THE OPENING CAMPAIGN IN NATAL TO THE INVESTMENT OF LADYSMITH
(OCTOBER 11-NOVEMBER 2)
The evident exposure of Natal to the first and heaviest attack of the
enemy, and the necessity so to provide for its defence as to gain the
time necessary for reinforcements to arrive, engaged very early the
anxious attention of the Imperial and local authorities. The latter
especially felt the greater solicitude, which is natural to those
whose interests are immediately threatened. As early as May 25, before
the Bloemfontein Conference between Sir Alfred Milner and President
Kruger, the Natal Ministry notified Mr. Chamberlain that, owing to
Boer preparations across the border, the scattered British in the neck
of Natal were getting uneasy, and the Ministry itself nervous, at the
prospect of war. These representations were {p.029} repeated more
urgently in the middle of June, and a month later a request was made
to be confidentially informed of the proposed plan for defence. When
this was communicated, it appeared that General Sir Penn Symons,
commanding the Imperial troops in Natal (who afterward was the first
general officer killed in the war), considered that with the force
then at his disposal--something over 5,000 men of all arms--he could
do no more than hold the railroad as far as Hattingh Spruit, some five
miles north of Dundee, thereby protecting the collieries. To advance
as far as Newcastle he estimated would require 2,000 more, while to
hold Laing's Nek an addition of 5,600 would be needed.
These calculations, as is now known, fell far short of the necessities
of the case, but they sufficiently alarmed the Colonial Government,
and upon its remonstrance the British Cabinet, on August 3, decided to
send a reinforcement of 2,000 men.
On the 6th of September the Governor of Natal telegraphed at length to
London many menacing symptoms observable among the Boers, {p.030}
from which war was believed to be inevitable, and urged the immediate
despatch of troops sufficient to protect the colony. In response to
this, orders were issued on September 8 for 5,700 men to start from
India, and a small additional force from England itself, making a
total of from seven to eight thousand. These were expected to arrive,
and actually did for the most part arrive, between October 12 and 19,
but even so were barely in time for the critical moment. They were
also only sufficient imperfectly to defend the colony, and were by no
means adequate to the offensive purpose which the Boer Government, in
its ultimatum, professed to discern.
Meanwhile, on the 25th of September, Glencoe had been occupied by a
detachment from Ladysmith, while reinforcements were sent to the
latter. It had by this time been recognized that the attempt to hold
the more advanced positions, such as Newcastle and Laing's Nek, would
expose the forces so placed to the fate of isolation which afterward
befell Ladysmith. The course of both the Imperial and colonial
governments at this period {p.031} was much affected by a wish not to
precipitate hostile action on the part of the Boers; for, in general,
war was not desired by the British, and, in particular, they were as
yet unready. On the 28th, however, such definite and threatening
movements were reported that the Natal Ministry decided at all hazards
to call out the volunteers, although it had apprehended that this step
would be considered practically equivalent to a declaration of war.
The increase of force in Natal to 15,000 men determined the sending
out of an officer superior in rank to General Symons. Sir George
White, designated for this duty, reached Cape Town October 3, and in
view of the serious news he there received, proceeded at once to
Durban. On the 9th, the day the Boer ultimatum was issued, he had at
Pietermaritzburg an interview with the Governor, in which he expressed
his disapproval of the position at Glencoe--an opinion in which other
officers of rank present coincided. The Governor replied that General
Symons had thought it safe, even before the Indian contingent arrived;
that the step had been {p.032} taken to assure the coal supply; and
that to recede from it now would involve grave political consequences,
disheartening the loyal, and tending to encourage a rising among the
blacks and the disaffected Dutch. Without changing his opinion as to
the military error involved, Sir George White resolved to allow the
detachment to remain. The decision thus taken finally constituted the
British military situation in Natal when the campaign opened; namely,
an advanced detachment of three or four thousand at Glencoe and
Dundee, a main body of eight to ten thousand at Ladysmith, with
smaller posts guarding the communications in rear of the latter.
The greater exposure of Natal, owing to its nearness to the Boer
States, had determined the concentration upon it of the bulk of the
British forces in South Africa, including the reinforcements so far
ordered; by the arrival of which it was expected that there would by
the end of October be 22,000 troops in South Africa. It was not till
October 7 that was issued the first order to mobilise, summoning
25,000 of the Army Reserve to join the colours.
The {p.033} necessities of Natal left but scant numbers to Cape
Colony, which was comparatively of less consequence, because the
points of vital importance to Great Britain lay near the sea-coast,
protected by their mere remoteness from any speedy attack. On the far
inland borders of the colony the situation soon reduced itself to that
with which we were so long familiar. The four or five thousand men
available at the outbreak of the war for the defence of the long
frontier, extending over five hundred miles, from the Basutoland
boundary to Mafeking, were obliged by the necessities of the case to
concentrate; which they did at Mafeking and Kimberley. There they were
speedily invested; and, being thus held in check, the border country,
including the important railroad junctions of De Aar, Naauwport and
Stormberg, lay freely open to the enemy. The seriousness of this
military condition was much increased by the well-known political fact
that the Dutch population of the region sympathized more or less
actively with the Boers. In fact many of them, upon the opening of
hostilities, crossed the border {p.034} to join the forces of the
Orange Free State.
