CHAPTER VII.

TORTURE

To the modern mind the judicial use of torture, as a means of

ascertaining truth, is so repellant and illogical that we are apt to

forget that it has, from the most ancient times, been practised by

nearly all civilized nations. With us the device of the jury has

relieved the judge of the responsibility resting upon him in other

systems of jurisprudence. That responsibility had to be met; a decision

had to be reached, even in the most doubtful cases and, where evidence

was defective and conflicting, the use of torture as an expedient to

obtain a confession, or, by its endurance, to indicate innocence, has

seemed, until modern times, after the disuse of compurgation and the

judgements of God, to be the only means of relieving the judicial

conscience. It was admitted to be dangerous and fallacious, to be

employed only with circumspection, but there was nothing to take its

place.[1]

That it should be used by the Inquisition was a matter of course, for

the crime of heresy was often one peculiarly difficult to prove;

confession was sought in all cases and, from the middle of the

thirteenth century, the habitual employment of torture by the Holy

Office had been the most efficient factor in spreading its use

throughout Christendom, at the expense of the obsolescent Barbarian

customs. It is true that Spain was loath to admit the innovation. In

Castile, which rejected the Inquisition, Alfonso X, notwithstanding his

admiration of the Roman law, required that confession must be voluntary

and insisted that, if obtained by torture, it must subsequently be

freely ratified, without threats or pressure.[2] In the kingdoms of

Aragon, which admitted the Inquisition, torture remained illegal, and it

was only by the positive commands of Clement V that it was employed, in

1311, on the Templars.[3] By the time that the Spanish Inquisition was

organized, however, torture in Castile was in daily use by the criminal

courts, and there could be no question as to the propriety of its

employment by the Holy Office. In Aragon, Peña tells us that, although

it was forbidden in secular jurisprudence, it was freely permitted in

matters of faith. Yet its use was jealously watched, for when the aid of

torture was sought in the case of a prisoner accused of the murder of a

familiar, the Córtes of 1646 complained of it as an unprecedented

innovation, which was only prevented by the active intervention of the

diputados and viceroy.[4] Valencia had been less rigid in excluding

torture from its courts, but so limited its use that, in 1684, the

tribunal reported that, in cases of unnatural crime (of which it had

cognizance, subject to the condition of trial by secular process), it no

longer used torture, because the methods permitted by the fueros were so

light that the accused felt no fear of them, and they were useless in

extracting confession.[5]

[Sidenote: _MORE MODERATE THAN IN ROME_]

We shall see that occasionally tribunals abused the use of torture, but

the popular impression that the inquisitorial torture-chamber was the

scene of exceptional refinement in cruelty, of specially ingenious modes

of inflicting agony, and of peculiar persistence in extorting

confessions, is an error due to sensational writers who have exploited

credulity. The system was evil in conception and in execution, but the

Spanish Inquisition, at least, was not responsible for its introduction

and, as a rule, was less cruel than the secular courts in its

application, and confined itself more strictly to a few well-known

methods. In fact, we may reasonably assume that its use of torture was

less frequent, for its scientific system of breaking down resistance, in

its long-drawn procedure, was more effective than the ruder and speedier

practice of the secular courts where, as we are told by Archbishop

Pedro de Castro of Granada, it was notorious that no one confessed

except when overcome by torture.[6]

In this respect, the comparison between the Spanish and the Roman

Inquisition is also eminently in favor of the former. We shall have

occasion presently to see the limitations which it placed on the use of

torture, while in Rome it was the rule that all who confessed or were

convicted in matters of faith were tortured for the further discovery of

the truth and the revelation of accomplices. In addition to this there

were many classes of cases in which torture was employed by Rome to

extort confession and in which it was forbidden in Spain--those

involving mere presumption of heresy, such as solicitation, sorcery,

blasphemy etc. Moreover in Rome the _in arbitrio judicum_ applied not

only to the kind and duration of the torture but also to its

repetition.[7] Spanish writers on practice, therefore, were justified in

claiming for their own tribunals a sparing use of torture unknown in

Italy, while, as regards its severity, the frequency with which in the

trials we find that the accused overcame the torture would indicate that

habitually it was not carried to extremity, as it so frequently was in

the secular courts. No torture-chamber in the Inquisition possessed the

resources of the corregidor who labored for three hours, in 1612, to

obtain from Diego Duke of Estrada confession of a homicide--the water

torture, the mancuerda, the potro, hot irons for the feet, hot bricks

for the stomach and buttocks, garrotillos known as bone-breakers, the

trampa to tear the legs and the bostezo to distend the mouth--and all

this was an every-day matter of criminal justice.[8]

The indirect torture of especially harsh imprisonment was not unknown to

the Inquisition, and was occasionally employed for the purpose of

breaking down obstinacy. It was not, as in the medieval Inquisition,

prescribed as an ordinary resource, but it was at the discretion of the

tribunal and could at any time be brought into play, as in the case of a

pertinacious heretic, in 1512, who was consigned to the most noisome

part of the prison, and afflicted in various ways, in the hope of

enlightening his understanding.[9] In the later period of leisurely

action, protracted imprisonment was frequently resorted to, in the hope

of inducing repentance and conversion, when wearing anxiety and despair

weakened the will as effectually as the sharper agonies of the pulley

and rack. There was also the ingenious device, frequently effective, by

which the fiscal concluded his formal accusation with a demand that, if

necessary, the accused should be tortured until he confessed. This was

unknown in the earlier period, but the Instructions of 1561 recommend

it, giving as a reason its good results, and also that torture requires

a demand from the prosecutor and a notification to the defendant, who is

unprepared for it at this stage of the trial.[10] After this it became

the universal custom in all cases admitting of torture, and the profound

impression produced on the unfortunate prisoner can be readily

conceived.

[Sidenote: _PRELIMINARIES_]

Torture itself, however, was regarded as too serious to be left to the

arbitrary temper of a baffled or angry inquisitor, and was preceded by

formalities designed to prevent its abuse. It was the last resort when

the result of a trial left doubts to be satisfied. After the prosecution

and defence had closed, and the consulta de fe had assembled to consider

the sentence, if the evidence was too weak for condemnation while the

innocence of the accused was not clear, it could adopt a vote to torture

and postpone the decision to await the outcome. Even in the ferocity of

the early period this deliberateness was frequently observed, although

in the reckless haste of procedure it was often omitted. Thus, in the

case of Diego García, a priest accused of having said twenty years

before, when a boy, that the sacrament was bread, the consulta held two

meetings, January 18 and 19, 1490, and finally voted torture. There was

no haste however and it was not until February 11th that García was

exposed to the very moderate water-torture of about a quart of water. No

confession was obtained and he was untied, with the protest that he had

not been sufficiently tortured, but it was not repeated and, on February

26th, he was acquitted and restored to his fame and honor, though, with

the curiously perverse inquisitorial logic, he was made to abjure _de

vehementi_ and forbidden to celebrate mass for six months.[11] The vote

of the consulta however was not universal and, in 1518, the Suprema

ordered it to be always observed, but a clause in the Instructions of

1561, reminding inquisitors that they must not inflict torture until

after hearing the defence shows how difficult it was to restrain their

arbitrary action.[12] Even in the early eighteenth century, in reviewing

a summary of cases of Valencia, from 1705 to 1726, the Suprema rebuked

the tribunal for torturing Sebastian Antonio Rodríguez without previous

consultation, but at this period the consulta de fe was becoming

obsolete and everything was centering in the Suprema.[13]

The vote of the consulta was still only preliminary. After it, the

accused was brought into the audience-chamber, where all the inquisitors

and the episcopal Ordinary were required to be present. He was notified

of the decision of the consulta; if he was a _diminuto_, the points in

which his confession had failed to satisfy the evidence were pointed

out; if a _negativo_, no explanations were necessary; if it was on

intention or in _caput alienum_ he was made to understand it. He was

adjured, in the name of God and the Blessed Virgin, to confess fully,

without false evidence as to himself or others and, if this failed to

move him, a formal sentence of torture was signed by all the judges and

read to him. It recited that, in view of the suspicions arising against

him from the evidence, they condemned him to be tortured for such length

of time as they should see fit, in order that he might tell the truth of

what had been testified against him, protesting that, if in the torture

he should die or suffer effusion of blood or mutilation, it should not

be attributed to them, but to him for not telling the truth. If the

torture was to discover accomplices, care was taken to make no allusion

to him and to give him no chance of clearing himself, for he was

assumed to be already convicted.[14]

