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[1] Proceeding from this interpretation of the Charter there arises the
need for a discussion on how the Indictment is to be construed with
respect to the conspiracy charged therein. This construction is based on
the legal concept of Anglo-American law which determines the
responsibility of a plurality of persons differently and in a more
far-reaching way than the German penal code, which contains the
principles of law to which the accused were subject at the time when
they committed the deed. The German penal code also provides that a
person can be held responsible for offenses committed by others provided
he participated in a common plan which was later carried out by others.
But the German penal code places decisive weight on determining the
extent to which the acts committed at a latter date correspond to the
common plan. Since in the serious crimes which are being prosecuted
before this Court the determination of the form of guilt in the original
plan is necessary in order to permit punishment, later acts of
commission by others can be charged against a defendant only to the
extent to which they corresponded to arrangements to which the defendant
deliberately agreed. A defendant who participated in certain plans
cannot be held responsible for subsequent plans of a wider scope, or for
acts of commission which far exceeded the original plans without his
co-operation.
Responsibility for subsequent plans and acts of commission can be
established according to German law only if it can be proved that the
defendant, without participating in those subsequent plans and actions,
at the time of his original participation recognized and approved this
manner of development and execution and, in other words, deliberately
encouraged it.
To revert to the example of the Prosecution:
He who participates’ in the plan for robbing a bank is responsible if
this plan is carried out, even though he does not personally participate
in the execution. But a person does not at the same time become guilty
of premeditated murder if the active members subsequently and without
his participation discuss murdering the guard or in case one of the
members should shoot one of the guards without prior agreement, because
the latter has caught him in the act.
Nobody can be convicted of premeditated murder if he did not participate
in a plan to commit murder, unless it can be proved that when he
participated in the plan for robbing the bank such killing of a guard
was already contemplated and that in spite of this he approved the plan
for the bank robbery. In that case he, too, would have deliberately
contributed to the murder. In other words, according to the provisions
of German substantive criminal law there does not exist a liability for
so-called excesses of the immediate culprits or for an unforeseen
development of plans not originally conceived on such a wide scope, so
that a more far-reaching interpretation in line with the concept of
conspiracy in Anglo-American law, which at the time when the accused
committed their deed did not exist, would violate the principle which
prohibits retroactive application of penal laws.
ONE HUNDRED
AND SEVENTY-SEVENTH DAY
Friday, 12 July 1946
_Morning Session_
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn today at 4 o’clock.
DR. MARX: Mr. President, with the permission of the Tribunal I shall now
continue with the presentation of the final plea for the Defendant
Streicher. Yesterday I had come to the point where the individual
accusations against Streicher had been summarized, and I had taken
liberty of explaining that these accusations are subdivided into three
different paragraphs:
1. Support of seizure of power and consolidation of the power of the
NSDAP after its entry into the Government.
2. Preparation of aggressive wars by propaganda aimed at the persecution
of the Jews.
3. Intellectual and spiritual preparation and education of the German
people and German youth to effect the destruction of Jewry and to
encourage hatred of the Jews.
With respect to Count One of the Indictment, the defendant does not deny
that, with regard to the Party’s later seizure of power, he supported
and promoted it with all his might from the very beginning. His support
went to the extent of a whole movement which he had built up personally
in Franconia and which he put at the disposal of Adolf Hitler’s Party,
which was quite small after the first World War and limited to Southern
Bavaria only. Furthermore, after Hitler’s release from the fortress of
Landsberg he immediately joined him again and subsequently championed
his ideas and aims with the greatest determination.
Until 1933 the defendant’s activity was limited to propaganda for the
NSDAP and its aims, particularly in the field of the Jewish question.
Nothing criminal can be seen in this attitude of the defendant as such.
Participation in a party within a state which allows such an opposition
party can be regarded as criminal only if, first of all, the aims of
such a party are objectively criminal and if, subjectively, a member of
such a movement knows, approves of, and thereby supports, these criminal
aims.
The foundation of the entire charges against all the defendants lies in
this very fact that the NSDAP is accused of having had criminal aims
from the very beginning. According to the assertion of the Prosecution,
the members of this Party started out with the plan of subjugating the
world, of annihilating foreign races, and of setting the German master
race above the whole world. They are accused of having harbored the will
to carry out these aims and plans from the very outset by means of
aggressive wars, murder, and violence. If, therefore, the Defendant
Streicher’s mere participation in the NSDAP and his support of it are to
be ascribed to him as a crime, it must be proved that the Party had such
plans and that the defendant knew and approved of them.
The gentlemen who spoke before me have already demonstrated sufficiently
that a conspiracy with such aims did not exist. Therefore I can save
myself the trouble of making further statements on this subject and I
can refer to what has already been set forth by the other defense
counsel. I have only to deal with the point that the Defendant Streicher
did not in any case participate in such a conspiracy, if the latter
should be considered by the High Tribunal to have existed.
The official Party Program strove to attain power in a legitimate way.
The aims advocated therein cannot be considered as criminal. Thus, if
such aims did actually exist, they could only—by the very nature of a
conspiracy—be known in a restricted circle.
The Party Program was not kept secret but was announced at a public
meeting in Munich, so that not only the whole public of Germany but also
that of the entire world could be informed about the aims of the Party.
Therefore that element supplied by secret agreement towards a common
aim, which is usually the characteristic sign of a conspiracy, is not
present.
The evidence too, has shown nothing to the effect that already at that
time there existed a plan for a war of revenge or aggression connected
with the previous or simultaneous extermination of the Jews. If,
nevertheless, a conspiracy should have existed, the latter would have
confined itself to the restricted circle which revolved exclusively
around Hitler. But the Defendant Streicher did not belong to that
circle. None of the offices he occupied provides the least proof of
that. As an old Party member he was just one among many thousands. As
honorary Gauleiter, as honorary SA Obergruppenführer, he was also only
an equal among equals. Thus one cannot find in any of the offices he
held any connection or complicity with the innermost circle of the
Party. It is also impossible to discern after the end of 1938 any
personal relations with the leading men of the Movement, either with
Hitler himself or with the Defendant Göring, or with Goebbels, Himmler,
or Bormann.
The Prosecution did not offer any evidence on this point, nor did the
proceedings produce any proof to that effect. Of all the material
presented during all these months of the Trial, nothing can be taken as
even a shadow of proof that the Defendant Streicher was so closely
connected with the supreme authority of the Party that he could have, or
even must have, known its ultimate aims.
In the Jewish question too the final aims of the Party—the effects of
which were manifest in the concentration camps—were not, before the
seizure of power and for several years after, formulated and determined
as they appeared in the end. The Party Program itself provided for Jews
to be placed under aliens’ law, and so the laws issued in the Third
Reich followed this line. Only later on, it may be added, the program in
this as in many other points became more radical and finally went
haywire altogether under the influence of the war. But any proof that
the Defendant Streicher knew other aims than those of the official Party
Program has not been offered. Consequently it has not been proved that
the defendant supported the seizure of power of the Party in cognizance
of its criminal aims; and only on such a basis could a penal charge be
brought against him.
The fact that the defendant, as Gauleiter, further endeavored to
increase and maintain the power of the Party after the seizure of power
is not disputed by him. But here, too, the defendant’s conduct can only
be considered punishable if he knew at that time the objectionable aims
of the Party. As a matter of actual fact it must be said here that the
Defendant Streicher, in contrast to almost all the other defendants, did
not remain in his position until the end, not even until the war.
Officially he was dismissed in 1940 from his position of Gauleiter, but
actually and practically he had been without any influence and power for
more than a year before that time. But as long as he could still work
within the modest framework of his capacity of Gauleiter, no criminal
plans of the NSDAP were recognizable. In any case not for anybody who,
like the Defendant Streicher, was outside the close circle surrounding
Adolf Hitler.
Count Two of the Indictment brought against the Defendant Streicher,
namely, the persecution of Jews as a means of preparation for a war of
aggression, can be included here. Up to 1937 the existence of a plan for
a war of aggression was in no way recognizable. In any case, if Hitler
had had any intentions in that direction, he did not allow them to be
recognized from the outside. If, however, anybody had been taken into
his confidence at that time, it would have been the leading men in
politics and the Armed Forces, who belonged to the closest circle around
him. To those, however, the Defendant Streicher by no means belonged. It
is especially significant here that at the outbreak of the war Streicher
was not even appointed Wehrkreiskommissar (Commissioner of Military
Administrative Headquarters) of his Gau. The individual conferences from
which the Prosecution derives the evidence for the planning of the war
which broke out later in no case ever saw the Defendant Streicher as
participant. His name does not appear anywhere, neither in any written
decree, nor in any minutes. Consequently no proof has been offered that
Streicher knew of such alleged plans for waging war. This does away with
the accusation that he preached hatred against the Jews in order to
facilitate thereby the conduct of the war planned for some later time.
