You, as impartial judges, will not wish to forget one thing: There

always was and there still is today another Germany, a Germany that

knows industriousness and economy; a Germany of Goethe and Beethoven, a

Germany that knows loyalty and honesty and other good qualities which in

past centuries were proverbial for the German character. Believe me,

Gentlemen of the Tribunal, in this epoch, when Germany is regaining

consciousness as after a severe illness, as she proceeds to rebuild a

better future from the ruins of an evil past, a future for her youth

which has no part in the crimes committed, at this time some 70 or 80

million German people are looking to you and are awaiting from you a

verdict which will open the way for the reconstruction of German

economy, the German spirit, and true freedom.

You are, Gentlemen, truly sovereign judges, not bound by any written

law, not bound to any paragraph, pledged to serve your conscience only,

and called by destiny to give to the world simultaneously a legal order

which will preserve for future generations that peace which the past was

unable to preserve for them. A well-known democrat of the old Germany,

the former Minister Dr. Diltz, said in a recent article on the Nuremberg

Trial: In a monarchist state justice would be administered in the name

of the king; in republics courts would pronounce their rulings in the

name of the people; but you, the Nuremberg Tribunal, should administer

justice in the name of humanity.

It is, indeed, a wonderful thought for the Court, an ideal aim, if it

could believe that its verdict could in fact make real the precepts of

humanity, and that it could prevent Crimes against Humanity for all

time. But in certain respects this would still remain an unsteady

foundation for a verdict of such magnitude as confronts you, because

ideas on what humanity demands or prohibits in individual cases may

vary, depending upon the epoch, the people, the party concepts according

to which one judges.

I believe you may find a reliable foundation for your verdict when you

revert to a maxim which has endured throughout the centuries and which

certainly will remain valid in ages to come: _Justitia est fundamentum

regnorum_.

Thus the German people, and with them the entire world, await from you a

judgment which will not just be hailed today by the victor nations as

the final victory over Germany, but which history will recognize as

proper; a verdict in the name of justice.

THE PRESIDENT: I call on Dr. Servatius for the Defendant Sauckel.

DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, may it please the Tribunal:

The Defense of the Defendant Sauckel has, in the first place, to deal

with the charge of “slave labor.” What is slave labor?

One cannot accept this as an established term comprising all the

occurrences which, in bewildering abundance, are charged against the

Defendant Sauckel under the heading “slave labor.” Particularly, those

actions ought first to be examined from a legal point of view. The legal

basis for this examination is the Charter. However, this Charter does

not say what is to be understood by “slave labor” or by “deportation.”

Therefore, these concepts must be clarified by interpretation. Article 6

of the Charter deals in two passages and from two different points of

view with deportation and slave labor. Deportation is designated both a

war crime and a crime against humanity, and forced labor appears as

“slave labor” under the heading of War Crimes, and as “enslavement”

under the heading of Crimes against Humanity.

The question of under what heading the mobilization of labor by the

Defendant Sauckel should fall is of decisive importance; if it is a war

crime, then it should be judged exclusively under martial law. If it is

a crime against humanity, then the latter presupposes the commission of

a war crime or of a crime against peace.

It follows therefrom that the deportation mentioned in Article 6(b)

cannot be the same thing as deportation according to Article 6(c), nor

can forced labor according to Article 6(b) be identical with forced

labor under Article 6(c). The difference between the two kinds must be

found in ...

THE PRESIDENT [_Interposing_]: That paragraph of your speech which is in

English on Page 2, the second paragraph:

“It follows therefrom that deportation mentioned in Article 6(b) cannot

be the same as deportation according to Article 6(c) ...” is not

altogether clear to the Tribunal. Could you make it clearer?

DR. SERVATIUS: In Article 6(c) we deal with Crimes against Humanity,

whereas in Article 6(b) we deal with War Crimes. In both articles the

expressions deportation and forced labor are used, but there must be

some differentiation, and my examination is directed at establishing

this difference more exactly. I believe, Mr. President, that my further

statements will make this clearer than it has heretofore been.

I turn now to the terminology used in the Charter. I was talking of the

difference between the two kinds of slave labor and deportation. The

difference between the two kinds is to be found in the fact that

something has to be added to the war crimes which violates the rules of

humanity.

The correctness of this interpretation may also be recognized in the

terminology of the Charter, however fluctuating it may be. For instance,

the Russian text for deportation as a war crime chooses the word _uvod_,

which means only removal from a place, whereas, on the other hand, it

uses for crimes against humanity of the same nature the technical

expression _ssylka_, by which penal deportation under the rule of the

czars is understood as denoting deportation in the sense of penal

deportation.

THE PRESIDENT: The French is not coming through. Will you just wait a

minute, there is some difficulty with the French translation, Dr.

Servatius. The Tribunal must adjourn.

MARSHAL: The Court will remain adjourned until a quarter to two.

[_The Tribunal recessed until 1345 hours._]

_Afternoon Session_

DR. SERVATIUS: I was speaking of the terminology of “deportation” in the

Russian text. I pointed out the distinction between the word _uvod_

meaning only transportation, and _ssylka_ meaning a deportation as a

form of punishment. From that one may conclude that deportation from the

occupied territories for the purpose of work can only be regarded as a

war crime, while it becomes a crime against humanity when assuming the

penal character of a transportation of prisoners.

However, the question arises whether, beyond this, according to the

Charter any removal of the population is punishable as a war crime,

regardless of whether it occurs for allocation of labor or for other

reasons. According to the text of the Charter, the latter seems at first

sight to be the case, since it renders punishable “removal for slave

labor, or for any other purposes.” Upon closer examination, however, it

becomes evident that this rule cannot be meant in such a sense, as there

are cases in which a removal is not only consistent with international

law but even becomes imperative.

Accordingly, the Charter could only be understood to mean that the

punishable act does not consist of plain “removal” but comprises the

composite concept “removal for slave labor” and “removal for any other

purpose.” The clause, “or for any other purpose,” should be understood

so as to mean only that an illegal purpose equivalent to slave labor

exists. If removal of any kind was to have been made punishable, then

the qualifying addition “for slave labor or for any other purpose” would

be contradictory to common sense. This definition is important for the

Defendant Sauckel, as otherwise proof of deportation classified as a war

crime would be evident from the acts admitted by him.

Just as for the various kinds of deportation, the difference between the

kinds of slave labor, according to the Charter, must be clarified. Here,

too, a clue to the interpretation is provided by the terminology of the

different languages, though not because of their clarity and consistency

but by the very opposite:

The English version speaks of “slave labor” as a war crime and of

“enslavement” as a crime against humanity; the French version states

_travaux forcés_ and _réduction en esclavage_, the Russian version

accordingly _rabstvo_ (slavery) and _poraboshtshenie_ (enslavement). It

is not discernible how the terms chosen differentiate _in re_. Basing

upon the fact that labor inconsistent with laws of humanity must be

carried out under more severe conditions than other labor and assuming

“slave labor” to be the severest forms of labor, it will be seen that no

definition can be derived from this terminology of the Charter and that

more of an ethical discrimination and stigmatization is intended.

Accordingly an objective division of the kinds of labor should be

carried out independent of the terminology by considering exclusively

the degree of severity of labor conditions. If one tries to analyze the

terminology used, one finds the designation “enslavement,” _esclavage_,

and _poraboshtshenie_ for the inhuman form of labor, whereas the labor

not inconsistent with laws of humanity is called “forced labor,”

_travaux forcés_, and _prinudidjenaja rabota_. Slave labor (“slave

labor,” _travaux forcés_, and _rabstvo_) consequently is the general

term comprising both kinds.

What does this definition mean for the defense of the Defendant Sauckel?

He admits having negotiated “compulsory labor” in the form of obligatory

labor which, as stated before, has been termed “slave labor” in general.

He denies, however, having demanded “slave labor,” which might be looked

upon as inhuman labor, in other words, enslavement. A different standard

applies, just as for deportation, to these two categories; “obligatory

labor” is only a war crime and must be judged according to the rules of

war; crimes against humanity, as I already stated above in connection

with deportation as a crime against humanity, bear the additional

characteristics of being connected with war crimes or crimes against

peace. If it can be proven that the mobilization of manpower as ordered

by the Defendant Sauckel was permitted by the rules of war, then the

same act cannot be held to be a crime against humanity.

The Indictment, too, has made a difference as to the kinds of labor. It

has treated, under Paragraph 3, Section VIII (H), as a separate war

crime under the title of “Conscription of Civilian Labor,” the

mobilization of manpower as directed by the Defendant Sauckel, which I

shall call “regulated labor mobilization,” and mentions only “forced

labor.” The French version speaks here of _travaux forcés_ and uses

terms such as _les obligèrent à travailler_ and _mis en obligation_; the

Russian version follows this and also speaks only of “compulsory labor”

as _prinuditjelnaja rabota_ but does not refer to this as being slave

labor.

