obliterated with
less difficulty, as it has been more slightly impressed, and less
frequently renewed. He who has often brooded over his wrongs, pleased
himself with schemes of malignity, and glutted his pride with the
fancied supplications of humbled enmity, will not easily open his bosom
to amity and reconciliation, or indulge the gentle sentiments of
benevolence and peace.
It is easiest to forgive, while there is yet little to be forgiven. A
single injury may be soon dismissed from the memory; but a long
succession of ill offices by degrees associates itself with every idea;
a long contest involves so many circumstances, that every place and
action will recall it to the mind, and fresh remembrance of vexation
must still enkindle rage, and irritate revenge.
A wise man will make haste to forgive, because he knows the true value
of time, and will not suffer it to pass away in unnecessary pain. He
that willingly suffers the corrosions of inveterate hatred, and gives up
his days and nights to the gloom of malice, and perturbations of
stratagem, cannot surely be said to consult his ease. Resentment is an
union of sorrow with malignity, a combination of a passion which all
endeavour to avoid, with a passion which all concur to detest. The man
who retires to meditate mischief, and to exasperate his own rage; whose
thoughts are employed only on means of distress and contrivances of
ruin; whose mind never pauses from the remembrance of his own
sufferings, but to indulge some hope of enjoying the calamities of
another, may justly be numbered among the most miserable of human
beings, among those who are guilty without reward, who have neither the
gladness of prosperity, nor the calm of innocence.
Whoever considers the weakness both of himself and others, will not long
want persuasives to forgiveness. We know not to what degree of malignity
any injury is to be imputed; or how much its guilt, if we were to
inspect the mind of him that committed it, would be extenuated by
mistake, precipitance, or negligence; we cannot be certain how much more
we feel than was intended to be inflicted, or how much we increase the
mischief to ourselves by voluntary aggravations. We may charge to design
the effects of accident; we may think the blow violent only because we
have made ourselves delicate and tender; we are on every side in danger
of errour and of guilt; which we are certain to avoid only by speedy
forgiveness.
From this pacifick and harmless temper, thus propitious to others and
ourselves, to domestick tranquillity and to social happiness, no man is
withheld but by pride, by the fear of being insulted by his adversary,
or despised by the world.
It may be laid down as an unfailing and universal axiom, that "all pride
is abject and mean." It is always an ignorant, lazy, or cowardly
acquiescence in a false appearance of excellence, and proceeds not from
consciousness of our attainments, but insensibility of our wants.
Nothing can be great which is not right. Nothing which reason condemns
can be suitable to the dignity of the human mind. To be driven by
external motives from the path which our own heart approves, to give way
to any thing but conviction, to suffer the opinion of others to rule our
choice, or overpower our resolves, is to submit tamely to the lowest and
most ignominious slavery, and to resign the right of directing our own
lives.
The utmost excellence at which humanity can arrive, is a constant and
determinate pursuit of virtue, without regard to present dangers or
advantage; a continual reference of every action to the divine will; an
habitual appeal to everlasting justice; and an unvaried elevation of the
intellectual eye to the reward which perseverance only can obtain. But
that pride which many, who presume to boast of generous sentiments,
allow to regulate their measures, has nothing nobler in view than the
approbation of men, of beings whose superiority we are under no
obligation to acknowledge, and who, when we have courted them with the
utmost assiduity, can confer no valuable or permanent reward; of beings
who ignorantly judge of what they do not understand, or partially
determine what they never have examined; and whose sentence is therefore
of no weight till it has received the ratification of our own
conscience.
He that can descend to bribe suffrages like these, at the price of his
innocence; he that can suffer the delight of such acclamations to
withhold his attention from the commands of the universal Sovereign, has
little reason to congratulate himself upon the greatness of his mind;
whenever he awakes to seriousness and reflection, he must become
despicable in his own eyes, and shrink with shame from the remembrance
of his cowardice and folly.
Of him that hopes to be forgiven, it is indispensably required that he
forgive. It is therefore superfluous to urge any other motive. On this
great duty eternity is suspended, and to him that refuses to practise
it, the Throne of mercy is inaccessible, and the Saviour of the world
has been born in vain.
No. 186. SATURDAY, DECEMBER 28, 1751.
_Pone me, pigris ubi nulla campis
Arbor æstica recreatur aurâ--
Dulce ridentem Lalagen amabo,
Dulce loquentem_. HOR. Lib. i. Ode xxii. 17.
Place me where never summer breeze
Unbinds the glebe, or warms the trees;
Where ever lowering clouds appear,
And angry Jove deforms th' inclement year:
Love and the nymph shall charm my toils,
The nymph, who sweetly speaks and sweetly smiles. FRANCIS.
Of the happiness and misery of our present state, part arises from our
sensations, and part from our opinions; part is distributed by nature,
and part is in a great measure apportioned by ourselves. Positive
pleasure we cannot always obtain, and positive pain we often cannot
remove. No man can give to his own plantations the fragrance of the
Indian groves; nor will any precepts of philosophy enable him to
withdraw his attention from wounds or diseases. But the negative
infelicity which proceeds, not from the pressure of sufferings, but the
absence of enjoyments, will always yield to the remedies of reason.
One of the great arts of escaping superfluous uneasiness, is to free our
minds from the habit of comparing our condition with that of others on
whom the blessings of life are more bountifully bestowed, or with
imaginary states of delight and security, perhaps unattainable by
mortals. Few are placed in a situation so gloomy and distressful, as not
to see every day beings yet more forlorn and miserable, from whom they
may learn to rejoice in their own lot.
No inconvenience is less superable by art or diligence than the
inclemency of climates, and therefore none affords more proper exercise
for this philosophical abstraction. A native of England, pinched with
the frosts of December, may lessen his affection for his own country by
suffering his imagination to wander in the vales of Asia, and sport
among the woods that are always green, and streams that always murmur;
but if he turns his thought towards the polar regions, and considers the
nations to whom a great portion of the year is darkness, and who are
condemned to pass weeks and months amidst mountains of snow, he will
soon recover his tranquillity, and, while he stirs his fire, or throws
his cloak about him, reflect how much he owes to Providence, that he is
not placed in Greenland or Siberia.
The barrenness of the earth and the severity of the skies in these
dreary countries, are such as might be expected to confine the mind
wholly to the contemplation of necessity and distress, so that the care
of escaping death from cold and hunger, should leave no room for those
passions which, in lands of plenty, influence conduct, or diversify
characters; the summer should be spent only in providing for the winter,
and the winter in longing for the summer.
Yet learned curiosity is known to have found its way into these abodes
of poverty and gloom: Lapland and Iceland have their historians, their
criticks, and their poets; and love, that extends his dominion wherever
humanity can be found, perhaps exerts the same power in the
Greenlander's hut as in the palaces of eastern monarchs.