Even this sentence was not necessarily a finality for, if the accused

offered a new defence, it had to be considered and acted upon before

proceeding further.[15] Moreover he had theoretically a right to appeal

to the inquisitor-general from this, as from all other interlocutory

sentences. This right varied at different times. A ruling by the

Suprema, in 1538, appears to indicate that it was granted as a matter of

right, but the Instructions of 1561 tell inquisitors that, if they feel

scruple, they should grant it, but if satisfied that the sentence is

justified they should refuse the appeal as frivolous and dilatory.[16]

Still the right to ask it was so fully recognized that, if the accused

was not twenty-five years of age and thus a minor, his _curador_ or

guardian was required to be present, in order to interject an appeal if

he saw fit, and I have met with an instance of this in the case of

Angela Pérez, a Morisco slave, before the Toledo tribunal in 1575, where

it was as usual unsuccessful, for the Suprema confirmed the

sentence.[17] Tribunals seem not infrequently to have allowed appeals,

but, with the growing centralization in the Suprema, they became

superfluous and a formula, drawn up in 1690, directs that no attention

be paid to them.[18]

[Sidenote: _CONDITIONS_]

When the indications of guilt were too slender to justify torture, the

consulta de fe sometimes voted to threaten torture.[19] Then the

sentence was formally drawn up and read to the accused, he was taken to

the torture-chamber, stripped and perhaps tied on the _potro_ or

_escalera_, without proceeding further. A curious case of this was that

of Leonor Pérez who, at the age of seventy, was sentenced, May 3, 1634,

in Valladolid, to be placed _in conspectu tormentorum_. When stripped,

on May 10th, the executioner reported marks of previous torture; the

proceedings were suspended and, on May 13th, she admitted that, twenty

years before, she had been tortured in Coimbra. On June 14th the

sentence was again executed, but, before being stripped, she confessed

to some Jewish beliefs and then fainted. A postponement was necessary

and two days later she revoked her confession. The case dragged on and

it was not until August 1, 1637 that she was condemned to abjure _de

vehementi_, to six years of exile, a fine of two hundred ducats, and to

be paraded in _vergüenza_, but we still hear of her as in prison, early

in 1639.[20] It required strong nerves to endure this threat of torture,

with its terrifying formalities and adjurations, and it was frequently

effective.

* * * * *

The conditions held to justify torture were that the offence charged was

of sufficient gravity, and that the evidence, while not wholly decisive,

was such that the accused should have the opportunity of "purging" it,

by endurance proportionate to its strength. From the inquisitor's point

of view, it was a favor to the accused, as it gave him a chance which

was denied to those whose condemnation was resolved upon. This is

illustrated by a highly significant case in the Toledo tribunal in 1488.

Juan del Rio had lived long in Rome, where he was present in the jubilee

of 1475; by the arts of the courtier he won the favor of Sixtus IV and

returned to Spain about 1483, loaded with benefices--among them a

prebend in the Toledo cathedral--which excited cupidity and enmity. He

was an Old Christian, of pure Biscayan descent, who could not be

suspected of Judaism, but he was a loose and inconsiderate chatterer; in

the Spain which he had left there was much licence, in the Rome where he

had so long sojourned there was more; he could not, on his return,

accommodate himself to the new order of things, and his reckless talk

gave the opportunity of making vacancies of his numerous preferments.

The evidence against him was of the flimsiest; the most serious charge

was that, when a tenant had been unable to pay rent on account of the

Inquisition, he had petulantly wished it at the devil. At a later period

he would have had a chance to purge the evidence by the water-torture,

but this was not permitted him; he was hurried to the stake as a

pertinacious _negativo_, leaving his spoils to those who could grasp

them.[21]

It was a well-accepted maxim of the civil law that torture should not be

employed when the penalty of the crime charged was less severe than the

infliction of torture--an equation of suffering which afforded to the

doctors ample opportunity of defining the unknown quantity. This was

fully accepted by the Inquisition and we are told that torture is not

indicated for propositions merely offensive, rash, scandalous or

blasphemous, or for the assertion that simple fornication is not a

mortal sin, or for heretical blasphemy, or sorcery, or for propositions

arising from ignorance, or for bigamy or solicitation in the

confessional, or for lying under excommunication for a year, or for

other matters which infer only light suspicion of heresy, even though

for some of these offences the punishment was scourging and the galleys.

Torture is freely alluded to as an irreparable injury the use of which

would be unjustifiable in such matters.[22]

[Sidenote: _CONDITIONS_]

This, however, was, like everything else in this nebulous region, open

to considerable laxity in application. When Francisco de Tornamira, a

boy of eighteen and page of the Duke of Pastrana, was tried in 1592, on

the charge of having said that Jews and Moors could be saved if they had

faith in their respective beliefs, he denied and was tortured till he

confessed, and then the triviality of his offence was admitted by

subjecting him only to abjuration _de levi_, to hearing a mass as a

penitent in the audience-chamber, and to a reprimand. The same tribunal

in 1579, tried Stefano Grillen, an Italian, who, in a discussion with

some chance fellow-travellers, maintained that the miracles at the

shrines of Our Lady of Atocha and of la Caridad were wrought by the

Virgin herself and not by her images. He freely confessed but was

tortured--apparently on intention--and was dismissed with the same

trivial punishment as Tornamira.[23] Even more suggestive is the case of

Juan Pereira, a boy of fifteen, tried, in 1646, for Judaism at

Valladolid. The proceedings were dilatory and he gradually became

demented; nothing could be done with him and opinions were divided as to

the reality of his insanity. The Suprema was applied to and sagely

ordered torture to find out. It was administered, April 22, 1648, but

the method of diagnosis was not as successful as its ingenuity deserved

and, in August, he was sent to a hospital for six months, with

instructions to observe him carefully. As his name after this disappears

from the records, he probably died in the hospital.[24] It is evident

that the Inquisition did not take to heart the warning issued by the

Suprema, in 1533, that torture was a very delicate matter.[25]

When we come to inquire as to the character of evidence requiring

torture for its elucidation, we find how illusory were all the attempts

of the legists to lay down absolute rules, and how it all ended in

leaving the matter to the discretion of the tribunal. As confession,

though desired, was not essential to conviction, the _negativo_ who was

convicted on sufficient evidence was not to be tortured, but was to be

relaxed. Even this rule, however, could be set aside at the caprice of

the judge, though he was warned, in such cases, to put on record a

protest that he did not direct the torture against the matters that had

been proved, for the very good reason that endurance of torture might

purge them and nullify the proof.[26] It was impossible to reduce to a

logical formula that which in its essence was illogical, or to frame an

accurate definition of evidence that was insufficient for conviction yet

sufficient for torture. It was easy to say that _semiplena_ evidence

suffices, but what was semiplena? One authority will tell us that a

single witness, even an accomplice, justifies torture, another that

three accomplice witnesses are requisite. One impartial and

unexceptionable witness, again, is sometimes held to require public fame

as an adjuvant, but the records are full of cases in which torture was

employed on the unsupported testimony of a single witness. The weight of

other more or less confirmatory evidence was also keenly debated,

without reaching substantial agreement--whether flight before arrest, or

breaking gaol, or vacillation and equivocation when examined, or even

pallor, was sufficient justification.[27] It is not surprising,

therefore, that, as a practical result, we are told that all these

questions must be left to the discretion of the judge, to be decided in

each individual case.[28] Under such conditions it would be useless to

expect consistency of practice in all tribunals and at all periods. We

have seen above that cases were sometimes suspended because evidence had

not been ratified, yet the Toledo tribunal, in 1584, tortured Lope el

Gordo for that very reason, because the chief witness against him had

not ratified his testimony, and it is satisfactory to add that Lope

endured the torments and thus earned suspension of his case.[29]

The _diminuto_, whose confession did not cover all the adverse evidence,

was, according to rule, to be tortured in order to account for the

deficiency. If he endured without further admission, he was to be

punished on the basis of what he had confessed, but if he did not thus

purge the evidence, he was to be sent to the galleys. This was sometimes

done in mere surplusage, apparently to gratify the curiosity of the

tribunal, as in the Toledo case of Antonio de Andrada, in 1585, who

confessed what was amply sufficient for his punishment, but, as there

were some omissions, was tortured to elucidate them. In the seventeenth

century, however, we are assured that there was much caution used in

torturing diminutos, and that it was not done unless the omitted matters

were such as to call for relaxation. If they concerned accomplices,

however, whom the culprit was suspected of shielding, he was tortured

_in caput alienum_. Retraction or vacillation of confession necessarily

required torture to reconcile the contradiction; this occurred chiefly

with timid persons, frightened by the demand of the fiscal for torture,

and thus led to make admissions which they subsequently recalled, thus

bringing upon themselves what they had sought to avoid.[30] The question

of intention, in the performance of acts in themselves indifferent, was,

as we have seen, the frequent occasion of torture, as there was no other

means known to the jurisprudence of the period, which was bent on

ascertaining the secrets of the offender's mind.