The Defendant Sauckel does not deny the facts taken here as a basis, but

I shall submit the legal reasons which justify this mobilization of

labor, and I shall prove that it does not involve any war crime that

would break international law.

The rules of international law are authoritative in determining the

question whether “regulated labor mobilization” is a war crime. The

Charter cannot prohibit what international law permits in wartime. Such

precepts of international law are laid down in the agreements on the

rules of war and in the general legal principles and usages as applied

by all states.

The Prosecution bases its opinion that labor mobilization is a war crime

on the definitions of the Hague Convention on Land Warfare, as well as

on the agreements and rules of war and the criminal codes of the

countries concerned. If it is shown that labor mobilization is permitted

by international law, then a judicial inquiry into the penal regulations

is, of course, not necessary.

The Hague Convention on Land Warfare can be considered as a basis for

the laws of warfare with which we are concerned here. Whether it was

recognized by all the states involved here is, from a practical point of

view, of little importance, for inasmuch as it was not recognized or

cannot be directly applied, it is a case of a shortcoming in

international law which is filled as a matter of course according to the

principles of the belligerent’s needs and his duty to respect the laws

of humanity. The principles of international law as established in the

Hague Convention on Land Warfare are in all cases an important guide.

The Prosecution quotes, in the first place, Article 46 of the Hague

Convention on Land Warfare, which is designed to safeguard the

fundamental rights of the population. It is typical for labor

mobilization that it does restrict liberty, whereas this particular

basic right is not protected by this article.

If the Hague Convention on Land Warfare is examined for a definite rule

concerning deportation and forced labor, it will be realized that no

such regulation exists. Just as in the sphere of air warfare and the use

of new weapons, the Hague Convention on Land Warfare could not deal with

questions which, at the time of its drafting, were far from the mind of

the contracting parties. The first World War was still fought between

two armies with already prepared material, and after it was used up the

fight would be ended. The idea of a long war consuming huge amounts of

material and requiring a continuous production with all available labor

was for the Hague Convention on Land Warfare not yet a problem ripe for

discussion.

Article 52 of the Hague Convention on Land Warfare, which deals with the

right to requisition, touches on the matter; but it can be seen that the

rules deal only with purely local requirements of an army which appears

fully equipped and has only supplementary local requirements. It is

characteristic for the purely local meaning that the requisitioning

authority is entrusted to the local commanders, in contrast to Article

51 of the Hague Convention on Land Warfare which permits only an

independent commanding general to impose compulsory contributions. The

literature about the right to requisition in international law

accordingly quotes only examples of local significance.

Although Article 52 of the Hague Convention on Land Warfare can

accordingly not be directly applied, its basic principles are

nevertheless binding on the belligerents. The basic idea is that an army

can demand practically everything necessary for the satisfaction of its

requirements. There are only two limitations: It may not take more than

it needs and not more than is compatible with the resources of the

country.

The idea of a local obligation to furnish services will have to be

adapted to modern warfare. The Hague Convention on Land Warfare

envisaged the employment of smiths and wheelwrights necessary for the

maintenance of the equipment of the army; work within the home country

of the occupying power was, in view of undeveloped transportation

conditions, impracticable and remained unconsidered.

Today the necessary work will no longer be done in the vicinity of the

front-lines but must be carried out in the belligerents’ own countries,

so that it must be possible to demand that labor should be available at

the only place where it can be done and where it is necessary. It must

also be possible to demand such labor for modern war requirements of

mass production for current replacements. What is necessary at any given

time can be asked for, the amount depending on prevailing conditions. If

in earlier times, according to the principle “the war feeds the war,” an

army far removed from its homeland was even to a large extent equipped

in occupied territory, it must surely be possible today to supply the

army by moving the workers to the factories in the belligerent’s own

country. The evolution of the laws of warfare is influenced by the

requirements which these laws have to serve.

With the basic idea of the obligation to furnish services the basic idea

on limitations will have to be accepted, too. These limitations must

also be interpreted to apply to the changed conditions. While the

obligation to furnish services is justified, no more work may be

demanded than the occupying power requires of its own people at home.

The intensity of the war as total war must be taken into consideration.

The obligation to work may thereby assume considerable proportions.

The meaning and the purpose of the Hague Convention on Land Warfare is

certainly not to place the nationals of a defeated state in a better

position than those of the victorious state which occupied the country.

This, however, would be the result if the Hague Convention on Land

Warfare were interpreted according to its original wording. If this is

maintained, then France, which had surrendered unconditionally together

with all the other occupied countries, would have been able to look on

in security while Germany, strangled by the blockade, was exhausting

herself in an indefatigable struggle by sacrifices of life and property.

Can one really demand that the prisoner in a besieged fortress should

live more comfortably than the defender of the fortress? If Germany

today could live according to the romantic concepts of the Hague

Convention on Land Warfare, this would certainly be preferable to the

burden of the peace treaty to be expected.

Actually, the Hague Convention on Land Warfare has not been adhered to

even in its original interpretation, if it is true that already before

the conclusion of the armistice the Soviet Union as occupying power

transferred the population on a large scale from the eastern parts of

Germany for the purpose of performing labor outside Germany. The

Tribunal could obtain official information about this through an inquiry

with the Control Council. I also have information that German civilian

internees are used for work in France today. Here too the Tribunal could

obtain official information.

The second limitation of the obligation to work is embodied in the rule

that no participation in war operations against the home country of the

worker may be demanded. Any work done for the occupying power indirectly

benefits its war effort; the prohibition is therefore restricted to

direct participation in operations of the fighting force. The literature

on international law contrasts the participation in military operations

with the permissible participation in preparations. Participation in war

operations in this sense was not asked of any worker; on the contrary,

the purpose was to employ workers away from these operations and without

disturbance by the war.

Consequently only such activity as is directed against the workers’ own

country is forbidden, thus taking the feelings of the individual into

consideration. No protection of the enemy state is thereby intended.

Wherever, therefore, the individual renounces his country and in a

struggle of ideologies opposes the government of his country, such a

restriction no longer applies. In connection with this I wish to point

to the vast number of foreigners who adopted such an attitude and who,

in part, still live in Germany today.

The same applies when the state to which the worker belongs has ceased

fighting. This question is of special importance with regard to the

obligation to work in the armament industry. The rules of the Geneva

Convention with regard to the work to be done by prisoners of war are

known. The basic notion, that no one may be forced to make weapons

against his own brothers, must apply to civilian workers also.

The fact, however, that one’s country is no longer in a legal state of

war is one of the reasons that nullify this restriction. The need for

protection also ceases to exist when a country, though legally still

participating in war, to all intents and purposes no longer possesses

any fighting forces and has thus ceased to exist as a military object of

attack. The fact, that this country may have allies who fight for it

cannot arbitrarily extend this limitation beyond the terms of the Geneva

Convention; nor is it the duty of a subject of a given state to protect

allies fighting for it and to participate in the policies of his

government.

Puppet governments cannot change reality. Recognition cannot be granted

to them unless they reappear as independent combatants under a command

of their own and are recognized as such. This applies to all states

defeated by Germany.

At the time of the mobilization of labor only Britain, the United

States, and the Soviet Union were active combatants against Germany.

British and American subjects were not affected by this mobilization,

although citizens of the Soviet Union were in part used in armament

production.

The legal position of citizens of the Soviet Union is however

fundamentally different. Under Document Number EC-338, USSR-356, the

Prosecution has submitted a decree by the People’s Commissars dated 1

July 1941. This decree deals with the utilization of prisoners of war

for labor purposes; but it also, however, refers to the employment of

interned civilians. According to the wording, armament production is not

forbidden for either category of workers; and only two limitations are

specified in the decree, namely, work in the combat zone and services

required of an orderly.

Thus, from the point of view of reciprocity, no objection can be raised

against the employment of Soviet citizens in armament production. In his

examination before the Tribunal the witness General Paulus stated that

prisoners of war were employed in factories of the Soviet Union, which

means that in a state with a directed economy they were employed during

the war in the armament industry. According to the decree it must be

assumed then that these workers were also employed in the production of

weapons.

The significance of such a violation of the principle that armament

production shall be forbidden lies in the serious consequence that no

formation of a generally recognized rule of international law in this

new field of utilization of manpower can thereby be proven. Under these

circumstances therefore Germany was likewise free to employ workers of

the Soviet Union and workers of all other states in armament production.

