NATAL CAMPAIGN. THE UNSUCCESSFUL BRITISH ATTEMPTS TO TURN THE BOERS'
RIGHT FLANK AT SPION KOP AND AT VAAL KRANTZ
On the 9th of January, 1900, the Fifth Division of the British Army,
which, under Lieut.-General Sir Charles Warren, had been assembling at
Estcourt, marched out for Frere, where General Buller's headquarters
had been established after the battle of Colenso. Arriving the same
evening, it started the next day for Springfield, the movement being
followed by the whole army, except the 6th Brigade, left at Chieveley,
and such other troops as were needed to protect the railroad to Durban
against raids. To control the action of the mass of the Boers,
dependence could be placed upon the operation in progress for turning
their right flank, to resist which {p.250} and to maintain the siege
of Ladysmith would require all the force at their disposal.
The abortive issue of this British undertaking, and of its sequent
operation against Vaal Krantz in the same quarter, removes the
necessity of giving minute details in a narrative which does not
profess to be a critical military study, but merely seeks to present a
clear analytical account of the various transactions.
It is necessary first to understand the principal features of the
country. In general directions, as far as effective, the movement
followed the valley of the Tugela. In this, ten miles west of Colenso,
there is a sharp bend at nearly right angles. There the stream for a
stretch of six miles has run south by east, while above it the river
bed again, as below, lies east and west, but is excessively tortuous,
winding back and forth among hills which on one side or the other come
down close to the water's edge. It was at Trichardt's Drift, about
seven miles above--west of--this north and south stretch, that the
British army was to make, and did make, its crossing; purposing
thereby to turn the {p.251} flanks of the Boer positions, which in a
general sense followed the north bank of the Tugela.
The conditions leading to the choice of this point appear to have been
as follows. Eastward of the north and south stretch just specified,
and as far as to the Ladysmith railroad, the mountain ranges north of
the river are not only high, but wide, broken, and intricate, ending
in Grobler's Kloof and the other kopjes mentioned in describing the
positions at Colenso. The reverse slopes of this broken region are
full six miles north of the river's course. The map shows the district
almost wholly bare of roads, an indication that it is unsuited to
large military operations. Upstream of the stretch, the ranges, though
steep and broken, are very much narrower. Three miles west of it, at
Potgieter's Drift, a road passes through from Springfield to the plain
beyond at Brakfontein, showing a considerable depression at this
point. By this road was made the second unsuccessful attempt of the
campaign, towards Vaal Krantz.
Four miles higher up, at Trichardt's Drift the {p.252} chain leaves
the river, trending north-north-west for eight miles, with a breadth
which, beginning with three miles at the south, narrows to one and a
half, with lessening elevation, towards the north end, where it drops
to the plain. The western slope of this eight mile spur, over the
southern part of which, contrary to first intention, the British
attack was actually made, is precipitous near the summit; lower down
it is more gradual, but still steep. A mile from the foot of the spur,
and parallel to it, runs a stream called Venter's Spruit, which enters
the Tugela from the north-west a little above Trichardt's. Six miles
from the ford, between spur and spruit, is Acton Homes, the point
designated by Buller as the first objective of the army, whence the
range was to be crossed. The change of direction noted at Trichardt's
gives to the whole range, from Colenso to Acton Homes, the character
of an arc of a circle, on the interior of which, considered as a
defensive position, the Boers moved, with the additional advantage of
being all mounted men. Near the southern end of the spur, but well to
its eastern edge, is the lofty eminence called {p.253} Spion Kop,
which played so important a part in the operation as it ultimately
developed.
At Acton Homes roads meet from north, south, east and west; a fact
which sufficiently indicates the importance of the point and the
comparatively favourable nature of the surroundings for
operations--for roads usually seek the easiest ground. From it two
start east for Ladysmith, crossing the spur by different ways, and
uniting some eight miles beyond in the plain lying west of Ladysmith,
where the network of communications shows the relatively open
character of the country. It was by one or both of these roads that
Buller purposed to advance.
On the 12th of January the 5th Division reached Springfield, and on
the 13th the whole army was assembled there or at Spearman's Hill,
near Potgieter's Drift, where Buller established his headquarters. The
hills there on the south side of the river were fortunately secured,
and naval batteries placed upon them commanding the opposite heights.
The turning movement by way of Acton Homes was then committed by Sir
Redvers Buller {p.254} to Sir Charles Warren, who on the 15th of
January received--to quote his own words--"secret instructions to
command a force to proceed across the Tugela, near Trichardt's Drift,
to the west of Spion Kop, recommending me to proceed forward, refusing
my right (Spion Kop), and bringing my left forward to gain the open
plain north of Spion Kop ... I was provided with four days' rations,
with which I was to cross the Tugela, fight my way round to north of
Spion Kop, and join your column opposite Potgieter's." This,
therefore, was Buller's plan; the spur was to be turned rather than
forced. It appears to have been his sustained purpose to leave the
execution to Warren, interfering himself not at all or the very least
possible. The force employed on the expedition has been nowhere found
officially stated. Warren himself says that his own command "amounted
to an army corps less one brigade," which, including all arms and the
medical and supply services, would be about 30,000 men--an estimate
that appears rather too high. The one brigade remained with Buller at
Spearman's Camp.