On the 9th of October, 1899, the Transvaal Government presented an
ultimatum. After recounting the political grievances of which it
complained, it demanded that all points of mutual difference should be
settled by arbitration, or other peaceful means, that the British
troops near the Transvaal border should be withdrawn, that the recent
reinforcements be removed altogether from South Africa, and that those
still on the sea should not be landed. If a satisfactory answer were
not received by 5 P.M., October 11, the action of the British
Government would be regarded as a formal declaration of war. War
therefore may be considered as having been formally initiated by the
Transvaal, at the day and hour thus fixed.
For some time prior to the opening of hostilities, the armed men of
both the South African Republic and the Free State had been assembling
in force on their respective frontiers toward Natal; the latter less
rapidly than the former, its military preparation not having received
as full development as that of its ally, {p.035} who for some years
had been contemplating the possibility of war and accumulating
material. The Transvaalers came in rapidly, and already by the end of
September had gathered in numbers enough to warrant a speedy advance,
before the expected reinforcements from India should reach the enemy.
There is good reason to believe that it was intended to issue the
ultimatum on October 2, a week before its actual date; but there
occurred the unpleasant surprise of finding that neither in food nor
in ammunition were the supplies at hand sufficient to justify an
immediate forward movement. The defect of imperfect transport
organisation, inherent to hastily levied irregular troops, made itself
at once felt. The delay doubtless strengthened both parties, but, as
usual, inured most to the benefit of the one then on the defensive.
The first transports from India began to arrive on Tuesday, October 3,
on which day also the bulk of the Natal volunteers were expected to be
in their places; and in the six intervening days, preceding the
ultimatum, eleven {p.036} more steamers entered Durban with troops
which were at once despatched to the front. General Symons took
command at Dundee, Sir George White of the main body at Ladysmith.
The number of the Boers near at hand, and capable of being brought
against either of the British posts, was variously estimated at the
moment at from 8,000 to 13,000. There can be little doubt, however,
that the latter figure was much more nearly correct; that, in fact, on
October 11, the available force for the invasion rather exceeded than
fell short of the higher figure. Although precise information is still
lacking, there can be no doubt, from the character of the Boer
operations, that rapid subsequent accessions raised their numbers in
Natal to near 30,000 before the middle of November.
It is well here, on the verge of opening hostilities, to recall what
has before been indicated, that the projection of the narrow neck of
Natal, forming an acute salient angle between two hostile borders,
gave especial facilities to the Boers to combine their movements
outside the observation of the enemy, and {p.037} to strike suddenly
either at one of the British detachments, or at the railroad uniting
them. Small bodies began to make their appearance from both quarters
almost immediately after the expiry of the time set by the ultimatum,
and for three or four days the ordinary reports of outpost
observations and shots exchanged were continually received.
The uncertainty consequent upon these divergent demonstrations, some
of which from the Free State seemed to aim at the rear of Ladysmith
itself, was balanced and checked by the knowledge that the principal
Transvaal force had assembled round Zandspruit, in its own territory,
near the railroad, and some fifteen miles beyond Majuba Hill. There
was reason also to believe that the Transvaalers would be found more
enterprising and numerous than the Free State men. It was, therefore,
natural to expect that the main attack would come from the north along
the railroad, and from the east, where the approach from the Transvaal
boundary, which is there marked by the Buffalo River, is over a
country much more practicable than the western mountain range. These
considerations in {p.038} fact appear to have dictated the first
combination of the Boers.
Within a week from the opening of hostilities, the latter had occupied
Newcastle, thirty-seven miles by rail from Glencoe. On the 18th
further demonstrations caused General Symons to withdraw the outpost
stationed at Glencoe to the camp, which was a mile and a half west of
Dundee. The following day, Thursday, he received information, which
proved to be in the main accurate, that a combined movement was in
progress by which his position was to be simultaneously attacked from
the north and from the east. The force in the latter direction was
given at 7,000--probably an excessive estimate; although, as several
commandos had been reported on Wednesday to be moving from the
northern toward the eastern column, it is probable that the latter was
expected to make the chief attack. A British reconnaissance on the
same evening had showed the enemy apparently in force some ten miles
to the northward on the railway; but, if an attack from that quarter
were intended, the Boer combination failed, for none was made.
