POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS DURING RECONSTRUCTION
SEC. 1. POLITICS AND POLITICAL METHODS
During the war the administration of the state government gradually fell
into the hands of officials elected by people more or less disaffected
toward the Confederacy. Provisional Governor Parsons, who had been
secretly disloyal to the Confederacy, retained in office many of the old
Confederate local officials, and appointed to other offices men who had
not strongly supported the Confederacy. In the fall of 1865 and the spring
of 1866 elections under the provisional government placed in office a more
energetic class of second and third rate men who had had little experience
and who were not strong Confederates. Men who had opposed secession and
who had done little to support the war were, as a rule, sent to Congress
and placed in the higher offices of state. The ablest men were not
available, being disfranchised by the President's plan.
In 1868, with the establishment of the reconstructed government, an
entirely new class of officials secured control. Less than 5000 white
voters, of more than 100,000 of voting age, supported the Radical
programme, and, as more than 3000 officials were to be chosen, the field
for choice was limited. The elections having gone by default, the Radicals
met with no opposition, except in three counties. In all the other
counties the entire Radical ticket was declared elected, even though in
several of them no formal elections had been held.
William H. Smith, who was made governor under the Reconstruction Acts, was
a native of Georgia, a lawyer, formerly a Douglas Democrat, and had
opposed secession, but was a candidate for the Confederate Congress.
Defeated, he consoled himself by going over to the Federals in 1862. Smith
was a man of no executive ability, careless of the duties of his office,
and in few respects a fit person to be governor. He disliked the
Confederate element and also the carpet-baggers, but as long as the latter
would not ask for high offices, he was at peace with them. It was his plan
to carry on the state government with the 2000 or 3000 "unionists" and the
United States troops. He did not like the negroes, but could endure them
as long as they lived in a different part of the state and voted for him.
In personal and private matters he was thoroughly honest, but his course
in regard to the issue of bonds showed that in public affairs he could be
influenced to doubtful conduct. It is certain that he never profited by
any of the stealing that was carried on; he merely made it easy for others
to steal; the dishonest ones were his friends, and his enemies paid the
taxes. As governor he had the respect of neither party. He went too far to
please the Democrats, and not far enough to please the Radicals. He
exercised no sort of control over his local officials and shut his eyes to
the plundering of the Black Belt. He was emphatically governor of his
small following of whites, not of all the people, not even of the blacks.
During his administration the whites complained that he was very active in
protecting Radicals from outrage, but paid no attention to the troubles of
his political enemies. His government did not give adequate protection to
life and property.
His lieutenant-governor, A. J. Applegate of Ohio and Wisconsin, was an
illiterate Federal soldier left stranded in Alabama by the surrender.
During the war he was taken ill in Mississippi and was cared for by Mrs.
Thompson, wife of a former Secretary of the Treasury. Upon leaving the
Thompson house he carried some valuable papers with him, which, after the
war, he tried to sell to Mrs. Thompson for $10,000. Lowe, Walker, &
Company, a firm of lawyers in Alabama, gave Applegate $300, made him sign
a statement as to how he obtained the papers, and then published all the
correspondence.[2088] The charge of thievery did not injure his candidacy.
Before election he had been an _attaché_ of the Freedmen's Bureau. After
the constitution had been rejected in 1868, Applegate went North, so far
that he could not get back in time for the first session of the
legislature. A special act, however, authorized him to draw his pay as
having been present. In a letter written for the Associated Press, which
was secured by the Democrats, there were thirty-nine mistakes in spelling.
As a presiding officer over the Senate, he was vulgar and undignified. His
speeches were ludicrous. When the conduct of the Radical senators pleased
him, he made known his pleasure by shouting, "Bully for Alabama!"
The secretary of state, Charles A. Miller, was a Bureau agent from Maine;
Bingham, the treasurer, was from New York; Reynolds, the auditor, from
Wisconsin; Keffer, the superintendent of industrial resources, from
Pennsylvania. Two natives of indifferent reputation--Morse and
Cloud--were, respectively, attorney-general and superintendent of public
instruction. Morse was under indictment for murder and had to be relieved
by special act of the legislature. The chief justice, Peck, was from New
York; Saffold and Peters were southern men; the senators and all of the
representatives in Congress were carpet-baggers. There were six candidates
for the short-term senatorship--all of them carpet-baggers. Willard Warner
of Ohio, who was elected, was probably the most respectable of all the
carpet-baggers, and was soon discarded by the party. He had served in the
Federal army and after the war was elected to the Ohio Senate. His term
expired in January, 1868; in July, 1868, he was elected to the United
States Senate from Alabama. George E. Spencer was elected to the United
States Senate for the long term. He was from Massachusetts, Ohio, Iowa,
and Nebraska. In Iowa he had been clerk of the Senate, and in Nebraska,
secretary to the governor. He entered the army as sutler of the First
Nebraska Infantry. Later he assisted in raising the First Union Alabama
Cavalry and was made its colonel. Spencer was shrewd, coarse, and
unscrupulous, and soon secured control of Federal patronage for Alabama.
He attacked his colleague, Warner, as being lukewarm.
The representatives and their records were as follows: F. W. Kellogg of
Massachusetts and Michigan represented the latter state in Congress from
1859 to 1865, when he was appointed collector of internal revenue at
Mobile. C. W. Buckley of New York and Illinois was a Presbyterian preacher
who had come to Alabama as chaplain of a negro regiment. For two years he
was a Bureau official and an active agitator. He was a leading member in
the convention of 1867. B. W. Norris of Skowhegan, Maine, was an
oil-cloth maker and a land agent for Maine, a commissary, contractor,
cemetery commissioner, and paymaster during the war. After the war he came
South with C. A. Miller, his brother-in-law, and both became Bureau
agents. C. W. Pierce of Massachusetts and Illinois was a Bureau official.
Nothing more is known of him. John B. Callis of Wisconsin had served in
the Federal army and later in the Veteran Reserve Corps. After the war he
became a Bureau agent in Alabama, and when elected he was not a citizen of
the state, but was an army officer stationed in Mississippi. Thomas
Haughey of Scotland was a Confederate recruiting officer in 1861-1862 and
later a surgeon in the Union army. He was killed in 1869 by Collins, a
member of the Radical Board of Education. It was said that he was without
race prejudice and consorted with negroes, but he was the only one of the
Alabama delegation whom Governor Smith liked. The latter wrote that "our
whole set of representatives in Congress, with the exception of Haughey,
are ... unprincipled scoundrels having no regard for the state of the
people."[2089]
In the first Reconstruction legislature, which lasted for three years,
there were in the Senate 32 Radicals and 1 Democrat. In the House there
were 97 Radicals (only 94 served) and 3 Democrats. The lone Democrat in
the Senate was Worthy of Pike, and to prevent him from engaging in debate,
Applegate often retired from his seat and called upon him to preside; the
Democrats in the House were Hubbard of Pike, Howard of Crenshaw, and
Reeves of Cherokee.[2090] In the Senate there was only 1 negro; in the
House there were 26, several of whom could not sign their names. In the
apportionment of representatives there was a difference of 40 per cent in
favor of the black counties. Hundreds of negroes swarmed in to see the
legislature begin, filling the galleries, the windows, and the vacant
seats, and crowding the aisles. They were invited by resolution to fill
the galleries and from that place they took part in the affairs of the
House, voting on every measure with loud shouts. A scalawag from north
Alabama wanted the negroes to sit on one side of the House and the whites
on the other, but he was not listened to. The doorkeepers,
sergeant-at-arms, and other employees were usually negroes. The negro
members watched their white leaders and voted _aye_ or _no_ as they voted.
When tired they went to sleep and often had to be wakened to vote. Both
houses were usually opened with prayer by northern Methodist ministers or
by negro ministers. None but "loyal" ministers were asked to officiate.
Strobach, the Austrian member, wearied of much political prayer, moved
that the chaplain cut short his devotions.