In this connection I should add that one of the main points in the
program of the NSDAP was the slogan, “Get rid of Versailles!” The
defendant adopted this point of the program which, however, does not
mean he envisaged a repeal of the treaty by means of war.
Even the former democratic German governments, in the course of their
negotiations with their former opponents in the World War, stressed the
fact at all times that the Versailles Treaty presented no proper basis
for permanent world peace and particularly for economic adjustment. Not
only in Germany but everywhere in the rest of the world clear-thinking
economic circles were against the Versailles Treaty. We may point
especially to the United States of America as an example of this.
Almost all political parties in Germany, irrespective of their other
aims, agreed that the Treaty of Versailles should be revised. Neither
was there any difference of opinion over the fact that such revision was
possible only on the basis of an agreement. Even to consider any other
possibility of solution would have seemed Utopian, for the German Reich
lacked all military power. The NSDAP also strove, at any rate as far as
could be seen from outward signs, to find a solution to the problem in
this way. To support such an aim, however, cannot be looked upon as a
violation of treaty obligations and, therefore, cannot be made the
object of a charge against the defendant. No proof has been offered that
he thought of warlike complications or that he desired them.
I now come to the matter of the defendant’s attitude in the Jewish
question. He is accused of having incited and instigated for decades the
persecution of the Jews and of being responsible for the final
extermination of Europe’s Jewry. It is clear that this accusation
constitutes the decisive point of the Indictment against Julius
Streicher and perhaps the decisive point of the total Indictment, for in
this connection the attitude of the German people to this question must
be tried and judged as well. The Prosecution takes the point of view
that there is just as little doubt as to the responsibility of the
defendant as there is doubt about the guilt in which the German people
are involved. As evidence of this the Prosecution put forward:
(a) The speeches by Streicher before and after the seizure of power,
particularly one speech in April 1925, in which, he spoke about the
extermination of the Jews. Herein, in the prosecutor’s opinion, is the
first evidence to be seen regarding the final solution of the Jewish
question planned by the Party, namely, the extermination of all Jews.
(b) Active assertion of the person and authority of the defendant,
especially on “Boycott Day,” 1 April 1933.
(c) Numerous articles published in the weekly paper, _Der Stürmer_,
among them especially those dealing with ritual murder and with
quotations from the Talmud. He is said to have knowingly and
intentionally described therein the Jews as a criminal and inferior race
and created and wished to create hatred of these people and the wish to
exterminate them. The defendant’s reply to these points is as follows:
He states that he worked merely as a private writer. His aim was to
enlighten the German people on the Jewish question as he saw it. His
description of the Jews was merely intended to show them as a different
and a foreign race and to make it clear that they live according to laws
which are alien to the German conception. It was far from his intention
to incite or inflame his circle of listeners and readers. Moreover, he
always only propagated the idea that the Jews, because of their alien
character, should be removed from German national and economic life and
withdrawn from the close association with the body of the German people.
Further, he always had in mind an international solution of the Jewish
question; he did not favor a German or even European partial solution
and rejected it. That was why he suggested, in an editorial in _Der
Stürmer_ in the year 1941, that the French island of Madagascar should
be considered as a place of settlement for the Jews. Consequently, he
did not see the final solution of the Jewish question in the physical
extermination of the Jews but in their resettlement.
It cannot be the aim of the Defense to go into further details of the
defendant’s actions as a writer and speaker, particularly with regard to
_Der Stürmer_ and his reply to the accusations raised against him. His
ideology and convictions shall not be explained, excused, or defended,
nor his manner of writing and speaking either. Examination and judgment
in this respect rest with the Tribunal alone. This much only shall be
said, that between the defendant’s actions and the expressions
frequently employed by him there is an antithesis which cannot be
bridged. It may be stated that the defendant never, when in charge of an
anti-Jewish undertaking, had coercive measures used against the Jewish
population, as might necessarily be expected of him if the accusations
made by the Prosecution were true.
I consider it my duty as defense counsel to broach and examine the
question as to whether the Defendant Streicher with his speeches, his
actions and his publications, not only strove towards the result alleged
by the Prosecution but actually attained it. The question therefore
should be examined as to whether Streicher actually educated the German
people to a degree of anti-Semitism which made it possible for the
leadership of the German nation to commit such criminal acts as actually
occurred. Furthermore, it must be examined whether the defendant filled
German youth with hatred against the Jews to the extent that is charged
by the Prosecution. Finally, the question must be examined whether
Streicher actually was the man who spiritually and morally prepared the
executive organs for their active persecution of the Jews.
At the beginning of this exposition it appears important to point out
that a great many of _Der Stürmer_ articles, from which the Prosecution
endeavors to deduce an incitement to stamp out and annihilate the Jews,
were not written by Streicher himself, but by his collaborators,
especially by the Deputy Gauleiter, Karl Holz, who was well known for
extremely radical tendencies. Even though the Defendant Streicher bears
formal responsibility for these articles, which responsibility he
expressly assumed before the Tribunal, this aspect nevertheless appears
very important for the extent of his criminal responsibility.
Further it may be said in this connection that, according to the
unrefuted statement of the defendant, the most caustic articles were
written in reply to articles and writings in the foreign press, which
contained very radical suggestions for the destruction of the German
nation—also, no doubt, due to the existing war psychosis.
The Defendant Streicher—and this cannot be denied and shall not be
defended—continually wrote articles in _Der Stürmer_ and also made
speeches in public which were strongly anti-Jewish and at least aimed at
the elimination of Jewish influence in Germany. During the first years
Streicher found a comparatively favorable soil for his anti-Jewish
tendencies. The first World War ended with Germany’s defeat, but wide
circles did not wish to admit the fact of a military victory of
Germany’s opponents of that time. They attributed this defeat
exclusively to a breakdown of national defense and resistance from
within and depicted Jewry as being the main culprit for this inner
undermining. In doing this they intentionally overlooked the mistakes
which had been committed by the Government of that time before and
during the war with respect to domestic and foreign policy, as well as
the errors of strategy. A scapegoat was sought on which to lay the blame
for the loss of the war, and it was thought to have been found in the
Jews. Jealousy, envy, and also disregard of personal shortcomings
accomplished the rest in influencing feelings unfavorably toward the
Jewish population. In addition to that came the inflation and in the
following years the economic depression with its steadily increasing
misery which, as experience shows, makes any nation ripe for any form of
radicalism.
On this ground and in this setting _Der Stürmer_ developed. For these
reasons it first met with a certain amount of interest and attracted a
considerable number of readers. But even in the last years before the
seizure of power it did not have great influence; its distribution
hardly went beyond Nuremberg and its close vicinity. By means of attacks
on persons known locally in Nuremberg and in other places, it managed to
arouse in these localities, from time to time, a certain amount of
interest and thereby to extend its circle of readers. Certain parts of
the population were interested in the propagation of such scandal and
for that reason subscribed to _Der Stürmer_.
But criminal action can only be seen here—and this is presumably the
opinion of the Prosecution also—if this type of literary and oral
activity led to criminal results. Now, was the German nation really
filled with hatred for the Jews by _Der Stürmer_ and by Streicher’s
speeches in the sense and to the extent asserted by the Prosecution?
The Prosecution submitted the evidence on this point in a very brief
manner. It draws conclusions, but it has not produced actual proof. It
alleges the existence of results, but cannot produce evidence for that
assumption. The prosecutor has maintained that without Streicher’s
incitements over a number of years the German people would not have
sanctioned the persecution of the Jews and that Himmler would not have
found among the German people anyone to carry out the measures for the
extermination of the Jews. If, however, the Defendant Streicher is to be
made legally responsible for this, then not only must it be proved that
the incitement as such was actually carried through and results achieved
in this direction; but—and this is the decisive point—conclusive proof
must be produced that the deeds which were done can be traced back to
that incitement. It is not the question of the result obtained which
must primarily and irrefutably be proved but the causative connection
between incitement and result. Now, how is the influence of _Der
Stürmer_ upon the German people to be estimated, and what picture
unfolds in the handling of the Jewish problem during the years between
1920 and 1944?
It is easy to recognize here three stages of development. The first
period comprises the time of the defendant’s activity between 1922 and
1933; the second that between 1933 and 1 September 1939, or February
1940; the third, the time from 1940 to the collapse.
With regard to the first period, it would show a considerable lack of
appreciation of the tendencies which had already existed in Germany for
a long time and thereby a completely groundless exaggeration of
Streicher’s influence, if no mention were made of the fact that long
before Streicher there was already a certain amount of anti-Semitism in
Germany. For instance a certain Theodor Fritsch had touched on the
Jewish question in his journal _Der Hammer_ long before Streicher’s
time, referring especially to the alleged menace offered by the
immigration of Jewish elements from the East, which might overflow the
country and acquire too much control in it.