General {p.039} Joubert, in reporting the results, said, "Commandant
Lucas Meyer (commanding the eastern force) has had an engagement with
the British at Dundee. Meyer made a plan of campaign by messenger with
Commandant Erasmus, who, however, did not put in an appearance."
Convergent attacks, intended to be simultaneous, but starting from
different quarters, are particularly liable to such mishaps.
While these two columns on the 18th were moving on Dundee, a third
force of about 1,000 mounted men, under General Koch, coming from the
north, passed round Glencoe to the westward, crossing the Biggarsberg,
a lofty spur of nearly 6,000 feet, that extends from the western
mountains almost across Natal, with occasional depressions, through
one of which the railroad passes. On Thursday these took possession of
Elandslaagte, a station sixteen miles north of Ladysmith, capturing
one train and nearly intercepting another. Railroad communication in
the rear of Symons was thus intercepted, at the moment that Meyer was
advancing from the east, expecting to fall upon him in conjunction
{p.040} with the northern column. During the night of the 19th Meyer's
force crossed the Buffalo River at Landman's Drift, ten miles east of
Dundee, at 2.30 A.M. drove in the British pickets in that direction,
and at daybreak was seen dotting the hill-ridges, about three miles
east of the camp.
The scene of the approaching action of October 20 is the valley of a
small stream, the general course of which, as nearly as can be judged
from the maps, is north and south. The river-bed, or donga--to use the
conveniently short South African term--is half a mile east of Dundee,
the ground sloping easily toward it; while on the other side the
watershed rises, slowly at first, afterward more rapidly, for a mile
or more, to the ridge occupied by the Boers, which the road to
Landman's crosses at a depression called Smith's Nek. The enemy were
on both sides of the latter when first seen by the British. To the
north of the Nek--to the Boer right--is Talana Hill, where the
decisive fighting occurred, and which had to be carried by direct
assault, lasting, with the intervals of cover, for nearly six hours.
The {p.041} characteristics of the Hill itself, therefore, need to be
understood. As described by an eye-witness, it is about eight hundred
feet high from the level of the donga. The summit presents the flat
table-like sky line, frequently noted in South African travel, of
which Table Mountain, in Cape Town, is the conspicuous example. After
a few hundred yards of gentle acclivity through open ground a wood is
reached, near which is a homestead called Smith's Farm. Half way
between the wood and the top is a stone wall supporting a terrace.
Between the wood and this wall the ground is steep, broken and rocky.
Immediately above the wall the terrace, though easy, is wide and open,
and consequently exposed. The terrace crossed, the remainder of the
ascent is almost perpendicular; a matter therefore of strenuous
climbing under fire.
It appears from this description that the wood and the terrace
afforded a certain amount of cover, as did the donga; that the first
rush from the latter could be made rapidly, with, however,
comparatively little shelter from a long-range fire, while to climb
the wall {p.042} and cross the terrace, though a short process,
involved the utmost exposure. Concerning the last scene of the drama,
the scaling the nearly precipitous fronts which skirted the Boers'
position, the difficulty of the achievement caused the losses of the
assailants there to be heaviest. It may be added that, owing to the
unexpected and rapid developments of the day, most of the British
fought without breakfast or other food.
As soon as the enemy were discovered a company of infantry occupied
the donga, where successive reinforcements were received, and under
cover of which the line prepared for the assault. At 5.30 the Boers
surprised the British by opening with artillery--six guns--at an
estimated distance of 5,400 yards from the British camp. To this three
batteries replied, two of which were soon moved down to the town side
of the donga. The artillery duel, at a range of 2,000 to 3,000 yards,
continued until toward eight o'clock, when the Boers ceased firing,
and General Symons gave the order to prepare for the assault.
Difficult as was the task, and inferior though the assailants were in
number, the conditions were {p.043} such that the weak garrison of
Dundee had no prospect of ultimate escape, unless they could rout the
enemy with which they were engaged before the co-operating body from
the north arrived.
While the action was in its early stages, at 10 A.M., scouts reported
a large force approaching along the railroad. The small detachment
left to guard the British camp moved out to meet and, if possible, to
delay this new enemy. Besides the purely local conditions, it was
essential, in the general plan of campaign, during the waiting period
of inferiority, while their reinforcements were still on the sea, that
the British should risk much to demoralise and daunt an enemy who,
whatever their advantages otherwise, had not that military training
and cohesion which facilitates rapid recovery from a reverse. Whatever
the first mistake of advancing their position so far, it is impossible
to withhold admiration from the rapidity and energy of the measures
taken in the first fortnight of the campaign.
It was a dull, drizzling morning when the line of hungry British
soldiers leaped from the donga {p.044} and rushed for the wood; their
batteries to the right and left sending a rapid continuous iron fire
over their heads upon the hill-top, whence the Boers rained down lead
upon their advance. Few dropped here; but in the wood, where for quite
a while they halted, concealed rather than covered, many were struck
down, and here it was that death found General Symons, who had
galloped up to tell the men the hill _must_ be taken. He had asked
much of his men, but he spared not himself. He fell honoured and
beloved; man cannot die better.