[Illustration: SCENES IN THE FIRST RECONSTRUCTED LEGISLATURE. (Cartoons
from "The Loil Legislature," by Captain B. H. Screws.)]
The whites in the legislature were for the most part carpet-baggers or
unknown native whites. The entire taxes paid by the members of the
legislature were, it is said, less than $100. Applegate, the
lieutenant-governor, did not own a dollar's worth of property in the
state. Most of the carpet-bag members lived in Montgomery; the rest of
them lived in Mobile, Selma, and Huntsville. Few of them saw the districts
they represented after election; some did not see them before or after the
election. The representative from Jackson County lived in Chattanooga,
Tennessee. The state constitution prohibited United States officials from
holding state offices, but nearly all Federal officers in the state also
held state offices. This was particularly the case in the southwestern
counties, which were represented by revenue and custom-house officials
from Mobile. Some of them were absent most of the time, but all drew pay;
one of the negro members, instead of attending, went regularly to school
after the roll was called. No less than twenty members had been indicted
or convicted, or were indicted during the session, of various crimes, from
adultery and stealing to murder. The legislature passed special acts to
relieve members from the penalties for stealing, adultery, bigamy, arson,
riot, illegal voting, assault, bribery, and murder.[2091]
Bribery was common in the legislature. By custom a room in the capitol was
set apart for the accommodation of those who wished to "interview" negro
members.[2092] There the agents of railroad companies distributed
conscience money in the form of loans which were never to be paid back.
Harrington, the speaker, boasted that he received $1700 for engineering a
bill through the House. A lottery promoter said that it cost him only $600
to get his charter through the legislature, and that no Radical, except
one negro, refused the small bribe he offered. Senator Sibley held his
vote on railroad measures at $500; Pennington, at $1000; W. B. Jones, at
$500. Hardy of Dallas received $35,000 to ease the passage of a railroad
bond issue, and kept most of it for himself; another received enough to
start a bank; still another was given 640 acres of land, a steam mill, and
a side track on a railroad near his mill. Negro members, as a rule, sold
out very cheaply, and probably most often to Democrats who wanted some
minor measures passed to which the Radical leaders would pay no attention.
It was found best not to pay the larger sums until the governor had signed
the bill. A member accepted a gift as a matter of course, and no attention
was paid to charges of bribery.[2093]
The election of February 4 and 5, 1868, at which the constitution was
rejected on account of the whites' refraining from voting, was in many
counties a farce. The legislature, in order to remedy any defects in the
credentials of the Radical candidates, passed a number of general and
special acts legalizing the "informal" elections of February 4 and 5, and
declaring the Radical candidates elected. In seven counties no votes had
been counted, but this made no difference.[2094]
The presiding officers addressed the members as "Captain, John, Mr.
Jones," etc. Quarrels and fights were frequent. One member chased another
to the secretary's desk, trying to kill him, but was prevented by the
secretary. In the cloak-rooms and halls were fruit and peanut stands,
whiskey shops, and lunch counters. Legislative action did not avail to
clear out the sovereign negroes and keep the halls clean. Political
meetings were held in the capitol, much to the damage of the
furniture.[2095]
The only measures that excited general interest among the members were the
bond-issue bills. Other legislation was generally purely perfunctory,
except in case an election law or a Ku Klux law was to be passed. There
was much special legislation on account of individual members, such as
granting divorces, ordering release from jail, relieving from the "pains"
of marriage with more than one woman, trick legislation, vacating offices,
etc. When, as in Mobile, the Democrats controlled too many minor offices,
the legislature remedied the wrong by declaring the offices vacant and
giving the governor authority to make appointments to the vacancies. The
Mobile offices were vacated three times in this way. In connection with
the Mobile bill it was found that fraudulent interpolations were sometimes
made in a bill after its passage. It would be taken from the clerk's desk,
changed, and then returned for printing.[2096]
Some of the laws passed failed of their object because of mistakes in
spelling. A committee was finally appointed to correct mistakes in
orthography. The House and Senate constantly returned engrossed bills to
one another for correction. A joint committee to investigate the education
of the clerks reported that they were unable to ascertain which of the
clerks was illiterate, though they discharged one of them. The minority
report declared that the fault was not with the clerks, but with the
members, many of whom could not write. Finally a spelling clerk was
employed to rewrite the bills submitted by the members.[2097] For making
fun of the ignorance of the Radical members, Ryland Randolph, a Democratic
member, elected in a by-election, was expelled from the House.
In 1868 the Radicals, fearing the result of the presidential election and
afraid of the Ku Klux movement which was beginning to be felt, passed a
bill giving to itself the power to choose presidential electors. The
negroes were aroused by the Radical leaders who were not in the
legislature, and sufficient pressure was brought to bear on the governor
to induce him to veto the measure.[2098]
According to the constitution, the Senate was to classify at once after
organization, so that half should serve two years and half four years. No
one was willing to take the short term and lose the $8 _per diem_ and
other privileges. So in 1868 the Senate refused to classify. Again in 1870
it refused to classify. The Radicals permitted the usurpation because it
was known that the Democrats would carry the white counties in case the
classification were made and elections held. Then, too, it was feared that
in 1870 the Democrats would have a majority in the lower house; hence a
Radical Senate would be necessary to prevent the repudiation of the
railroad indorsation. So all senators held over until 1872, and by shrewd
manipulation and the use of Federal troops the Senate kept a Radical
majority until 1874.[2099]
County and other local officials were incompetent and corrupt. The policy
of the whites in abstaining from voting on the constitution (1868) gave
nearly every office in the state to incompetent men. In the white counties
it was as bad as in the black, because the Radicals there despaired of
carrying the elections and put up no regular candidates. However, in every
county some freaks offered themselves as candidates, and at "informal"
elections received, or said they received, a few votes. After the state
was admitted in spite of the rejection of the constitution, these people
were put in office by the legislature. Had the white people taken part in
the elections instead of relying upon the law of Congress in regard to
ratification and not refrained from voting, they could have secured nearly
all the local offices in the white counties. No other state had such an
experience; no other state had such a low class of officials in the
beginning of Reconstruction. But the very incapacity of them worked in
favor of better government, for they had to be gotten rid of and others
appointed. Not a single Bureau agent whose name is on record failed to get
some kind of an office. In Perry County most of the officials were
soldiers of a Wisconsin regiment discharged in the South; the circuit
clerk was under indictment for horse stealing. In Greene County a
superintendent of education had to be imported under contract from
Massachusetts, there being no competent Radical. In Sumter County one
Price, who had a negro wife, was registrar, superintendent of education,
postmaster, and circuit clerk. A carpet-bagger, elected probate judge,
went home to Ohio, after the supposed rejection of the constitution, and
never returned. The sheriff and the solicitor were negroes who could not
read. Another Radical was at once circuit clerk, register in chancery,
notary public, justice of the peace, keeper of the county poorhouse, and
guardian _ad litem_. In Elmore County the probate judge was under
indictment for murder. In Montgomery, Brainard, the circuit clerk, killed
his brother-in-law and tried to kill Widmer, the collector of internal
revenue. The Radical chancellor and marshal were scalawags--one a former
slave trader, the other a former divine-right slave owner. The sheriff of
Madison could not write. In Dallas the illiterate negro commissioners
voted for a higher rate of taxation, though their names were not on the
tax books; their scalawag associates voted for the lower rate. Thus it was
all over Alabama.
In July, 1868, the Reconstruction legislature continued in force the code
of Alabama, which provided for heavy official bonds. But the adventurers
could not make bond. So a special law was passed authorizing the supreme
court, chancellors, and circuit judges to "fix and prescribe" the bonds of
all "judicial and county officials." Later the suspended code went into
effect, and the Democrats succeeded in turning out many newly elected
Radicals who could not make bond. Almost at the beginning the Democrats
began the plan of refusing to make bond for Radicals, and thus made it
almost impossible for the latter to hold office until the legislature
again came to their relief.
