IV. Every attempt at organising the desired new League of Nations

must start from, and keep intact, the independence and equality of

the several States, with the consequence that the establishment of a

central political authority above the sovereign States is an

impossibility.

V. The development of an organisation of the Community of States

began before the outbreak of the World War and is to be found in the

establishment of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague by

the First Hague Peace Conference of 1899. But more steps will be

necessary to turn the hitherto unorganised Community of States into

an organised League of Nations.

VI. The organisation of the desired new League of Nations should

start from the beginning made by the Hague Peace Conferences, and

the League should therefore include all the independent civilised

States.

VII. The objection to the reception of the Central Powers, and of

Germany especially, into the League.

VIII. The objection to the reception of the minor transoceanic

States into the League.

IX. The seven principles which ought to be accepted with regard to

the organisation of the new League of Nations.

X. The organisation of the League of Nations is not an end in itself

but only a means of attaining three objects, the first of which is

International Legislation. The meaning of the term 'International

Legislation' in contradistinction to Municipal Legislation.

International Legislation in the past and in the future.

XI. The difficulty in the way of International Legislation on

account of the language question.

XII. The difficulty created by the conflicting national interests of

the several States.

XIII. The difficulty caused by the fact that International Statutes

cannot be created by a majority vote of the States. The difference

between universal and general International Law offers a way out.

XIV. The difficulty created by the fact that there are as yet no

universally recognised rules concerning interpretation and

construction of International Statutes and ordinary conventions. The

notorious Article 23(h) of the Hague Regulations concerning Land

Warfare.

THE LECTURE

I. In my first lecture on the League of Nations I recommended the

following three rules to be laid down by a League of Nations:

Firstly, every State must submit all judicial disputes to an

International Court of Justice and must abide by the judgment of such

Court.

Secondly, every State previous to resorting to arms, must submit every

political and non-judicial dispute to an International Council of

Conciliation and must at any rate listen to the advice of such Council.

Thirdly, the member States must unite their forces against such State or

States as should resort to arms without previously having submitted the

matter in dispute to an International Court of Justice or to an

International Council of Conciliation.

And I added that these three rules cannot create a satisfactory

condition of affairs unless four problems are faced and solved, namely:

The Organisation of the League, Legislation by the League,

Administration of Justice and Mediation within the League. My lecture

to-day will deal with two of these problems, namely the Organisation and

the Legislation of the League.

Let us first consider the Organisation of the League. Hitherto the body

of civilised States which form the Family of Nations and which, as I

pointed out in my first lecture, is really a League of Nations evolved

by custom, has been an unorganised Community. This means that, although

there are plenty of legal rules for the intercourse of the several

States one with another, the Community of civilised States does not

possess any permanently established organs or agents for the conduct of

its common affairs. At present these affairs, if they are peaceably

settled, are either settled by ordinary diplomatic negotiation or, if

the matter is pressing and of the greatest importance, by temporarily

convened International Conferences or Congresses.

II. It is true there are the so-called Great Powers which are the

leaders of the Family of Nations, and it is therefore asserted by some

authorities that the Community of States has acquired a certain amount

of organisation because the Great Powers are the legally recognised

superiors of the minor States.

But is this assertion correct? The Great Powers, are they really the

legally recognised superiors of the minor States?

I deny it. A Great Power is any large-sized State possessing a large

population which gains such economic, military, and naval strength that

its political influence must be reckoned with by all the other Powers.

At the time of the outbreak of the World War eight States had to be

considered as Great Powers, namely Great Britain, Austria-Hungary,

France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the United States of America, and Japan.

But it is very probable that the end of the World War will see the

number of Great Powers reduced to six. The collapse and break up of

Russia has surely for the present eliminated her from the number of

Great Powers. And it is quite certain that Austria-Hungary will not

emerge from the struggle as a Great Power, if she emerges from it as a

whole at all. History teaches that the number of the Great Powers is by

no means stable, and changes occasionally take place. Look at the

condition of affairs during the nineteenth century. Whereas at the time

of the Vienna Congress in 1815 eight States, namely Great Britain,

Austria, France, Portugal, Prussia, Spain, Sweden, and Russia were still

considered Great Powers, their number soon decreased to five, because

Portugal, Spain, and Sweden ceased to be Great Powers. On the other

hand, Italy joined the number of the Great Powers after her unification

in 1860; the United States of America joined the Great Powers after the

American Civil War in 1865; and Japan emerged as a Great Power from her

war with China in 1895.