The Hague Convention on Land Warfare thus does not forbid the regulated

utilization of manpower, but there are also further international

aspects permitting such a utilization of manpower. The assent of the

government of the occupied state is of primary consideration. This

assent was given by France. The objection that Marshal Pétain’s

Government was not a constitutional government is invalid, for it was

the legitimate successor to the provisional armistice Government. That

it represented the French State with foreign governments is of decisive

consideration in international relations. This authority of

representation was confirmed by the United States by its keeping an

ambassador in Vichy even after its own entry into the war. Great Britain

also negotiated the terms of an armistice with a general of the Vichy

Government in Syria in 1941.

This Government once recognized could not be deprived of its legality by

the simple declaration of an oppositional government, even though the

latter might have been recognized by the Allies. A government loses its

international position only if it is forced to transfer its actual power

to the oppositional government. Up to that moment it retains authority

within its sphere of influence.

The other objection that the Government of Marshal Pétain was not free

to act as it wished and that consequently agreements with Germany in the

field of utilization of manpower were reached by coercive measures and

are therefore invalid, is not justified from the point of view of

international law. Armistice and peace treaties are always concluded

under great pressure. That this does not curtail the validity of such

treaties is an obvious point of international law. This has constantly

been emphasized when refusing German demands for a revision of the

Treaty of Versailles.

Agreements which are reached in periods between the armistice and the

peace treaty are subject to the same conditions. This also applies to

the agreement with France with respect to the utilization of manpower.

Thus, if—contrary to the statement of the Defendant

Sauckel—negotiations about the utilization of manpower were conducted

in the form of an ultimatum, there could from the point of view of

international law still be no reason for an objection. Besides,

Sauckel’s influence surely cannot have been so great that he could have

exerted an excessive amount of pressure.

The validity of such agreements is open to doubt only under very special

conditions, such as would mean that excessive obligations were to be

assumed which obviously violate principles of humanity; for instance, if

the agreements contain a clause stating that work must be performed

under slave-like conditions.

The motive for these agreements was, however, to offer, especially to

the French workers, favorable working conditions and salaries for their

obligatory labor in Germany, thus to attract the workers.

Military reasons too can command the evacuation of an occupied territory

by part of the population and thereby cause a displacement of manpower.

This may happen when the population participates in partisan warfare or

is active in resistance groups and thus endangers security instead of

behaving obediently and peacefully. It even suffices for the population

in the so-called partisan territories to be drawn upon even against its

will for the support of the partisans. That such conditions were

organized by Germany’s enemies as combat measures in an increasing

degree, first in the East and later in the West, is today looked upon as

a patriotic achievement. In view of this one must not forget that the

resulting displacement of workers was precisely the consequence of their

activities and that such action was permitted by international law.

Evacuation had to be carried out in the interest of security, and

assignment of labor elsewhere was necessary if only to maintain order.

It is the privilege of the occupying power to utilize this labor within

a regulated state economy in the manner deemed most appropriate under

the prevailing conditions. Similar measures might also be imposed in

areas of retreat after it had been ascertained that the male population

illegally took part in hostilities during the retreat, as it had been

called upon to do by the enemy, sometimes even being supplied with

weapons.

Evacuation measures for the security of combat troops are equally

permissible under international law. To engage persons evacuated from

the combat zone in new work is not only legal but is actually the duty

of the occupation administration. The state which calls upon its

subjects to fight and thereby intensifies combat, bears the guilt for

such evacuation. The necessary retaliatory measures therefore must be

legal.

Whenever such evacuations become necessary, they must be carried out

without undue suffering for the population. For this preparatory

measures, which alone can avoid unnecessary hardships, are necessary.

That is the duty of administration as laid down in Article 43 of the

Hague Convention on Land Warfare. Thereto appertain the proposals made

by Sauckel for the evacuation of territories of retreat in France in the

event of invasion (Document 1289-PS). These proposals did not

materialize and cannot therefore incriminate the Defendant Sauckel.

This administrative duty may also call for a displacement of labor in

order to avoid unemployment and famine. This, for example, occurred when

the industrial areas of the Soviet Union were occupied, where there were

no more working possibilities after the population became unemployed

following the scorched earth policy adopted by the Soviet Union, and

supplies failed to arrive because of transport difficulties.

These military and administrative points of view of international law

can invalidate a number of reproaches; but they do not answer the basic

question, namely, whether the enlistment of workers is also permitted

outside the Hague Convention on Land Warfare for the very purpose of

intensified labor to enable the state to carry on the war through

increase of production and to allow it to release its own workers for

service at the front.

A purely military emergency would provide no excuse for disregarding

international law. Victory jeopardized must not be sought by breaking

the law when in distress, because the laws of warfare are intended to

govern that very combat, which is of necessity connected with distress.

International law inclines differently where it is a case of a measure

to be taken to safeguard the existence of the state. That is a law of

self-preservation which every state is entitled to because higher

institutions are lacking which could protect it from destruction.

It has repeatedly been stressed by all concerned that in this war our

existence was at stake. This became evident for Germany after the fatal

battles on the Eastern Front in the winter 1941-42. Whereas up to that

time no wholesale employment of foreign labor had been necessary, new

equipment now had to be produced immediately. The German labor reserves,

were depleted due to the drafting of 2 million workers for service at

the front. The employment of unskilled women and young people could not

immediately relieve the situation. During the later stages of the war,

especially through aerial warfare, armament demands increased to such an

extent that, in spite of the increased employment of women and young

people, the level could no longer be maintained. The means were

exhausted.

The official figures which the Defendant Sauckel made public in his

speech in Posen in February 1943 (see Document 1739-PS) proved that

already in 1939, at the beginning of the second World War, more than

twice as many women were being employed than at the end of the first

World War and that their number at the end of the second World War had

increased by another 2 million to a total of over 10 million. This

figure exceeds the entire number of male and female workers in the

armament industry at the end of the first World War. Yet in spite of

that there was a shortage of labor. This has been confirmed by the

witness Rohland for Codefendant Speer in Document Speer-56, according to

which Speer also declared that foreign labor was needed under all

circumstances.

The crux of the matter did not concern the problem of female labor,

where by introducing additional home labor the limit was attained, but

that of procuring specialists and men for heavy labor. Among the 10

million German women who were at work, there were also the wives of

front-line officers and others from similar classes of society.

The notion that in Britain the women were conscripted for work in a

higher degree than in Germany is wrong. In Germany the women had to work

up to 45 and later 50 years of age, and they actually worked in

factories and did not have fake jobs of a social kind. Even

schoolchildren beginning with the age of 10 were required to work, and

from 16 years onward they were switched to regular labor or occupied in

other services. Families were disrupted; schools and universities were

closed; pupils and students worked in the armament industry, and even

the wounded could not continue their studies. A grim fight was waged

over every person capable of work. Speer’s reserve of workers did not

exist. What efforts were made in this sector is shown among others by

Enclosure 2 of the Wartburg Document RF-810.

Another point of view illustrating the necessity of employing additional

labor is the fact that the powers in possession of colonies brought

labor from their colonies; France (see Document RF-22, Page 17), for

instance, took in about 50,000 workers from North Africa and Indo-China,

which were under the command and supervision of officers and

noncommissioned officers. Since Germany, having been refused colonies

and on account of the blockade, was unable to draw upon such reserves,

she was entitled to some means, in her fight for existence, of procuring

labor where it could be found inactive in occupied territories.

This is in outline the basis, with regard to international law, for

judging the regulated mobilization of labor as a war crime. One may,

with regard to certain points, differ in opinion; and it will generally

be found that in international law a uniform interpretation will not be

readily arrived at. The interests of individual members in the community

of international law play an important part and are not always

identical; legal principles are often not recognized because some state

does not wish to place itself officially in contradiction with its

former actions, or because it prefers to remain unbound for the future.

As counsel for the Defense, I am in a position to present my

interpretation of law without such inhibitions. The significance of my

statement for the Defense, apart from the objective side, lies in the

fact that the Defendant Sauckel, subjectively, was for good reasons

entitled to believe in the lawfulness of a regulated mobilization of

labor and that to him his actions were not discernible as being in

contradiction with international law. This was supported by the

impression which the Defendant Sauckel could not but gain of the

permissibility of a regulated mobilization of labor, as shown by the

attitude of other superior offices. When Sauckel entered upon his

office, foreign workers had already been enlisted by individual action;

and he could take it for granted that the State would equally proceed in

a legal manner. None of the highest offices has ever raised legal

objections before Sauckel. These offices, both the competent Foreign

Office and the highest civil and military offices in the occupied

territories, accepted his orders as a matter of course; and no questions

of doubt on international law were raised.

For the opinion of the Defendant Sauckel the attitude of the foreign

agencies concerned was necessarily of special importance, notably the

consent of the French and the Belgians, who came to Berlin personally

for discussions. From this resulted the good co-operation with the local

authorities in the occupied territories, as was the case before enemy

propaganda intervened.