On {p.255} the evening of January 16 this brigade, the 4th, under
Lyttelton, covered by the naval batteries, crossed at Potgieter's
Drift, and established itself in kopjes a mile north of the river. The
movement was a feint on the Brakfontein Road, and was continued the
following days to draw attention from the true attack by Warren. The
latter crossed on the 17th at Trichardt's, occupied the hills on the
north side commanding the ford, and pushed the cavalry as far as Acton
Homes, which they entered without serious opposition, but were soon
after withdrawn. That night and the 18th the wagon train passed over,
and on the 19th two brigades advanced farther and occupied some hills
on the right.
During the 19th Warren made up his mind that the plan "recommended"
him was not practicable without modification, and, after consulting
his principal subordinates, telegraphed that evening to Buller as
follows: "I find there are only two roads north of the Tugela by which
we could possibly get from Trichardt's Drift to Potgieter's--one by
Acton Homes, the other by Fair View and Rosalie. The first I reject as
too long; the second {p.256} is a very difficult road for a large
number of wagons unless the enemy is thoroughly cleared out. I am,
therefore, going to adopt some special arrangement which will involve
my stay at Venter's Laager for two or three days. I will send in for
further supplies and report progress." Explained by other remarks of
Warren's in his despatches, this appears to mean that the easier road
by Acton Homes was thought by him too long for his division to
traverse with the food they could carry in their haversacks, and that
it was therefore necessary to take the shorter, which leaves the main
road three miles from Trichardt's, and strikes directly over the
range, passing north, and within three miles, of Spion Kop. To do this
the men would carry four days' rations, and the wagons be returned
south of the Tugela. First of all, however, the positions in front
must be captured, including Spion Kop.
The above telegram was the only report made at this period by Warren
to his superior. Various operations went on during the next three
days, presumably pursuant of the purpose stated in Warren's subsequent
account of {p.257} his proceedings--"We must first capture the
position in front of us." The estimate of their effect by Buller, who
was at the scene on the 21st and 22nd, is best given in the words of
his report to Lord Roberts. "I went over to Sir C. Warren on the 23rd.
I pointed out to him that I had no further report and no intimation of
the special arrangements foreshadowed by his telegram of the 19th,
that for four days he had kept his men exposed to shell and rifle
fire, perched on the edge of an almost precipitous hill, that the
position admitted of no second line, and the supports were massed
close behind the firing line in indefensible formations, and that a
panic or sudden charge might send the whole lot in disorder down the
hill at any moment. I said it was too dangerous a situation to be
prolonged, and that he must either attack or I should withdraw his
force. I advocated, as I had previously done, an advance from his
left." This last phrase does not make certain whether Buller's
judgment coincided with that of Warren concerning the impracticability
of the Acton Homes route, but it seems to indicate that it did not.
Warren {p.258} replied that he had intended to assault Spion Kop the
night before, but had not done so because the general told off for the
work wished first to reconnoitre the ground. It was decided that the
attack should be made that night, and General Woodgate was detailed
for the command at Buller's "suggestion"--or, to use Warren's words,
"the Commander-in-Chief desired."
The assault was made that night and was entirely successful, the
British gaining possession of the summit and remaining there all next
day. It was found, however, that the Boers had guns in position on
neighbouring heights within effective range. It was possible also for
the Boer riflemen, with their extraordinary aptitudes for stalking, to
maintain a perpetual fire from well-covered positions; whereas, to
whatever cause attributable, there does not seem to have been a
well-organised plan to provide artificially and rapidly the shelter
which the flat bare tops of South African mountains do not naturally
extend. General Woodgate was mortally wounded at 10 A.M.
Reinforcements were then on the way, and when his fall was reported,
{p.259} General Coke, with two fresh regiments, was sent to assume
command. He heliographed down at 2 P.M. that unless the enemy's guns
could be silenced the men could not hold the place under another day's
shelling. Some hours later, at 9.30 P.M., he was called down to make a
personal report of the conditions.
Towards nightfall Warren made arrangements to send up two naval
12-pounders, a mountain battery, and a heavy working party under
engineer direction to organise field protection--a provision that
should have formed part of the original plan--elaborated through four
days of operations. Before these reached the summit, and in ignorance
that they were on the way, Colonel Thorneycroft, left in command by
Coke's departure, decided that the position was untenable, and soon
after 9.30 P.M. evacuated it. Upon this Sir Redvers Buller commented:
"Preparations for the second day's defence should have been organised
during the day, and have been commenced at nightfall. As this was not
done I think Colonel Thorneycroft exercised a wise discretion." From
this judgment Lord Roberts {p.260} dissented vigorously. "I am of
opinion that Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft's assumption of
responsibility and authority was wholly inexcusable. During the night
the enemy's fire could not have been formidable, and ... it would not
have taken more than two or three hours at most to communicate by
messenger with General Coke or Sir C. Warren, and to receive a reply.