Be that as it may, so much is certain, a State is a Great Power not by

law but only by its political influence. The Great Powers are the

leaders of the Family of Nations because their political influence is

so great. Their political and economic influence is in the long run

irresistible; therefore all arrangements made by the Great Powers

naturally in most cases gain, either at once or in time, the consent of

the minor States. It may be said that the Great Powers exercise a kind

of political hegemony within the Family of Nations. Yet this hegemony is

not based on law, it is simply a political fact, and it is certainly not

a consequence of an organisation of the Family of Nations.

III. The demand for a proper organisation of the Community of States

had, up to the outbreak of the World War, been raised exclusively on the

part of the so-called Pacifists in order to make the abolition of war a

possibility. It is a common assertion on the part of the Pacifists that

War cannot die out so long as there is no Central Political Authority in

existence above the several States which could compel them to bring

their disputes before an International Court and also compel them to

carry out the judgments of such a Court. For this reason many Pacifists

aim at such an organisation of the Community of States as would bring

all the civilised States of the world within the bonds of a federation.

They demand a World Federation of all the civilised States, or at any

rate a federation of the States of Europe, on the model of the United

States of America.

If such a Federal World State were practically possible, there would be

no objection to it, although International Law as such would cease to

exist and be replaced by the Constitutional Law of this Federal World

State. But in my first lecture I pointed out that such a Federal World

State is practically impossible. And it is not even desirable.

The development of mankind would seem in the main to be indissolubly

connected with the national development of the peoples. Most peoples

possessing a strong national consciousness desire an independent State

in which they can live according to their own ideals. They want to be

their own masters, and not to be part and parcel of a Federal World

State to which they would have to surrender a great part of their

independence. Moreover--as I likewise pointed out in my first lecture

(pp. 18-20)--it would be impossible to establish a strong Government and

a strong Parliament in a Federal World State.

However this may be, it is not at all certain that war would altogether

disappear in a Federal World State. The history of Federal States

teaches that wars do occasionally break out between their member States.

Think of the war between the Roman Catholic and the Protestant member

States of the Swiss Confederation in 1847, of the war in 1863 between

the Northern and the Southern member States within the Federation which

is called the United States of America, and of the war between Prussia

and Austria within the German Confederation in 1866.

IV. But what kind of organisation of the League of Nations is possible

if we reject the idea of a Federal State?

Neither I, nor anyone else who does not like to build castles in the

air, can answer this question directly by making a detailed proposal. It

is at present quite impossible to work out a practical scheme according

to which a more detailed organisation of the League of Nations could be

realised. But so much is certain that every attempt at organising this

League must start from, and must keep intact, the independence and the

equality of all civilised States. It is for this reason that a Central

Political Authority above the sovereign States can never be thought of.

Every attempt to organise a League of Nations on the model of a Federal

State is futile. If a detailed organisation of the League should ever

come, it will be one _sui generis_, one absolutely of its own kind; such

as has never been seen before. And it is at present quite impossible to

map out a detailed plan of such an organisation although, as I shall

have to show you later, the first step towards an organisation has

already been made, and further steps towards the ideal can be taken. The

reason that it is at present impossible is that the growth and the final

shape of the organisation of the League of Nations will, and must, go

hand in hand with the progress of International Law. But the progress of

International Law is conditioned by the growth, the strengthening, and

the deepening of international economic and other interests, and of

international morality. It is a matter of course that this progress can

only be realised very slowly, for there is concerned a process of

development through many generations and perhaps through centuries, a

development whose end no one can foresee. It is sufficient for us to

state that the development had already begun before the World War, and

to try to foster it, as far as is in our power, after the conclusion of

peace.

V. I said that this development has begun. Where is this beginning of

the development to be found?

It is to be found in the establishment of the Permanent Court of

Arbitration at the Hague and the Office therewith connected. The

Permanent Court of Arbitration is not an institution of the several

States, but an institution of the Community of States in

contradistinction to its several members. Had the International Prize

Court agreed upon by the Second Hague Peace Conference of 1907 been

established, there would have come into existence another institution of

the Community of States.