Whether cognizance of breaking a law is indispensable when committing a

crime against international law may be a moot point; but to establish

guilt leading to a conviction, cognizance of the realization of all the

criminal facts is essential. This includes cognizance of the fact that

the action performed was contrary to international law. The subjective

aspect of the facts, involving criminal guilt of the Defendant Sauckel,

cannot be proved in respect to application of the regulated mobilization

of labor. It would be impossible to commit the Defendant Sauckel for yet

another legal reason, even if the regulated mobilization of manpower

really were a violation of international law. According to the Hague

Convention on Land Warfare, no individual responsibility exists. The

Hague Convention on Land Warfare differentiates between two kinds of war

crimes; those which can be committed by an individual, such as murder

and ill-treatment, and those which can be committed only by parties in a

war. The regulated utilization of manpower is a proceeding which can

only be initiated by the state. While the individual action is punished

according to the penal code of the different states, a special

regulation was laid down for offenses committed by parties in a war in

Article 3 of the introductory agreement to the Hague Convention on Land

Warfare. This specifies only a liability for damages on the part of the

state. This passage of the Hague Convention on Land Warfare still

applies today, since it cannot be rescinded by agreement among the

Allies alone. The Charter, which specifies the immediate criminal

responsibility of the state organs or its executors, is void insofar as

it is contradictory to the Hague Convention on Land Warfare.

I do not have to refer to the fact that Germany, as one of the parties

to the agreement, would have had to agree to the suspension of Article

3; there are other reasons which speak for a continuation of this

stipulation. A modification of the Hague Convention on Land Warfare in

the sense of the Charter might have resulted from the law of usage or

general custom due to changing legal conceptions. The presupposition for

this assumption would be, however, that the contracting powers

relinquish their sovereignty, since only then would the punishment of

the state organs be possible. However, such a renunciation of the rights

of sovereignty has not, as far as I am aware, taken place to such an

extent as would generally render such punishment permissible. With

regard to this point, I refer to the general statements made by

Professor Jahrreiss before the Tribunal.

I shall now deal with the utilization of manpower as a crime against

humanity. If a regulated utilization of manpower appears permissible

according to international law, there remains the problem of the method

of its execution, namely, the question of up to what point this

utilization of manpower can still be regarded as in order and when it

will exceed the permissible limit.

The Charter fails to define the concept of humanity. As far as

international law is concerned, the term can only be transposed from the

practice of the nations. In endeavoring to establish the limit for

actions permissible under international law, we must, for the sake of

comparison, mention the bombing of large cities and the use of the

atomic bomb, as well as deportations and evacuations as still in

progress today. These are all incidents which have occurred before the

eyes of the world and were regarded as permissible by the executing

countries.

Once again we are confronted with the conception of necessity and find

that it is being interpreted in a very flexible manner. This should be

kept in mind when examining the mobilization of labor as to any

violation of the principle of humanity involved. Its aim is not the

sudden killing of hundreds of thousands; however, it naturally entails

hardships and is certainly also subject to mistakes which arise

unintentionally or are due to the shortcoming of individuals. An answer

will be required to the question of whether deliberate killing does not

always weigh heavier than the temporary infliction of other sufferings.

Also, the Charter does not prescribe punishment for every violation of

the principles of humanity but only when inhuman treatment occurred in

the execution of, or in connection with, a crime for which the Tribunal

is competent. However, the Tribunal is competent only for Crimes against

Peace and for War Crimes. As for Crimes against Peace, inhuman treatment

may be admissible in self-defense, while it is punishable when committed

by an aggressor; or alternatively, it must be a case of a war crime.

This does not apply when compatriots are ill-treated, for they are not

protected by the laws of warfare. Prosecution for an act against

humanity committed toward them can only take place if a crime against

peace is involved at the same time.

From an objective point of view labor commitment furthered the waging of

the war which has been designated by the Prosecution as a war of

aggression or as a war violating treaties. If this is established and if

it is proved moreover that the mobilization of labor was carried out in

an inhuman way, then the requirements of the Charter will have been met

and a crime against humanity committed, regardless of whether the

mobilization of labor was allowed or not allowed by the rules of war,

since it was committed in connection with a crime against peace. But

punishment can be inflicted only if the culprit himself knows that an

unlawful war is being waged and that he is furthering it by his action.

Since the Defendant Sauckel denies any such knowledge, it must be

proved.

The other possibility of meeting the factual requirement occurs when the

inhuman act serves to carry out a war crime or is connected with it. Of

the examples given by the Charter for violation of the rules of war, the

following in the main can be taken to apply to the mobilization of

labor: murder, ill-treatment, and deportation of the civilian

population. As shown by this enumeration, these war crimes are not,

however serious they may be, in themselves crimes against humanity. Some

aggravating circumstance making the act inhuman must be added. As shown

by the examples of inhuman “extermination” and “enslavement,” the acts

in question must be objectively of particular scope or cruelty.

Subjectively, however, an inhuman disposition of the culprit and the

knowledge of the inhuman character of the act, that is to say, knowledge

of the scope of the measure or of the cruelty of its execution, is

additionally required. How far these conditions apply to the Defendant

Sauckel must be investigated later on. A “regulated mobilization of

labor,” as allowed by international law can never in itself be a crime

against humanity; but its execution may be carried out in such a way

that it involves killings and ill-treatment, which for their part might

be war crimes.

Such ill-treatment could result from regulations issued by the highest

authority involved, who thereby would bear the responsibility. It may,

however, also be committed by subordinate agencies acting on their own

authority without the knowledge or intention of their superior

authorities. In that case the head of the agency acting on its own

accord bears the responsibility. Lastly, it may be a case of a purely

individual act committed against the regulations in force. For such an

act the individual is solely responsible.

It follows that the Defendant Sauckel is responsible, to begin with,

only for such general orders and instructions which he has given, not

however for independent acts by superior authorities in the occupied

territories or by supreme Reich authorities, such as the Chief of SS and

Police, which were not under his jurisdiction. The orders and directives

of the Defendant Sauckel have been submitted, and they must show whether

the mobilization of labor as ordered by him was in fact a regulated one

or was tantamount to an “ill-treatment” of the population. Apart from

the call for volunteers, mobilization of labor took place on the basis

of a compulsory service decree, signed as a legal measure in accordance

with Hitler’s instructions by the territorial commanders. The authority

to issue such laws exceeded the powers of the Defendant Sauckel, nor

could he ask that any such laws be issued. He did however approve of

them and made them the basis for his work. The contents of these laws

were consistent with the fundamental ideas of the German laws concerning

compulsory labor service. These laws were coercive. The use of coercive

measures is not called for as long as the legal authority of the

occupying power is acknowledged by the population; they become necessary

only when such authority fails.

In this connection the Defendant Sauckel has repeatedly asked for the

maintenance of executive authority by operations in partisan-infested

territories for overpowering the resistance movement (Document R-124).

No legal objections can be raised against the fact that to this end he

demanded the use of means provided by the State. He is wrongly

incriminated only by the words “SS and Police,” which have been

connected by the Prosecution with the conception of crime. Such an

incrimination would only be justified if the criminal character of the

Police had been proven and if the Defendant Sauckel at that time had had

cognizance of such criminal activity.

That force may be used in case of resistance against orders of the

occupation force cannot be disputed. The question is, where are the

limits of force and whether or not there are legal and illegal,

admissible and inadmissible, human and inhuman, measures of force.

If fundamental laws are no longer deemed to be valid when a state of

siege is declared within a state, surely this will apply all the more to

a power occupying another country in wartime. Anyone who refuses to

carry out the orders of the occupying power knowingly participates in

the fight to which he is not entitled and has to accept the

consequences. Obedience is the primary duty toward the occupying power;

and where patriotism and obedience are conflicting issues, the law

decides against patriotism. The punishment meted out is, as such, not

subject to any limitation; and the threats of punishment by an

occupation power are, for purposes of intimidation, usually extremely

severe. The question is whether there exists a limit, from the

standpoint of humanity, which prohibits punishment in excess of the

legitimate purpose which may be considered unwarranted. Orders like the

burning of houses, which were issued independently by subordinate

offices in connection with the recruitment of labor, must be examined

from this point of view.

This question is not easy to answer, if one bears in mind the special

underlying circumstances and realizes that it was a case here of an open

struggle between the occupying power and the population, with official

support from the enemy. In case of uprisings and organized general

resistance one cannot disclaim the applicability of the military laws as

practiced by the combat troops. Necessity alone must be the decisive

factor in this case. International law has put only one limit to

coercive measures in forbidding, in Article 50 of the Hague Convention

on Land Warfare, collective punishment of an entire population for the

deeds of individuals for which the population cannot be held partially

responsible. It is essential that such partial responsibility shall have

been established by actual events and not construed through orders. It

is not specified wherein collective punishment may consist. The

limitations of humanity, as I already pointed out, must be respected,

but in war this is a vague conception; necessity and practical value

must always have preference.