Immediately after the end of the first World War the so-called “German
National Protective and Defensive League” (Deutsch-Völkischer Schutz-
und Trutzbund) appeared on the scene, which in contrast to _Der Stürmer_
and the Movement brought into being by Streicher, extended over the
whole of Germany, setting as its aim the repression of Jewish influence.
Anti-Semitic groups existed in the South as well as in the North long
before Streicher. In comparison with these large-scale efforts, _Der
Stürmer_ could only have a regional importance. This alone explains why
its influence was never at any time or in any place of great importance.
It is a decisive fact, however, that the German nation in its totality
did not let itself be influenced by all these groups either in its
business relations or in its attitude towards Jewry and that even during
the last years before the NSDAP came to power no violent actions against
the Jews were committed anywhere by the people. However, when towards
the end of the second decade after the first World War a considerable
increase of the NSDAP became noticeable, this was not due to
anti-Semitic reasons but to the fact that the prevailing confusion in
the various parties had been unable to point to a way out of the
ever-increasing economic misery. The call for a strong man became ever
more urgent. The conviction became more and more firmly rooted among the
broad masses that only a personality who was not dependent on the change
of majorities would be able to master the situation.
The NSDAP knew how to exploit this general trend for its own ends and to
win over the nation, sunk in despair, by making promises in all
directions. But never did the masses think, when electing the NSDAP at
that time, that its program would produce developments as we have
witnessed.
With the seizure of power by the NSDAP in 1933, the second epoch was
introduced. The power of the State was exclusively in the hands of the
Party and nobody could have prevented the use of violence against the
Jewish population. Now would have been just the right moment for the
Defendant Streicher to put into effect the baiting the Prosecution has
alleged. If by that time wide circles of the population, or at least the
veteran members of the NSDAP, had been trained to be radical Jew haters,
as stated by the Prosecution, acts of violence against the Jewish
population would necessarily have taken place on a greater scale due to
that feeling of hatred. Pogroms on the largest scale would have been the
natural result of a truly anti-Semitic attitude of the people. But
nothing like that happened. Apart from some minor incidents, evidently
caused by local or personal conditions, no attacks on Jews or their
property took place anywhere. It is quite clear that a feeling of hatred
for the Jewish people did not prevail anywhere at least up to 1933, and
the charge brought by the Prosecution against the defendant that ever
since the very outset of his fight he successfully educated the German
people to hate the Jews can thus be dropped.
The year of the seizure of power by the NSDAP also put _Der Stürmer_ to
a decisive test. Had _Der Stürmer_ been considered by the broad masses
of the German people as the authoritative champion against the Jews and
therefore indispensable for that fight, an unusually large increase in
the circulation would have followed. No such interest was, however,
shown. On the contrary, even in Party circles demands were made that
_Der Stürmer_ should be discontinued entirely; or at least that its
illustrations, style, and tone should be altered. It became more and
more clear that the already small interest in Streicher’s Jewish policy
was steadily declining. It must be added that with the seizure of power
by the Party the total press apparatus came under the control of the
Party, which immediately undertook to co-ordinate the press, that is, to
direct it from a central office in the spirit of the National Socialist
policy and ideology. This was done through the Minister of Propaganda
and the Reich Press Chief via the official “National Socialist
Correspondence.” Particularly Dr. Goebbels, the Minister of Propaganda,
described by various witnesses such as Göring, Schirach, Neurath, and
others as the most bitter advocate of the anti-Semitic trend in the
Government, is said to have given each week to the entire German press
several anti-Jewish leaders, which were printed by more than 3,000
dailies and illustrated papers. If in addition we take into account that
Dr. Goebbels was making broadcasts of an anti-Semitic nature, we need no
further explanations for the fact that the interest in a one-sided
anti-Semitic journal should diminish and that is what actually happened.
It is particularly significant that at that time it had been repeatedly
suggested that _Der Stürmer_ should be suppressed altogether. This is
brought out clearly in the testimony given by Fritzsche, on 27 June
1946, who stated in addition that neither Streicher nor _Der Stürmer_
had any influence in the Ministry of Propaganda and that he was
considered so to speak as nonexistent. It may have been for the same
reason that _Der Stürmer_ was not even declared a press organ of the
NSDAP and was not even entitled to show the Party symbol. It was looked
upon by the Party and State administration, in contrast to all papers
which were considered to be of any importance, as a private paper
belonging to a private writer.
The firm which published _Der Stürmer_, and which belonged at that time
to a certain Härdel, was not inclined, however, to accept so quietly the
dwindling of its circle of readers, for it was now aided by the fact
that Streicher had become the highest leader in Franconia; and it knew
how to make the most of this circumstance. Already at that time pressure
was exerted on many sections of the population to prove their loyal
political attitude and trustworthiness by subscribing to _Der Stürmer_.
The witness Fritzsche also has alluded to this circumstance, stating
that many Germans only decided to subscribe to _Der Stürmer_ because
they thought it would be a means of paving the way for their intended
membership in the Party.
So as not to give a false impression of the circulation figures of _Der
Stürmer_ during the years between 1923 and 1933, the following analysis
will show the different stages of its development.
In the years 1923 to 1933 _Der Stürmer_ was able to increase its
circulation from some 3,000 to some 10,000 copies, and this in turn went
up to some 20,000 shortly before the seizure of power. On the average,
however, between 1923 and 1931 the circulation was only some 6,000
copies. Following the seizure of power, by the end of 1934 it had
reached an average of some 28,000 copies. It was not until 1935 that
_Der Stürmer_ became the property of the Defendant Streicher who,
according to his statement, bought it from the widow of the previous
owner for 40,000 RM—a not very considerable sum. From 1935 on the
management of the business was taken over by an expert, who succeeded by
clever canvassing in increasing the circulation to well over 200,000
copies; and this figure was later increased still further until it more
than doubled. The relatively low circulation figures for _Der Stürmer_
up to the beginning of 1935 show that, despite the Party’s rise to
power, popular interest in _Der Stürmer_ existed only to a small extent.
The extraordinary increase in the circulation which began in 1935 is to
be traced to the adroit canvassing methods already mentioned which were
carried out by the new director Fink. The use of the Labor Front, as
explained by the proclamation of Dr. Ley in Number 36 of _Der Stürmer_,
1935—which copy, Mr. President, I have taken the liberty of submitting
as an exhibit—and the acquisition thereby of many thousands of forced
subscribers must be ascribed to the personal relations of the manager
Fink with Dr. Ley.
In that connection I further refer to a quotation from the _Pariser
Tageblatt_ of 29 March 1935 reproduced in _Der Stürmer_ of May 1935.
Here, too, it is stated that the increase of _Der Stürmer’s_ circulation
cannot be ascribed to the desire of the German people for such kind of
spiritual food. It is neither presumable nor probable in any way that
the compulsory subscription to _Der Stürmer_, forced on the members of
the Labor Front in such a manner, could have actually turned subscribers
into readers of _Der Stürmer_ and followers of its line of thought. On
the contrary, it is known that bundles of _Der Stürmer_ in their
original wrappings were stored in cellars and attics and that they were
brought to light again only when the paper shortage became more acute.
When, therefore, the Defendant Streicher wrote in his paper in
1935—Document Number GB-169—that the 15 years’ work of enlightenment
of _Der Stürmer_ had already attracted to National Socialism an army of
a million of “enlightened” members, he claimed a success for which there
was no foundation whatsoever. The men and women who joined the Party
after 1933 did not apply for membership as a result of the so-called
enlightenment work of _Der Stürmer_ but either because they believed the
Party’s promises and hoped to derive advantages from it or because by
belonging to the Party they wanted, as the witness Severing expressed
it, to insure for themselves immunity from political persecution. The
sympathy for the Party and its leadership very soon decreased in the
most marked manner. Thus the Defendant Streicher, too, lost authority
and influence to an ever-increasing extent even in his own district of
Franconia, at least from 1937 on. The reasons for this are sufficiently
known.
Toward the end of 1938 he saw himself deprived of practically all
political influence, even in his own district. The controversy between
him and Göring ended with the victory of the latter. Hitler, when
pressed to do so by the Defendant Göring, had dropped Streicher
completely, as the Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe at that time was
naturally more important and far more influential than the Gauleiter,
Streicher. The defendant even had to submit to Aryanization as carried
out in the district of Franconia with its correctness being checked by a
special commission sent by Göring. In the course of the year 1939
Streicher was completely pushed aside and was even forbidden to speak in
public. At the outbreak of the war, in contrast to all other Gauleiter,
he was not even appointed to the position of Wehrkreiskommissar of his
own district.
During the last phase, in the war years, the Defendant Streicher had no
political influence whatsoever. As from February 1940 he was relieved of
his position as a Gauleiter and lived on his estate in Pleikershof, cut
off from all connections. Even Party members were forbidden to visit
him. Since the end of 1938 he had no connections whatsoever with Hitler,
by whom he had been completely cast off from that time on.