But the establishment of International Courts would not justify the

assertion that thereby the Community of States has turned from an

unorganised community into an organised community. To reach this goal

another step is required, namely an agreement amongst the Powers,

according to which the Hague Peace Conferences would be made a permanent

institution which periodically, within fixed intervals, assemble without

being convened by one Power or another. If this were done, we could say

that the hitherto unorganised Community of States had turned into an

organised League of Nations, for by such periodically assembling Hague

Peace Conferences there would be established an organ for the conduct

of all such international matters as require international legislation

or other international action.

However that may be, the organisation created by the fact that the Hague

Peace Conferences periodically assembled, would only be an immature one;

more steps would be necessary in order that the organisation of the

Community of States might become more perfect and more efficient. Yet

progress would be slow, for every attempt at a progressive step meets

with opposition, and it would be only when the _international_ interests

of the civilised States become victorious over their particular

_national_ interests that the Community of States would gradually

receive a more perfect organisation.

VI. There is no doubt that the experiences of mankind during the World

War have been quickening development more than could have been expected

in normal times. The universal demand for a new League of Nations

accepting the principles that every judicial dispute amongst nations

must be settled by International Courts and that every political dispute

must, before the parties resort to arms, be brought before a Council of

Conciliation, demonstrates clearly that the Community of States must now

deliberately give itself some kind of organisation, because without it

the principles just mentioned cannot be realised.

Now a number of schemes for the organisation of a new League of Nations

have been made public. They all agree upon the three aims of the League

and the three rules for the realisation of these aims which I mentioned

in my first lecture, namely compulsory settlement of all judicial

disputes by International Courts of Justice, compulsory mediation in

cases of political disputes by an International Council of Conciliation,

and the duty of the members of the League to turn against any one member

which should resort to arms in violation of the principles laid down by

the League. However, these schemes differ very much with regard to the

_organisation_ of the League. I cannot now discuss the various schemes

in detail. It must suffice to say that some of them embody proposals for

a more or less state-like organisation and are therefore not acceptable

to those who share my opinion that any state-like organisation of the

League is practically impossible. But though some of the schemes, as for

instance that of Lord Bryce and that of Sir Willoughby Dickinson, avoid

this mistake, none of them take as their starting point that which I

consider to be the right one, namely the beginning made at the two Hague

Peace Conferences. _In my opinion the organisation of a new League of

Nations should start from the beginning made by the two Hague Peace

Conferences._

VII. However, there is much objection to this, because it would

necessitate the admission into the new League of all those States which

took part in the Second Hague Peace Conference, including, of course,

the Central Powers. The objections to such a wide range of the League

are two-fold.

In the first instance, the admission of the Central Powers, and

especially of Germany, into the League is deprecated. By her attack on

Belgium at the outbreak of the war, and by her general conduct of the

war, Germany has deliberately taken up an attitude which proves that,

when her military interests are concerned, she does not consider herself

bound by any treaty, by any rule of law, or by any principle of

humanity. How can we expect that she will carry out the engagements into

which she might enter by becoming a member of the League of Nations?

My answer is that, provided she be utterly defeated and no peace of

compromise be made with her, militarism in Germany will be doomed, the

reparation to be exacted from her for the many cruel wrongs must lead to

a change of Constitution and Government, and this change of Constitution

and Government will make Germany a more acceptable member of a new

League of Nations. The utter defeat of Germany is a necessary

preliminary condition to the possibility of her entrance into a League

of Nations. Those who speak of the foundation of a League of Nations as

a means of ending the World War by a peace of compromise with Germany

are mistaken. The necessary presuppositions of such a League are

entirely incompatible with an unbroken Prussian militarism.

But while her utter defeat is the necessary preliminary condition to her

entrance into a League of Nations, the inclusion of Germany in the

League, after her utter defeat, is likewise a necessity. The reason is

that, as I pointed out in my first lecture (p. 17), in case the Central

Powers were excluded from the League, they would enter into a League of

their own, and the world would then be divided into two rival camps, in

the same way as before the war the Triple Alliance was faced by the

Entente. _The world would be proved not ripe for a new League of Nations

if peace were concluded with an undefeated Germany; and the League would

miss its purpose if to a defeated and repenting Germany entrance into it

were refused._

VIII. In the second instance, the entrance of the great number of minor

transoceanic States into the League is deprecated because these States

would claim an equal vote with the European Powers and thereby obstruct

progress within the League.