[Sidenote: _WITNESSES_]

Yet it is possible that in some cases, when torture appears to be pure

surplusage, there may have been the kindly intention of contributing to

the salvation of the sufferer, by inducing or confirming his conversion;

for habitual persecution for the greater glory of God induced a state of

mind precluding all rational intellectual processes, where the faith was

concerned. Thus Rojas tells us that there should be no hesitation in the

use of torture, when the salvation of the culprit's soul was involved,

so that he might be reconciled to the Church and undergo penance through

which he might be saved.[31] This reasoning was urged in the case of

Réné Perrault, in 1624, by some of the consultores of the tribunal of

Toledo. His crime of maltreating the Host was public and unquestionable,

but he had varied in his statements as to his faith; the consulta de fe

was unanimous in ordering torture to discover possible accomplices, but

some of the members desired a special additional torture in order to

confirm him in the faith and save his soul.[32]

* * * * *

That witnesses should be tortured, in order to obtain or confirm their

testimony, is an abuse which, repulsive as it may seem to us, has been,

with more or less disguise, a practice wherever torture has been used.

It is true that the Roman law prohibited that one who had admitted his

own guilt should be examined as to that of another, and this principle,

adopted in the False Decretals, became a part of the early canon

law.[33] The Inquisition, however, regarded the conviction of a heretic

as only the preliminary to forcing him to denounce his associates; the

earliest papal utterance, in 1252, authorizing its use of torture,

prescribed the employment of this means to discover accomplices and

finally Paul IV and Pius V decreed that all who were convicted and

confessed should, at the discretion of the inquisitors, be tortured for

this purpose.[34] The _question préalable_ or _définitive_, in which the

convict was tortured to make him reveal his associates, became, through

the influence of the Inquisition, a part of the criminal jurisprudence

of all lands in which torture was employed. It was, in reality, the

torture of witnesses, for the criminal's fate had been decided, and he

was thus used only to give testimony against others.

The Spanish Inquisition was, therefore, only following a general

practice when it tortured, _in caput alienum_, those who had confessed

their guilt. No confession was accepted as complete unless it revealed

the names of those whom the penitent knew to be guilty of heretical

acts, if there was reason to suspect that he was not fully discharging

his conscience in this respect, torture was the natural resort. Even the

impenitent or the relapsed, who was doomed to relaxation, was thus to be

tortured and was to be given clearly to understand that it was as a

witness and not as a party, and that his endurance of torture would not

save him from the stake. The Instructions of 1561, however, warn

inquisitors that in these cases much consideration should be exercised

and torture _in caput alienum_ was rather the exception in Spain, than

the rule as in Rome.[35] In the case of the _negativo_, against whom

conclusive evidence was had, and who thus was to be condemned without

torture, the device of torturing him against his presumable accomplices

afforded an opportunity of endeavoring to secure his own confession and

conversion. We have seen this fail, in 1596, in the Mexican case of

Manuel Diaz, nor was it more successful in Lima, in 1639, with Enrique

de Paz y Mello, although the final outcome was different. He

persistently denied through five successive publications of evidence, as

testimony against him accumulated in the trials of his associates. He

was sentenced to relaxation and torture _in caput alienum_; it was

administered with great severity without overcoming his fortitude, and

he persisted through five other publications as fresh evidence was

gathered. Yet at midnight before the auto de fe, in which he was to be

burnt, he weakened. He confessed as to himself and others and his

sentence was modified to reconciliation and the galleys, while good use

was made of his revelations against thirty of his accomplices.[36]

[Sidenote: _NO EXEMPTIONS_]

The torture of witnesses who were not themselves under trial was

permitted when they varied or retracted, or so contradicted other

witnesses that it was deemed necessary thus to ascertain the truth; but

whether clerical witnesses could be so treated was a subject of debate.

As a rule torture in such cases was directed to be moderate, neither

light nor excessive, but when testimony was revoked it could be repeated

up to three inflictions.[37] As we have seen above (Vol. II, p. 537)

slaves testifying in the cases of their masters could always be tortured

if necessary to confirm their evidence. In the prosecution of Juan de la

Caballería, in 1488, as accessory to the murder of San Pedro Arbués, his

slave-girl Lucía gave compromising evidence which she was persuaded to

retract, with the result that she was twice tortured and confirmed

it.[38]

* * * * *

Like _majestas_, in heresy there were no privileged classes exempt from

torture. Nobles were subject to it and so were ecclesiastics of all

ranks, but the latter were to be tortured less severely than laymen,

unless the case was very grave, and they were entitled to a clerical

torturer if one could be found to perform the office. As in their

arrest, so in torture the sentence, by a carta acordada of 1633, had to

be submitted to the Suprema for confirmation.[39]

As regards age, there seems to have been none that conferred exemption.

Llorente, indeed, in describing a case in which a woman of ninety was

tortured at Cuenca, says that this was contrary to the orders of the

Suprema which prescribed that the aged should only be placed _in

conspectu tormentorum_,[40] but I have never met with such a rule. In

1540 the Suprema ordered that consideration should be given to the

quality and age of the accused and, if advisable, the torture should be

very moderate, while the Instructions of 1561, which are very full,

impose no limit of age and leave everything to the discretion of the

tribunal.[41] Cases are by no means infrequent in which age combined

with infirmity is given as a reason for omitting torture or inflicting

it with moderation, but age alone offered no exemption. At a Toledo auto

de fe we find Isabel Canese, aged seventy-eight, who promptly confessed

before the torture had proceeded very far, and Isabel de Jaen, aged

eighty who, at the fifth turn of the cords fainted and was revived with

difficulty.[42] In 1607, at Valencia, Jaime Chuleyla, aged seventy-six,

after confessing certain matters, was accused by a new witness of being

an alfaquí; this he denied and was duly tortured.[43]

Not much more respect was paid to youth. In 1607, at Valencia, Isabel

Madalena, a girl of thirteen, who was vaguely accused of Moorish

practices, was tortured, overcame the torture and was penanced with a

hundred lashes. In the same year that tribunal showed more consideration

for Joan de Heredia, a boy of ten or eleven, whom a lying witness

accused of going to a house where Moorish doctrines were taught. On his

steadfast denial, he was sentenced to be placed _in conspectu

tormentorum_, which was carried out in spite of an appeal by his

procurator, but he persisted in asserting his innocence and the case was

suspended.[44] Mental incapacity, short of insanity, was not often

allowed exemption and it is creditable to the Valencia tribunal that

when, about 1710, the Suprema ordered the torture of Joseph Felix, for

intention with regard to certain propositions, it remonstrated and

represented that he was too ignorant to comprehend the object of the

torture.[45]

* * * * *

[Sidenote: _CONDITION OF PATIENT_]

It was a universal law that torture should not endanger life or limb

and, although this was often disregarded when the work was under way, it

called for a certain amount of preliminary caution to see that the

patient was in condition promising endurance--caution admitted in theory

but not always observed in practice. When there was doubt, the physician

of the Inquisition was sometimes called in, as in the case of Rodrigo

Pérez, at Toledo, in 1600, who was sick and weak, and the medical

certificate that torture would endanger health and life sufficed to save

him, but the Suprema was not so considerate when, in 1636, it ordered

the Valencia tribunal to torture Joseph Pujal before transferring him to

the hospital, as was done afterwards on account of his illness.[46]