In what way now did _Der Stürmer_ exert any influence during the war
period? It can be said that during the war _Der Stürmer_ no longer
attracted any attention worth mentioning. The gravity of the times, the
anxiety for relatives on the battlefield, the battles at the front, and
finally the heavy air attacks completely diverted the German people’s
interest from questions dealt with in _Der Stürmer_. The people were
weary of the continuous repetition of the same assertions. The best
proof of how little _Der Stürmer_ was desired as reading matter can be
seen in the fact that in restaurants and cafés _Der Stürmer_ was always
available for perusal, whereas other papers and magazines were
permanently being read. The circulation figures decreased steadily and
unceasingly in those years. Certainly the influence of _Der Stürmer_ in
the political sphere no longer amounted to anything.
During the periods mentioned _Der Stürmer_ was rejected by large circles
of the population from the very outset. Its crude style, its often
objectionable illustrations, and its one-sidedness aroused widespread
displeasure. There can be no question of any influence being exercised
by _Der Stürmer_ upon the German people or even the Party. Although the
German people for years had been deluged with Nazi propaganda, or rather
because of that very fact, a journal such as _Der Stürmer_ could exert
no influence upon its inner attitude. Had the German people—as
maintained by the Prosecution—actually been saturated with the spirit
of fanatical racial hatred, other factors certainly would have been far
more responsible for it than _Der Stürmer_ and would have contributed
far more essentially to a hostile attitude towards the Jews.
But nothing of such nature can be established. The general attitude of
the German people was not anti-Semitic, at any rate, not in such a way
or to such a degree that they would have desired, or approved of, the
physical extermination of the Jews. Even official Party propaganda with
regard to the Jewish problem had exerted no influence upon the broad
masses of the German people, neither had it educated them in the
direction desired by the State leadership.
This is shown by the fact that it was necessary to issue a number of
legal decrees in order to segregate the German population from the
Jewish. The first example of this is the so-called Law for the
Protection of German Blood and German Honor of September 1935, by the
provisions of which any racial intermingling of German people with the
Jewish population was subject to the death penalty. The passing of such
laws would not have been necessary if the German people had been
predisposed to an anti-Semitic attitude, for they would then of their
own accord have segregated themselves from the Jews.
The law for the elimination of the Jews from German economic life,
promulgated in November 1938, was along the same lines. In a people
hostile towards the Jews, any trade with Jewish circles would have
necessarily ceased and their business would have automatically come to a
standstill. Yet in fact the intervention of the State was needed to
eliminate Jewry from economic life.
The same conclusion can be drawn from the reaction of the greater part
of the German populace to the demonstrations carried out against the
Jews during the night of 9-10 November 1938. It is proved that these
acts of violence were not committed spontaneously by the German people
but that they were organized and executed with the aid of the State and
Party apparatus upon instructions of Dr. Goebbels in Berlin. The result
and the effect of these State-directed demonstrations—which in a
cynical way were depicted for their effect abroad as an expression of
the indignation of the German people at the assassination of the
Secretary of the Embassy in Paris, Vom Rath—were different from that
visualized by the instigators of this demonstration.
These acts of violence and excesses based upon the lowest instincts
found unanimous condemnation, even in the circles of the Party and its
leadership. Instead of creating hostility towards the Jewish population
they roused pity and compassion for their fate. Hardly any other measure
taken by the NSDAP was ever rejected so generally. The effect upon the
public was so marked that the Defendant Streicher in his capacity as
Gauleiter found it necessary in an address in Nuremberg to give a
warning against exaggerated sympathy for the Jews. According to his
statement he did not do this because he approved of these measures but
only in order to strengthen by his influence the impaired prestige of
the Party.
Previously, as appears from the testimony of the witness Fritz Herrwerth
examined here, he refused SA Obergruppenführer Von Obernitz’s request to
take part personally in the demonstration planned and called it useless
and prejudicial. He publicly expressed this point of view later also,
during a meeting of the League of Jurists at Nuremberg. In doing so he
risked placing himself in open opposition to the official policy of the
State.
All these facts show that despite the anti-Jewish propaganda carried on
by the Government, actual hostility against the Jewish population did
not exist among the people themselves. Thus it is as good as proved that
neither Streicher’s publications in _Der Stürmer_ nor his speeches
incited the German people in the sense maintained by the Prosecution.
Therefore the general attitude of the German nation provides no proof of
incitement to hatred of the Jews having been successfully carried out by
the Defendant Streicher and leading to criminal results. The
Prosecution, however, has further supported its accusation by the
specific assertion that only a nation educated to absolute hatred of
Jews by men like the defendant could approve of such measures as the
mass extermination of Jews. Thereby the charge is made against the whole
of the German people that they knew about the extermination of the Jews
and approved of it; the severity and consequences of such a charge on
the whole future of the German nation is impossible to estimate.
But did the German nation really approve of these measures? A fact can
only be approved of if it is known. Therefore should this assertion of
the Prosecution be considered as proved, then logically it must also be
considered as proved that the German nation actually had knowledge of
these occurrences. However, evidence in this respect has shown that
Reichsführer SS Himmler, who was entrusted by Hitler with the mass
assassinations, and his close collaborators shrouded all these events in
a veil of deepest secrecy. By threatening with the most severe
punishments any violations of the rule of absolute silence which was
imposed, they managed to lower before the events in the East and in the
extermination camps an iron curtain which hermetically sealed off those
facts from the public.
Hitler and Himmler prevented even the corps of the highest leaders of
the Party and State from gaining any insight and information. Hitler did
not hesitate to give false information to even his closest
collaborators, like Reich Minister Dr. Lammers, who was heard here as a
witness, and to make him believe that the removal of the European Jews
to the East meant their settlement in the Eastern Territories but by no
means their extermination. However much the statements of the defendants
may diverge on many points, in this connection they all agree so
completely with one another and with the statements of other witnesses
that the veracity of their testimonies simply cannot be questioned. If
it was not possible for even the Defendant Frank in his capacity as
Governor General of Poland to get through to Auschwitz, because without
Hitler’s special consent even he was denied entrance, then this fact
speaks for itself.
If even the leading personalities of the Third Reich, with the exception
of a very small circle, were not informed and if even they had at best
very vague information, then how could the general public have known
about it? Under these circumstances the possibilities for finding out
what was going on in the camps were extremely slight.
For the majority of the people, foreign news did not exist as a source
of information. Listening to foreign radio stations was punishable with
the heaviest penalties and therefore did not take place. And if it did,
the news broadcast by foreign radio stations concerning events in the
East, although, or rather because, it corresponded to facts, was so
crass, so horrible beyond any human understanding, that it was bound to
appear to any normal individual, as in fact it did, as intentional
propaganda. Germany could only gain factual knowledge of the
extermination measures against the Jews from people who either were
working in the camps themselves or came in contact with the camps or
their inmates or from former concentration camp inmates.
There is no need to explain that members of the camp personnel who were
concerned with these happenings kept silent, not only because they were
under stringent orders to do so, but also in their own interest.
Furthermore, it is known that Himmler had threatened the death penalty
for information from the camps and for spreading news about the camps
and that not only the actual culprit but also his relatives were
threatened with this punishment. Finally, it is known that the
extermination camps themselves were so hermetically sealed off from any
contact with the world that nothing concerning the events which took
place in them could penetrate to the public.
The prisoners in the camps who came into contact with fellow-workers in
their work kept silent because they had to. People who came to the camps
were also under the threat of this punishment insofar as they could
obtain any insight into things at all, which was all but impossible in
the extermination camps. From these sources, therefore, no knowledge
could come for the German people.
But the order for absolute silence was compulsory to a still greater
measure for every concentration camp inmate who had been released.
Hardly anybody ever came back to life from the actual murder camps; but
if, once in a while, a man or woman was released, in addition to the
other threatened punishments the threat of being sent back to the camp
hung over them if they violated the order for silence. And this renewed
detention would have meant gruesome death.
It was therefore nearly impossible to learn from released concentration
camp prisoners positive facts concerning the occurrences in the camps.
If this was the case with regard to normal concentration camps in
Germany, it applied in a still greater measure to the extermination
camps. Every lawyer who, as I did, defended people before detention in a
concentration camp and who was visited by them again after their
release, will be able to confirm that it was not possible, even in such
a position of trust and under the protection of professional legal
secrecy, to get former concentration camp inmates to talk.
If men such as Severing, who testified here—a Social Democrat of long
standing, who was highly trusted by his party comrades and who was,
because of this, in touch with many former concentration camp
inmates—came to know of the real facts connected with the extermination
of the Jews only very late and even then to a very restricted extent,
then such considerations must apply even more to any normal German.
It can be derived with absolute certainty from these facts that the
leaders of the State, that Hitler and Himmler, wanted under all
circumstances to keep secret the extermination of the Jews; and this
forms the base for another argument—in my opinion, a cogent
one—against the anti-Semitism of the German people asserted by the
Prosecution. If the German people had indeed been filled with such
hatred of Jewry as the Prosecution affirms, then such rigorous methods
for secrecy would have been superfluous.