It was about 10 that Symons received his wound. Obedient to his last
commands, the troops broke cover and worked their way from the wood to
the wall, step by step; a few feet onward, rushed and down; again a
rush and again down. Below the terrace they stopped, protected by the
wall but unable to advance; for did man show head or hand, down swept
the deadly fire from above. Men, however, are not of iron; eyes and
hands weary; the brain and the nerves feel strain; and it is of the
essence of defence that it exhausts quicker than does offence.
{p.045} It lacks intrinsically the moral tension that sustains; when
the forward impulse is removed, the evil spirit of backwardness finds
room to enter. As hours pass, this difference in moral conditions
affects those which are external--saps physical endurance.
Whatever the reason, toward noon the Boer fire slackened; possibly the
necessity of husbanding ammunition was felt. The British scaled the
wall, crossed rapidly the terrace, and gained the foot of the last
steep climb which lay between them and the enemy's position. Their
artillery also moved forward, to sustain the final perilous attempt by
keeping down the enemy's fire; but, despite all it could do, the loss
here was great and fell especially heavily upon the officers, who
exposed themselves freely. Out of seventeen of the latter that went
into action with one battalion, five were killed and seven wounded;
and the other regiments suffered in like manner, if not to the same
degree. As the assailants got near the top, the batteries had to cease
firing, unable longer to assure their aim between friend and foe. The
last rush was then made with the bayonet, but, as is usual, {p.046}
the defendants did not await the shock of immediate contact. They
broke and fled as the British advance crowned the summit, leaving
there some thirty dead and wounded, besides seventy wounded in a field
hospital on the reverse side of the hill. The artillery of the attack
continued to move forward to Smith's Nek, whence the enemy's force was
visible in full retreat. It was at 1.30 P.M. that the position, which
General Yule, Symons's successor, styled "almost inaccessible," was
finally carried.
The precise numbers engaged can as yet be only a matter of estimate,
but there is little doubt that the assailants were inferior in number
to the defenders. The former were about 2,000; the latter were by
General Yule thought to be about 4,000, many of whom, doubtless, were
not on the hill itself. The satisfaction of the victors, in what was
certainly a splendid feat of arms, was somewhat marred by the
disappearance of a body of cavalry, which at the opening of the day
had been sent to work round the enemy's right--northern--flank. They
had been taken prisoners, apparently by the co-operating Boer {p.047}
force which had failed to come up in time for the fighting.
The following afternoon--Saturday, the 21st--a demonstration was made
by this force; but it was not pushed home, being confined to a
bombardment by two heavy guns--40-pounders--at a range of 6,000 yards.
In prevision of such an attempt, Yule had already shifted some of his
equipage, and now, finding that the hostile guns outranged his own, he
removed the camp two miles to the southward, on high ground. On the
22nd, news being received of the enemy's defeat at Elandslaagte the
day before, he endeavoured to cut off the fugitives at Glencoe, but
the nearness of the northern Boers compelled him to desist, and
finally to resume his last position. Realising from all the conditions
that Dundee could not be held, unless reinforced, and that
reinforcement was improbable, he decided now to retreat upon
Ladysmith.
At 9 P.M. that night the British marched out, taking their transport
trains, but necessarily leaving the wounded behind them. The road
followed diverges from the railroad to the {p.048} eastward, crossing
the Biggarsberg, and coming out at a place called Beith. There it
forks, the right-hand branch trending toward Ladysmith, parallel to
the railroad and distant from it eight to ten miles. The march was
severe, for the pace was necessarily rapid and sustained, and the
roads heavy from recent rains; nor was it without serious risk from
the nearness of the enemy, although the battle of Talana Hill had done
much to free the eastern flank, and that of Elandslaagte the western.
No molestation was experienced.
It is necessary now to narrate the operations of the Ladysmith
garrison, which cannot in effect be dissociated from those of its
dependant at Dundee.
The demonstrations of the Boers, in various directions, kept Sir
George White in doubt as to their immediate intentions until Thursday,
the 19th, when Elandslaagte was occupied by the force under General
Koch. The same day word was received of the enemy's approach to
Dundee. Both movements threatened to isolate the latter. On the 20th a
reconnaissance toward Elandslaagte {p.049} was made by General
French, who had arrived the day before from England. Thick weather
prevented precise determination of the hostile numbers or position,
but the general fact was established. That evening the successful
results of the day's action at Dundee became known, and the next
morning--Saturday, October 21--the reconnaissance was resumed under
better atmospheric conditions. From a cliff between two and three
miles from Elandslaagte a clear view of the enemy was obtained, and
their fire drawn, which proved that both numerically and in artillery
they were superior to the detachment before them. They had expected
reinforcements, and those engaged in the ensuing affair were probably
nearer 2,000 than to the 1,000 of two days before.