There were many vacancies and few white Radicals to fill them; the
scalawags thought that the negro ought to be content with voting. Smith
had many vacancies to fill by appointment. Most of the paying ones were
given to Radicals, and many of the others were given to Democrats, whom he
preferred to negroes. In the black counties the property owners and the Ku
Klux began to make the most obnoxious officials sell out and leave, and
Governor Smith would, by agreement, appoint some Democrat to such
vacancies. This custom became frequent, and, in spite of himself, Smith's
"lily white" sentiments were undermining the rule of his party.[2100] An
argument used by the more liberal of the Radicals in favor of removal of
disabilities was that in some counties the local offices could not be
filled on account of the operation of the disfranchising laws.[2101]
The Federal judiciary was represented by Richard Busteed, an Irishman, who
was made Federal judge in 1864. He came South in 1865 with bloodthirsty
threats and at once began prosecutions for treason. More than 900 cases
were brought before him. There were no convictions, but a rich harvest of
costs. He was ignorant of law, and in the court room was arbitrary and
tyrannical to lawyers, witnesses, and prisoners. It was charged that he
was in partnership with the district attorney. Bribery was proven against
him. The leading lawyers, both Radical and Democratic, asked Congress to
impeach him, but to no effect. It was his custom to solicit men to bring
causes before him. A Selma editor was brought before him and severely
lectured for writing a disrespectful article about Busteed's grand jury.
There was one Democratic lawyer whom Busteed feared--General James H.
Clanton. Clanton paid no attention to Busteed's vagaries, but sat on the
bench with him, advised him and made him take his advice, won all his
cases, and bullied Busteed unrebuked. The latter was afraid he would be
killed if he angered Clanton, and Clanton played upon his fears. At first
a great negrophile, Busteed became more and more obnoxious to the Radical
party, and was soon accused of being a Democrat and removed. Another
Federal officer, Wells, the United States district attorney, had been
discharged from the Union army on the ground of insanity.[2102]
The new constitution made all judgeships elective and also provided for
the election of a solicitor in each county. The result was seen in the
number of incapable judges and illiterate solicitors. The probate judge of
Madison was "a common jack-plane carpenter from Oregon," and his sheriff
could not write. Many of the judges had never studied law and had never
practised. Public meetings were held to protest against incompetent
judges and to demand their resignations. Governor Smith usually appointed
better men, and not always those of his own party, to the places vacated
by resignation, sale, or otherwise. Before the war the state judiciary had
stood high in the estimation of the people, and judicial officers were
forbidden by public opinion to take part in party politics. Under the
Reconstruction government the judicial officials took an active part in
political campaigns, every one of them, from Busteed and the supreme court
to a county judge, making political speeches and holding office in the
party organization. From a party point of view the scarcity of white
Radicals made this necessary. Notaries public, who also had the powers of
justices of the peace, were appointed by the governor. Their powers were
great and indefinite, and in consequence they almost drove the justices
out of activity. Some of them issued warrants running into all parts of
the state, causing men to be brought forty to fifty miles to appear before
them on trifling charges.
The Reconstruction judiciary generally held that a jury without a negro on
it was not legal. In the white counties such juries were hard to form.
Northern newspaper correspondents wrote of the ludicrous appearance of
Busteed's half negro jury struggling with intricate points of maritime
law, insurance, constitutional questions, exchange, and the relative value
of a Prussian guilder to a pound sterling. When they were bored they went
to sleep. The negro jurors recognized their own incompetence and usually
agreed to any verdict decided upon by the white jurors. Had the latter
been respectable men, no harm would have been done, but usually they were
not. A negro jury would not convict a member of the Union League--he had
only to give the sign--nor a negro prosecuted by a white man or indicted
by a jury; but many negroes prosecuted by their own race were convicted by
black juries. For many years it was impossible to secure a respectable
Federal jury on account of the test oath required, which excluded nearly
all Confederates of ability. As an example of the working of a local
court, the criminal court of Dallas may be taken. The jurisdiction
extended to capital offences. Corbin, the judge, was an old Virginian who
had never read law. He refused to allow one Roderick Thomas, colored, to
be tried by a mixed jury, demanding a full negro jury. The prosecution
was then dropped because all twelve negroes drawn were of bad character.
Corbin then entered on the record that Thomas was "acquitted." Thomas had
stolen cotton, and the fact had been proven; but he soon became clerk of
Corbin's court and later took Corbin's place as judge, with another negro
for clerk. Nearly every Radical official in Dallas County was indicted for
corruption in office by a Radical or mixed jury, but negro juries refused
to convict them.[2103]
An elaborate militia system was provided for by the carpet-baggers, with
General Dustin of Iowa, a carpet-bagger, as major-general. The strength of
organization was to be in the black counties, but Governor Smith
persistently refused to organize the negro militia. He was afraid of the
effect on his slender white following, and he did not think that the negro
ought to do anything but vote. He was also afraid of Democratic militia,
afraid that it would overturn the hated state government. He tried to get
several friendly white companies to organize, but failed, and during the
rest of his term relied exclusively upon Federal troops. Even before the
Reconstruction government was set going it was seen that the whites would
be restless. Forcing the rejected constitution and the low-class state
government upon the people against the will of the majority had a very bad
effect. They recognized it as the government _de facto_ only, and they so
considered it all during the Reconstruction. Then the Ku Klux movement
began, and north Alabama especially was disturbed for several years. Smith
sometimes threatened to call out the militia, but never did so. However,
he kept the Federal troops busy answering his calls. After the election of
Grant the army was always at the service of the state officials, who used
detachments as police, marshals, and _posses_. The government had not the
respect of its own party, and had to be upheld by military force. It was a
fixed custom to call in the military when the law was to be
enforced--governor, congressmen, marshals, sheriff, judge, justice of
peace, politicians, all calling for and obtaining troops. It was
distasteful duty to the Federal officers and soldiers. Though the people
knew that only the soldiers upheld the state government, yet they were
not, as a rule, sorry to see the soldiers come in. The military rule was
preferable to the civil rule, and acted as a check on Radical
misgovernment. The whites were often sorry to see the soldiers leave, even
though they were instruments of oppression. Wholesale arrests by the army
were not as frequent during Smith's administration as later.[2104]
[Illustration: ELECTION FOR PRESIDENT, 1868.]
The state government was shaken to its foundations by the presidential
campaign and election of 1868. The whites had waked up and gone to work in
earnest. It was the first election in which the races voted against one
another. Busteed, Strobach, and other carpet-baggers toured the North,
predicting chains and slavery for the blacks and butchery for the "loyal"
whites in case Seymour were elected. The Union League whipped the negroes
into line. Brass bands lent enthusiasm to Radical parades. The negroes
were afraid that they would "lose their rights" and be reënslaved, that
their wives would have to work the roads and not be allowed to wear
hoopskirts. The Radicals urged upon the Democrats the view that those who
did not believe in negro suffrage could not take the voter's oath. Many
Democrats refused to register because of the oath. There were numbers who
would not vote against Grant because they believed that he was the only
possible check against Congress. Others felt that so far as Alabama was
concerned the election was cut and dried for Grant. But nevertheless a
majority of the whites determined to resist further Africanization in
government. Their natural leaders were disfranchised, but a strong
campaign was made. The hope was held out of overthrowing the irregular
revolutionary state government and driving out the carpet-baggers in case
Seymour became President. North Alabama declared that a vote for Grant was
a vote against the whites and formed a boycott of all Radicals. The south
Alabama leaders tried to secure a part of the negro vote, and urged that
imprudent talk be avoided and that carpet-baggers and scalawags be let
alone, and the negroes be treated kindly as being responsible for none of
the evils. Orders purporting to be signed by General Grant were sent out
among the negroes, bidding them to beware of the promises of the whites
and directing them to vote for him. Some rascally whites made large sums
of money by selling Grant badges to the blacks. They had been sent down
for free distribution; but the negroes, ordered, as they believed, by the
general, purchased his pictures at $2 each, or less. The carpet-baggers
were afraid of losing the state. Some left and went home. Others wanted
the legislature to choose electors. Still others wanted to have no
election at all, preferring to let it go by default; but the higher
military commanders, Terry and Grant, were sympathetic and troops were so
distributed over the state as to bring out the negro vote. Army officers
assisted at Radical political meetings, and the negro was informed by his
advisers that General Grant had sent the troops to see that they voted
properly. The result was that the state went for Grant by a safe
majority.[2105]
During the administration of Smith the incompatibility of the elements of
the Radical party began to show more clearly. The native whites began to
desert as soon as the convention of 1867 showed that the negro vote would
be controlled by the carpet-baggers. The genuine Unionist voters resented
the leadership of renegade secessionists. The carpet-baggers demanded the
lion's share of the spoils and were angered because Smith vetoed some of
their measures; the scalawags upheld him. The carpet-baggers felt that
since they controlled the negro voters they were entitled to the greater
consideration. Their manipulation of the Union League alarmed the native
Radicals.