Next to the manner of recruiting labor, the conditions of work may

represent an ill-treatment which can be looked upon as a war crime. On

principle, there can be no question of ill-treatment whenever the

foreign workers are generally treated in the same way as the workers of

the home country. Different treatment is only permissible when special

circumstances justify it. Whereas generally foreign workers work on the

same level as the Germans, the so-called, Eastern Workers were

discriminated against. The most striking difference here was the

limitation of freedom. If this had been arbitrary, that would be

sufficient reason for declaring this to be ill-treatment. But the

reasons for this limitation of freedom were not arbitrary; they were

conditioned by the State’s need for security. During wartime the

presence of an enemy alien in the country always represents a danger,

and it is for that very reason that originally the bringing in of

foreign workers had been dispensed with. Only when necessity demanded

the utilization of foreign workers did the need of security have to be

taken into account simultaneously. The measures to be taken will depend

upon the danger, which will vary according to the attitude of the alien.

Whereas police measures with regard to the French were almost

imperceptible, the Eastern Workers were in the beginning kept under

supervision in camps.

The natural interest of the state lies in attaining security by winning

the aliens over inwardly because their collaboration is desired. This

will never be achieved by depriving them of their freedom. As long as

the attitude of the alien cannot be clearly assessed, especially if he

be like the citizens of the Soviet Union, propagandistically trained,

more stringent control may be necessary. However, it must not develop

into permanent captivity, and should at most constitute a sort of

quarantine. To deprive people without guilt of their liberty for an

extended period is not admissible, because that would correspond to a

forbidden collective punishment. The mere assumption of danger is not

sufficient to justify such limitations; there must be certain acts which

show that such foreign workers appear dangerous even under normal

working conditions. The custody of Eastern Workers behind barbed wire

and without permission to go out, as ordered by Himmler, must be

regarded as ill-treatment if it is a permanent practice.

The Defendant Sauckel, guided by a feeling that in this matter the

limits of the permissible had been overstepped, immediately took steps

against this and in a tough fight against Himmler demanded and obtained

the withdrawal of barbed wire and the prohibition to go out, as can be

seen from the ensuing decrees, Document Number Sauckel-10, Exhibit

USA-206.

Where in spite of later arrangements the old methods were still applied

by the police, Sauckel always intervened whenever he heard of such

occurrences. This has been confirmed repeatedly by witnesses. I refer

particularly to Exhibit Sauckel-10, the statement by the witness Goetz.

Another controversial point was the identification by a badge “Ost,”

which was maintained until 1944 and then replaced by a national

insignia. This identification of the Eastern Workers, who were free to

move among the population, was necessary for security reasons. This

cannot be considered ill-treatment. The distaste for this sign shown by

the Eastern Workers was chiefly due to the defamation of this badge by

propaganda, and the Defendant Sauckel always tried to change this

insignia and to replace it by a national insignia such as the other

workers wore voluntarily. He finally prevailed here also against Himmler

(Document RF-810, Page 12).

Equality must also exist between a nation’s own workers and foreign

workers with regard to the rules concerning maintenance of discipline.

With all belligerent states the war has raised the same problem as to

how to deal with those workers who do not properly fulfill their work

duties; that is to say, slackers, shirkers, and saboteurs. The practice

of discharge, common in peacetime, is ineffective during war; on the

other hand, deserters from work cannot be tolerated today by any

belligerent. In cases amounting to sabotage, police and penal measures

were called for, the principal one being a short term in a labor

training camp; in certain extreme cases, imprisonment in a concentration

camp was inflicted. Document 1063-PS, RF-345, shows the similarity in

the execution of the regulations as applied to Germans and foreigners.

Such police measures, which are caused by disloyal conduct of the

worker, are justified. The Wartburg Document RF-810 shows in the report

of the expert Dr. Sturm that such measures were carried out on a very

moderate scale and that only 0.1 to 0.2 per thousand were thus punished.

Hence it follows that the issue of regulations concerning the

maintenance of discipline is not yet in itself an ill-treatment which

might form the basis for a crime against humanity. Such ill-treatment,

however, can consist of excesses such as did occur outside the

competence of the Defendant Sauckel. He can only be held responsible for

those if he himself was subjectively to blame in that he knew of such

excesses and approved of them although he might have prevented them.

In summing up one can say that the “regulated mobilization of labor” is

permissible in international law and that restrictions imposed on

workers within the limits of necessities must be permitted for reasons

of state security. On the other hand, excesses in carrying out the

regulations must be looked upon as ill-treatment and may amount to

crimes against humanity. Responsibility for those rests with whoever has

instigated them or who, within the sphere of his competence, failed to

prevent them in the performance of his duty. When measuring the grave

charges brought against the Defendant Sauckel by the standards of the

aforesaid legal considerations, it will be necessary first of all to

single out those fields in which the evidence reveals him to be

absolutely clear of any responsibility.

In the first place, it is not proved that the Defendant Sauckel can be

connected with the biological extermination of the population. His whole

interest, as has been shown, pointed toward the opposite direction,

since his purpose was to obtain people as laborers. He had nothing to do

with migration measures and any methods used in that respect.

Work in concentration camps was just as far removed from the Defendant

Sauckel’s responsibility. Himmler’s speech in Posen in October 1943

(Document 1919-PS, Page 21) reveals that the SS had erected gigantic

armament plants of their own. We know that Himmler covered his extensive

labor requirements by despotic arbitrary arrests of persons in occupied

territories. Inside Germany he had workers engaged in regular employment

arrested on insignificant pretexts and brought to concentration camps,

fraudulently using the regular labor offices. This is clearly shown in

Document 1063-PS, containing a letter dated 17 December 1942 as well as

a letter dated 25 June 1943, in which a requirement of 35,000 prisoners

is signified. Moreover, no correspondence with reference to

concentration camp labor ever passed through Sauckel’s offices. As an

example, I refer to Document 1584-PS containing some correspondence with

Himmler’s department. The Defendant Sauckel’s name is never mentioned

with reference to a conscription of prisoners, and the witnesses have

unanimously stated that the Defendant Sauckel had no connection with

these matters. This is also confirmed by the statement of the Director

of the armament ministry’s Labor Office, Schmelter, who received the

prisoners required direct from Himmler.

Another field which must be eliminated is the conscription of Jews for

labor. This formed a part of labor conscription of concentration camp

prisoners; it was Himmler’s own personal secret sphere. This is revealed

for instance by Document R-91, in which Himmler’s service orders the

arrest of 45,000 Jews as concentration camp prisoners.

By the production of Document L-61 the Prosecution has attempted to

convict Sauckel of a share of guilt in this field. This document is a

letter, dated 26 November 1942, from Sauckel’s office to the presidents

of the provincial labor offices, stating that by agreement with the

Chief of the Security Police and SD, Jewish workers remaining in the

plants must be withdrawn and evacuated to Poland. As a matter of fact,

this letter actually confirms that Sauckel had nothing to do with Jewish

labor in the concentration camps, since Jewish workers were withdrawn

from his department under the very pretext of evacuation. The measure is

indeed solely concerned with the purely technical matter of excluding

the Jewish laborers and replacing them by Poles, an operation which

could not have been carried out without the participation of Sauckel’s

office.

This letter is in continuation of a correspondence which can be traced

back to the period prior to Sauckel’s assumption of office, and Document

L-156 subsequently deals with the same technical operation. The

unimportant character of the matter is attested by the fact that these

letters were not sent from the Defendant Sauckel’s head office in the

Thüringerhaus, but from an auxiliary office in the Saarlandstrasse. The

Defendant Sauckel disclaims knowledge of this correspondence and points

out that the letters do not bear his original signature but were,

according to the routine of his service, made out in his name just

because they were of minor importance. The fact that the letters begin

with the routine business term of “by agreement with,” instead of “by

consent of,” the Chief of Police and SD does not mean that they refer to

an agreement reached, but simply points to the agency in charge of the

matter.

Next, reference has been made to “extermination by labor.” However,

Documents 682-PS and 654-PS, dated September 1942, unmistakably show

that this is a case of a secret maneuver of Himmler and Goebbels in

co-operation with the Reich Minister of Justice, Thierack. The Defendant

Sauckel is not involved.

Neither was the conscription of workers for the Organization Todt under

Sauckel’s responsibility. The accusations proceeding from Document UK-56

in this respect, bearing upon labor conscription methods in the Channel

Islands, do not therefore concern him. The documents do not show that

the Defendant Sauckel was aware of these proceedings or that he could

have prevented them. This separation between the Defendant Sauckel’s

labor jurisdiction and the Organization Todt is confirmed in Document

L-191, the report of the International Labor Office in Montreal.