Pregnancy has always been deemed a sufficient reason for at least

postponing the infliction, but the Madrid tribunal, in instructions of

1690, only makes the concession of placing pregnant women on a seat, in

place of binding them on the rack, while applying the exceedingly severe

torture of the _garrote_--sharp cords, two on each arm and two on each

leg, bound around the limb and twisted with a short lever.[47] Hernia

was regarded, at least in the earlier time, as precluding torture, and I

have met with several cases in which it served to exempt the patient

but, in 1662, the official instructions of the Suprema order that no

exceptions be made on that account, save the omission of the _trampazo

vigoroso_, which causes downward strain; in the other tortures a good

strong truss suffices to avert danger and it should always be kept on

hand in readiness for such subjects.[48] In accordance with this the

Madrid tribunal in 1690, orders for hernia cases the use of the seat

provided for pregnant women. As regards women who were suckling, there

seems to have been no established rule. In 1575, when the Valencia

tribunal proposed to torture María Gilo, the physician who was called in

reported that it would expose the child to imminent risk and the purpose

was abandoned. In 1608, however, at Toledo, when the same question arose

in the case of Luisa de Narvaez, the consulta voted in discordia and the

Suprema ordered her to be tortured.[49]

Besides these generalities, there were occasional special cases in which

torture was abandoned in consequence of the condition of the

patient--heart disease, excessive debility, repeated faintings during

the administration and other causes. The physician and the surgeon were

always called in, when the prisoner was stripped, to examine him and

they were kept at hand to be summoned in case of accident. The tribunals

seem to have been more tender-hearted than the Suprema which, in its

instructions of 1662, reproved inquisitors who avoid sentencing to

torture on account of weakness or of a broken arm. This, it says, is not

proper, because it forfeits the opportunity of obtaining confession in

the various preliminaries of reading the sentence, carrying to the

torture-chamber, stripping him and tying him to the trestle; besides,

after commencing, the torture is always to be stopped when the physician

so orders.[50] There was another salutary precaution--that there should

be a proper interval between the last meal and the torture. About 1560,

Inquisitor Cervantes says that the patient is not to have food or drink

on the evening before or on the morning of the infliction and, in 1722,

a writer specifies eight hours for the preliminary fasting.[51]

* * * * *

[Sidenote: _THE EXECUTIONER_]

In the administration of torture, all the inquisitors and the episcopal

representative were required to be present, with a notary or secretary

to record the proceedings. No one else save the executioner was allowed

to be present, except when the physician or surgeon was called in. In

the earlier period, there was some trouble in providing an official to

perform the repulsive work. An effort seems to have been made to compel

the minor employees to do it but with doubtful success. Ferdinand, in a

letter of July 22, 1486, to Torquemada, complains that the inquisitors

of Saragossa had employed a torturer because the messengers had refused

to do the work, and he suggests that a messenger be discharged and the

torturer serve in his place without increase of salary; if this cannot

be done the salary should be reduced. No salaried torturer appears in

the pay-rolls; the duties were not constant and doubtless when wanted

proper functionaries were called in and paid--but there is

suggestiveness in a letter of Ferdinand, in 1498, ordering the

restoration of a certain Pedro de Moros, who had been dropped, to serve

as messenger and "for such other duties as the inquisitors might order"

at five hundred sueldos a year.[52] At one time the alcaide of the

prison seems to have been the official torturer for, in 1536, the

Suprema writes to the inquisitors of Navarre that, if their alcaide is

not skilled in the business, they must find some one who is, and not

work the implements themselves, as they seem to have done, for it is not

befitting the dignity of their persons or office.[53] In 1587, at

Valencia, we hear that the messenger and portero served as assistants

and the Suprema ordered the work to be entrusted to a confidential

familiar.[54] Eventually however the tribunals employed the public

executioner of the town, who was skilled in his vocation. When, in 1646,

at Valladolid, Isabel López was ordered to be tortured on November 23d,

the alcaide reported that the public functionary was absent and the time

of his return was uncertain; the torture was necessarily postponed and,

on the 27th, Isabel took it into her head to confess and thus escaped

the infliction.[55] In Madrid, from March to August, 1681, Alonso de

Alcalá, the city executioner, was paid by the tribunal forty-four

ducats, for eleven torturings, at four ducats apiece.[56] It seems

strange that objection should be made to the torturer being disguised

but, in 1524, the Suprema forbade him to wear a mask or to be wrapped in

a sheet; subsequently he was permitted to wear a hood and to change his

garments and, in the seventeenth century, a mask and other disguise were

permissible, if it were thought best that he should not be

recognized.[57]

At every stage in the preliminaries, after reading the sentence, taking

the prisoner down to the torture-chamber, calling in the executioner,

stripping the prisoner and tying him to the trestle, there was a pause

in which he was solemnly adjured to tell the truth for the love of God,

as the inquisitors did not desire to see him suffer.[58] The exposure of

stripping was not a mere wanton aggravation but was necessary, for the

cords around the thighs and arms, the belt at the waist with cords

passing from it over the shoulders from front to back, required access

to every portion of the body and, at the end of the torture, there was

little of the surface that had not had its due share of agony. Women as

well as men were subjected to this, the slight concession to decency

being the _zaragüelles_ or _paños de la vergüenza_, a kind of

abbreviated bathing-trunks, but the denudation seems to have been

complete before these were put on.[59] The patient was admonished not

to tell falsehoods about himself or others and, during the torture, the

only words to be addressed to him were "Tell the truth." No questions

were to be put and no names mentioned to him, for the reason, as we are

told, that the sufferers in their agonies were ready to say anything

that was in any way suggested, and to bear false-witness against

themselves and others. The executioner was not to speak to the patient,

or make faces at him, or threaten him, and the inquisitors should see

that he so arranged the cords and other devices as not to cause

permanent crippling or breaking of the bones. The work was to proceed

slowly with due intervals between each turn of the _garrotes_ or hoist

in the _garrucha_, or otherwise the effect was lost, and the patient was

apt to overcome the torture.

It was a universal rule that torture could be applied only once, unless

new evidence supervened which required purging, but this restriction was

easily evaded. Though torture could not be repeated, it could be

continued and, when it was over, the patient was told that the

inquisitors were not satisfied, but were obliged to suspend it for the

present, and that it would be resumed at another time, if he did not

tell the whole truth. Thus it could be repeated from time to time as

often as the consulta de fe might deem expedient.[60] The secretary

faithfully recorded all that passed, even to the shrieks of the victim,

his despairing ejaculations and his piteous appeals for mercy or to be

put to death, nor would it be easy to conceive anything more fitted to

excite the deepest compassion than these cold-blooded, matter-of-fact

reports.

* * * * *

As for the varieties of torture currently employed, it must be borne in

mind that the Inquisition largely depended on the public executioners,

and its methods thus were necessarily identical with those of the

secular courts; while even when its own officials performed the duty,

they would naturally follow the customary routine. The Inquisition thus

had no special refinements of torture and indeed, so far as I have had

opportunity of investigation, it confined itself to a few methods out of

the abundant repertory of the public functionaries.

