or ten--two conciliators and two deputy conciliators from among their
own subjects, and one conciliator and one deputy conciliator from among
the subjects of some other State. Now when a non-justiciable dispute
arises between two States which has not been settled by diplomatic
means, the three conciliators of each party in dispute shall meet to
investigate the matter, to report thereon, and to propose, if possible,
a settlement.
According to this proposal there would be in existence a number of
Councils of Conciliation equal to half the number of the members of the
League. Whenever a dispute arises, the Permanent Council of
Conciliation--with which I shall deal presently--shall appoint a
Chairman from amongst its own members. The Council thus constituted
shall investigate the case, report on it, send a copy to each party in
dispute and to the Permanent Council of Conciliation.
The _Permanent_ Council of Conciliation should be a _small_ Council to
be established by each of the Great Powers appointing one conciliator
and one deputy conciliator for a period of--say--five or ten years. The
reason why only the Great Powers should be represented in the Permanent
Council of Conciliation at the Hague is that naturally, in case coercion
is to be resorted to against a State which begins war without having
previously submitted the dispute to a Council of Conciliation, the Great
Powers will be chiefly concerned. This Permanent Council of Conciliation
would have to watch the political life of the members of the League and
communicate with all the Governments of the members in case the peace of
the world were endangered by the attitude of one of the members; for
instance by one or more of the members arming excessively. The Council
would likewise be competent to draw the attention of States involved in
a dispute to the fact that they ought to bring it before either the
International Court of Justice or their special Council of Conciliation.
This proposal of mine concerning mediation within the League of Nations
is, of course, sketchy and would need working out in detail if one were
thinking of preparing a full plan for its realisation. However that may
be, my proposal concerning a number of Councils of Conciliation has the
advantage that non-justiciable disputes would in each case be
investigated and reported on by conciliators who have once for all been
appointed by the States in dispute and who therefore possess their
confidence. On the other hand, the proposed Permanent Council of
Conciliation would guarantee to the Great Powers that important
influence which is due to them on account of the fact that they would be
chiefly concerned in case economic, military, or naval measures had to
be resorted to against a recalcitrant member of the League.
XII. Having discussed International Mediation by International Councils
of Conciliation, I must now turn to two questions which I have hitherto
purposely omitted, although in the eyes of many people they stand in the
forefront of interest, namely, firstly, _disarmament_ as a consequence
of the peaceable settlement of disputes by an International Court of
Justice and International Councils of Conciliation, and, secondly, the
question of the _surrender of sovereignty_ which it is asserted is
involved by the entrance of any State into the proposed League of
Nations.
Now as regards disarmament, I have deliberately abstained from
mentioning it hitherto, although it is certainly a question of the
greatest importance. The reason for my abstention is a very simple one.
I have always maintained that disarmament can neither diminish the
number of wars nor abolish war altogether, but that, if the number of
wars diminishes or if war be abolished altogether, disarmament will
follow. There is no doubt that when once the new League of Nations is in
being, war will occur much more rarely than hitherto. For this reason
disarmament will _ipso facto_ follow the establishment of a League of
Nations, and the details of such disarmament are matters which will soon
be solved when once the new League has become a reality. Yet I must
emphasise the fact that disarmament is not identical with the total
abolition of armies and navies. The possibility must always be kept in
view that one or more members of the League will be recalcitrant, and
that then the other members must unite their forces against them. And
there must likewise be kept in view the possibility of a war between two
members of the League on account of a political dispute in which
mediation by the International Councils of Conciliation was
unsuccessful. Be that as it may, it is certain that in time disarmament
can take place to a very great extent, and it is quite probable that
large standing armies based on conscription might everywhere be
abolished and be replaced by militia.
XIII. Let me now turn to the question of sovereignty. Is the assertion
really true that States renounce their sovereignty by entering into the
League? The answer depends entirely upon the conception of sovereignty
with which one starts. If sovereignty were absolutely unfettered liberty
of action, a loss of sovereignty would certainly be involved by
membership of the League, because every member submits to the
obligation never to resort to arms on account of a judicial dispute, and
in case of a political dispute to resort to arms only after having given
an opportunity of mediation to an International Council of Conciliation.
But in fact sovereignty does not mean absolutely boundless liberty of
action; and moreover sovereignty has at no time been a conception upon
the contents of which there has been general agreement.