The enlistment of labor by civil and military departments is another

chapter. This was to a certain extent carried out as “pirate”

mobilization and kept secret from the Defendant Sauckel, because he

opposed these practices and endeavored to prevent them by all means.

Occasionally he was by-passed by higher orders. In this category there

is labor enlistment by the SS, the Reichsbahn, Air Force construction

battalions, Speer’s transport and traffic units, fortification and

engineering staffs, and other services.

The exclusion of these aspects from the scope of the Indictment should

exonerate Sauckel all the more since in these cases his directives did

not apply.

Document 204-PS illustrates in this respect the circumstances in which

transport auxiliaries were produced in White Russia. Document 334-PS

shows the same with regard to the execution of an independent drive for

Air Force auxiliaries, which cannot be held against Sauckel. The

commitment of adolescents, known as the Hay Action, according to

Document 031-PS of 14 June 1944, remained outside Sauckel’s jurisdiction

and activities, as becomes clear from the document itself. The 9th Army

together with the Eastern Ministry were the originators.

A letter from the Codefendant Rosenberg to Reich Minister Lammers of 20

July 1944 (Document 345-PS) falsely refers to the “agreement” of the

Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor; on the other hand

it states that the Defendant Sauckel was not connected with an SS helper

action and that he refused co-operation in this affair. According to

this, as stated by Document 1137-PS of 19 October 1944, a special office

in the Rosenberg Ministry with its own personnel attended to the seizure

of juveniles. The Defendant Sauckel’s agency was by-passed and labor

furnished directly to the armament industry.

In circumvention of the Defendant Sauckel’s agency certain measures also

took place which Hitler caused by direct orders to the local offices of

the Armed Forces and of the civil administration; this for instance

applied to the labor commitment ordered in the occupied territories for

the fortification of the Crimea (Document UK-68).

The enlistment of labor in Holland, which was carried out by the Armed

Forces against the protest of the labor service offices, is another of

these cases; this is shown in Document 3003-PS and is confirmed by the

Defendant Seyss-Inquart.

An important sector, which is beyond the Defendant Sauckel’s

responsibility, embraces all the actions undertaken as punitive measures

against partisans and resistance groups. These are independent police

measures; I already spoke about their judicial evaluation. Whether they

were admissible and could be approved depends on the circumstances. For

example, measures against the resistance movement in France, as

described in Document UK-78 (French Government Report), cannot be

included under the direct responsibility of Defendant Sauckel. Thus the

most incriminating occurrences enumerated in Count 3, Paragraph VIII of

the Indictment under “Deportation,” which ended in concentration camps,

are not within the responsibility of the Defendant Sauckel.

The deportations for political and racial reasons, which are also

mentioned under VIII (B) of the Indictment, such as the deportation of

French citizens to concentration camps, do not come within the

responsibility of the Defendant Sauckel either. The resettlement of

Slovenes and Yugoslavs described under (B) 2, must also be excluded.

According to the Indictment (under VIII, (H) 2) only part of the

approximately 5 million Soviet citizens mentioned are stated to have

been seized for labor commitment, the remainder being removed in other

ways to which the regulations of the Defendant Sauckel did not apply.

This is important not so much on account of the number of people

involved, but because the alleged bad conditions might have applied in

that very sector, since there the danger of improper treatment was

unquestionably greater.

THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time to break off?

[_A recess was taken._]

DR. SERVATIUS: The prisoners of war are also exempted from the field of

responsibility of the Defendant Sauckel. Such labor did not have to be

enlisted but was only directed. This was done by means of special labor

offices, which operated independently in connection with the

prisoner-of-war camps and collaborated exclusively with the Armed

Forces. Their task consisted only of employing prisoners of war where

they were needed. The Defendant Sauckel could only request a transfer of

prisoners of war. This is referred to in the Prosecution Document

1296-PS, of 27 July 1943, which mentions under Heading III the increase

in the employment of prisoners of war in collaboration with the Army

High Command.

The assignment of prisoners of war to plants took place under the

supervision of the Armed Forces, who at the same time enforced

observance of the Geneva Convention. Sauckel is in no way connected with

the death of hundreds of thousands of prisoners of war of the Soviet

Union in 1941 of whom Himmler speaks in his Posen speech (Document

1919-PS) and for whose replacement workers had to be brought in.

By Document USSR-415, the official Soviet report about the Lamsdorf

Camp, the Defendant Sauckel is connected with the alleged ill-treatment

of prisoners; but this is done merely because the number of personnel in

the camp was reported to him as a purely routine matter. The charge

cannot be maintained. The document, moreover, is not chronologically

substantiated after the year 1941.

The Defendant Sauckel, although personally not competent, intervened in

excess of his official duties for the care of the prisoners of war,

because he had an interest in their work morale. He issued general

decrees; this Document Sauckel-36 shows that he demanded an adequate

standard food supply, and Document Sauckel-39 shows that he demanded the

same working hours as for German workers; he also stressed the fact that

no disciplinary punishment could be inflicted by the plants.

Further discrimination among the accusations raised must be made

according to the time of the incidents. The Defendant Sauckel did not

take over his office until 21 March 1942. His measures, therefore, could

only have had effect some time later. What conditions prevailed previous

to that can be seen from some documents dating from 1941. In Document

1206-PS leading authorities advocated feeding the workers on horse and

cat meat, and in Document USSR-177 the production of bread of very

inferior quality is suggested. Just a short time before the Defendant

Sauckel took office Himmler in a sharp decree ordered the confinement of

the workers behind barbed wire. It is fair to say that an extremely low

level in the treatment of the foreign workers at that time in the Reich

had been reached. The conception which prevailed with regard to the

powers of resistance and the working capacity of the Russians is tragic.

With the advent of the Defendant Sauckel a fundamental change took

place, which led to a constantly increasing improvement of the

situation. The credit for having effected a change here is, according to

some documents I will cite, solely due to the Defendant Sauckel. This is

shown in particular by Document EC-318, which is a record, dated 15

April 1942, of the first meeting between the Defendant Sauckel and Reich

Minister Seldte and his specialist staff when taking office. It is

recorded there that it was the Defendant Sauckel who made his assumption

of office dependent on the condition that food supplies for foreigners

must equal those for Germans, and that the granting of this request was

guaranteed by Hitler, Göring, the Minister for Food, Darré, and his

state secretary, Backe. It is also established there that the Defendant

Sauckel demanded the removal of the barbed wire, and actually succeeded

in this; and finally, that he immediately took steps against the low

wages of the Eastern Workers. The execution of his fundamental demands

was then also immediately followed through with tenacity by the

Defendant Sauckel against the resistance of all authorities.

The program of the mobilization of labor of 20 April 1942, Document

016-PS, accordingly proceeds to inveigh against all acts of cruelty and

chicanery and demands that foreign workers be correctly and humanely

treated; a hope is even expressed that a propaganda effect in Germany’s

favor ought to be achieved by the way in which labor allocation was

carried out. This thought was frequently reiterated later. An economical

allocation of workers was urged in order to counteract the waste

indulged in by influential agencies.

A year later, on 20 April 1943, the Defendant Sauckel again addressed a

declaration of the procedure to be followed to all persons concerned

with labor commitment. This is the repeatedly mentioned “Manifesto of

Labor Allocation,” Document Number Sauckel-81, which was issued as a

warning and a call to battle addressed to all agencies preparing to

challenge the serious responsibility of the Defendant Sauckel. Goebbels

opposed it by claiming that the title was too assuming, while the

propaganda aspect went beyond the bounds of the matter. Other agencies

simply disregarded the copies sent to them and did not forward them,

whereupon Sauckel sent copies directly to the industries concerned. How

this circular was dealt with by the various recalcitrant agencies is

shown by its description as a “notorious manifesto,” as it was referred

to unchallenged in a session of the Central Planning Board on 1 March

1944; Document R-124, Page 1779.

The Defendant Sauckel was reproached for having been over-zealous. I

refer to a remark made by General Milch (who was interrogated before the

Tribunal), in which he mentions the Central Planning Board, criticizing

the allegedly too lenient treatment of loafers, and declaring that if

anything was undertaken against them, agencies would immediately become

interested in Germany which would protect the “poor fellow” and

intercede for the human rights of others. This is Document R-124, Page

1913.

The attitude of Defendant Sauckel was generally known and has been

confirmed by various documents. Thus all the agencies addressed

themselves to him in case of complaints and deficiencies, not in order

to make the Defendant Sauckel responsible for them, but to solicit his

help, because everybody knew how eagerly he advocated improvements.