It is asserted that some of the minor transatlantic States made the

discussions at the Hague Conferences futile by their claim to an equal

vote. Now it is true that some of these States have to a certain extent

impeded the work of the Hague Conferences, but some of the minor States

of Europe, and even some of the Great Powers, have done likewise. The

Community of States consisting of sovereign States does not possess any

means of compelling a minority of States to fall in with the views of

the majority, but I shall show you very soon, when I approach the

problem of International Legislation, that International Legislation of

a kind is possible in spite of this fact. And so much is certain that

the minimum of organisation of the new League which is now necessary,

cannot be considered to be endangered by the admittance of the minor

transoceanic States into the League. Progress will in any case be slow,

and perfect unanimity among the Powers will in any and every case only

be possible where the _international_ interests of all the Powers compel

them to put aside their real or imaginary particular _national_

interests.

IX. For these reasons I take it for granted that the organisation of a

new League of Nations should start from the beginning made by the Hague

Peace Conferences. Therefore the following seven principles ought to be

accepted:

First principle: The League of Nations is composed of all civilised

States which recognise one another's external and internal

independence and absolute equality before International Law.

Second principle: The chief organ of the League is the Peace

Conference at the Hague. The Peace Conferences meet

periodically--say every two or three years--without being convened

by any special Power. Their task is the gradual codification of

International Law and the agreement upon such International

Conventions as are from time to time necessitated by new

circumstances and conditions.

Third principle: A permanent Council of the Conference is to be

created, the members of which are to be resident at the Hague and

are to conduct all the current business of the League of Nations.

This current business comprises: The preparation of the meetings of

the Peace Conference; the conduct of communications with the several

members of the League with regard to the preparation of the work of

the Peace Conferences; and all other matters of international

interest which the Conference from time to time hands over to the

Council.

Fourth principle: Every recognised sovereign State has a right to

take part in the Peace Conferences.

Fifth principle: Resolutions of the Conference can come into force

only in so far as they become ratified by the several States

concerned. On the other hand, every State agrees once for all

faithfully to carry out those resolutions which have been ratified

by it.

Sixth principle: Every State that takes part in the Peace

Conferences is bound only by such resolutions of the Conferences as

it expressly agrees to and ratifies. Resolutions of a majority only

bind the majority. On the other hand, no State has a right to demand

that only such resolutions as it agrees to shall be adopted.

Seventh principle: All members of the League of Nations agree once

for all to submit all judicial disputes to International Courts

which are to be set up, and to abide by their judgments. They

likewise agree to submit, previous to resorting to arms, all

non-judicial disputes to International Councils of Conciliation

which are to be set up. And they all agree to unite their economic,

military, and naval forces against any one or more States which

resort to arms without submitting their disputes to International

Courts of Justice or International Councils of Conciliation.

You will have noticed that my proposals do not comprise the creation of

an International Government, an International Executive, an

International Parliament, and an International Army and Navy which would

serve as an International Police Force. No one can look into the future

and say what it will bring, but it is certain that for the present, and

for some generations to come, all attempts at creating an International

Government are not only futile but dangerous; because it is almost

certain that a League of Nations comprising an International Executive,

an International Parliament, and an International Army and Navy would

soon collapse.

X. However this may be, and whatever may be the details of the

organisation of the League, such necessary organisation is not an end in

itself but a means of attaining three objects, namely: International

Legislation, International Administration of Justice, and International

Mediation. I shall discuss International Administration of Justice and

International Mediation in my next lecture, to-day I will only draw your

attention to International Legislation.

In using the term 'International Legislation,' it must be understood

that 'legislation' is here to be understood in a figurative sense only.

When we speak of legislation in everyday language, we mean that process

of parliamentary activity by which Municipal Statutes are called into

existence. Municipal Legislation presupposes a sovereign power, which

prescribes rules of conduct to its subjects. It is obvious that within

the Community of States no such kind of legislation can take place.

Rules of conduct for the members of the League of Nations can only be

created by an agreement amongst those members. Whereas Municipal

Statutes contain the rules of conduct set by an authority sovereign over

its subjects, International Statutes--if I may be allowed to use that

term--contain rules of conduct which the members of the Community of

States have agreed to set for themselves. International Statutes are

created by the so-called Law-making Treaties of the Powers. But in one

point Municipal Legislation and the Law-making Treaties of the Powers

resemble one another very closely:--both intend to create law, and for

this reason it is permissible to use the term 'International

Legislation' figuratively for the conclusion of such international

treaties as contain rules of International Law.

The League of Nations and Its Problems: Three Lectures · 第 2 / 5 段