The negroes were becoming conscious of their power and were inclined to
demand a larger share of the offices than the carpet-baggers wanted to
give them. Some of the negroes were desirous of voting with the whites.
Negro leaders were aspiring to judgeships, to the state Senate, to be
postmasters, to go to Congress. Even now the party was held together only
by the knowledge that it would be destroyed if divided.[2106]
In 1868 Governor Smith and other Radical leaders, convinced that they were
permanently in power, secured the passage of a law providing for the
gradual removal of disabilities imposed by state law. The same year a
complete registration had been made for the purpose of excluding the
leading whites. After disabilities were removed, so far as state action
was concerned there was no advantage to Radicals in a registration of
voters. On the other hand, it threatened to become a powerful aid to the
Democrats, who began to attend the polls and demand that only registered
voters be allowed to cast ballots, thus preventing repeating.
Consequently, as a preparation for the first general election in the fall
of 1870, the legislature passed a law forbidding the use of registration
lists by any official at any election. No one was to be asked if he were
registered. No one was to be required to show a registration certificate.
The assertion of the would-be voter was to be taken as sufficient. And it
was made a misdemeanor to challenge a voter, thus interfering with the
freedom of elections. After this a negro might vote under any name he
pleased as often as he pleased. This election system was in force until
1874, when the Democrats came into power.[2107]
To the Forty-first Congress in 1869 returned only one of the former
carpet-bag delegation, C. W. Buckley. Two so-called Democrats were chosen,
two scalawags, and a new carpet-bagger. P. M. Dox, one of the Democrats,
was a northern man who had lived in the South before the war, who was
neutral during the war; and after the war he posed as a "Unionist."
Congressional timber was scarce on account of the test oath and the
Fourteenth Amendment, so Dox secured a nomination. His opponent was a
negro, which helped him in north Alabama. The other Democrat, W. C.
Sherrod, who was also from north Alabama, had served in the Confederate
army. His opponent was J. J. Hinds, one of the most disliked of the
carpet-baggers. Robert S. Heflin, one of the scalawags, was from that
section where the Peace Society flourished during the war. At first a
Confederate, in 1864 he deserted and went within the Federal lines.
Charles Hays, the other scalawag, became the most notorious of the
Reconstruction representatives in Congress. He was a cotton planter in one
of the densest black districts and managed to stay in Congress for four
years. He is chiefly remembered because of the Hays-Hawley correspondence
in 1874. Alfred E. Buck of Maine had been an officer of negro troops. He
served only one term and after defeat passed into the Federal service. He
died as minister to Japan in 1902. This delegation was weaker in ability
and in morals than the carpet-bag delegation to the Fortieth Congress.
[Illustration: ELECTION OF 1870 FOR GOVERNOR.]
In the fall of 1870 Governor Smith was a candidate for reëlection against
Robert Burns Lindsay, Democrat. The hostility of Smith to carpet-baggers
weakened the party. The ticket was not acceptable to the whites because
Rapier, a negro, was candidate for secretary of state. The genuine
Unionists were becoming ultra Democrats, because of the prominence given
in their party to former secessionists like Parsons, Sam Rice, and Hays,
and to negroes and carpet-baggers. Lindsay was from north Alabama, which
supported him as a "white man's candidate." The negroes had been taught to
distrust scalawags, as being little better than Democrats. Smith was asked
why he ran on a ticket with a negro. He replied that now that was the only
way to get office. He also called attention to the fact that in north
Alabama the Democrats drew the color line, and called themselves the
"white man's party," while in the black counties they made an earnest
effort to secure the negro vote. The Union League, through Keffer, sent
out warning that whatever would suit "Rebels" would not suit "union men,"
who must treat their "fine professions as coming from the Prince of
Darkness himself," and that if Lindsay were elected, the "condition of
union men would be like unto hell itself." Smith and Senator Warner said
that the Democrats would repudiate railroad bonds, destroy the schools,
and repeal the Amendments and the Reconstruction Acts. In the white
counties the Radical speakers were generally insulted, and soon the white
districts were given up as permanently lost. The Black Belt alone was now
the stronghold of the Radicals. Strict inspection here prevented the
negroes from voting Democratic, as some were disposed to do. Negroes in
the white counties voted for Democrats with many misgivings. An old man
told a candidate, "I intend to vote for you; I liked your speech; but if
you put me back into slavery, I'll never forgive you." Federal troops were
again judiciously distributed in the Black Belt and in the white counties
when there was a large negro vote. As a result the election was very
close, Lindsay winning by a vote of 76,977 to 75,568.
Ex-Governor Parsons, who had now become a Radical, advised Smith not to
submit to the seating of Lindsay, but to force a contest, and meanwhile to
prevent the vote from being counted by the legislature. So, by injunction
from the supreme court, the Radical president of the Senate, Barr, was
forbidden to count the votes for governor. But the houses in joint session
counted the rest of the votes, and E. H. Moren, Democrat, was declared
elected lieutenant-governor. A majority of the House was anti-Radical. The
old Senate, refusing to classify, held over. As soon as Moren was
declared elected, Barr arose and left, followed by most of the Radical
senators, saying that he was forbidden to count the vote for governor.
Moren at once appeared, took the oath, and the joint meeting not having
been regularly adjourned, he ordered the count for governor to proceed. A
few Radical senators had lingered out of curiosity, and were retained.
Thus Lindsay was counted in, and at once took the oath of office. By the
advice of Parsons, Smith, though willing to retire, refused to give place
to Lindsay. The Radical senators recognized Smith; the House recognized
Lindsay. Smith brought Federal troops into the state-house to keep Lindsay
out, and for two or three weeks there were rival governors. Finally Smith
was forced to retire by a writ from the carpet-bag circuit court of
Montgomery.[2108]
Lindsay was born in Scotland and educated at the University of St.
Andrews. He lived in Alabama for fifteen years before the war, opposed
secession, and gave only a half-hearted support to the Confederacy. As he
said: "I would rather not tell my military history, for there was very
little glory in it.... I do not know that I can say much about my
soldiering."[2109] Lindsay was a scholar, a good lawyer, and a pure man,
but a weak executive. In this respect he was better than Smith, however,
who was supported by a unanimous Radical legislature. Under Lindsay the
Senate was Radical and the House doubtful. The Radical auditor held over;
Democrats were elected to the offices of treasurer, secretary of state,
attorney-general, and superintendent of public instruction. W. W. Allen, a
Confederate major-general, was placed in command of the militia and
organized some white companies.
The Democratic and independent majority of the House had some able
leaders, but many of the rank and file were timid and inexperienced.
Several thousand of the best citizens were still disfranchised. There were
too many young men in public office, half-educated and inexperienced. In
the House there were only fourteen negroes. So far as the legislature was
concerned, there would be a deadlock for two years. The Radicals would
consent to no repeal of injurious legislation, and thus the evil effects
of the laws relating to schools, railroads, and elections continued.
Governor Lindsay tried to bring some order into the state finances, but
the Democrats were divided on the subject of repudiating the fraudulent
bond issues, while the Radicals upheld all of the bond stealing. Lindsay
was blamed by the people for not dealing more firmly with the question,
but, as a matter of fact, he did as well as any man in his position could
do.