Thus Document 084-PS, which is a report by Dr. Gutkelch of the Central

Agency for Eastern Nations of the Rosenberg Ministry, dated 30 September

1942, emphasized in various places the influence of the Defendant

Sauckel and recommends getting into closer touch with him. His

Codefendant Rosenberg also points to Sauckel’s strenuous efforts in

Document 194-PS, Page 6, a letter of 14 December 1942 to Koch, Reich

Commissioner for the Ukraine. The Codefendant Frank likewise on 21

November 1943 applied to the Defendant Sauckel—Document 908-PS—for a

basic change in the legal position of Poles inside the Reich.

To what extent do real events correspond with that which has been

stated? The first point to be dealt with is the mobilization, which is

practically identical with the point of deportation. Then follows the

examination of the treatment of workers as designated by the term “slave

labor.”

The evidence has refuted the erroneous assumption that the Defendant

Sauckel carried out the enlistment and mobilization of foreign workers

on his own responsibility and through his own organization. It has been

established that the supreme authorities in the occupied territories

executed the laws regarding compulsory work as they had received them on

Hitler’s orders. All these agencies had their own administrative system

and guarded their departments against the intrusion of others.

A communication of the Rosenberg Ministry of the East to Koch, the Reich

Commissioner for the Ukraine, dated 14 December 1942, Document 194-PS,

Page 7, in which the Codefendant Rosenberg particularly refers to the

right of sovereignty existing in questions of labor allocation, proves

that this administrative system had not been infringed upon. These

supreme authorities had their own labor offices which were organized in

detail from each ministry down to the least important office. In

reference I wish to cite Document 3012-PS, an ordinance of 6 February

1943, by the Supreme Command of the Army, dealing with compulsory work

in the Eastern operational sector, and Document RF-15, an ordinance of 6

October 1942.

The Defendant Sauckel could merely place requests with these agencies

for the number of workers he was ordered to bring to Germany, and give

them the necessary instructions. These were his limitations, which he

never exceeded. He respected the right of execution as opposed to the

right of issuing instructions. For these tasks deputies were appointed

for each territory who, in accordance with the ordinance of 30 September

1942, Exhibit USA-510, were directly subordinate to the Defendant

Sauckel; they did not however belong to his agency, but to the

territorial authorities. It was expressly confirmed by the witness Bail,

called by the Codefendant Rosenberg, that this applied to the chief

deputy in the East, State Counsellor Peuckert who belonged to the staff

of the Eastern Ministry.

This State Counsellor Peuckert was at the same time consultant for the

Economic Staff East for the rear army area which bordered on the

territory under civil administration; here too he acted only in an

accessory capacity as deputy of the Defendant Sauckel. This is proved by

Document 3012-PS, which is a memorandum dealing with a conversation of

10 March 1943 concerning labor allocation, in which the position of

Peuckert is noted on the attendance list. Through this arrangement with

regard to Peuckert’s functions, created in the interest of the

territorial authorities, all personal interference by the Defendant

Sauckel was made impossible. In Document 018-PS, that is, in the letter

to the Defendant Sauckel dated 21 December 1942, the Codefendant

Rosenberg complains about the methods of labor mobilization in the East;

but this must be considered as the complaint of a minister who is unable

to assert himself against his subordinates and turns toward the

presumable sources of the difficulties he is encountering.

It is true that these difficulties could have been removed immediately

if the Defendant Sauckel had refrained from insisting on the fulfillment

of his mission. But this fulfillment was the very task, specified in the

decree of appointment as having to be effected under all circumstances.

The Defendant Sauckel had to fight against all obstacles due to weakness

or departmental egotism, and had to see to it that local agencies did

not out of a desire to let things ride fail to supply the required

manpower, while other offices held it back out of selfish interests.

“With all means” and “ruthlessly” are recurring expressions employed in

combating these symptoms.

General Falkenhausen, the military commander in Belgium and northern

France, during his hearing erroneously declared in Document RF-15 that

the Defendant Sauckel forced him to mobilize labor and had carried this

out by the aid of a special “organization” of his own. However, he had

to admit that this was incorrect when the order signed by himself about

the introduction of compulsory labor was put before him. This is also

confirmed by the statements of the witnesses Timm and Stothfang.

In France workers were mobilized by the French administration. The

superior German office was not the office of the Defendant Sauckel, but

of the military commander in France, where Sauckel had only a deputy.

The negotiations which the Defendant Sauckel conducted in Paris and

which were the subject of the evidence lie outside of this activity;

they are negotiations of a diplomatic nature between the German and

French Governments in which Sauckel participated. They were held in the

German Embassy.

Conditions and circumstances in the other territories were analogous.

The recruiting commissions, which corresponded to the labor mobilization

staffs in the rear army areas and the operational zones, were also by no

means offices of the Defendant Sauckel, as the Codefendant Rosenberg

assumes. These recruiting commissions were vaguely connected with the

Defendant Sauckel only insofar as they were composed of experts who

emanated from the German labor offices belonging to Sauckel’s

department. They received directives only through their superior office,

in order to guarantee uniform handling of all recruiting regulations.

Regulation Number 4 in Document Number Sauckel-15 is very clear on this

point. This advance appointment of the deputies as of 30 September 1942,

which was already issued on 7 May 1942, provides for the sole

responsibility of the military and civil authorities of the occupied

territories. The deputies mentioned there as having been assigned the

same functions, are the deputies with the German missions in friendly

foreign countries.

This was misunderstood by the Prosecution, so that wrong conclusions

were arrived at, to the disadvantage of the Defendant Sauckel, about the

responsibility for recruiting and transport. The interpretation of the

provision that all technical and administrative procedures of labor

allocation were exclusively within the competence and responsibility of

the Defendant Sauckel is also incorrect as far as occupied territory is

concerned. This stipulation refers solely to the functions in the Reich

and establishes the competence of the Plenipotentiary General for the

Allocation of Labor, of the district labor offices, and the labor

offices; this can be seen from Document 016-PS, last paragraph.

The Defendant Sauckel, therefore, is not directly responsible for the

conscription of manpower. Indirectly, however, responsibility can be

charged to him in that although he was aware of these unsatisfactory

conditions and knew that they could not be stopped, he nevertheless

demanded more workers.

It must be added that in the Defendant Rosenberg’s letter of 21 December

1942, Document 018-PS, the Defendant Sauckel learned for the first time

of the recruiting methods which were described as mass deportation. At

the meeting which followed in the beginning of January 1943, the

Defendant Rosenberg declared that he was opposed to this and that he

would not tolerate such procedures. This is also confirmed by his

previous letter of 14 December 1942 addressed to Koch, Reich

Commissioner for the Ukraine, Document 194-PS, in which he clearly calls

the latter’s attention to his obligations to proceed legally.

Koch’s memorandum of 16 March 1943, Document Rosenberg-13, of which the

Defendant Sauckel learned only here at the Trial, explains that these

incidents are exaggerated individual cases, their justification being

based on the necessity of carrying out measures for the restoration of

the prestige of the occupation authority. It is expressly declared in

this that the recruitment of workers was undertaken by legal means and

that steps were being taken in the event of arbitrary measures, Document

Number Rosenberg-13, Pages 11 and 12.

It was not altogether impossible that it might have been a matter of

tricky propaganda exaggerations, as Koch specifically points out. In

wartime such a possibility exists, and the propaganda tendency of the

Molotov reports (Document USSR-151) goes to emphasize this.

The Defendant Sauckel was also supported in this idea by the result of

an investigation into the details of a “manhunt” which was reported to

him at Minsk by Field Marshal Kluge; it turned out to be a round-up of

workers employed by a private firm at the time of the retreat.

The Katyn case shows how difficult it is to determine the truth of such

events when they are made use of as effective weapons of propaganda. As

the witnesses from the Defendant Sauckel’s office have confirmed, no

other incidents involving such abuses have become known. The cases

reported are to a certain extent obviously repetitions of the same

happenings as communicated from various sources.

None of these reports, however, displays any desire to approve of such

things; they are a sort of house alarm for the purpose of remedying and

improving conditions.

Now, can one believe the Defendant Sauckel when he declares that he did

not know about the conditions alleged by the Prosecution? What reached

him through official channels is insufficient as proof of cognizance,

and the witnesses confirm that the so-called “methods” were unknown. On

the other hand we find here documents of the authorities of the occupied

countries from which it appears that the Reich Commissioner in the

Ukraine ordered the burning down of houses in retaliation for resisting

the administration, and there are decrees providing for such measures.

Reports made to the Eastern Ministry regarding such events do not lead

to penal prosecution but to suspension of the proceedings, such as the

Raab case (Document 254-PS) and the Müller case (Document 290-PS).

Any doubt must be countered with the following: The measures employed

were not approved by the highest instances, and were only

surreptitiously applied by the lower offices who therefore had every

reason not to let them become known. From the files on the preliminary

proceedings of the cases of Raab and Müller it definitely appears that

the existing regulations were unknown at the ministry.