The term 'sovereignty' was introduced into political science by Bodin in
his celebrated work 'De la Republique,' which appeared in 1577. Before
that time, the word _souverain_ was used in France for any political or
other authority which was not subordinate to any higher authority; for
instance, the highest Courts were called _cours souveraines_. Now Bodin
gave quite a new meaning to the old term. Being under the influence and
in favour of the policy of centralisation initiated by Louis XI of
France (1461-1483), the founder of French absolutism, Bodin defines
sovereignty as the 'absolute and perpetual power within a State.'
However, even Bodin was far from considering sovereignty to give
absolutely unfettered freedom of action, for he conceded that
sovereignty was restricted by the commandments of God and by the rules
of the Law of Nature. Be that as it may, this conception of sovereignty
once introduced was universally accepted; but at the same time the
meaning of the term became immediately a bone of contention between the
schools of publicists. And it is to be taken into consideration that the
science of politics has learnt to distinguish between sovereignty of
the State and sovereignty of the agents who exercise the sovereign
powers of the State. According to the modern view sovereignty is a
natural attribute of every independent State as a State; and neither the
monarch, nor Parliament, nor the people can possess any sovereignty of
their own. The sovereignty of a monarch, or of a Parliament, or of the
whole people is not an original attribute of their own, but derives from
the sovereignty of the State which is governed by them. It is outside
the scope of this lecture to give you a history of the conception of
sovereignty, it suffices to state the undeniable fact that from the time
when the term was first introduced into political science until the
present day there has never been unanimity with regard to its meaning,
except that it is a synonym for independence of all earthly authority.
Now, do you believe that the independence of a State is really infringed
because it agrees never to make war on account of a judicial dispute,
and in case of a political dispute not to resort to arms before having
given opportunity of mediation to International Councils of
Conciliation? Independence is not boundless liberty of a State to do
what it likes, without any restriction whatever. The mere fact that
there is an International Law in existence restricts the unbounded
liberty of action of every civilised State, because every State is
prohibited from interfering with the affairs of every other State. The
fact is that the independence of every State finds its limitation in the
independence of every other State. And it is generally admitted that a
State can through conventions--such as a treaty of alliance or of
neutrality or others--enter into many obligations which more or less
restrict its liberty of action. Independence is a question of degree,
and, therefore, it is also a question of degree whether or no the
independence of a State is vitally encroached upon by a certain
restriction. In my opinion the independence of a State is as little
infringed by an agreement to submit all its judicial disputes to the
judgment of a Court and not to resort to arms for a settlement, as the
liberty of a citizen is infringed because in a modern State he can no
longer resort to arms on account of a dispute with a fellow citizen but
must submit it to the judgment of the Court.
And even if it were otherwise, if the entrance of a State into the new
League of Nations did involve an infringement of its sovereignty and
independence, humanity need not grieve over it. The Prussian conception
of the State as an end in itself and of the authority of the State as
something above everything else and divine--a conception which found
support in the philosophy of Hegel and his followers--is adverse to the
ideal of democracy and constitutional government. Just as Henri IV of
France said 'La France vaut bien une messe,' we may well say 'La paix du
monde vaut bien la perte de l'independance de l'etat.'
XIV. I have come to the end of this course of lectures, but before we
part I should like, in conclusion, to touch upon a question which has
frequently been put with regard to the proposal of a new League of
Nations:--Can it really be expected that, in case of a great conflict of
interests, all the members of the League will faithfully carry out their
engagements? Will the new League stand the strain of such conflicts as
shake the very existence of States and Nations? Will the League really
stand the test of History?
History teaches that many a State has entered into engagements with the
intention of faithfully carrying them out, but, when a grave conflict
arose, matters assumed a different aspect, with the consequence that the
engagements remained unfulfilled. Will it be different in the future?
Can the Powers which enter into the League of Nations trust to the
security which it promises? Can they be prepared to disarm, although
there is no guarantee that, when grave conflicts of vital interests
arise, all the members of the League will faithfully stand by their
engagements?
These are questions which it is difficult to answer because no one can
look into the future. We can only say that, if really constitutional and
democratic government all the world over makes international politics
honest and reliable and excludes secret treaties, all the chances are
that the members of the League will see that their true interests and
their lasting welfare are intimately connected with the necessity of
fulfilling the obligations to which they have submitted by their
entrance into the League. The upheaval created by the present World War,
the many millions of lives sacrificed, and the enormous economic losses
suffered during these years of war, not only by the belligerents but
also by all neutrals, will be remembered for many generations to come.