If Hitler had been convinced that the German nation saw in the Jews its
principal enemy, that it approved of and desired the extermination of
Jewry, then he would obviously have published the planned and also the
effected extermination of this very enemy. As a sign of the “total war”
constantly propagandized by Hitler and Goebbels, there would indeed have
been no better means to strengthen the faith in victory and the will of
the people to fight than the information that Germany’s principal enemy,
these very Jews, had already been annihilated.
So unscrupulous a propagandist as Goebbels certainly would not have
failed to use such a striking argument if he could have based it on the
necessary presupposition, that is, the German people’s absolute
determination to exterminate the Jews. However, the “final solution” of
the Jewish question had by all possible means to be kept secret even
from the German people who had for years been subjected to the heaviest
pressure by the Gestapo. Even leading men in the State and the Party
were not allowed to be told of it.
Hitler and Himmler were evidently themselves convinced that even in the
midst of a total war, and after decades of education and gagging by
National Socialism, the German nation—and above all its Armed
Forces—would have reacted most violently on the publication of such a
policy against the Jews. The policy of secrecy followed here cannot be
explained by any considerations of the enemy nations. In the years 1942
and 1943 the whole world was already engaged in a bitter war against
National Socialist Germany.
An intensification of this struggle seemed hardly possible, at any rate
not by the mere publishing of facts which had long since become known
abroad. Apart from this, considerations of making a still worse
impression on the enemy countries could hardly influence men such as
Hitler, Goebbels, and Himmler.
If they had expected to achieve even the slightest tangible results by
proclaiming to the German people the extermination of the Jews, they
would certainly not have omitted to proclaim it. On the contrary, they
would have tried in every way to strengthen by this means the German
people’s faith in victory. The fact that they did not do this is the
best proof that even they did not consider the German people radically
anti-Semitic, and it is also the best proof that there can be no
question of such anti-Semitism on the part of the German people.
I may therefore sum up by saying that all this stands in contradiction
to the Prosecution’s assertion that the Defendant Streicher brought up
the German people to hate the Jews to an extent which made them approve
of the extermination of Jewry. Therefore, even if the defendant by means
of his proclamations had aimed at achieving such an end he was not
successful.
In this connection, light must also be thrown upon the part attributed
by the Prosecution to the Defendant Streicher, namely that he had
educated German youth in the spirit of anti-Semitism and had inculcated
the poison of anti-Semitism so deeply into their hearts that these
pernicious effects would be felt long after his death.
The main reproach made against the defendant in this connection is based
on the fact that young people, as a result of Streicher’s education in
hatred toward the Jews, are supposed to have been ready to commit crimes
against Jews which otherwise they would not have committed, and that
youth thus educated might be expected to perpetrate such crimes in the
future too. Here the Prosecution relies mainly on the juvenile
literature published by Der Stürmer and some announcements addressed to
youth which appeared in this paper.
Far be it from me to gloss over these products or to defend them.
Evaluation of them can and must be left to the Tribunal. In accordance
with the basic principle of the Defense, the only question to be taken
up here will be whether or not the defendant in any way influenced the
education of youth in a manner to promote criminal hatred of Jews.
As for the books which have been mentioned here, it must be said that
German youth scarcely knew of their existence—much less did they read
them. No evidence has been produced in support of the Prosecution’s
assumption to the contrary. The healthy common sense of German youth
refused such stuff. German boys and girls preferred other reading
material. It may be emphasized in this connection that neither the text
nor the illustrations in these books could attract youth in any way.
They were, on the contrary, bound to be shunned.
Of special importance in regard to this point is the fact that,
Defendant Baldur von Schirach, the man responsible for educating the
whole body of German youth, testified under oath that the
afore-mentioned juvenile books published by this company were not
circulated by the Hitler Youth Leadership and did not find a circle of
readers among the Hitler Youth. The witness made the same assertions in
regard to _Der Stürmer_. One of his closest co-workers, the witness
Lauterbacher, stated in this connection that _Der Stürmer_ was actually
banned for the Hitler Youth by the Defendant Von Schirach. It is clear
that the very style and illustrations of _Der Stürmer_ were ill-adapted
to attract the interest of young persons or to offer them ethical
support. The step taken by the Reich Youth Leadership is therefore quite
understandable.
Although some of _Der Stürmer_ articles submitted by the Prosecution
seem to indicate that _Der Stürmer_ was read in youth circles and
produced a certain effect there, it must be borne in mind that these
were typical commissioned articles, that is, commissioned for propaganda
purposes. There is no evidence whatsoever to support the Prosecution’s
assertion that German youth harbored criminal hate toward Jews.
Therefore, neither the German people nor its youth ...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, perhaps this would be a convenient time to
break off.
[_A recess was taken._]
DR. MARX: One might now be tempted to assume that _Der Stürmer_
exercised a particularly strong influence upon the Party organizations,
the SA and SS; but this was not the case either. The SA, the largest
mass organization of the Party, rejected _Der Stürmer_ just as did the
mass of the people. Its publications were _Der SA-Führer_ and _Die SA_.
The mass of the SA took these as the foundation of their ideology. These
publications do not contain even one article from the pen of the
Defendant Streicher. If the latter had really been the man the
Prosecution believes him to be, the most authoritative and influential
propagandist of anti-Semitism, he would of necessity have been called
upon to collaborate in these publications, which were issued to instruct
the SA on the Jewish question. A publication intended to provide
ideological instruction could never have dispensed with the
collaboration of such a man.
The fact that not one word by Julius Streicher himself ever appeared in
these papers demonstrates afresh that the picture drawn of him by the
Prosecution does not correspond in any way with the actual facts. The
Defendant Streicher could gain no influence over the SA through his
paper and the columns of _Der SA-Führer_ and _Die SA_ were closed to
him. Even the highest SA leaders refused to advocate his ideas. The SA
Deputy Chief of Staff, SA Obergruppenführer Jüttner, testifying before
the commission on 21 May 1946, made the following statement in this
connection:
“At a leader conference, the former SA Chief of Staff, Lutze,
stated that he did not want propaganda for _Der Stürmer_ in the
SA. In certain groups _Der Stürmer_ was even prohibited. The
contents of _Der Stürmer_ disgusted and repelled most of the SA
men. The policy of the SA with regard to the Jewish question was
in no way directed at the extermination of the Jews; it aimed
only at preventing a large-scale immigration of Jews from the
East.”
The ideology of _Der Stürmer_ was thus rejected on principle by the
individual SA man as well as by the SA leaders, and there is therefore
no question of Streicher’s having influenced the SA.
Not only was the Defendant Streicher not asked to collaborate in SA
publications, but his articles did not appear in any other newspapers
and publications. He was given no chance of contributing either to the
_Völkischer Beobachter_ or to other leading organs of the German press,
although the Propaganda Ministry intended enlightenment on the Jewish
question to form one of the noblest tasks of the German press.
The Defendant Streicher was given no opportunity, either by the State
leadership or by the Propaganda Ministry, of impressing his ideas upon a
wider circle. The Defendant Fritzsche, the man who shared the decisive
authority in the Propaganda Ministry, testified that Streicher never
exerted any influence upon propaganda and that he was completely
disregarded. In particular, he was not entrusted with radio talks,
although talks given over the radio would have had much greater effect
on the masses than an article in _Der Stürmer_, which necessarily
reached only a limited circle. The fact that even the official
propaganda of the Third Reich made no use of the Defendant Streicher
makes it clear that no results could be expected from his activities,
and that, in fact, he had no influence at all. The official leaders of
the German State recognized Streicher for what he actually was, the
insignificant publisher of an entirely insignificant weekly. It must be
stressed once more as clearly as possible that the fundamental attitude
of the German people was no more radically anti-Semitic than that of
German youth or the Party organizations. Success in instigating and
inciting to criminal anti-Semitism is, therefore, not proven.
I now come to the last and decisive part of the accusation, that is, to
the examination of the question: Who were the chief persons responsible
for the orders given for the mass-extermination of Jewry; how was it
possible that men could be found who were ready to execute these orders;
and whether without the influence of the Defendant Streicher, such
orders would not have been given or executed.
The main person responsible for the final solution of the Jewish
question—the extermination of Jewry in Europe—is without doubt Hitler
himself. Though this greatest of all trials in world history suffers
from the fact that the chief offenders are not sitting in the dock,
because they are either dead or not to be found, the facts ascertained
have nevertheless resulted in cogent conclusions concerning the actual
responsibility.