[Sidenote: _VARIETIES_]

In the earlier period only two tortures were generally in vogue--the

_garrucha_ or pulleys and the water-torture. These are the only ones

alluded to by Pablo García and both of them were old and

well-established forms.[61] The former, known in Italy as the

_strappado_, consisted in tying the patient's hands behind his back and

then, with a cord around his wrists, hoisting him from the floor, with

or without weights to his feet, keeping him suspended as long as was

desired and perhaps occasionally letting him fall a short distance with

a jerk. About 1620 a writer prescribes that the elevating movement

should be slow, for if it is rapid the pain is not lasting; for a time

the patient should be kept at tiptoe, so that his feet scarce touch the

floor; when hoisted he should be held there while the psalm Miserere is

thrice repeated slowly in silence, and he is to be repeatedly admonished

to tell the truth. If this fail he is to be lowered, one of the weights

is to be attached to his feet and he is to be hoisted for the space of

two Misereres, the process being repeated with increasing weights as

often and as long as may be judged expedient.[62]

The water-torture was more complicated. The patient was placed on an

_escalera_ or _potro_--a kind of trestle, with sharp-edged rungs across

it like a ladder. It slanted so that the head was lower than the feet

and, at the lower end was a depression in which the head sank, while an

iron band around the forehead or throat kept it immovable. Sharp cords,

called _cordeles_, which cut into the flesh, attached the arms and legs

to the side of the trestle and others, known as _garrotes_, from sticks

thrust in them and twisted around like a tourniquet till the cords cut

more or less deeply into the flesh, were twined around the upper and

lower arms, the thighs and the calves; a _bostezo_, or iron prong,

distended the mouth, a _toca_, or strip of linen, was thrust down the

throat to conduct water trickling slowly from a _jarra_ or jar, holding

usually a little more than a quart. The patient strangled and gasped and

suffocated and, at intervals, the toca was withdrawn and he was adjured

to tell the truth. The severity of the infliction was measured by the

number of jars consumed, sometimes reaching to six or eight. In 1490, in

the case of the priest Diego García, a single quart satisfied the

inquisitors and he was acquitted.[63] In the Mexican case of Manuel

Díaz, in 1596, the cordeles were applied; then seven garrotes were

twisted around arms and legs, the toca was thrust down his throat and

twelve jarras of a pint each were allowed to drip through it, the toca

being drawn up four times during the operation. In the Toledo case of

Marí Rodríguez, in 1592, the operation was divided, the cordeles being

applied while she was seated on the _banquillo_, and were given eight

turns; she was then transferred to the trestle, and the garrotes were

used, followed by the water; at the second jarra she vomited profusely;

she was untied and fell to the floor. The executioner lifted her up and

put on her chemise; she was told that if she would not tell the truth

the torture would be continued; she protested that she had told the

truth and it was suspended. For nine months she was left in her cell,

then the consulta de fe voted to suspend the case and she was told to be

gone in God's name.[64]

It was probably not long after this that these forms of torture

gradually fell into disuse and were replaced by others which apparently

were regarded as more merciful. In 1646 the Suprema applied to the

tribunal of Córdova for information concerning the garrucha and silla

and for a description of the _trampa_ and _trampazo_ which it used, with

an estimate of their severity. The tribunal replied that the silla had

been abandoned because it could scarce be called a torture and the

garrucha on account of the danger of causing dislocations. For more than

thirty years the tribunal, as well as the secular courts, had

discontinued its use as also the brazier of coals, heated plates of

metal, hot bricks, the toca with seven pints of water, the

_depiñoncillo_, _escarabajo_, _tablillas_, _sueño_ and others. The

methods in use were the cordeles and garrotes, of which there were three

kinds, the _vuelta de trampa_, the _mancuerda_ and stretching the

accused in the _potro_ or rack.

[Sidenote: _VARIETIES_]

The letter proceeds to describe at great length and in much detail these

somewhat complicated processes. In abandoning the pulleys and the

water-jar, the patient gained little. He was adjusted for torment by a

belt or girdle with which he was swung from the ground; his arms were

tied together across his breast and were attached by cords to rings in

the wall. For the trampa or trampazo the ladder in the potro had one of

its rungs removed so as to enable the legs to pass through; another bar

with a sharp edge was set below it and through this narrow opening the

legs were forcibly pulled by means of a cord fastened around the toes

with a turn around the ankle. Each _vuelta_, or turn given to the cord,

gained about three inches; five vueltas were reckoned a most rigorous

torture, and three were the ordinary practice, even with the most

robust. Leaving him stretched in this position, the next step was the

mancuerda, in which a cord was passed around the arms, which the

executioner wound around himself and threw himself backward, casting his

whole weight and pushing with his foot against the potro. The cord, we

are told, would cut through skin and muscle to the bone, while the body

of the patient was stretched as in a rack, between it and the cords at

the feet. The belt or girdle at the waist, subjected to these alternate

forces was forced back and forth and contributed further to the

suffering. This was repeated six or eight times with the mancuerda, on

different parts of the arms, and the patients usually fainted,

especially if they were women.

After this the potro came in play. The patient was released from the

trampa and mancuerda and placed on the eleven sharp rungs of the potro,

his ankles rigidly tied to the sides and his head sinking into a

depression where it was held immovable by a cord across the forehead.

The belt was loosened so that it would slip around. Three cords were

passed around each upper arm, the ends being carried into rings on the

sides of the potro and furnished with garrotes or sticks to twist them

tight; two similar ones were put on each thigh and one on each calf,

making twelve in all. The ends were carried to a _maestra garrote_ by

which the executioner could control all at once. These worked not only

by compression but by travelling around the limbs, carrying away skin

and flesh. Each half round was reckoned a _vuelta_ or turn, six or seven

of which was the maximum, but it was usual not to exceed five, even with

strong men. Formerly the same was done with the cord around the

forehead, but this was abandoned as it was apt to start the eyes from

their sockets. All this, the Cordova tribunal concludes, is very

violent, but it is less so and less dangerous than the abandoned

methods.

These remained practically the tortures in use. In 1662 the Suprema, in

ordering the tribunal of Galicia to "continue" the torture of Antonio

Méndez, called upon it to report as to its manner of administering

torture. Its answer of May 13th shows that it was using the mancuerda

and potro, though after a somewhat primitive fashion. To this, by order

of the Suprema, Gonzalo Bravo replied, May 22d with elaborate

instructions, especially as to the trampazo, indicating that

substantially the methods described by Córdova were recognized

officially. Galicia appears to have puzzled over this until September

19th, when it apologized for its lack of experience and asked for

detailed plans and drawings of the form of potro required. It is fairly

presumable from all this that thenceforward these new methods were

adopted in all the tribunals.[65]

* * * * *

[Sidenote: _SEVERITY_]

There was and could be no absolute limitation on the severity of

torture. The Instructions of 1561 say that the law recognizes it as

uncertain and dangerous in view of the difference in bodily and mental

strength among men, wherefore no certain rule can be given, but it must

be left to the discretion of judges, to be governed by law, reason and

conscience.[66] All that Gonzalo Bravo can say, in the Instructions of

1662, is that its proper regulation determines the just decision of

cases, and the verification of truth; the discretion and prudence of the

judges must look to this, tempered by the customary compassion of the

Holy Office, in such way that it shall neither exceed nor fall short.

How this discretion was exercised depended wholly on the temper of the

tribunal. One authority tells us that torture should never be prolonged

more than half an hour, but the cases are numerous in which it lasted

for two and even three hours. In that of Antonio López, at Valladolid,

in 1648, it commenced at eight o'clock and continued until eleven,

leaving him with a crippled arm; in a fortnight he endeavored to

strangle himself, and he died within a month.[67] Such cases were by no

means rare. Gabriel Rodríguez, at Valencia, about 1710, was tortured

thrice and condemned to the galleys, but this was commuted on finding

that he was crippled "por la violencia de la tortura."[68] Nor was death

by any means unknown. In 1623, Diego Enríquez, at Valladolid, was

tortured December 13th. In the process an "accident" occurred and he was

carried to his cell. On the 15th the physician reported that he should

be removed to a hospital, which was done with the greatest secrecy and

he died there. There is something hideously suggestive in such a matter

of fact record as that of Blanca Rodríguez Matos, at Valladolid, which

simply says that she was voted to torture, May 21, 1655, and it having

been executed she died the same day; the case was continued against her

fame and memory and, in due course, was suspended, November 19th.[69]

The very large number of cases recorded in which the accused overcame

the torture without confession would argue that it was frequently light.