One cause of weakness to the administration was the fact that some of the
attorneys for the railroads were prominent Democrats who insisted upon the
recognition of the fraudulent bonds. These attorneys were few in number,
but they caused a division among the leaders. The selfish motive was very
evident, though for the sake of appearance they talked of "upholding the
state's credit," "the fair name of Alabama," etc. It is difficult to see
that their conduct was in any way on a higher plane than that of the
carpet-baggers, who issued the bonds with intent to defraud. In order to
protect themselves they mercilessly criticised Lindsay.
Most of the local officials held over from 1868 to 1872; in by-elections
it was clearly shown that the Radicals had lost all except the Black Belt,
where they continued to roll up large majorities, but even here they were
losing by resignation, sale of offices, Ku Kluxing, and removal. The more
decent carpet-baggers were leaving for the North; the white Radicals were
distinctly lower in character than before, having been joined by the dregs
of the Democrats while losing their best white county men. Lindsay made
many appointments, thus gradually changing for the better the local
administration. Owing to the peculiar methods by which the first set of
officials got into office, the local administration was never again as
bad, except in some of the black counties, as it was in 1868-1869. As the
personnel of the Radical party ran lower and lower, more and more
Democrats entered into the local administration. But in spite of the fact
that they secured representation in the state government, they were unable
to make any important reforms until they gained control of all
departments. The results of one or two local elections may be noticed. In
Mobile, which had a white majority, the carpet-bag and negro government
was overthrown in 1870. Though prohibited by law from challenging
fraudulent voters, the Democrats intimidated the negroes by standing near
the polls and fastening a fish-hook into the coat of each negro who voted.
The negroes were frightened. Rumor said that those who were hooked were
marked for jail. Repeating was thus prevented; many of them did not vote
at all. In Selma the Democrats came into power. Property was then made
safe, the streets were cleaned, and the negroes found out that they would
not be reënslaved. Governor Lindsay endeavored to reform the local
judicial administration by getting rid of worthless young solicitors and
incompetent judges, but the Radical Senate defeated his efforts. He was
unable to secure any good legislation during his term, and all reform was
limited to the reduction of administration expenses, the checking of bad
legislation, and the appointment of better men to fill vacancies.[2110]
To the Forty-second Congress Buckley, Hays, and Dox were reëlected. The
new congressmen were Turner, negro, Handley, Democrat, and Sloss,
Independent. Turner had been a slave in North Carolina and Alabama and had
secured a fair education before the war. He had at first entered politics
as a Democrat, and advised the negroes against alien leaders. To succeed
Warner, George Goldthwaite, Democrat, was chosen to the United States
Senate.
In 1872 the Democrats nominated for governor, Thomas H. Herndon of Mobile,
who was in favor of a more aggressive policy than Lindsay. He was a south
Alabama man and hence lost votes in north Alabama. David P. Lewis, the
Radical nominee, was from north Alabama and in politics a turncoat.
Opposed to secession in 1861, he nevertheless signed the ordinance and was
chosen to the Confederate Congress; later he was a Confederate judge; in
1864 he went within the Federal lines; in 1867-1868 he was a Democrat, but
changed about 1870. He was victorious for several reasons: the
administration was blamed for the division in the party and for not
reforming abuses; Herndon did not draw out the full north Alabama vote;
the presidential election was held at the same time and the Democrats
were disgusted at the nomination of Horace Greeley; Federal troops were
distributed over the state for months before the election, and the
Enforcement Acts were so executed as to intimidate many white voters. The
full Radical ticket was elected. All were scalawags, except the treasurer.
In a speech, C. C. Sheets said of the Radical candidates,
"Fellow-citizens, they are as pure, as spotless, as stainless, as the
immaculate Son of God."[2111]
[Illustration: ELECTION OF 1872 FOR GOVERNOR.]
In both houses of the legislature the Democrats had by the returns a
majority at last. The Radicals were in a desperate position. A United
States Senator was to be elected, and Spencer wanted to succeed himself.
He had spent thousands of dollars to secure the support of the Radicals,
and a majority of the Radical members were devoted to him. Most scalawags
were opposed to his reëlection, but it was known that he controlled the
negro members, and to prevent division all agreed to support him. But how
to overcome the Democratic majorities in both houses? Parsons was equal to
the occasion. He advised that the Radical members refuse to meet with the
Democrats and instead organize separately. So the Democrats met in the
capitol and the Radicals in the United States court-house, as had been
previously arranged. The Senate consisted of 33 members and the House of
100. The Democrats organized with 19 senators and 54 members in the
House, all bearing proper certificates of election, and each house having
more than a quorum. At the court-house the Radicals had 14 senators and 45
or 46 representatives who had certificates of election. There were 4
negroes in the Senate and 27 in the House. In neither Radical house was
there a quorum; so each body summoned 5 Radicals who had been candidates,
to make up a quorum. It was hard to find enough, and some custom-house
officials from Mobile had to secure leave of absence and come to
Montgomery to complete the quorum.
The regular (Democratic) organization at the capitol counted the votes and
declared all the Radical state officials elected. Lewis and McKinstry,
lieutenant-governor, accepted the count and took the oath and at once
recognized the court-house body as the general assembly. Lindsay had
recognized the regular organization, but had taken no steps to protect it
from the Radical schemes. The militia was ready to support the regular
body, but Lewis was more energetic than Lindsay. He telegraphed to the
nearest Federal troops, at Opelika, to come; when they came, he stationed
them on the capitol grounds. He proposed to the Democrats that they admit
the entire Radical body, expelling enough Democrats to put the latter in a
minority. Upon their refusal, he told the court-house body to go ahead
with legislation. Some of the Radicals--one or two whites and four or five
negroes--were dubious about the security of their _per diem_ and showed
signs of a desire to go to the capitol. These were guarded to keep them in
line, and were also paid in money and promises of Federal offices. The
weak-kneed negroes were shut up in a room and guarded, to keep them from
going to the capitol.
Spencer was determined to be elected and would not wait for the trouble to
be settled. On December 3, 1872, the court-house Radicals chose him to
succeed himself. The next thing was to prevent the regular assembly from
electing a Senator who might contest. Two of that body had died; one or
two were indifferent and easily kept away from a joint session; others
were called away by telegrams (forged by the Radicals) about illness in
their families; three members were arrested before reaching the city; one
member was drugged and nearly killed. By such methods a quorum was
defeated in both houses at the capitol until December 10, when the absent
members came in, and F. W. Sykes was chosen to the United States Senate.
Meanwhile Lewis and the Radical members had appealed to President Grant to
be sustained. By his direction United States Attorney-General Williams
prepared a plan of compromise skilfully designed to destroy the Democratic
majority in the House and produce a tie in the Senate. Lewis was assured
that the plan would be supported by the Federal authorities. The plan was
as follows: (1) Both bodies were to continue separate organizations until
a fusion was effected. (2) On a certain day, both parties of the House
were to meet in the capitol, and in the usual manner form a temporary
organization--but the Democrats whose seats were contested but who had
certificates of election were to be excluded, while the Radical
contestants were to be seated. This would give a Radical majority. Then
the contests were to be decided and a permanent organization formed. (3)
In the same way the Senate was to be temporarily organized, the regularly
elected Democrats being excluded, while their contestants were seated,
except in the case of the Democratic senator from Conecuh and Butler, who
was to sit but not to vote. By this arrangement there was a bare chance
that the Democrats might secure a majority of one in the Senate. (4) As
soon as the fusion was thus made, the permanent organization was to be
effected. Nothing was said about the legality of past legislation by each
body, but the understanding was that all was to be considered void.
Meanwhile Lewis had tried to obtain forcible possession of the capitol,
but Strobach, the sheriff whom he sent, was arrested by order of the House
and imprisoned until he apologized. The Democrats were plainly informed
that the "gentle intimations of the convictions of the law officer of the
United States" would be enforced by the use of Federal troops, and there
was nothing to do but give way. The plan was put into operation on
December 17.