The Defendant Sauckel did travel through the Ukraine, but it is unlikely

that his attention should have been called to matters which might have

got the local offices into trouble. The views of the Defendant Sauckel

were well known, while on the other hand there existed a violent quarrel

between the offices of Reich Commissioner Koch and Reich Minister

Rosenberg. When the documents from both offices such as have been

submitted are read carefully, it can be seen from the file notes that in

this struggle both sides were collecting arguments and that neither

wished to commit itself. Since the Defendant Sauckel himself had no

direct authority, it is understandable that actual conditions should

have remained unknown to him. Still another point of view must be

considered: various documents mention that a certain pressure would have

to be applied in the procurement of workers, since the workers were to

be obtained “under all circumstances.” Does this sanction all methods?

It remains to be seen what was actually done in pursuance of these

statements.

The OKH in one case thereupon ordered the increased mobilization of

workers and permitted collective conscription, while prohibiting

collective punishment. In this connection see Document 3012-PS,

containing a telephone message from the Economy Staff East to General

Stapf of 11 March 1943.

The best illustration can be found in that same Document 3012-PS by a

file note concerning a discussion of 10 March 1943. Here General Nagel

requests clear guiding principles and State Counsellor Peuckert asks for

“reasonable” recruitment methods to be established by the OKH as the

authorized agency. Document 2280-PS is also relevant here, which is the

only personal statement made in Riga on 3 May 1943 on this question by

the Defendant Sauckel. There he states that only “all permissible means”

are allowed.

Document 3010-PS, Economy Inspection South, may also be quoted, in which

on 17 August 1943 the use of “all suitable means” is permitted.

Orders are issued which contain severe measures in case of noncompliance

with the duty to work: deprivation of ration and clothing cards.

Imprisonment of relatives is threatened, as well as the taking of

hostages.

What is the position as to the admissibility of such measures?

The deprivation of food cards has today become a generally applied means

of coercion based on the rationing system, which derives from

present-day conditions. It is easily carried out and does not require

any special executive force, while being extremely effective. Concerning

the imprisonment of relatives, severe violations of personal custody can

be recorded even today. The Hague Convention on Land Warfare offers

protection only against collective punishment of the population, but it

does not protect the members of the family who may be considered as

sharing the responsibility in the case of a refusal to work. The French

law of 11 June 1943, which was presented as Document RF-80, also

provides for such imprisonment only in the case of deliberate

co-operation.

There finally remains the shooting of a prefect, which the Defendant

Sauckel demanded. Apart from the fact that this statement as such is

irrelevant from the point of view of criminal law, because it was not

actually carried out, its legal import is merely a request to apply the

existing French law. This law has been submitted by the Prosecution as

Document RF-25, a decree of 31 January 1943 by the military commander in

France, Article 2 of which provides for the death penalty.

Equally misunderstood by the Prosecution is a statement uttered by the

Defendant Sauckel according to which one should handcuff the workers in

a polite way (Document RF-86, Page 10, negotiation by Sauckel in Paris

on 27 August 1943). But as appears from the context, the point in

question is merely a comparison between the clumsy manner of the Police

and the obliging manner of the French; handcuffing was not thereby

especially advocated as a method of mobilization: Clean, correct, and

Prussian on the one hand while at the same time obliging and polite on

the other; that is how the work was to have been done.

I also refer to the proposal for “shanghaiing” as described in Document

R-124, Page 1770, which is known to the Tribunal from the proceedings.

The statement which the Defendant Sauckel has made gives an

understandable explanation; according to it, this was legally a

preliminary recruitment intended to induce the workers to agree to the

real enlistment later on in the official recruitment offices.

These various incidents—shooting of a prefect, handcuffing, and

shanghaiing—may be explained in various ways, but one can reach a

complete understanding of the subjective side only if one considers why

these statements were made, and under what conditions. The underlying

reason for all these statements is the struggle against resistance and

sabotage which in France assumed ever greater proportions. Therefore it

is not a question of brutality and cynicism; rather were these

statements intended to counteract the indecision displayed by the

authorities.

Another consideration which must be appended here is whether the

Defendant Sauckel had not exhausted the manpower of the country by his

measures to such an extent that more workers could only be obtained by

inhuman methods and that the Defendant Sauckel must have known this. The

important point here is the figure for the “quotas.” It has been

established that they were high, but it has also been established that

they were not fixed arbitrarily, but only after a careful study by the

statistical department. Only a small percentage of the population was

actually apprehended, and the decisive issue was not so much their

inability to perform the work required as their will to offer

resistance. In the occupied territories of the East were large reserves

of manpower, especially among older adolescents, which were not

effectively utilized. The German troops, their ranks greatly thinned,

saw the densely populated villages during their retreat, and then felt

the impact of the enemy thus reinforced shortly afterward.

In France there were likewise many forces which placed themselves under

the protection of the Maquis or the “blocked factories.” This is

confirmed not only by the French Government Report, Document Number

RF-22, but is also apparent from a remark which Kehrl, a witness for the

Codefendant Speer, made in the Central Planning Board on 1 March 1944,

Document R-124, Page 66. This witness states there that labor was

available on an abundant scale in France.

Another conclusive contribution here is Document 1764-PS, Page 6, which

is the report by Minister Hemmen of 15 February 1944, which deals with

the “Reconstruction Program” of Marshal Pétain, and points out that the

population was unscathed by war and was increasing by 300,000 young men

every year.

If the number of workers mobilized is deemed to be of importance in this

connection, it must be compared with the total population figures, while

on the other hand it should be taken into consideration that Germany did

not demand anything which she did not ask of herself to an even higher

degree. The Defendant Sauckel was forced to the conclusion that the

people, instead of being unable to work, did not want to do so. In order

to influence the people the propaganda struggle intensified, and threats

of punishment were proclaimed by both parties; this first engendered in

the population of the occupied territories a conflict of feelings which

was the undoing of many.

The Defendant Sauckel could with good reason refer to the results of the

counterpropaganda and of the deteriorating war situation as

necessitating coercion; he could not, however, on the basis of the

information at his disposal become convinced that the exhaustion of the

countries was so great that nothing more could be extracted from them

without the use of inhuman methods. The Defendant Sauckel believed he

could obtain his object by creating special working conditions rather

than by using violence. As an example I refer to the promise which

Sauckel himself gave on 3 May 1943 in Riga, Document 2228-PS.

Apart from all this there is one more field of labor procurement which

must be put in a different category. That is the liberation of prisoners

of war on condition that labor forces be made available for Germany by

“relève” or “transformation.”

The French Government Report RF-22 declares both methods of procuring

labor forces to be inadmissible. It is pointed out in the report that

the exchange on the basis of “relève” amounted to the enslavement of a

roughly threefold number of French workers. Against this it must be

stated that the replacement workers came only for 6 months for voluntary

work and in succession. At the end of 18 months all workers were free,

while the prisoner was liberated immediately.

Coercion for the execution of the “relève” did not exist. From a legal

point of view it was not assailable. Captivity can be terminated at any

time; release may be made subject to a condition. The French report

unduly stresses its moral indignation in quoting a phrase of the

president of a news agency of the United States; this phrase speaks of

the “abominable choice of either to work for the hereditary enemy or to

deprive a son of one’s own country of a chance of release from

captivity.”

To refute this, I refer to the healthy sentiment according to which in

the older Russian literature such a change was applauded as a patriotic

and magnanimous deed during the Nordic War. Neither the King of Sweden

nor Peter the Great seems to have considered exchange as equal to

replacement by a substitute slave.

The “transformation” (“Erleichtertes Statut”) is contained in Document

Number Sauckel-101. This is the release of a Frenchman from captivity if

he accepts other work, or under condition that an additional French

worker should come to Germany according to the “relève” regulations. No

prisoner of war was forced in this manner to change his legal status,

but whole camps volunteered for it. If a prisoner made use of the

possibility offered, he forfeited thereby the special legal protection

of the Geneva Convention with regard to work; but this was done in

agreement with his government, and thus does not constitute a violation

of international law.

The home furlough connected with the change-over was discontinued

because the men granted these furloughs did not return, even in the case

of the first convoys. The French Report, RF-22, itself states on Page 69

that of the 8,000 men forming one leave convoy, 2,000 did not return.

The report states that the “unfortunate people” were placed before the

alternative: “Either you return, or your brothers die.” This

consideration, however, did not impress them. Nor could their promise

prevent them from immediately joining the Maquis.

The cancellation of these home furloughs does not therefore constitute

an arbitrary act in slave labor. Perusal of the French report can only

strengthen that impression.

It follows therefore that no conscription of workers, violating the laws

of war or carried out in an inhuman manner, was effected by the

Defendant Sauckel in this field either.