It can be considered as proved beyond any doubt that Hitler was a man of
unique and even demoniacal brutality and ruthlessness who, in addition,
later lost all sense of proportion and all self-control. The fact that
his chief characteristic was ruthless brutality became apparent for the
first time in its force when the so-called Röhm Putsch was suppressed in
June 1934. On this occasion Hitler did not hesitate to have his oldest
fellow combatants shot without any kind of trial. His unrestrained
radicalism was further revealed in the way in which the war with Poland
was conducted. He ordered the ruthless extermination of leading Polish
circles merely because he feared an antagonistic attitude toward Germany
on their part. The orders which he gave at the beginning of the Russian
campaign were still more drastic. At that time he already ordered
partial operations for the extermination of Jewry:
These examples show beyond doubt that respect for any principle of
humanity was alien to this man. Furthermore the proceedings, by the
depositions of all the defendants, have clearly established the fact
that in basic decisions Hitler was not open to any outside influence.
Hitler’s basic attitude toward the Jewish question is well known. He had
already become an anti-Semite during the time he spent in Vienna in the
years before the first World War. There is, however, no actual proof
that Hitler from the very beginning had in mind such a radical solution
of the Jewish question as was finally effected in the annihilation of
European Jewry. When the Prosecution declares that from the book _Mein
Kampf_ a direct road leads to the crematories of Mauthausen and
Auschwitz, this is only an assumption; and no evidence for it has been
given. The evidence rather suggests the fact that Hitler also wanted to
see the Jewish problem in Germany solved by way of emigration. This
thought, as well as the position of the Jewish part of the population
under the laws governing aliens, formed the official State policy of the
Third Reich. Many of the leading anti-Semites considered the Jewish
question as settled after the laws of 1935 had been promulgated. The
Defendant Streicher shared this opinion. The stiffening of Hitler’s
attitude to the Jewish question cannot be traced back beyond the end of
1938 or the beginning of 1939. Only then did it become apparent that in
case of war—which he believed was propagated by the Jews—he was
planning a different solution. In his Reichstag speech on 30 January
1939 he predicted the extermination of Jewry should a second World War
be let loose against Germany. He expressed the same ideas in a speech
made in February 1942, on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the
day on which the Party was founded. And, finally, his testament, too,
confirms his exclusive responsibility for the murdering of European
Jewry as a whole.
Though Hitler had adopted an increasingly implacable attitude on the
Jewish question ever since the beginning of the war, there is nothing to
show that he visualized the extermination of the Jews in the early
stages of the war. His final resolution to this effect was undoubtedly
formed when Hitler, probably as early as 1942, saw that it was
impossible to secure a victory for Germany.
It can be assumed almost with certainty that the decision to exterminate
the Jews originated—as did almost all of Hitler’s plans—exclusively
with himself. It cannot be ascertained with certainty how far others who
were closely attached to Hitler brought their influence to bear on him.
If such influence did exist, it can only have come from Himmler,
Bormann, and Goebbels. It can at least be stated beyond any doubt that
during the decisive period from September 1939 to October 1942 Streicher
did not influence him, nor, under the circumstances, could he have done
so. At that time Streicher was living—deprived of all his offices and
completely left in the cold—at his farm at Pleikershof. He had no
connection with Hitler either personally or by correspondence. This has
been proved beyond all doubt by the statements made by the witnesses
Fritz Herrwerth and Adele Streicher, and by the statement under oath of
the defendant himself. It cannot, however, be maintained in earnest that
his reading of _Der Stürmer_ moved Hitler to give orders for wholesale
murder. This should make it clear that the Defendant Streicher had no
influence whatever on either the man who made the decision to
exterminate Jewry, or on the orders issued by him.
In October 1942 Bormann’s decree ordering the extermination of Jewry was
issued (Document 3244-PS). It has been established beyond all question
that this order came from Hitler and went to Reichsführer SS Heinrich
Himmler, who was charged with the actual extermination of the Jews. He
for his part charged the Chief of the Gestapo, Müller, and his
commissioner for Jewish affairs, Eichmann, with the final execution of
the order. These three men are the three who are chiefly responsible,
next to Hitler. It has not been proved that Streicher had any
possibility of influencing them, or that he did actually influence them.
He states—and there is no proof to the contrary—that he never knew
either Eichmann or Müller, and that his relations with Himmler were
slight and far from friendly.
Casually it might be mentioned that Himmler was one of the most radical
anti-Semites of the Party. From the beginning he had advocated a
merciless fight against the Jews; and in any case, judging by what we
know of him, he was not the man to allow himself to be influenced by
others in matters of principle. Apart from that, however, a comparison
of the two personalities shows that Himmler was in every way the
stronger and superior man of the two, so that for this reason alone the
exertion of any influence by the Defendant Streicher on Himmler may be
ruled out. I believe I may refrain from further illustration of this
point.
I now come to the question of whether the activity of the Defendant
Streicher had a decisive influence on the men who actually carried out
the orders; that is, on members of the Einsatzgruppen on the one hand,
and on the execution Kommandos in the concentration camps on the other;
and whether any spiritual and intellectual preparation was necessary to
make these men willing to execute such measures.
In his speeches in Nikolaev, Posen, and Kharkov—which have often been
mentioned here—the Reichsführer SS stated unequivocally not only that
he besides Hitler was responsible for the final solution of the Jewish
question, but also that the execution of the orders was only made
possible by the employment of forces which he himself had selected from
among the SS. We know from Ohlendorf’s testimony that the so-called
Einsatzgruppen consisted of members of the Gestapo and the SD, companies
of the Waffen-SS, members of the police force with long service records,
and indigenous units.
It must be stated as a matter of principle that the Defendant Streicher
never had the slightest influence on the ideological attitude of the SS.
The extensive evidence material of this Trial contains no shadow of
proof that Streicher had any connections with the SS. The alleged Enemy
Number One of the Jews, the great propagandist of the persecution of the
Jews—as he has been pictured by the Prosecution—the Defendant
Streicher never had the opportunity of writing for the periodical _Das
Schwarze Korps_ or even for the _SS Leithefte_. These periodicals alone,
however, as the official mouthpieces of the Reichsführer SS, determined
the ideological attitude of the SS. These SS periodicals also determined
their attitude toward the Jewish question. In these circles _Der
Stürmer_ had just as small a public; it was rejected, just as it was in
other circles. Himmler himself rejected Streicher ironically as an
ideologist. Therefore the Defendant Streicher could not have had any
influence on the ideology of the SS members of the Einsatzgruppen, much
less on the old members of the Police, and least of all on the foreign
units. Nor could he dictate the ideology of the execution squad’s in the
concentration camps. Those men originated for the most part from the
Death’s Head Units, that is the old guard units, of whom the above
statement is true to a greater degree. Added to this is the fact that
the experienced members of the Police, as well as the SS men with long
service records, were trained in absolute obedience to their leaders.
Absolute obedience to a Führer command was a matter of course for both.
Even those experienced police force members, however, accustomed as they
were to absolute obedience, even the veteran SS men, could not simply be
charged by Himmler with carrying out the executions of the Jews. Rather
did he have to select men whom he trusted to lead these execution squads
and to make them personally responsible for their assignments, pointing
out explicitly that he would take all responsibility and that he himself
was only passing on a definite order from Hitler.
Even these men, whom the Prosecution alleges to have been the elite of
Nazism, were so far from being enemies of the Jews in the meaning of the
Indictment, that the entire authority of the head of State and Führer,
and of his most brutal henchman, Himmler, was required to force upon the
men responsible for carrying out the execution orders the conviction
that their order was based on the will of the authoritarian head of the
State; an order which, according to their conviction, had the power of a
fundamental State law and therefore was above all criticism.
The men charged to carry out the annihilation, therefore, obeyed their
orders not for ideological reasons and not because they were incited to
do so by Streicher, as the Prosecution contends, but solely in obedience
to an order from Hitler transmitted to them through Himmler, and knowing
that disobedience to a Führer order meant death. In this respect, too,
therefore, Streicher’s influence has not been proved.
The accusations brought against the defendant by the Prosecution are
herewith exhausted. But, in order to reach a conclusion and to form a
judgment of the defendant which will take the actual findings fully into
account, it seems advisable to give once more a short account of his
personality and his activities under the Hitler regime.
The Prosecution considers him to be the leading anti-Semite and the
leading advocate of a ruthless determination to annihilate Jewry. This
conception, however, does justice neither to the part played by the
defendant and the influence actually exercised by him, nor to his
personality. The manner of the defendant’s employment in the Third Reich
and the way in which he was called upon to co-operate in the propagation
and final solution of the Jewish question shows the Prosecution’s
conception to be false. The only occasion on which the defendant was
called upon to take an active part in the fight against Jewry was in his
capacity as chairman of the Action Committee for the Anti-Jewish Boycott
Day on 1 April 1933. His attitude on that day is in direct opposition to
his violent utterances in _Der Stürmer_ and makes it evident that the
passages in his paper which have been attacked were pure propaganda.