General Coke appears to have left Spion Kop at 9.30 P.M. for the
purpose of consulting with Sir Charles Warren, and up to that hour the
idea of a withdrawal had not been entertained. Yet, almost immediately
after General Coke's departure Colonel Thorneycroft issued an order,
without reference to superior authority, which upset the whole plan of
operations, and rendered unavailing the sacrifices which had already
been made to carry it into effect." In face of this severe, and in the
author's judgment merited, condemnation, it would be less than just
not to quote also Lord Roberts' further words. "Lieut.-Colonel
Thorneycroft appears to have behaved in a very gallant manner
throughout the day, and it was doubtless due in great measure {p.261}
to his exertions and example that the troops continued to hold the
summit until directed to retire."
On the morning of the 25th, seeing that Spion Kop was no longer held,
Buller assumed command in person, and began to withdraw to the south
of the Tugela. This movement was completed on the 27th, the troops
reaching their new camps by 10 A.M. of that day.
Thus, unfortunately, ended in failure an expedition concerning which
Lord Roberts wrote, "The attempt was well devised, and I agree with
Sir Redvers Buller in thinking that it ought to have succeeded." He
continues, "That it failed may, in some measure, be due to the
difficulties of the ground, and the commanding positions held by the
enemy, probably also to errors of judgment and want of administrative
capacity on the part of Sir Charles Warren. But, whatever faults Sir
Charles Warren may have committed, the failure must also be ascribed
to the disinclination of the officer in supreme command to assert his
authority and see that what he thought best was done, and also to the
{p.262} unwarrantable and needless assumption of responsibility by a
subordinate officer."
It would be presumptuous and unbecoming in an officer not of the land
service to express an opinion upon the difficulties of detail
encountered in the various operations of this week's work. But the
points selected for criticism in the expressions of Lord Roberts just
quoted belong to the fundamentals, common to both military
professions. The generous wish of Sir Redvers Buller to leave his
subordinate untrammelled discretion in the management of an operation
intrusted to him, was pushed to an extreme, and was maintained, as is
plainly evidenced by his own dispatch, after confidence was shaken.
The situation was one familiar, on a smaller scale, to every officer
who has ever had command. It is difficult at times to draw the line
between fussy interference and reasonable superintendence; yet more
difficult to determine the moment when a subordinate must be subjected
to the mortification of virtual supersession in the control of a
matter that has been committed to him. But these are, after all, only
instances of embarrassments common {p.263} to life, which increase in
degree and in number as one mounts the ladder. Whatever may be said in
favour of the fullest discretion to a subordinate out of signal
distance--and very much indeed must be said for this--nothing can
relieve a commander-in-chief only four miles distant of the
responsibility, not for his own reputation--a small matter--but for
his country's interests, in directing according to his own judgment
the great operations of a campaign. However honourable to generosity,
it is certainly carrying self-abnegation to an indefensible extreme to
leave the decision of attack or withdrawal, of movement by direct
attack or by flanking--"by the left"--to a junior, when one's self is
on the spot, in actual conversation.
The action of Colonel Thorneycroft in withdrawing raises also the
mooted question of when and how the assumption of responsibility in
disobeying orders--express or implied, general or particular--is to be
justified; a matter on which much unenlightened nonsense has lately
been spoken and written in the United States. No general rule,
{p.264} indeed, can be laid down, but this much may surely be
re-affirmed--that the justification of so serious a step must ever
rest, not on the officer's _opinion_ that he was doing right, but upon
the fact, demonstrated to military judgment by the existing
conditions, that he _was_ right. Colonel Thorneycroft's intentions
were doubtless of the best; the writer cannot but believe that Lord
Roberts's sentence will be endorsed by the professions, for the
reasons he himself gives.
After the withdrawal across Trichardt's Drift, a week was allowed for
repose after the seven days' fighting just undergone. The attempt to
reach Ladysmith was then renewed, taking the road by Potgieter's Drift
to Brakfontein. It was decided first to get possession of Vaal Krantz,
a height three or four miles east of Spion Kop, to the right of the
road. The movement began on February 5th, under the immediate
direction of Sir Redvers Buller. The same day Vaal Krantz was carried
and occupied; but Buller was disappointed in the advantage he hoped
from it. He reported that "it was necessary after seizing {p.265}
Vaal Krantz to entrench it as the pivot of further operations, but I
found after trying for two days that, owing to the nature of the
ground, this was not practicable; it was also exposed to fire from
heavy guns which fired from positions by which our artillery was
dominated."
As the projected advance depended upon the tenure of Vaal Krantz, and
this could not be assured under the circumstances, the attempt had to
be abandoned. On the evening of February 7 the British army again
retired south of the Tugela, and thence returned to the camps at
Chieveley, facing Colenso.
In the operations about Spion Kop from January 17-24, the British
losses were: killed, officers 27, men 245; wounded, officers 53, men
1,050; missing and prisoners, officers 7, men 351. Total, 87 officers,
1646 men.
At Vaal Krantz, February 5-7, the losses were: killed, officers 2, men
23; wounded, officers 18, men 326; missing, men 5. Total, 20 officers,
354 men.