This is doubtless true to a great extent, but the surprising endurance

sometimes displayed shows that this was not always the case. Thus Tomás

de Leon, at Valladolid, November 5, 1638, was subjected to all the

successive varieties and overcame them, although at the end it was found

that his left arm was broken. So, in 1643, in the same tribunal,

Engracia Rodríguez, a woman sixty years of age, had a toe wrenched off

while in the _balestilla_. Nevertheless the torture proceeded until, in

the first turn of the mancuerda, an arm was broken. It then was stopped

without having extorted a confession, but her fortitude availed her

little, for fresh evidence supervened against her and, some ten months

later, she confessed to Jewish practices. Another of the same group,

Florencia de Leon, endured the balestilla, three turns of the mancuerda

and the potro without confessing, but she did not escape without

reconciliation and prison.[70]

The process and its effects on the patient can best be understood from

the passionless business-like reports of the secretary, in which the

incidents are recorded to enable the consulta de fe to vote

intelligently. They are of various degrees of horror and I select one

which omits the screams and cries of the victim that are usually set

forth. It is a very moderate case of water-torture, carried only to a

single jarra, administered in 1568 by the tribunal of Toledo to Elvira

del Campo, accused of not eating pork and of putting on clean linen on

Saturdays. She admitted the acts but denied heretical intent and was

tortured on intention. On April 6th she was brought before the

inquisitors and episcopal vicar and, after some preliminaries, was told

that it was determined to torture her, and in view of this peril she

should tell the truth, to which she replied that she had done so. The

sentence of torture was then read, when she fell on her knees and begged

to know what they wanted her to say. The report proceeds:

[Sidenote: _REPORTS_]

She was carried to the torture-chamber and told to tell the truth,

when she said that she had nothing to say. She was ordered to be

stripped and again admonished, but was silent. When stripped, she

said "Señores, I have done all that is said of me and I bear

false-witness against myself, for I do not want to see myself in

such trouble; please God, I have done nothing." She was told not to

bring false testimony against herself but to tell the truth. The

tying of the arms was commenced; she said "I have told the truth;

what have I to tell?" She was told to tell the truth and replied "I

have told the truth and have nothing to tell." One cord was applied

to the arms and twisted and she was admonished to tell the truth

but said she had nothing to tell. Then she screamed and said "I

have done all they say." Told to tell in detail what she had done

she replied "I have already told the truth." Then she screamed and

said "Tell me what you want for I don't know what to say." She was

told to tell what she had done, for she was tortured because she

had not done so, and another turn of the cord was ordered. She

cried "Loosen me, Señores and tell me what I have to say: I do not

know what I have done, O Lord have mercy on me, a sinner!" Another

turn was given and she said "Loosen me a little that I may remember

what I have to tell; I don't know what I have done; I did not eat

pork for it made me sick; I have done everything; loosen me and I

will tell the truth." Another turn of the cord was ordered, when

she said "Loosen me and I will tell the truth; I don't know what I

have to tell--loosen me for the sake of God--tell me what I have to

say--I did it, I did it--they hurt me Señor--loosen me, loosen me

and I will tell it." She was told to tell it and said "I don't know

what I have to tell--Señor I did it--I have nothing to tell--Oh my

arms! release me and I will tell it." She was asked to tell what

she did and said "I don't know, I did not eat because I did not

wish to." She was asked why she did not wish to and replied "Ay!

loosen me, loosen me--take me from here and I will tell it when I

am taken away--I say that I did not eat it." She was told to speak

and said "I did not eat it, I don't know why." Another turn was

ordered and she said "Señor I did not eat it because I did not wish

to--release me and I will tell it." She was told to tell what she

had done contrary to our holy Catholic faith. She said "Take me

from here and tell me what I have to say--they hurt me--Oh my arms,

my arms!" which she repeated many times and went on "I don't

remember--tell me what I have to say--O wretched me!--I will tell

all that is wanted, Señores--they are breaking my arms--loosen me a

little--I did everything that is said of me." She was told to tell

in detail truly what she did. She said "What am I wanted to tell? I

did everything--loosen me for I don't remember what I have to

tell--don't you see what a weak woman I am?--Oh! Oh! my arms are

breaking." More turns were ordered and as they were given she cried

"Oh! Oh! loosen me for I don't know what I have to say--Oh my

arms!--I don't know what I have to say--if I did I would tell it."

The cords were ordered to be tightened when she said "Señores have

you no pity on a sinful woman?" She was told, yes, if she would

tell the truth. She said, "Señor tell me, tell me it." The cords

were tightened again, and she said "I have already said that I did

it." She was ordered to tell it in detail, to which she said "I

don't know how to tell it señor, I don't know." Then the cords were

separated and counted, and there were sixteen turns, and in giving

the last turn the cord broke.

She was then ordered to be placed on the potro. She said "Señores,

why will you not tell me what I have to say? Señor, put me on the

ground--have I not said that I did it all?" She was told to tell

it. She said "I don't remember--take me away--I did what the

witnesses say." She was told to tell in detail what the witnesses

said. She said "Señor, as I have told you, I do not know for

certain. I have said that I did all that the witnesses say. Señores

release me, for I do not remember it." She was told to tell it. She

said "I do not know it. Oh! Oh! they are tearing me to pieces--I

have said that I did it--let me go." She was told to tell it. She

said "Señores, it does not help me to say that I did it and I have

admitted that what I have done has brought me to this

suffering--Señor, you know the truth--Señores, for God's sake have

mercy on me. Oh Señor, take these things from my arms--Señor

release me, they are killing me." She was tied on the potro with

the cords, she was admonished to tell the truth and the garrotes

were ordered to be tightened. She said "Señor do you not see how

these people are killing me? Señor, I did it--for God's sake let me

go." She was told to tell it. She said "Señor, remind me of what I

did not know--Señores have mercy upon me--let me go for God's

sake--they have no pity on me--I did it--take me from here and I

will remember what I cannot here." She was told to tell the truth,

or the cords would be tightened. She said "Remind me of what I have

to say for I don't know it--I said that I did not want to eat it--I

know only that I did not want to eat it," and this she repeated

many times. She was told to tell why she did not want to eat it.

She said, "For the reason that the witnesses say--I don't know how

to tell it--miserable that I am that I don't know how to tell it--I

say I did it and my God how can I tell it?" Then she said that, as

she did not do it, how could she tell it--"They will not listen to

me--these people want to kill me--release me and I will tell the

truth." She was again admonished to tell the truth. She said, "I

did it, I don't know how I did it--I did it for what the witnesses

say--let me go--I have lost my senses and I don't know how to tell

it--loosen me and I will tell the truth." Then she said "Señor, I

did it, I don't know how I have to tell it, but I tell it as the

witnesses say--I wish to tell it--take me from here--Señor as the

witnesses say, so I say and confess it." She was told to declare

it. She said "I don't know how to say it--I have no memory--Lord,

you are witness that if I knew how to say anything else I would say

it. I know nothing more to say than that I did it and God knows

it." She said many times, "Señores, Señores, nothing helps me. You,

Lord, hear that I tell the truth and can say no more--they are

tearing out my soul--order them to loosen me." Then she said, "I do

not say that I did it--I said no more." Then she said, "Señor, I

did it to observe that Law." She was asked what Law. She said, "The

Law that the witnesses say--I declare it all Señor, and don't

remember what Law it was--O, wretched was the mother that bore me."

She was asked what was the Law she meant and what was the Law that

she said the witnesses say. This was asked repeatedly, but she was

silent and at last said that she did not know. She was told to tell

the truth or the garrotes would be tightened but she did not

answer. Another turn was ordered on the garrotes and she was

admonished to say what Law it was. She said "If I knew what to say

I would say it. Oh Señor, I don't know what I have to say--Oh! Oh!

they are killing me--if they would tell me what--Oh, Señores! Oh,

my heart!" Then she asked why they wished her to tell what she

could not tell and cried repeatedly "O, miserable me!" Then she

said "Lord bear witness that they are killing me without my being

able to confess." She was told that if she wished to tell the truth

before the water was poured she should do so and discharge her

conscience. She said that she could not speak and that she was a

sinner. Then the linen toca was placed [in her throat] and she said

"Take it away, I am strangling and am sick in the stomach." A jar

of water was then poured down, after which she was told to tell the

truth. She clamored for confession, saying that she was dying. She

was told that the torture would be continued till she told the

truth and was admonished to tell it, but though she was questioned

repeatedly she remained silent. Then the inquisitor, seeing her

exhausted by the torture, ordered it to be suspended.