In the House contests the Democrats lost their majority, as was intended.
In the Senate they lost all except one by the plan itself. To unseat
Senator Martin from Conecuh would be a flagrant outrage. So his case went
over until after Christmas. The Democrats elected the clerks, doorkeepers,
and pages. The Radicals still kept up their separate organization, not
meaning to abide by the fusion unless they could gain the entire
legislature. During the vacation Lieutenant-Governor McKinstry wrote to
Attorney-General Williams asking if the Federal government would support
him in case he himself should decide as to the rightful senator from
Conecuh. He explained that a majority of the committee on elections was
going to report in favor of Martin, Democrat, who held the certificate of
election. Further, he said that if the Senate were allowed to vote on the
question, the Democratic senator would remain seated. He proposed to
decide the contest himself upon the report made, and not allow the Senate
to vote. Williams was now becoming weary of the conduct of the Radicals;
he told McKinstry that the course proposed was contrary to both
parliamentary and statute law, and said that Federal troops would not be
furnished to support such a ruling. Moreover, he expressed strong
disapproval of the course of the Radicals in keeping up their separate
organization contrary to the plan of compromise. He ordered the marshal
not to allow the Federal court-house to be used by the Radicals, but the
marshal paid no attention to the order.
After the holidays the Democrats and anti-Spencer Radicals hoped to bring
about a new election for Senator. On February 11, 1873, Hunter of Lowndes,
a Radical member of the House, proposed that the legislature proceed to
the election of a Senator. Parsons, the speaker, refused to entertain the
motion and ordered Hunter under arrest. McKinstry refused to consider the
Senate as permanently organized until Martin was disposed of, fearing a
joint session. The Radical solicitor of Montgomery secured several
indictments against Spencer's agents for bribery, and summoned several
members of the legislature as witnesses. Parsons ordered Knox, the
solicitor, and Strobach, the sheriff, to be arrested for invading the
privileges of the House. Next, Hunter, who had been arrested for proposing
to elect a Senator, had Parsons arrested for violation of the Enforcement
Acts in preventing the election of a Senator. Busteed, Federal judge,
discharged Parsons "for lack of evidence."
In the Senate the Radicals matured a plan to get rid of Martin. A caucus
decided to sustain McKinstry in all his rulings. It was known that
Edwards, a Democratic senator, wanted to visit his home. So Glass, a
Radical senator, proposed to pair with him, and at the same time both get
leave of absence for ten days. Edwards and Glass went off at the same
time, in different directions. A mile outside of town, Glass left the
train, returned to Montgomery, and went into hiding. Now was the time.
The reports on the Martin contest were called up. A Democrat moved the
adoption of the majority report in favor of Martin; a Radical moved that
the minority report be substituted in the motion. The Democrats were
voting under protest because they wanted debate and wanted Edwards, one of
the writers of the majority report, to return. In order to move a
reconsideration, Cobb, a Democrat, fearing treachery, voted with the
Radicals; Glass appeared before his name was reached, broke his pair, and
voted; McKinstry refused to entertain Cobb's motion for a reconsideration,
and though the effect of the voting was only to put the minority report
before the Senate to be voted upon, McKinstry declared that Martin by the
vote was unseated and Miller admitted. The temporary Radical majority
sustained him in all his rulings, and thus the Democrats lost their
majority in the Senate. The whole thing had been planned beforehand;
McKinstry had arms in his desk; the cloak-rooms were filled with roughs to
support the Radicals in case the Democrats made a fight; the Federal
troops were at the doors in spite of what Williams had said. McKinstry now
announced that the Senate was permanently organized and the schism healed.
Glass was expelled by the Masonic order for breaking the pair. Spencer was
safe, since the Republican Senate at Washington was sure to admit him.
In the course of the contest Spencer had spent many thousands of dollars
in defeating dissatisfied Radical candidates for the legislature and in
purchasing voters. The money he used came from the National Republican
executive committee, from the state committee, and from the government
funds of the post-office at Mobile and the internal revenue offices in
Mobile and Montgomery. More than $20,000 of United States funds were used
for Spencer, who, after his election, refused to reimburse the postmaster
and the two collectors, who were prosecuted and ruined. Every Federal
office-holder was assessed from one-fifth to one-third of his pay during
the fall months for campaign expenses. They were notified that unless they
paid the assessments their resignations would be accepted. Spencer refused
to pay the bills of a negro saloon-keeper who had, at his orders,
"refreshed" the negro members of the legislature. But of those who voted
for Spencer in the Radical "legislature" more than thirty secured Federal
appointments. Of other agents about twenty secured Federal appointments.
One of them, Robert Barbour, was given a position in the custom-house at
Mobile with the understanding that he would not have to go there. His pay
was sent to him at Montgomery.
As a preparation for the autumn presidential contest, Spencer worked upon
the fears of Grant and secured the promise of troops, though he had some
difficulty. His letters are not at all complimentary to Grant. Finally he
wrote, "Grant is scared and will do what we want." The deputy marshals
manufactured Ku Klux outrages and planned the arrest of Democratic
politicians, of whom scores were gotten out of the way, for a week or two,
but none were prosecuted. There was no election of Senator other than that
of Spencer by the irregular body and that of Sykes by the regular
organization at the capitol, neither of which took place on the day
appointed by law. The Senate admitted Spencer on the ground that Governor
Lewis had recognized the court-house aggregation. Sykes contested and of
course failed; the Senate refused for several years to vote his expenses,
as was customary. In 1885, Senator Hoar secured $7,132 for Spencer as
expenses in the contest. In 1875 the Alabama legislature, Radical and
Democratic, united in an address to the United States Senate, asking that
Spencer's seat be declared vacant.[2112]
Under Lewis the Radical administration went to pieces. The enormous issues
of bonds, fraudulent and otherwise, by Smith and Lewis which destroyed the
credit of the state; ignorant negroes in public office; drunken judges on
the benches; convicts as officials; teachers and school officers unable to
read; intermarriage of whites and blacks declared legal by the supreme
court; the low character of the Federal officials; constant arrests of
respectable whites for political purposes; use of Federal troops; packed
juries; purchase and sale of offices; defaulters in every Radical county;
riots instigated by the Radical leaders; heavy taxes,--all these
burdens bore to the ground the Lewis administration before the end of its
term. The last year was simply a standstill while the whites were
preparing to overthrow the Radical government, which was demoralized and
disabled also by constant aid and interference from the Federal
administration.
[Illustration: DEMOCRATIC AND CONSERVATIVE LEADERS.
GOVERNOR R. M. PATTON.
GENERAL JAMES H. CLANTON. Organizer of the present Democratic Party in
Alabama.
GOVERNOR GEORGE S. HOUSTON.
GOVERNOR R. B. LINDSAY.
MAJOR J. R. CROWE, now of Sheffield, Ala., one of the founders of the Ku
Klux Klan at Pulaski, Tenn.]
Lewis appointed a lower class of officials than Smith had appointed, among
them many ignorant negroes for minor offices. Carpet-baggers and scalawags
were becoming scarce. The white counties under their own local government
were slowly recovering; the formerly wealthy Black Belt counties were
being ruined under the burden of local, state, and municipal
taxation.[2113]
To the Forty-second Congress Alabama, now entitled to eight
representatives, sent four scalawags, Pelham, Hays, White, and Sheets; one
negro, Rapier; and three Democrats or Independents, Bromberg, Caldwell,
and Glass; carpet-baggers were now at a discount; scalawags and negroes
wanted all the spoils.
In the spring of 1874 the whites began to organize to overthrow Radical
rule. They were firmly determined that there should not be another Radical
administration. In the Radical party only a few whites were left to hold
the negroes together. Some of the negroes were disgusted because of
promises unfulfilled; others were grasping at office; the Union League
discipline was missed; "outrages" were no longer so effective. The
Radicals had no new issues to present. The state credit was destroyed; the
negroes no longer believed so seriously the stories of reënslavement; the
northern public was becoming more indifferent, or more sympathetic toward
the whites. The time for the overthrow of Radical rule was at hand.