French telegraphed to Ladysmith and received a promise of more troops,
the last of which arrived--the infantry by train--about 3 P.M.
Meantime the enemy had quitted Elandslaagte for a ridge of rocky hills
about a mile and a half south-east of the station--a position
characterised as exceptionally strong by Sir George White, who
witnessed {p.050} the affair, but left its management in French's
hands. More in detail, the ridge is described as being about 800 feet
high, 800 to 1,000 yards long, and in a general sense perpendicular to
the railroad; lying, therefore, south-east and north-west. At the
latter extremity, nearer the road, are two marked elevations, with a
neck between them, in which was the Boers' laager. Of these the
westernmost is the higher, but both commanded the rest of the ridge
throughout its full extent to the south-east. In front of the ridge
the country, of general rolling contour, presents a shallow valley
some two or three miles wide. The near side of this to the British,
when the latter first advanced, was occupied by a few Boers, but these
fell back quickly to their main body. In making their dispositions the
Boers occupied in chief force the western elevations, intrenching
their artillery on the inner and lower of the two. A thinner firing
line was developed thence to the eastward, along the summit of the
ridge covering the approach from the front. A flank being usually the
weakest part of a line, the natural course for the assailant would
{p.051} be to attack in flank at the lower--eastern--extremity of the
ridge, and to advance thence toward the main positions, supported in
so doing by a secondary front attack by riflemen and artillery. To
impede such an attempt the Boers had set up at intervals barbed wire
fences. Through these, and over a broken rocky surface, the attacking
column must fight its way, step by step, till the final hills were
reached and could be rushed as Talana had been by their countrymen the
day before.
The plan above outlined was the one adopted by General French; seven
companies of infantry being allotted to the front attack, a regiment
and five companies to that upon the flank. A few squadrons of cavalry
accompanied the latter movement, as well to protect it when in
performance as to profit by any mishap befalling the enemy. The troops
formed just below and under cover of the rising ground on the hither
side of the valley fronting the hostile line. The fire of the latter
was drawn, and the situation of their artillery thus discovered--despite
the use of smokeless powder--by the flashes of their {p.052} guns,
which showed the more clearly against the blackness of a big thunder
cloud rising behind the Dutch positions, which enabled the British
also to see distinctly the bursting of their own shrapnel over the
enemy.
The usual artillery duel succeeded at a distance of 4,500 yards--two
miles and a half--but from the lateness of the hour, and the amount of
work ahead, no time could be lost, so the infantry operation began as
quickly as possible. The front attack moved down into the valley, a
firing line of three hundred men covering the space of 500 yards from
end to end, its remaining companies following at intervals to support
it, and to replace those who fell--to "feed" the line, keeping it at
full strength.
The first part of this advance was, on account of the distance,
resisted chiefly by artillery fire, which, though accurate, was seen
to cause there few casualties. At 1,200 yards from the enemy's
positions, being there well within rifle range, the line halted, lay
down, and opened fire. The smooth surface of the ground gave little
natural shelter; what {p.053} there was was found chiefly behind ant
hills, of which there were very many. The musketry fire here undergone
was severe, for the only diversion to it continued so far to be the
British artillery, the flanking movement not having yet fully
developed. Under the undivided attention of the enemy's riflemen, the
line worked its way steadily forward, men dropping frequently, to
within 800 yards of the summit, where they finally lay down and waited
under a constant fall of shot till the bugle should summon them to the
storm.
Meantime, during these last 400 yards, the flank attack was beginning.
In general, the first ascent was of the rocky, broken character before
noted, both here and at Talana; but, the strength of the Boer force
being on the other flank, the assailants, while mounting, were covered
by the slope and did not come fairly under fire until the top was
reached. Then they began to fall rapidly, but a few paces further the
ground dipped, and again gave momentary shelter. It was, however, but
to take breath for the final rush; if rush it can be called, which
meant steady, dogged bearing up against a pitiless rain {p.054} of
projectiles, and forcing one's way forward rock by rock, while
companions drop, one by one, on either side. Six hundred yards of such
work lay, before the flanking column, interrupted ever and anon by the
barbed-wire obstacles, which, however, were themselves often cut down
by the intensity of the fire.
Under such conditions the community of action which rests upon formal
organisation and method ceases to be effectual. The momentum that
endures to the end, and so effects the results of co-operation, finds
its energy partly in individual character, partly in the moral
fellowship of impulse and of purpose which, once imparted, remains
subconscious, perhaps, but ineradicable. The man knows, or rather
feels, that if he gets to the end he will find his comrades there; and
that if he goes back he will not find them, but his own self-contempt.