It would therefore seem to be certain that, while the memory of these
losses in lives and wealth lasts, all the members of the League will
faithfully carry out the obligations connected with the membership of
the League into which they enter for the purpose of avoiding such a
disaster as, like a bolt from the blue, fell upon mankind by the
outbreak of the present war. On the other hand, I will not deny that no
one can guarantee the future; that conflicts may arise which will shake
the foundations of the League of Nations; that the League may fall to
pieces; and that a disaster like the present may again visit mankind.
Our generation can only do its best for the future, and it must be left
to succeeding generations to perpetuate the work initiated by us.
INDEX
Administration of Justice by International Courts, difficulties of, 62;
maintenance of tradition of, 67;
permanent institution for the, 61.
Aims of the League of Nations defined, 23, 28, 35-36.
Article 8 of the Hague Convention concerning the Pacific Settlement of
International Disputes, 70.
Article 23(h) of the Hague Regulations concerning Land Warfare, 45-55;
controversy respecting interpretation of, 45;
correspondence respecting, with Foreign Office, 48-55.
Autocratic Government, 11.
Belgium, 37, 66.
Bodin, 76.
Bonfils on Article 23(h) of the Hague Regulations concerning Land
Warfare, 49.
Bordwell on Article 23(h) of the Hague Regulations concerning Land
Warfare, 50.
British Empire, 13, 20.
Bryan Peace Treaties, 71.
Bryce, Lord, scheme of, 36.
Central Powers, the, are they to become members of the League of
Nations? 17, 36;
necessity for utter defeat of, 15, 37.
Colonies, wars for the acquisition of, 10.
Complex cases of dispute, how to settle, 68.
Congress of Vienna, 30, 42.
Constitutional Government, 10, 11;
necessity for, 19.
Court of Appeal, International, 66, 67, 69;
manning of, 64.
Court of Arbitration, establishment of International, 61.
Court of First Instance, International, 64;
manning of, 66.
Crucee, Emeric, 9.
Davis, General, on Article 23(h) of the Hague Regulations concerning
Land Warfare, 51.
Democracy, 10, 11.
Dickinson, scheme of Sir Willoughby, 36.
Disarmament, 21, 74.
Dubois, Pierre, 8.
Dynastic wars, 10.
Engagements of the members of the League of Nations, security for
fulfilment of, 79.
Equality, of States, 33, 39;
of the votes at Hague Peace Conferences, 38.
Family, the, a product of natural development, 10.
Family of Nations, political hegemony of the Great Powers within the, 31.
Federal World State, A, 18-20;
demanded by Pacifists, 31;
why not possible, 19.
Foreign Office, letter of, to Professor Oppenheim concerning Article
23(h), 52-55.
German Confederation, civil war within the, 32.
German Weissbuch on Article 23(h) of the Hague Regulations concerning
Land Warfare, 51, 54, 55.
Germany, is she to become a member of the League of Nations? 17, 36;
necessity for the utter defeat of, 15, 37.
Great Powers, 30, 66;
power and influence of the, 29-31.
Greece, city States of ancient, 7.
Gregory on Article 23(h) of the Hague Regulations concerning Land
Warfare, 50.
Grey, Earl, 5, 52, 53, 55.
Grotians, the School of, 62.
Grotius, Hugo, 9.
Hague Convention concerning the Pacific Settlement of International
Disputes, Article 8 of, 70.
Hague Peace Conferences, 34;
method of legislating by, 45;
the work of, obstructed by some States, 38;
standing council of, proposed, 39;
starting point of organisation of League of Nations by, 36, 39;
votes of States of equal value at, 38.
Hague Regulations concerning Land Warfare, controversy respecting
interpretation of Article 23(h) of, 45.
Henry IV of France, 9, 78.
Holland, Professor, on Article 23(h) of the Hague Regulations concerning
Land Warfare, 50.
Independence of States, what it is, 33, 77.
International Army and Navy, why impossible, 6, 18, 20-22, 41.
International Case Law, 64.
International Council of Conciliation, 28, 40, 69;
scheme for the establishment of, 72-74;
starting points for, 70.
International Court of Appeal, 66, 67;
a necessity, 63;
manning of, 64.
International Court of First Instance, 64;
manning of proposed bench to serve as, 64.