Although on that day he could have drawn upon the whole power of State
and Party against Jewry, he was content to order that Jewish places of
business be marked as such and put under guard. In addition, he gave
explicit instructions that any molestation of the Jews or acts of
violence, or any damage to Jewish property, was forbidden and would be
punished. In the later stages no further use at all was made of the
defendant. He was not even consulted on the ideological basis for the
settlement of the Jewish question. He was unable to voice his ideas in
the press or over the air. He was not asked to write on the
clarification of the Jewish question either in the _Schulungsbriefe_ of
the Party or the periodicals belonging to the organizations.
Not he but the Defendant Rosenberg was charged by Hitler with the
ideological training of the German people. The latter was responsible
for the Institute for Research into the Jewish Question, set up in
Frankfurt, and not the Defendant Streicher; in fact, the latter was not
even considered as a collaborator in this institute. The Defendant
Rosenberg was commissioned with the arrangement of an Anti-Jewish World
Congress in 1944. It is true that this assembly did not take place, but
it is significant that the plans made for it did not include the
participation of the Defendant Streicher.
The whole of the anti-Jewish laws and decrees of the Third Reich were
drafted without his participation. He was not even called in to draft
the racial laws proclaimed at the Party rally in Nuremberg in 1935. The
Defendant Streicher did not take part in a single conference on even
moderately important questions in either peace or wartime. His name does
not appear on any list of participants or on any minutes. Not even in
the course of the discussions themselves is one single reference made to
his name.
The fight against Jewry in the Third Reich grew more and more embittered
from year to year, especially after the outbreak of war and during its
course. In contrast to this, however, the influence of the Defendant
Streicher yearly grew weaker. Already by 1939 he was almost entirely
pushed aside and had no relations with Hitler or other leading men of
State and Party. In 1940 he was relieved of his office as Gauleiter and
after that he played no further part in political life.
If the Defendant Streicher had really been the man the Prosecution
believes him to be, his influence and his activity would have increased
automatically with the intensification of the fight against the Jews.
His career would not have ended, as it actually did, in political
powerlessness and banishment from the scene of action, but with the
commission to carry out the destruction of Jewry.
It cannot be denied that by writing _ad nauseam_ on the same subject for
years in a clumsy, crude, and violent manner, the Defendant Streicher
has brought upon himself the hatred of the world. By so doing, he has
created a strong feeling against himself which led to his importance and
influence being rated far higher than they actually were, for which he
now runs the risk of having the extent of his responsibility similarly
misjudged.
The defense counsel, who in this case had a difficult and thankless
task, had to limit himself to presenting those aspects and facts which
allow the true significance of this man and the role he played in the
tragedy of National Socialism to be recognized. But it cannot be the
task of the Defense to deny indisputable facts and to defend acts for
which absolutely no excuse exists.
The fact remains, therefore, that this defendant took part in the
demolition of the main synagogue of Nuremberg, and thus allowed a place
of religious worship to be destroyed. The defendant states as an excuse
that his aim in so doing was not the demolition of a building meant for
religious worship, but the removal of an edifice which appeared out of
place in the Old Town of Nuremberg, and that his opinion had been shared
by art experts. The truth of this was proved by the fact that he left
the second Jewish house of worship untouched until it finally, and
without his connivance, went up in flames during the night of 9 to 10
November. However that may be, the defendant shows the same lack of
scruple here as he does in his other actions. He must account here for
his actions in this connection alone; the Defense cannot shield him. But
here, too, the fact that the population of Nuremberg disapproved of
these actions clearly and unmistakably must be stressed. It was clear to
any impartial observer that the people viewed such actions with icy
detachment and that only brute force could compel them to tolerate such
measures and to look on at such senseless proceedings.
It is just as impossible for the Defense to express any opinion on the
revival of the ritual murder myth. No interest whatsoever was taken in
these articles; but their tendency is obvious. The only point in the
defendant’s favor, apart from the good faith with which we must credit
him, is the fact that the author of these articles was not himself, but
Holz; he must, however, put up with the charge that he allowed it to
happen.
It must appear incomprehensible that the defendant continued to play a
part in the publication of _Der Stürmer_ long after he had been
politically crippled and vanished from the scene of action. This very
fact reveals his one-track mind better than anything else.
When the Prosecution accuses the defendant of having aimed at the
physical annihilation of the Jews and prepared the way for this later
result by means of his publications, I would like to refer to the
statements given by the defendant under oath at his interrogation, to
which I am here referring in their entirety.
The defendant claims that in the long series of articles published by
_Der Stürmer_ since its foundation there were none demanding actual
deeds of violence against the Jews. He also claims that among the
issues, of which there were over one thousand, only about 15 were found
to contain expressions which could form the basis for a charge against
him in the meaning of the Indictment.
On the contrary, the defendant argued that his articles and speeches had
always shown an unmistakable tendency to achieve a solution of the
Jewish problem in its entirety throughout the world, since any kind of
partial solution would serve no useful purpose and failed to reach the
heart of the problem. Basing himself on this very point of view he had
always expressed himself unequivocally as opposed to any kind of
violence, and he would never have approved of an action such as that
finally carried out by Hitler in such a gruesome manner.
This must raise serious doubts as to whether the defendant can be proved
to have agreed with the mass murders practiced on Jewry, and I leave
this decision to the Tribunal. In any case, he himself refers to the
fact that he had no reasonably certain knowledge of these wholesale
murders until 1944, a fact corroborated by the statements of the
witnesses Adele Streicher and Hiemer.
He considered the articles published in the _Israelitisches Wochenblatt_
as propaganda and consequently did not believe them. In this connection,
the fact that up to the autumn of 1943 he did not in any article express
satisfaction concerning the fate of Jewry in the East is in his favor.
Although he did write then on the disappearance of the Jewish reservoir
in the East, there is nothing to show that he had any reliable source of
information at his command. He might, therefore, very well have believed
that this process of disappearance was not identical with physical
annihilation but might represent the evacuation of the Jewish population
assembled there to neutral countries or the territory of the Soviet
Union. As no evidence has been presented to show that the defendant had
received hints from any quarter in regard to the intended extermination
of Jewry, he could not have conceived of such a diabolical occurrence
which appears to be utterly inconceivable to the human mind. And it
certainly cannot be assumed that the mental capacity of the defendant
should have enabled him to foresee a solution of the Jewish question
such as could only have originated in the brain of a person who was no
longer in his right senses.
The defendant describes himself as a fanatic and seeker of truth. He
professes to have written nothing and to have expressed nothing in his
speeches which he had not taken from some authentic source and properly
confirmed.
There is no doubt that he was a fanatic. The fanatic, however, is a man
who is so possessed or convinced of an idea or illusion that he is not
open to any other consideration, and is convinced of the correctness of
his own idea and no other. A psychiatrist might regard it as a sort of
mental cramp. Fanaticism of any kind is not far removed from maniacal
obsession. As a rule it goes along with considerable overestimation of
oneself and overevaluation of one’s own personality and its influence on
the world around it.
Not one of the defendants here on trial shows such a wide discrepancy
between fact and fancy as does the Defendant Streicher.
The Prosecution showed him as he appeared to the outside world. What he
really was—and is—has been shown by the Trial. But only actual facts
can form the basis for the judgment. Base your judgment also, Gentlemen,
on the fact that the defendant in his position as Gauleiter of Franconia
also showed many humane characteristics—that he had a large number of
political prisoners released from concentration camps, which even caused
criminal proceedings to be started against him. It should also be borne
in mind that he treated the prisoners of war and the foreign laborers
working on his estate very well in every respect.
Whatever the judgment against the Defendant Streicher may be, it will
concern the fate of a single individual. It seems to be established,
however, that the German people and this defendant were never in
agreement on this essential question. The German people always
disapproved of the aims of this defendant as expressed in his
publications, and retained its own opinion of and attitude toward the
Jews.
The Prosecution’s assumption that the tendentious articles in _Der
Stürmer_ found an echo or a ready acceptance among the German
population, or even produced an attitude which would readily accept
criminal measures, is herewith fully refuted.
The overwhelming majority of the German nation preserved their sound
common sense and showed themselves disinclined toward all acts of
violence. The nation may therefore claim to be declared free of all
moral complicity in, and co-responsibility for, those crimes before the
public tribunal of the world, so as to be able again to take its place
in the ranks of the nations.
I leave the decision on the guilt or innocence of this defendant in the
hands of the High Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: I call on Dr. Sauter for the Defendant Funk.
DR. FRITZ SAUTER (Counsel for Defendant Funk): Gentlemen of the
Tribunal, I have the task of examining the case of the Defendant Dr.
Walter Funk. That is to say, I am to deal with a topic which
unfortunately is especially dry and prosaic. May I first make a short
statement.
I shall on principle refrain from making any statements on legal,
political, historical, or psychological matters which may be too
general, although the temptation to make such general statements,
particularly within the framework of these proceedings, may be
considerable. General statements of the kind have already been made in
abundance by my colleagues and will probably be still further
supplemented. Therefore, I shall limit myself to examining and
presenting to you from the point of view of the Defense the picture
which the evidence in this Trial shows of the personality of the
Defendant Funk, his actions, and their underlying motives.