It is scarce worth while to continue this pitiful detail. Four days were

allowed to elapse, for experience showed that an interval, by stiffening

the limbs, rendered repetition more painful. She was again brought to

the torture-chamber but she broke down when stripped and piteously

begged to have her nakedness covered. The interrogatory went on, when

her replies under torture were more rambling and incoherent than before,

but her limit of endurance was reached and the inquisitors finally had

the satisfaction of eliciting a confession of Judaism and a prayer for

mercy and penance.[71]

[Sidenote: _RATIFICATION OF CONFESSION_]

It is impossible to read these melancholy records without amazement that

the incoherent and contradictory admissions through which the victim,

in his increasing agonies, sought to devise some statement in

satisfaction of the monotonous command to tell the truth, should have

been regarded by statesmen and lawgivers as possessed of intrinsic

value. The result was a test of endurance and not of veracity. In one

case we find a man of such fibres and nerves that all the efforts of the

torturer fail to elicit aught but denial--the cords may rasp through the

flesh to the bone and limbs be wrenched to the breaking without

affecting his constancy. In another, when a few turns of the garrote

have twisted a single cord into his arm--or even at the mere aspect of

the torture-chamber, with its grimly suggestive machinery--he will yield

and confess all that is wanted as to himself and all the comrades whose

names he can recall in the dizziness of his suffering. Yet, with full

knowledge of this, for centuries the secular and ecclesiastical courts

of the greater part of Christendom persisted in the use of a system

which, in the name of justice, perpetrated an infinite series of

atrocities.

* * * * *

Yet, as though still more effectually to deprive the system of all

excuse, the confession obtained at such cost was practically admitted to

be in itself worthless. To legalize it, a ratification was required,

after an interval of at least twenty-four hours, to be freely made,

without threats and apart from the torture-chamber. This was essential

in all jurisdictions, and the formula in the Inquisition was to bring

the prisoner into the audience-chamber, where his confession was read to

him as it had been written down. He was asked whether it was true or

whether he had anything to add or to omit and, under his oath, he was

expected to declare that it was properly recorded, that he had no change

to make and that he ratified it, not through fear of torture, or from

any other cause, but solely because it was the truth. Such ratification

was required even when the confession was made on hearing the sentence

of torture read or when placed _in conspectu tormentorum_.[72] This was

customarily done on the afternoon of the next day, to allow the full

twenty-four hours to expire, but there was sometimes a longer interval.

Thus, in the case of Catalina Hernández, at Toledo, who confessed on

being stripped, July 13, 1541, it was not until the 27th that her

ratification was taken, the inquisitors explaining that press of

business had prevented it earlier.[73]

The declaration in the ratification, that it was not made through fear

of torture was a falsehood, for, in all jurisdictions, a retraction of

the confession called for a repetition of torment, and in fact we

sometimes find that when the confession was made the prisoner was warned

not to retract for, if he did so, the torture would be "continued."[74]

This was possibly to evade a singularly humane provision in the

Instructions of 1484, to the effect that, if the confession is ratified,

the accused is to be duly punished, but if he retracts, in view of the

infamy resulting from the trial, he is to abjure publicly the heresy of

which he is suspect and be subjected to such penance as the inquisitors

may compassionately assign. The mercy of this, however, is considerably

modified by a succeeding clause that it is not to deprive them of the

right to repeat the torture in cases where by law they can and ought to

do so.[75] Still, it was probably the first portion of the provision

that guided the Toledo tribunal, in 1528, in the case of Diego de Uceda,

on trial for Lutheranism. At the sight of the torture-chamber he broke

down and admitted all that the witnesses had testified, but could not

remember what it was. As this was evidently inspired by fear, the

torture went on when, at the first turn of the garrote, he inculpated

himself so eagerly that he was warned not to bear false-witness against

himself. He declared it to be the truth and was untied. Before he was

called upon to ratify, he asked for an audience in which he ascribed his

confession to fear and declared himself ready to die for the faith of

the Church, and a week later he ratified this revocation, saying that he

was out of his senses under the torture. He was not tortured again and

his sentence, some months later, was in accordance with the Instructions

of 1484--to appear in an auto de fe, to abjure _de vehementi_ and to be

fined at the discretion of the inquisitors.[76]

[Sidenote: _REPETITION_]

Such cases, however, were exceptional and the regular practice was to

repeat the torture, when a confession followed by another revocation,

subjected the victim to a third torture.[77] Whether the process could

be carried on indefinitely was a doubtful question which some legists

answered in the negative on the general philosophic assumption that

nature and justice abhorred infinity, but this reasoning, however,

academically conclusive, was not respected in practice when a conviction

was desired. There was one dissuasive from revocation, which was brought

to bear when culprits gave unreasonable trouble, which was the penalty

incurred by _revocantes_. This is illustrated, as also the troublesome

questions which sometimes perplexed the tribunals, by the case of Miguel

de Castro, tried for Judaism, at Valladolid, in 1644. As a negativo, he

was tortured and confessed, after which he ratified, revoked and

ratified again. A process was commenced against him for revoking; he was

tortured again, until an arm was dislocated and he lost two fingers,

during which he confessed and then revoked the confession. He would have

been tortured a third time had not the physician and surgeon declared

him to be unable to endure it. The Suprema ordered him to be relaxed to

the secular arm, if he could not be induced to repent and return to the

Church, when, under the persuasion of two calificadores, he begged for

mercy and confessed as to himself and others. Finally he was sentenced

to reconciliation and irremissible prison and sanbenito, with a hundred

lashes as a special punishment for revocation, which was executed

January 21, 1646.[78]

Some culprits, we are told, cunningly took advantage of the opportunity

of retraction, by confessing at once, as soon as subjected to torture,

then recanting and repeating this process indefinitely, to the no small

disgust of the inquisitors. A writer of the close of the seventeenth

century, who mentions this, shows that the subject was then in an

indeterminate condition, by suggesting as a remedy that they should be

subjected to extraordinary penalties.[79] A case at Cuenca, in 1725, in

which these tactics were successful, indicates that by that time a third

torture was not recognized as lawful. Dr. Diego Matheo López Zapata, as

soon as the torturer was ready to begin, exclaimed that he was ready to

confess, and made a detailed confession of Judaic practices followed for

nearly fifty years. The next day he revoked and, when the torture was

resumed, he repeated his confession, only to revoke it as before. The

tribunal appears to have been powerless and contented itself with making

him appear in an auto de fe as a penitent, with a sanbenito to be

immediately removed, abjuration _de vehementi_ and twenty years' exile

from Cuenca, Murcia and Madrid.[80] At an earlier period he would scarce

have escaped without scourging, galleys and irremissible prison.

* * * * *

When torture was administered, without eliciting a confession, the

logical conclusion, if torture proved anything, was that the accused was

innocent. In legal phrase, he had purged the evidence and was entitled

to acquittal.[81] Such, indeed, was the law, but there was a natural

repugnance to being baffled, or to admit that innocence had been so

cruelly persecuted, and excuses were readily found to evade the law. On

such a subject there could be no definite line of practice prescribed,

and the situation is reflected by the Instructions of 1561, which tell

the inquisitor that, in such cases, he must consider the nature of the

evidence, the degree of torture employed, and the age and disposition of

the accused; if it appears that he has fully purged the evidence, he

should be fully acquitted, but if it seems that he has not been

sufficiently tortured he can be required to abjure either for light or

vehement suspicion, or some pecuniary penalty can be imposed, although

this should be done only with great consideration.[82] Thus the matter

was practically left to the discretion of the tribunal, with the implied

admission that, when torture proved unsuccessful, it was merely

surplusage.

[Sidenote: _ENDURANCE WITHOUT CONFESSION_]

The authorities naturally are not wholly at one with regard to the

practical applications of these principles--except that acquittal should

rarely be granted and, in fact, while the records are full of cases in

which torture was overcome, it is somewhat unusual to find the parties

acquitted, or their cases even suspended. About 1600 a writer tells us

that these cases are to be treated with some extraordinary penalty or

with acquittal or suspension, according to the degree of suspicion that

remains, but that Moriscos, however light the suspicion, must appear in

an auto de fe and abjure _de vehementi_ and, if there has been evidence

by single witnesses, they must be sent to the galleys for three years or

more; with other culprits, if the suspicion is light, there may be

acquittal or suspension, but suspension is the more usual. It all

depends upon the degree in which the evidence has been purged by the

torture.[83] As this degree was a matter purely conjectural,

inquisitorial discretion was unlimited.

The rule as to Moriscos is borne out by the Valencia auto de fe of 1607,

in which there appeared sixteen who had overcome the torture, most of

whom were visited with imprisonment, scourging or fines.[84] With their

expulsion in 1609-10, there was no further call for discrimination, and

the general practice is expressed about 1640, by an experienced

inquisitor, who tells us that, when there have been several single

witnesses, the accused who overcomes the torture should be subjected to

some severe extraordinary punishment, such as abjuring _de vehementi_,

with confiscation of half his property, or a heavy fine--the latter

being preferable as it is more easily collected and the culprit endures

it better in order to preserve his credit.[85] That this reflects the

current practice would appear from a Cuenca auto de fe, June 29, 1654.