Such is unanimity, the oneness of will that comes of a common training
and of common ideals, bred-in, if not inborn. So this mass of men,
independent each, and yet members, each, one of the other, struggled
forward, through failing {p.055} light and drenching rain--for the
storm had burst as the ascent began--till half the way was won. Then
the bugle sounded "Charge," and the reply came cheerily up from below.
The men, in the valley and on the hill, moved forward with the
bayonet, still not neglecting cover, but looking now more to speed.
Again, as usual, save a few of the more stubborn who were killed at
their guns, the defenders did not await the shock but fled down the
hills, where the cavalry that had accompanied the flank attack got
among them and completed their discomfiture.
The battle at Elandslaagte was distinctly creditable to both sides,
but upon the whole gave sounder cause for self-congratulation to the
British than to their opponents. The former were numerically superior
to the defenders, but not to an extent which countervailed even the
natural advantages of the ground, further improved by measures for
which time allowed.
Regarded apart from its connection with the campaign as a whole,
simply as a combat unrelated to other incidents, the conception and
the {p.056} execution of the attack were admirable; while in the
matter of military dynamic energy, to whatever source that shown on
the one side or the other may be attributed, the potentiality of the
attacking force was demonstrated to be greater than that of the
opponent.
Still more was the action at Elandslaagte commendable, when viewed in
relation to the general respective conditions of the Boers and the
British in Natal at that time.
Duly to appreciate the merits and the results of these two successive
days of fighting, at Talana and at Elandslaagte, it must be remembered
that the British in a general sense, and at Dundee locally as well,
were upon the defensive, and that the Boer movements were each a part
of one general plan directed, and most properly, to overwhelm and
destroy the detachments--Dundee and Ladysmith--in detail; they
together being rightly considered one fraction of the enemy's whole
force, present or hurrying over sea. So regarded, the vigour with
which the British took the initiative, assumed the offensive,
themselves in turn attacking in detail, and severely punishing, the
separate factors of the enemy's {p.057} combination, is worthy of
great praise. Sir Penn Symons is perhaps entitled to the greater meed
because to him fell, with the greater burden, the greater opportunity,
to which he proved not unequal.
Such men were worthy of the steady forward gallantry shown by officers
and men. Both leaders and led easily carry off the palm from the more
phlegmatic opponents, who failed to sweep them away. The result was to
save Ladysmith, or rather--what was most really important--to save the
organized force that was there shut in. The brilliant antecedent
campaign, the offensive right and left strokes, the prompt and timely
resolve of Yule to retreat just as he did, and the consequent
concentration, utterly frustrated the Boers' combinations, and
shattered antecedently their expectations of subduing the British by
the cheaper method of exhaustion. The failure was not only signal, but
in the end discreditable; for while success is no sure proof of merit,
nor its opposite of indesert, the wide miscalculation of the ultimate
result, which kept the Boers so long inactive before Ladysmith, and
saved Natal, while reinforcements were {p.058} well known all the
while to be hasting across the sea, is entitled to scant respect from
any indications in its favour. The faulty execution of the original
plan, which enabled the enemy to concentrate and to accumulate
adequate means of resistance, and the subsequent underestimate of the
endurance of the garrison, bear the same mark. In issuing their
ultimatum, in opening the campaign, in combining against Dundee, and
finally in investing Ladysmith, the Boers exceeded decisively that
five minutes of delay upon which, to use Nelson's words, turns victory
or defeat; and the loss of time, as yet only serious, through the
procrastinations of the siege became irremediable.
It is noticeable that the returns of casualties at Elandslaagte do not
perfectly bear out extreme conclusions as to the fatal preponderance
of the defence over the offence in modern warfare. As reported soon
after the action, the British lost in killed, 55; in wounded, 199. Of
the Boers, 65 dead were found on the ground; others, estimated--guessed
is perhaps more correct--at 50, were killed in pursuit by the cavalry.
Their wounded {p.059} is not stated, but there were many among the
three hundred prisoners taken. It is true, certainly, that in this
affair not only was the British attack well combined, but their
superiority in numbers was considerable. Still, after all deductions,
the greater loss of the defendants casts doubt, either upon their
marksmanship or upon the prevalent theory that the effects of modern
weapons are revolutionary. As a historical fact, a front attack upon
intrenched men, even irregulars, has been a desperate business as far
back, at least, as Bunker Hill and Fort Moultrie.
Twenty-four hours after Elandslaagte, at 9 P.M., Sunday, October 22,
Yule's men started on their march of sixty miles, of mountain climb
and over rain-drenched roads, to Ladysmith. Their own work at Talana
Hill had secured the left flank of their retreat, by the
demoralization of Meyer's force; to protect their right, the
increasing numbers and threatening movements of the enemy west of the
railroad impelled Sir George White to further action. On the 24th he
moved out a strong force, which discovered the {p.060} enemy at
Rietfontein, seven miles from Ladysmith, on a ridge west of, and
parallel to, the Glencoe road; their artillery intrenched in the
centre, and supported by infantry upon commanding elevations at either
end. The British drew up on a parallel ridge, to the eastward, and an
action ensued, confined mainly to artillery at 3,000 yards. In the end
the Boers, chiefly a body of Free State men, evacuated their positions
about 2 P.M. and retired to the westward. Pursuit was not attempted.