International Court of Justice, 18, 28, 65-68;
manning of, 65;
proposed permanent bench of, 65, 66;
proposed special benches of, for different cases, 66.
International Courts, claims of all States in manning of, 64;
difficulties of manning of, 65;
precedents of, 64.
International Executive, why impossible, 19, 41.
International Government, why impossible, 19.
International Law, a book law at present, 43;
and League of Nations interdependent, 6, 33;
complied with often without Courts, 60;
grew by custom during Middle Ages, 8;
not in being in antiquity, 6;
progress of, 33, 35, 38;
universal and general, difference between, 44.
International Legislation, 38, 41-48;
a by-product only in the past, 42;
difficulties of, created by conflicting interests of States, 44;
difficulties of, created by different methods of interpretation and
construction, 45;
difficulties of, created by the fact that a majority vote cannot
create a statute, 44;
difficulties of, created by the language question, 43;
meaning of the term, 41;
possible even without International Courts, 42, 60;
possible only by agreement of all the States, 42;
wide field open for, 43.
International Statutes, cannot be created by majority vote, 44;
interpretation and construction of, 45;
what are? 42.
Internationalism, growth of, 12.
Law-making treaties, what are? 42.
'La France vaut bien une messe,' 78.
League of Nations, 3, 8;
aims defined, 23, 28, 35-36;
and International Law interdependent, 6;
career in a sense started already, 8, 16;
conception of, very old, 6;
demand for, universal, 11;
impossibility of state-like organisation of, 36;
no unanimity concerning its aims or organisation, 18;
organisation of, demanded, 31;
problems connected with, 24, 28;
seven principles of, which ought to be adopted, 39-41;
so-called, but League of States is meant, 13;
starting point of organisation of, 33, 36, 39;
constitution _sui generis_ of, a necessity, 22, 33;
what is new in the now desired, 11;
when it would be an organised community, 11, 34.
Marini, Antoine, 8.
Mediation, International. _See_ International Council of Conciliation.
Militarism, conception of, 15;
Prussian, 16.
Nation, the, a product of historical development, 10, 14;
conception of, 13, 14;
not to be confounded with race, 13-14.
Nations, not to be confounded with States, 13, 14.
Nationality, principle of, 14, 32.
'Natura non facit saltus,' 5.
Naturalists, the School of, 62.
Oppenheim, letter of Foreign Office concerning Article 23(h) of the
Hague Regulations to Professor, 52-55.
Pacifists, 31.
Parliament, International, why impossible, 18, 19.
Permanent Court of Arbitration, International, 34;
establishment of, by the First Peace Conference, 61.
Permanent International Commissions of the Bryan Peace Treaties, 71.
Podiebrad, 8.
Police, International, 6, 41.
Politis on Article 23(h) of the Hague Regulations concerning Land
Warfare, 49, 55.
Porter _v._ Freundenberg, case of, 47.
Positivists, the School of, 62.
Precedents of International Courts, 66.
Principle of Nationality, 14, 32.
Prize Court, International, proposed by Second Peace Conference, 34.
Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? 21.
Race, a product of natural development, 10;
not to be confounded with Nation, 13, 14.
Rebus sic stantibus, proposal for dealing with the clause, 69.
Religion, wars of, 10.
Sovereignty, conception of, 75;
not surrendered by entrance into the League of Nations, 74, 75, 78.
State, ideal of the national, 14.
States of the World, the 25 Allied belligerent and the 17 neutral, 16-17.
Statutes, difference between International and Municipal, 42.
Sully, 9.
Swiss Confederation, civil war within the, 32.
Switzerland, 13.
Taft, Ex-President, 5.
Transoceanic States, entrance into League of Nations of, 38.
Tribe, the, a product of natural development, 10.
Ubi societas ibi jus, 8.
Ullmann, on Article 23(h) of the Hague Regulations concerning Land
Warfare, 50.
United States, civil war in the, 32.
Vienna Congress, the, 30, 42.
Votes, equality of, at Hague Peace Conferences, 38.
Wars for national unity, 10.
Wehberg on Article 23(h) of the Hague Regulations concerning Land
Warfare, 50.
Whewell, Dr., 4.
Whittuck on Article 23(h) of the Hague Regulations concerning Land
Warfare, 50.
Wilson, President, 5.
World Federation, a demand of Pacifists, 31.
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Transcriber's Note:
Minor typographical errors have been corrected without note. Variant
spellings have been retained. Hyphenation has been standardised.