Don Andrés de Fonseca had been required to abjure _de vehementi_, at

Valladolid in 1628; the evidence of his relapse was strong, but

insufficient for conviction; he endured torture without confessing; then

further evidence supervened and he was again tortured with the same

ill-success; he appeared in the auto as a penitent, abjured _de levi_,

with ten years' exile and a fine of five hundred ducats. Doña Theodora

Paula had overcome the torture and had abjuration de lev, six years'

exile and a fine of three hundred ducats. Doña Isabel de Miranda had

been unsuccessfully tortured and was sentenced to two years' exile and

three hundred ducats. So, after fruitless torture, Doña Isabel Henríquez

had the same punishment, and Manuel Lorenzo Madureyra was sentenced to

abjuration _de vehementi_, ten years' exile and five hundred ducats

fine.[86] It is to the credit of the Valladolid tribunal that, in 1624,

it showed itself more lenient and suspended six cases in which torture

proved fruitless, inflicting no punishment except six years of exile on

María Pérez, who was charged with false-witness.[87]

Perhaps the frequency with which torture was overcome may be partially

explained by bribery of the executioner. This was rendered difficult by

the secrecy surrounding all the operations of the tribunals, yet it was

possible, and the kindred of one who was arrested would naturally seek

to propitiate the minister of justice in case the prisoner should fall

into his hands. At a Valencia auto de fe, in 1594, there appeared

ninety-six Morisco penitents of whom fifty-three had been tortured

without extracting confessions.[88] It may possibly be only a

coincidence that, in 1604, Luis de Jesus, the torturer of the tribunal

was prosecuted for receiving money from Moriscos, but we may readily

imagine that communities, living in perpetual dread of the Inquisition,

might tax themselves to subsidize the executioner regularly.[89] A

similar case occurs in the Córdova auto of June 13, 1723, in which

appeared the executioner, Carlos Felipe, whose offence is discreetly

described as fautorship of heretics and unfaithfulness in their favor,

in the discharge of his office.[90]

* * * * *

[Sidenote: _FREQUENCY_]

It is a little remarkable that, although the use of torture was so

frequent and must have been generally known, there appears to have been

a shrinking from admitting it in the sentences publicly read in the

autos de fe, which habitually recited the details of the

trials--possibly attributable, in part at least, to a desire to preserve

secrecy, although it is particularly marked in the early period when

secrecy had not become so rigid as it was subsequently. Indeed, in the

sentence of Juan González Daza, who confessed under torture in 1484, at

Ciudad Real, it is mendaciously asserted that he pertinaciously denied

until he learned that his accomplice, Fernando de Theba, had confessed,

when he did so freely.[91] This continued as a rule, though

occasionally there is less reticence. In one sentence I have found it

alluded to--that of Mari Gómez, at Toledo, in 1551.[92] Sometimes there

is a veiled allusion to it, as though the inquisitors could not conceal

it wholly, but felt a certain shame in admitting it openly. Thus in the

sentence of Elvira del Campo (see p. 24), which gives a very detailed

account of the incidents of the trial, it is stated that, on using "mas

diligencias," with her she admitted the charges, and in the sentence of

Doctor Zapata, in 1725, "cierta diligencia" is alluded to as having been

employed.[93]

* * * * *

It would of course be impossible to compile statistics of the

torture-chamber, or to form a reasonably accurate estimate of the number

of cases in which it was employed during the career of the Inquisition.

Some fragmentary data, however, can be had, as in the record of the

Toledo tribunal between 1575 and 1610. During this period it tried four

hundred and eleven persons for heretical offences admitting of the use

of torture, and in these it was used once on one hundred and nine, and

twice on eight, besides two cases in which it had to be stopped on

account of the fainting of the patient, and seven in which confession

was obtained before it commenced. There were also five cases in which

the accused was placed in _conspectu tormentorum_.[94] In all, we may

say that here its agency was invoked in about thirty-two per cent. of

heretical prosecutions. This is probably less than the average. In a

number of cases tried by the tribunal of Lima between 1635 and 1639,

nearly all the accused appear to have been tortured, while the report of

the tribunal of Valladolid for 1624 shows that of eleven cases of

Judaism and one of Protestantism, eleven were tortured and, in 1655,

every case of Judaism, nine in number, was subjected to torture.[95]

After all, numbers, however they may impress the imagination, are not

supremely important. They are simply a measure of the greater or less

activity of the tribunals and not of the principles involved. Whenever

there was a doubt to solve, whether as to the sufficiency of the

evidence, the intention of the accused, the completeness with which he

had denounced his associates, or other inscrutable matter, recourse to

torture was a thing of course. In not a few cases, indeed, there seems

to have been an almost infantile confidence in its power as a universal

solvent. About 1710, Fernando Castellon, on trial at Valencia for

Judaism, claimed not to be baptized and was promptly tortured to find

out, but without success.[96] In 1579 the Toledo tribunal had to deal

with Anton Moreno, an aged peasant, accused of entertaining views too

liberal as to salvation; torture seemed the only means of definition

and, between the turns of the garrote, he was made to express his

opinions as to the saving effects of death-bed repentance and the

viaticum on a sinner who had been duly baptized with the water of the

Holy Ghost. There was ghastly ludicrousness in the attempt, under such

persuasion, to ascertain the beliefs of an untutored old man, on these

subtle questions of scholastic theology, ending with the result that he

was adjudged to be worthy only of abjuration _de levi_, with a reprimand

and hearing of a mass in the audience-chamber.[97]

[Sidenote: _FEES_]

As the activity of the Inquisition diminished, in the latter half of the

eighteenth century, the use of torture naturally decreased but, until,

the suppression in 1813, the formal demand for it was preserved in the

accusation presented by the fiscal. One of the early acts of Fernando

VII, on his restoration in 1814, was the issue of a cédula, July 25th,

addressed to all officers of justice, reciting that, in 1798, when the

Royal Council learned that, in the courts of Madrid, the accused were

subjected to the severest pressure to extort confessions, it

investigated the matter and found that thumb-screws and other methods

more or less rigorous were employed, and that this was without authority

of law: consequently on February 5, 1803, the discontinuance of these

was ordered, except fetters to the feet, and at the same time inquiries

made of all courts in the kingdom showed that various kinds of

compulsion were used whereby the innocent were sometimes compelled to

convict themselves falsely. In view of all of this Fernando now ordered

that in future no judge should use any kind of pressure or torment to

obtain confession from the accused or testimony from witnesses, all

usages to the contrary being abolished.[98] This can scarce have

applied to the Inquisition but, under the Restoration, it had little to

do with actual heresy and, before it was thoroughly reorganized, all

doubts were removed by Pius VII. Llorente tells us that the _Gazette de

France_ of April 14, 1816, contained a letter from Rome of March 31st,

stating that the pope had forbidden the use of torture in all tribunals

of the Inquisition, and had ordered that this be communicated to the

ambassadors of France and Portugal.[99] I see no reason for doubting

this, although no such brief appears in the Bullarium of Pius VII, and

we may assume that at last the Spanish Holy Office closed its career

relieved of this disgrace.

* * * * *

According to an _arancel_, or fee-list, of 1553, the executioner was

entitled to one real for administering torture, or to half a real if the

infliction was only threatened. In the lay courts the sufferer was

obliged to pay his tormentor, for there is a provision that, if he is

poor, the executioner is to receive nothing and is not allowed to take

his garments in lieu of the money.[100] In the Inquisition where, for

offences justifying torture, arrest was accompanied with sequestration,

the tribunal necessarily took upon itself the payment and, as we have

seen, in 1681, the fee had increased to four ducats. In cases which did

not end with confiscation, the outlay was undoubtedly included among the

costs of the trial charged against the sequestrated estate. In the Roman

Inquisition, where torture was used so much more indiscriminately, a

decision of the Congregation, in 1614, relieved the accused from payment

of the fee.[101]

A History of the Inquisition of Spain; vol. 3 · 第 6 / 18 章