The security and junction of Yule's detachment was the prime immediate
necessity, and it was by this fully apparent that the time was come
when offensive returns, on the part of the greatly outnumbered
British, must be limited to those needed to insure necessary delay
before final inevitable interception and investment. It was no
occasion for displays of military fancy sparring.
Shortly after noon of Thursday, October 26, Yule's column marched into
Ladysmith--"done up," telegraphed White, "but in good spirits and only
need rest." The lamented Steevens, with his graphic pen, has described
for us the pride, pomp and circumstance of the return {p.061} of the
men who had stormed Talana Hill, and had still before them the grim
protracted realities of Ladysmith.
"Before next morning was gray in came the 1st Rifles. They plashed
uphill to their blue-roofed huts on the south-west side of the town.
By the time the sun was up they were fed by their sister battalion,
the 2nd, and had begun to unwind their putties. But what a sight!
Their putties were not soaked and not caked; say, rather, that there
may have been a core of puttie inside, but that the men's legs were
imbedded in a serpentine cast of clay. As for their boots, you could
only infer them from the huge balls of stratified mud they bore round
their feet. Red mud, yellow mud, black mud, brown mud--they lifted
their feet toilsomely; they were land plummets that had sucked up
specimens of all the heavy, sticky soils for fifteen miles. Officers
and men alike bristled stiff with a week's beard. Rents in their khaki
showed white skin; from their grimed hands and heads you might have
judged them half red men, half soot-black. Eyelids hung fat and heavy
over hollow cheeks and pointed cheekbones. Only {p.062} the eye
remained--the sky-blue, steel-keen, hard, clear, unconquerable English
eye--to tell that thirty-two miles without rest, four days without a
square meal, six nights--for many--without a stretch of sleep, still
found them soldiers at the end.
"That was the beginning of them; but they were not all in till the
middle of the afternoon--which made thirty-six hours on their legs.
The Irish Fusiliers tramped in at lunch-time--going a bit short some
of them, nearly all a trifle stiff on the feet--but solid, square and
sturdy from the knees upward. They straightened up to the cheers that
met them, and stepped out on scorching feet as if they were ready to
go into action again on the instant. After them came the guns--not the
sleek creatures of Laffan's Plain, rough with earth and spinning mud
from their wheels, but war-worn and fresh from slaughter; you might
imagine their damp muzzles were dripping blood. You could count the
horses' ribs; they looked as if you could break them in half before
the quarters. But they, too, knew they were being cheered; they threw
their ears up and flung {p.063} all the weight left them into the
traces.
"Through fire, water and earth, the Dundee column had come home
again."[3]
The undeniable error of placing an advanced detachment in Dundee had
thus been redeemed; at much material cost, it may be granted, but the
moral gain probably exceeded, and the gallant author of the mistake
paid for his error with his life. General Symons died in Dundee on the
day his column came in touch with the Ladysmith force.
In the ensuing week the Boers in largely superior numbers closed
rapidly down upon the now concentrated British, who on their part
strained every nerve to accumulate strength and resources, and to
secure time, by imposing caution and delay upon the enemy.
It was in an attempt of this kind that the disaster at Nicholson's Nek
was incurred. The enemy had appeared in great numerical strength upon
the hills, from three to five miles north of the town, and thence
round to the eastward, over a line of seven or eight miles. A
reconnaissance in force was planned for {p.064} Monday, October 30,
and in support of it, to secure the British left flank, a detachment
of a dozen companies of infantry with a mountain battery started at 11
P.M., Sunday, to march nearly due north, up the bed of a stream called
Bell's Spruit, to occupy the elevation known as Nicholson's Nek.
Advance along the broken, rock-strewn, and unfamiliar watercourse was
necessarily slow, but was unmolested until about two hours before
daybreak, when some boulders were rolled down from a neighbouring
height and fell among the mules of the battery, which was in the
middle of the column, preceded and followed by infantry. The terrified
creatures broke from their keepers, turned, and dashed in the darkness
through the rear of the division, where several shots were fired into
them by the startled soldiers, unable to see the character of the rush
they felt. Confusion necessarily ensued, and the panic spread to the
other ammunition animals, which stampeded. Order was with difficulty
restored, and the detachment, thus arrested, at daybreak found itself
still two miles short of its destination. It was not thought expedient
to {p.065} press on; and refuge, rather than position, was sought
upon a hill near by, which looked defensible, but upon climbing was
found to be commanded from several quarters. These were soon occupied
by the Boers, and after a resistance protracted to about 3 P.M., the
detachment was compelled to surrender. Something over a thousand men
were thus lost to the besieged, who could ill afford it. The
missing--mostly prisoners--amounted to 843. On the field 52 were found
dead, and 150 wounded were brought back to Ladysmith. Less than 100
escaped.