SEC. 2. SOCIAL CONDITIONS DURING RECONSTRUCTION
In previous chapters something has been said of social and economic
matters, especially concerning labor, education, religion, and race
relations. Some supplementary facts and observations may be of use.
The central figure of Reconstruction was the negro. How was his life
affected by the conditions of Reconstruction? In the first place, crime
among the blacks increased, as was to be expected. Removed from the
restraints and punishments of slavery, with criminal leaders, the negro,
even under the most African of governments, became the chief criminal. The
crime of rape became common, caused largely, the whites believed, by the
social equality theories of the reconstructionists. Personal conflicts
among blacks and between blacks and whites were common, though probably
decreasing for a time in the early '70's. Stealing was the most frequent
crime, with murder a close second. During the last year of negro rule the
report of the penitentiary inspectors gave the following statistics:--
================================================
CRIMES | WHITES | NEGROES
----------------------------|----------|--------
Murder | 11 | 43
Assault | 2 | 21
Burglary and grand larceny | 15 | 199
Arson | 1 | 4
Rape | 0 | 6
Other felonies | 2 | 14
|----------|--------
Total | 31 | 287
================================================
Thus 1 white to 16,936 of population was in prison for felony; 1 black to
2294; felonies, 1 white to 8 blacks; misdemeanors, 1 white to 64 blacks.
In Montgomery jail were confined about 12 blacks to 1 white. These
statistics do not show the real state of affairs, since most convictions
of blacks were in cases prosecuted by blacks. To be prosecuted by a white
was equivalent to persecution--so reasoned the negro jury in the Black
Belt. Under the instigation of low white leaders, the negroes frequently
burned the houses and other property of whites who were disliked by the
Radical leaders. Several attempts, more or less successful, were made to
burn the white villages in the Black Belt; hardly a single one wholly
escaped. For several years the whites had to picket the towns in time of
political excitement. The worst negro criminals were the discharged negro
soldiers, who sometimes settled in gangs together in the Black Belt. More
charges were made of crimes by blacks against whites, than by whites
against blacks. Most criminals did not go to prison after conviction. The
Radical legislature passed a law allowing the sale of the convict's labor
to relatives. A good old negro could buy the time of a worthless son for
ten cents a day and have him released.
The marriage relations of the negroes were hardly satisfactory, judged by
white standards. The white legislatures in 1865-1866 had declared slave
marriages binding. The reconstructionists denounced this as a great
cruelty and repealed the law. Marriages were then made to date from the
passage of the Reconstruction Acts. Many negro men had had several wives
before that date. They were relieved from the various penalties of
desertion, bigamy, adultery, etc. And after the passage of these laws,
numerous prominent negroes were relieved of the penalties for promiscuous
marriages. Divorces became common among the negroes who were in politics.
During one session of the legislature seventy-five divorces were granted.
This was cheaper than going through the courts, and more certain. The
average negro divorced himself or herself without formality; some of them
were divorced by their churches, as in slavery.
Upon the negro woman fell the burden of supporting the children. Her
husband or husbands had other duties. Children then began to be unwelcome
and foeticide and child murder were common crimes. The small number of
negro children during the decade of Reconstruction was generally remarked.
Negro women began to flock to towns; how they lived no one can tell;
immorality was general among them. The conditions of Reconstruction were
unfavorable to honesty and morality among the negroes, both male and
female. The health of the negroes was injured during the period 1865-1875.
In the towns the standard of living was low; sanitary arrangements were
bad; disease, especially consumption and venereal diseases, killed large
numbers and permanently injured the negro constitution.
Negro women took freedom even more seriously than the men. It was
considered slavery by many of them to work in the fields; domestic service
was beneath the freedwomen--especially were washing and milking the cows
tabooed. To live like their former mistresses, to wear fine clothes and go
often to church, was the ambition of a negro lady. After Reconstruction
was fully established the negro women were a strong support to the Union
League, and took a leading part in the prosecution of negro Democrats.
Negro women never were as well-mannered, nor, on the whole, as
good-tempered and cheerful, as the negro men. Both sexes during
Reconstruction lost much of their cheerfulness; the men gradually ceased
to go "holloing" to the fields; some of the blacks, especially the women,
became impudent and insulting toward the whites. While many of the negroes
for a time seemed to consider it a mark of servility to behave decently to
the whites, toward the close of Reconstruction and later conditions
changed, and the negro men especially were in general well-behaved and
well-mannered in their relations with whites except in time of political
excitement.
The entire black race was wild for education in 1865 and 1866, but most of
them found that the necessary work--which they had not expected--was too
hard, and by the close of Reconstruction they were becoming indifferent.
The education acquired was of doubtful value. There was in 1865-1867 a
religious furor among the negroes, and several negro denominations were
organized. The chief result, as stated at length elsewhere, was to
separate from the white churches, discard the old conservative black
preachers, and take up the smooth-tongued, ranting, emotional, immoral
preachers who could stir congregations. The negro church has not yet
recovered from the damage done by these ministers. Negro health was
affected by the night meetings and religious debauches. In general it may
be said that the negro speech grew more like that of the whites, on
account of schools, speeches, much travel, and contact with white leaders.
The negro leaders acquired much superficial civilization, and very quickly
mastered the art of political intrigue.
A very delicate question to both races was that of the exact position of
the negro in the social system. The convention of 1867 had contained a
number of equal-rights members, and there had been much discussion. A
proposition to have separate schools was not made obligatory. A measure to
prevent the intermarriage of the races was lost, and the supreme court of
the state declared that marriages between whites and blacks were lawful.
Laws were passed to prevent the separation of the races on street cars,
steamers, and railway cars, but the whites always resisted the enforcement
of such laws. Some negroes, especially the mulattoes, dreamed of having
white wives, but the average pure negro was not moved by such a desire.
When the Coburn investigation was being made, Coburn, the chairman, was
trying to convince a negro who had declared against the policy and the
necessity of the Civil Rights Bill. The negro retorted by asking how he
would like to see him sitting by his (Coburn's) daughter's side. The black
declared that he would not like to be sitting by Miss Coburn and have some
young man who was courting her come along and knock over the big black
negro; further he did not want to eat at the table nor sit in cars with
the whites, preferring to sit by his own color. Some of the negroes were
displeased at the proposed Civil Rights Bill, thinking that it was meant
to force the negro to go among the whites.[2114] There were negro police
in the larger towns, Selma, Montgomery, and Mobile, who irritated the
whites by their arrests and by discrimination in favor of blacks. The
negroes, in many cases, had ceased to care for the good opinion of the
whites and, following disreputable leaders, suffered morally. The color
line began to be strictly drawn in politics, which increased the
estrangement of the races, though individuals were getting along better
together.[2115]
The white carpet-baggers and scalawags never formed a large section of the
Radical party and constantly decreased in numbers,--the natives returning
to the white party, the aliens returning to the North. The native Radicals
were found principally in the cities and holding Federal offices, and in
the white counties were still a few genuine Republican Unionist voters.
The carpet-baggers were found almost entirely in the Black Belt and in
Federal offices. As their numbers decreased the general character was
lowered. Some of the white Radicals were sincere and honest men, but none
of this sort stood any chance for office. If they themselves would not
steal, they must arrange for others to steal. The most respectable of the
Radicals were a few old Whigs who had always disliked Democrats and who
preferred to vote with the negroes. Such a man was Benjamin Gardner, who
became attorney-general in 1872.
All white Radicals suffered the most bitter ostracism--in business, in
society, in church; their children in the schools were persecuted by other
children because of their fathers' sins. The scalawag, being a renegade,
was scorned more than a carpet-bagger. In every possible way they were
made to feel the weight of the displeasure of the whites. Small boys were
unchecked when badgering a white Radical. One Radical complained that the
youngsters would come near him to hold a spelling class. The word would be
given out: "Spell _damned rascal_." It would be spelled. "Spell _damned
Radical_." That would be spelled. "They are nearly alike, aren't they?"