Gentlemen of the Tribunal, the entire course of this Trial and the
particular evidence offered in his own case have shown that the
Defendant Funk did not play a decisive part in the National Socialist
regime at any time and in any of the cases indicted here.
Funk’s authority of decision was always limited by the superior powers
of others. The defendant’s statement, made during his personal
examination, that he was allowed to come up to the door, but was never
permitted to enter, has been shown by the evidence to be quite correct.
Funk was entrusted with tasks by the Party—as distinct from the
State—only during the last year prior to the seizure of power, that is,
in 1932. These, however, were of no practical significance, as they were
of very short duration. Funk was never appointed to any Party office
after the seizure of power. He was never a member of any Party
organization—SS, SA, or Corps of Political Leaders. Funk was a member
of the Reichstag for only a little more than 6 months shortly before the
seizure of power. Consequently he was not a member of the Reichstag when
the fundamental laws for the consolidation of National Socialist power
were passed. The Reich Cabinet passed the laws for which Funk is held
responsible, in particular the Enabling Act, at a time when Funk had not
yet been made a member of the Cabinet. At this, it will be remembered,
he did not become a member until the close of 1937 by virtue of his
appointment as Minister of Economics, that is, at a time when no further
Cabinet sessions were held. As Press Chief of the Reich Cabinet Funk had
neither a seat nor a vote in the Cabinet and could exert no influence
whatsoever upon the contents of the bills drafted. I refer to Lammers’
statement in this connection. The same applies to the racial laws, the
so-called Nuremberg Laws.
Funk’s relations with the Führer only became closer for a period of 18
months during which he had to give regular press reports to Hitler in
his capacity as Press Chief of the Reich Cabinet, that is, from February
1933 to August 1934, up to the death of Reich President Von Hindenburg.
Later, Funk reported to Hitler only on very rare occasions. In this
connection the witness Dr. Lammers makes the following statement:
“Later he (Funk) only visited Hitler in his capacity of Reich
Minister of Economics on very rare occasions. He was frequently
not invited to attend conferences—even those to which he should
have been invited. He complained to me about this frequently.
The Führer often raised objections, saying that there were
various reasons against Funk and that he himself viewed Funk
skeptically and did not want him.”
That is the testimony given by Dr. Lammers on 8 April 1946. When asked
whether Funk had often complained to him about his unsatisfactory
position as Reich Minister for Economics and about the anxiety caused
him by conditions generally, Dr. Lammers replied:
“I know that Funk was very much worried and that he wanted an
opportunity to discuss his anxieties with the Führer. He was
extremely anxious for an opportunity of reporting to the Führer
in order to obtain information, at least, about the war
situation.” (That was in 1943 and 1944). And Lammers continues:
“With the best intentions in the world, Funk could not obtain an
audience from the Führer, and I was unable to get him to the
Führer.”
Funk explains the striking fact that he was invited to attend only four
or five Führer conferences during the whole of his ministerial activity
by saying that Hitler did not need him. Up to 1942 Hitler issued his
instructions in economic affairs to Göring, who in his capacity of
Delegate for the Four Year Plan was responsible for the entire economy.
From the beginning of 1942 Hitler also issued instructions to Speer, who
as Armament Minister had special authority to issue directives to all
branches of production and from 1943 personally directed the entire
production. Funk therefore never played the principal part in the
economy of the National Socialist Reich, but always only a subordinate
role. This was specifically confirmed by his Codefendant Göring in his
statement on 16 March:
“Naturally, in view of the special powers delegated to me
(Göring) he had to follow my directives in the field of economy
and the Reichsbank. The responsibility for the directives and
policy of the Minister for Economics and President of the
Reichsbank Funk is entirely mine.”
In the session of 20 June the Defendant Speer also testified that in his
capacity as Armament Minister he reserved to himself from the very
beginning any authority of decision in the most important economic
spheres such as coal, iron and steel, metal, aluminum, and the
production of machinery. Prior to Speer’s commission at the beginning of
1942, electric power and building were entirely under the jurisdiction
of Armament Minister Todt.
For the greater part, the evidence submitted by the Prosecution in the
case of the Defendant Funk does not relate to acts personally committed
by Funk or instructions issued by him, but rather to the various and
widely differing positions which he occupied. On Page 29 of the trial
brief the Prosecutor himself declares that the argument offered against
Funk may be described as inferential. The Prosecution starts from the
assumption that judging by the positions which he had held Funk must
have had knowledge of the various events which form the subject of the
accusation. Generally speaking, the Prosecution refers to instructions
and directives issued by Funk personally only in the case of the
application instructions which he issued in November 1938 in connection
with the Four Year Plan decrees for the elimination of Jews from
economic life. I shall deal with this chapter separately at a later
stage.
Finally, Funk was not invited to attend political and military
conferences. His position was that of a technical minister with very
limited power of decision.
As Reich Minister for Economics Funk was subordinated to the Four Year
Plan, that is, to Göring. Later on, the Armament Minister became Funk’s
superior. And finally, as was shown by the testimony of Göring, Lammers,
and Hayler, the Ministry of Economics became a regular trade ministry,
which dealt mainly with the distribution of consumers’ goods and with
the technicalities of foreign trade. Similarly in the case of the
Reichsbank the Four Year Plan determined the use of gold and foreign
currency. The Reichsbank was deprived of its right to decide on the
credits to be granted to the Reich for the internal financing of the war
when Funk took over office as its President. Funk is thereby exonerated
of any responsibility for the financing of the war. The responsible
agency so far had always been the Reich Minister of Finance: In other
words, not Funk. Finally, as Plenipotentiary for Economics, Funk’s sole
task in August 1938 was to co-ordinate the civil economic resources for
such measures as would guarantee a smooth conversion from peace to
wartime economy. These consultations resulted in the proposals presented
by Funk to Hitler on 25 August 1939 in the letter which has been several
times quoted under Document Number 699-PS. At his examination Funk
stated that this letter did not portray matters with complete accuracy,
since it was a purely private letter, a letter of thanks for birthday
congratulations received from Hitler. This point will have to be taken
up again later, as the Prosecution particularly emphasized Funk’s
position as Plenipotentiary for Economics. The evidence shows that his
position as Plenipotentiary General was Funk’s most disputed position,
but also his weakest.
With regard to the occupied territories Funk had no decisive authority
whatsoever. All the witnesses interrogated on the point testified to
this. But all witnesses also confirmed that Funk always opposed the
spoliation of the occupied territories. He fought against German
purchases in the black markets; he opposed the abolition of the foreign
exchange relations with Holland, a measure intended to facilitate German
purchases in Holland; and, as we have heard from the witness Neubacher,
he organized exports to Greece from Germany and the eastern European
states, and even sent gold there. He also repeatedly opposed the
financial overburdening of the occupied territories especially in 1942
and 1944, and the raising of the occupation costs in France. He defended
the currency of the occupied countries against reported attempts at
devaluation. In the case of Denmark he even succeeded in raising the
value of the currency, in spite of all opposition. Furthermore, Funk
fought against the arbitrary stabilization of exchange when currency
arrangements were made with occupied countries. Germany’s clearing debt
was always recognized by Funk as a true commercial debt even with regard
to the occupied countries. This is shown especially by his proposal,
mentioned here, to commercialize this clearing debt by a loan to be
issued by Germany for subscription in all European countries. Funk was
also opposed to the overworking and especially to the compulsory
employment of foreign labor in Germany.
The Defendant Sauckel has already testified to this at his interrogation
here. The witnesses Hayler, Landfried, Puhl, and Neubacher, and the
Codefendant Seyss-Inquart, have all confirmed that these measures taken
by Funk had favorable results for the occupied countries. According to
these statements Funk always strove to keep order in the economic and
social life of the occupied territories and to preserve it as far as
possible from disintegration. He always disapproved and opposed radical
and arbitrary measures and favored agreements and compromises. Even
during the war Funk was always thinking of peace. This statement was
made by the witnesses Landfried and Hayler, who added that Funk was
repeatedly reproached for his attitude by the leading State and Party
offices. The Defendant Speer also testified at his interrogation that
during the war Funk had employed too many workers in the manufacture of
consumers’ goods and that it was for this reason that Funk had to hand
over the management of the consumers’ goods production in 1943.
That Funk revolted against the horrible “scorched earth” policy just as
Speer did has been proved to the Court by Speer himself, as well as by
the witness Hayler on 7 May 1946. This witness declared that he had
seldom seen Funk so much upset as he was when informed of this order for
destruction. Hayler testified that Funk, in his capacity of Reich
Minister of Economics and President of the Reichsbank, gave orders that
existing stocks should be protected from destruction as decreed, in
order to insure a supply of consumers’ goods necessary for the
population and to safeguard currency transactions in the German
territory which had been abandoned.