[Footnote 3: "From Cape Town to Ladysmith," p. 79.]
The rest of the British movement was successfully carried out, the
enemy retiring before them; but although all the troops were out,
except those absolutely needed for garrisoning the works, the enemy's
field bases--"laagers"--could not be reached. Their numbers and
dispositions so far made were observed; but the approaching
powerlessness of the British for decisive offensive action was also
shown. Upon returning to camp at 2 P.M., it was happily found that a
naval brigade from the cruiser "Powerful," lying at Durban, {p.066}
had reached Ladysmith with long range and heavy guns. These were
quickly got into position and soon silenced a Boer 40-pounder, which
at daybreak had opened fire on the town from a hill between two and
three miles to the northward. A few hours later news came in of the
reverse at Nicholson's Nek.
The naval guns arrived in the nick of time, the very day that the
enemy got their first heavy piece at work, and but three days before
all communication with outside was intercepted. The closeness of the
shave emphasizes the military value of unremitting activity in doing,
and unremitting energy in retarding an opponent. At one end of the
line Talana Hill, Elandslaagte, Rietfontein; at the other, 200 miles
away, a naval division rushing guns ashore and to the railroad. The
result, a siege artillery opportunely mounted to keep the adversary at
distance.
"The enemy's guns," telegraphed Sir George White, October 30, "range
further than our field guns. I have now some naval guns, which have
temporarily silenced, and I hope {p.067} will permanently dominate,
the enemy's best guns, with which he has been bombarding the town at a
distance of over 6,000 yards." "Our forces were seriously outnumbered
and our guns outranged" (yesterday), wrote a correspondent in
Ladysmith, "until the arrival of the naval brigade, who rendered
excellent service." "The prompt assistance rendered by the Navy 190
miles inland has added immensely to the defensive strength of the
position, which now depends upon keeping down the enemy's artillery
fire. If the siege guns of the Boers can be controlled, the rifle fire
of a stout-hearted force ought to render a successful assault
impossible."
The naval guns were six--two 4.7 inch, and four long 12-pounders. They
were mounted on carriages hastily extemporised for the emergency by
Captain Percy Scott, of the Royal Navy, and, as they outranged the
army field guns by full 2,000 yards, they extended by at least double
that distance the diameter of the circle of investment imposed upon
the enemy.
On the 2nd of November telegraphic communication {p.068} between
Ladysmith and the outer world was broken, and the same day railroad
communication was intercepted; the last train out carrying General
French to take a cavalry command at Cape Town. The brief, exciting,
and brilliant prelude to the war was concluded, and a great and
controlling centre of national and military interest had been
established by the isolation of some 13,000 British in the midst of
foes whose numbers are not even yet accurately known, but of whose
great superiority in that respect there can be no doubt. For a hundred
and eighteen weary days the blockade lasted, until, on February 28,
1900, the advance of the relieving force entered the place.
Almost simultaneously with the beginning of the investment, on the
31st of October, General Sir Redvers Buller arrived from England at
Cape Town to take chief command of the British forces in South Africa.
The second period of the war now opened, before recounting which it
will be necessary to summarize the general situation at date, as
constituted by many preliminary occurrences in different, and {p.069}
even remote, quarters of the world. Up to the present, success had
seemed to lie with the Boers, but the appearance was only superficial.
Their plan had been well designed, but in execution it had failed; and
while the failure is to be laid in part to a certain tardiness and
lack of synchronism in their own movements, it was due yet more to the
well-judged, energetic, and brilliantly executed movements of Sir
George White and Sir Penn Symons, which utilised and completed the
dislocation in the enemy's action, and so insured the time necessary
for organising defence upon an adequately competent scale.
"Sir George White's force," wrote Spencer Wilkinson, on the 18th
October, "is the centre of gravity of the situation. If the Boers
cannot defeat it their case is hopeless; if they can crush it they may
have hopes of ultimate success."[4] The summary was true then, and is
now. In the preliminary trial of skill and strength the Boers had been
worsted.
[Footnote 4: "Lessons of the War," p. 13.]
NOTE.--The effective British force shut up in Ladysmith on
November 2 was 13,496, besides which there were 249 sick {p.070}
and wounded; total, 13,745. The Boer force in Natal is not
accurately known, but is roughly reckoned at double the British;
say 30,000. This estimate is probable, both from the extent of
their operations, and because they ought to have had at least so
many. It would be more to their discredit to have had fewer than
to fail with more. The non-military element in Ladysmith raised
the number of the besieged to about 21,000.