The blacks always felt that the carpet-bagger was more friendly to them
than the scalawag was, for the carpet-baggers associated more closely with
the negroes. The alien white teachers boarded with negroes; some of the
politicians made it a practice to live among the negroes in order to get
their votes. The candidates for sheriff and tax collector in Montgomery
went to negro picnics, baptizings, and church services, drank from the
same bottle of whiskey with negroes, had the negro leaders to visit their
homes, where they dined together, and the white women furnished music. The
carpet-baggers seldom had families with them, and, excluded from white
society, began to contract unofficial alliances among the blacks. Scarcely
an alien office-holder in the Black Belt but was charged with immorality
and the charges proven. Numbers were relieved by the legislature of the
penalties for adultery. The average Radical politician was in time quite
thoroughly Africanized. They spoke of "us niggers," "we niggers," at first
from policy, later from habit. When Lewis was elected, in 1872, a white
Radical cried out in his joy, "We niggers have beat 'em." Two years later
white Radicals marched with negro processions and sang the song:--
"The white man's day has passed;
The negro's day has come at last."[2116]
One effect of Reconstruction was to fuse the whites into a single
homogeneous party. Before the war political divisions were sharply drawn
and feeling often bitter, so also in 1865-1867 and to a certain extent
during the early period of Reconstruction. At first there was no "Solid
South"; within the white man's party there were grave differences between
old Whig and old Democrat, Radical and Conservative. There were different
local problems before the whites of the various sections that for a while
prevented the formation of a unanimous white man's party. There were the
whites of the Black Belt, the former slaveholders, who wished well to the
negro, favored negro education, and looked upon his political activity as
a joke, but who came nearer than any other white people to recognizing the
possibility of permanent political privileges for the black. They believed
that they could sooner or later regain moral control over their former
slaves and thus do away with the evils of carpet-bag government.
It must be said that the former slaveholding class had more consideration,
then, before, and since, for the poor negro than for the poor white,
probably because the negroes only were always with them. The poorest
whites felt that the negro was not only their social but also their
economic enemy, and, the protection of the owner removed, the blacks
suffered more from these people than ever before. The negro in school, the
negro in politics, the negro on the best lands--all this was not liked by
the poorest white people, whose opportunities were not as good as those of
the blacks. Between these two extremes was the mass of the whites,
displeased at the way negro suffrage, education, etc., was imposed, but
willing to put up with the results if good. The later years of
Reconstruction found the temper of the whites more and more exasperated.
They were tired of Reconstruction, new amendments, force bills, Federal
troops, and of being ruled as a conquered province by the least fit. Every
measure aimed at the South seemed to them to mean that they were
considered incorrigible, not worthy of trust, and when necessary to punish
some whites, all were punished. And strong opposition to proscriptive
measures was called fresh rebellion. "When the Jacobins say and do low and
bitter things, their charge of want of loyalty in the South because our
people grumble back a little seems to me as unreasonable as the complaint
of the little boy: 'Mamma, make Bob 'have hisself. He makes mouths at me
every time I hit him with my stick.'" Probably the grind was harder on the
young men, who had all life before them and who were growing up with
slight opportunities in any line of activity. Sidney Lanier, then an
Alabama school-teacher, wrote to Bayard Taylor, "Perhaps you know that
with us of the young generation in the South, since the war, pretty much
the whole of life has been merely not dying." Negro and alien rule was a
constant insult to the intelligence of the country. The taxpayers were
non-participants. Some people withdrew entirely from public life, went to
their farms or plantations, kept away from towns and from speech-making,
waiting for the end to come. I know old men who refused for several years
to read the newspapers, so unpleasant was the news. The good feeling
produced by the magnanimity of Grant at Appomattox was destroyed by his
southern policy when President. There was no gratitude for any so-called
leniency of the North, no repentance for the war, no desire for
humiliation, for sackcloth and ashes and confession of wrong. The
insistence of the Radicals upon a confession of depravity only made things
much worse. There was not a single measure of Congress during
Reconstruction designed or received in a conciliatory spirit.
Under the Reconstruction régime the political, and to some extent the
social, morality of the whites declined. Constant fighting fire with fire
scorched all. While in one way the bitter discipline of Reconstruction was
not lost, yet with it the pleasantest of southern life went out. During
the war and Reconstruction there was a radical change in southern
temperament toward the severe. Hospitality has declined; old southern life
was never on a strictly business basis, the new southern life is more so;
the old individuality is partially lost; class distinctions are less felt.
The white people, by the fires of Reconstruction, have been welded into a
homogeneous society.[2117] The material evils of Reconstruction are by no
means the more lasting: the state debt may be paid and wasted resources
renewed; but the moral and intellectual results will be the permanent
ones.
In spite of the misgovernment during the Reconstruction, there was in most
of the white counties a slow movement toward industrial development. All
over the state in 1865-1868 and 1871-1874 there were poor crops. The white
counties gradually found themselves better able to stand bad seasons. The
decadence of the Black Belt gave the white farmer an opportunity. The
railroads now began to open up the mineral and timber districts, rather
than the cotton counties. During the last four years of negro rule the
coal and iron of the northern part of the state began to attract northern
capital and rapid development began. The timber of the white counties now
began to be cut. In the mines, on the railroads, and in the forests many
whites were profitably employed. Farmers in the white counties, having
thrown off the local Reconstruction government, began to organize
agricultural societies, Patrons of Husbandry, Grangers, etc., and to hold
county fairs. The Radicals maintained that this granger movement was only
another manifestation of Ku Klux, and it was, in a way.[2118]
Immigration from the North or from abroad amounted to nothing; disturbed
political conditions and the presence of the negroes prevented it. Nor did
the Reconstruction rulers desire immigration; their rule would be the
sooner overthrown. There were two movements of emigration from the
state--culminating in 1869 and in 1873-1874. Those were the gloomiest
periods of Reconstruction, especially for the white man in the Black Belt.
Most of the emigrants went to Texas, others to Mexico, to Brazil, to the
North, and to Tennessee and Georgia, where the whites were in power. It
was estimated that in this emigration the state lost more of its
population than by war.
In the Black Belt the condition of the whites grew worse. Frequent
elections demoralized negro labor, and crops often failed for lack of
laborers. The more skilful negroes went to the towns, railroads, mines,
and lumber mills. On account of this migration and the gradual dying off
of slavery-trained negroes, negro agricultural labor was less and less
satisfactory. The negro woman often refused to work in the fields. The
white population of the Black Belt decreased in comparison with the
numbers of blacks. The whites deserted the plantations, going to the towns
or gathering in villages. Taxation was heavy, tax sales became frequent.
One of the worst evils that afflicted the Black Belt was the so-called
"deadfall." A "deadfall" was a low shop or store where a white thief
encouraged black people to steal all kinds of farm produce and exchange it
with him for bad whiskey, bad candy, brass jewellery, etc. This evil was
found all over the state where there were negroes. Whites and industrious
blacks lost hogs, poultry, cattle, corn in the fields, cotton in the
fields and in the gin. The business of the "deadfall" was usually done at
night. The thirsty negro would go into a cotton field and pick a sack of
cotton worth a dollar, or take a bushel of corn from the nearest field,
and exchange it at a "deadfall" for a glass of whiskey, a plug of tobacco,
or a dime. These "deadfalls" were in the woods or swamps on the edges of
the large plantations. It was not possible to guard against them. The
"deadfall" keepers often became rich, the harvests of some amounting to 30
to 80 bales of cotton for each, besides farm produce. Careful estimates by
grand juries and business men placed the average annual loss at one-fifth
of the crop. A bill was introduced into the legislature to prohibit the
purchase after dark of farm produce from any one but the producer. The
measure was unanimously opposed by the Radicals, on the ground that it was
class legislation aimed at the negroes. The debates show that some of them
considered it proper for a negro to steal from his employer. After the
Democratic victory in 1874 a law was passed abolishing "deadfalls."[2119]