THE OUTBREAK OF WAR
The indecisive outcome of the battle of Tippecanoe seemed to
necessitate the continuation of the war which Harrison's campaign
had precipitated. But Tecumseh's plans were not yet matured, and his
British advisers steadily warned him against the mistake of making a
premature beginning of the struggle with the Americans, which would
permit them to crush the Indians before the British should be ready to
come to their assistance. He chose, therefore, to make light of the
affair at Tippecanoe, and continued to protest that there would be no
war with the Americans unless they themselves forced it.[525] One thing
had, however, been rendered certain by the Tippecanoe campaign: sooner
or later the Americans must renew the attack upon the Indians; and a
war with the British would bring an Indian war also upon the Northwest.
[Footnote 525: In a speech delivered at a council of the tribes
at Massassinway on the Wabash, in May, 1812, Tecumseh disclaimed
responsibility for the fight of Tippecanoe, referring to it as "the
unfortunate transaction that took place between the white people and
a few of our young men at our village." He stated that the trouble
between his followers and Governor Harrison had been settled, and
further that had he been at home there would have been no bloodshed
(Dawson, Harrison, 266-67).]
Finally after long debate the country blundered hesitantly and
half-heartedly into the War of 1812. The people of New England were
so bitterly opposed to this step, and to the party in power, as to
give rise to suspicion of their loyalty to the Union. The middle and
southern states were, on the whole, favorably disposed toward the war.
But in no other section were the people as eager for war to begin as
in the West. Here, on the frontier, the traditional enmity toward
England was comparatively untouched by the commercial advantages which
committed New England to a policy of peace. Revival of commerce had
little effect upon the West with its desultory cultivation and crude
and inadequate means of transportation, but the spirit of expansion
was strong and the greed for land was unappeased. To this sentiment
was added the belief, firmly held by the westerner, that the British
were primarily responsible for the insecurity of the frontier. In part
this was justified by the facts of the situation, but not to the extent
which the American frontiersmen believed it was. Whether well founded
or not, the belief filled them with resentment toward the British and
rendered them keen for war. "I cannot but notice," wrote Surgeon Van
Voorhis from Fort Dearborn in October, 1811, in a letter to a friend,
"the villainy practiced in the Indian country by British agents and
traders; you hear of it at a distance, but we near the scene of action
are sensible of it. They labor by every unprincipled means to instigate
the Savages against the Americans, to inculcate the idea that we intend
to drive the Indians beyond the Mississippi, and that in every purchase
of land the Government defrauds them; and their united efforts aim too
at the destruction of every trading house and the prevention of the
extension of our frontier. Never till a prohibition of the entrance
of all foreigners, and especially British subjects, into the Indian
Country takes place, will we enjoy a lasting peace with the credulous,
deluded, and cannibal savages."[526]
[Footnote 526: Van Voorhis, _Ancestry of Major Wm. Roe Van Voorhis_,
144-45.]
The West looked forward to war, not only as a solution of the Indian
problem, but also as the means of securing Canada. Yet greater danger
threatened the Northwest, in the event of war, than any other portion
of the United States. Of the territories Michigan was the most
defenseless and exposed to attack. There were in all ten settlements
scattered over a wide extent of country, the distance between the
closest of them being thirty miles and that between the two extremes
over ten times as great.[527] The entire population, counting
British, French, Americans, negroes, and the troops of the garrison
at Detroit, was less than five thousand, four-fifths of them being of
French-Canadian descent. The chief source of danger arose, however,
from the exposed situation of the settlements, rather than from lack
of numbers. Ordinarily the frontier was the extreme line of white
occupation and was backed by settlements whose population became denser
in proportion to their distance from it. Michigan, however, presented
the phenomenon of a double frontier, open on one side to the British
and on the other to the savages; furthermore the settlements were so
scattered as to render effectual co-operation between them in case of
attack out of the question.
[Footnote 527: Memorial of the inhabitants of Michigan Territory to the
President and Congress, December 8 and 10, 1811, in _American State
Papers, Indian Affairs_, I, 780-82; _Michigan Pioneer Collections_, XV,
61-63.]
Separated from even the southernmost of the Michigan settlements by
a wide extent of wilderness, which contained the stronghold of the
budding Indian confederacy, were the white settlements of Indiana.
They had a population of about thirty thousand, clustered principally
in two groups, the one around Vincennes, the other on the Ohio
opposite Louisville, with one hundred miles of wilderness between
them.[528] From the Wabash to the Illinois and Kankakee, stretching
far to the southward, was the great wedge of lands still held by the
Indian tribes. Beginning with the old French town of Vincennes, then
Harrison's headquarters, the line of the frontier followed the Wabash
River nearly fifty miles to Fort Harrison, opposite the present city
of Terre Haute. Extending north from Fort Harrison to the Michigan
settlements and westward to the Mississippi were the Indian villages
and hunting-grounds. The principal settlements of Illinois were still,
as in the old French days, clustered along its lower Mississippi
border. A line drawn from Vincennes to the mouth of Rock River on the
Mississippi would have had south of it practically all of them. The
total white population of the territory was probably less than half
that of Indiana.
[Footnote 528: Henry Adams, _History of the United States_, VI, 68.]
To protect this extensive northwestern frontier the United States had,
in the early part of 1812, some half-dozen feeble garrisons, with an
average strength of about seventy-five men. At Detroit, the largest
and most important military station in the Northwest, were ninety-four
men;[529] at Mackinac, three hundred miles away, were seventy-nine;
at the opposite end of Lake Michigan and about an equal distance
from both Mackinac and Detroit was Fort Dearborn with a garrison of
fifty-five men; at Fort Wayne and at Fort Harrison, the new stockade
on the Wabash, were about as many. All of these were one-company posts
except Detroit, which had two companies. The fortifications had not
been designed for, nor were they expected to be capable of, defense
against the forces of a civilized nation. They were supposed to possess
sufficient strength to withstand an attack by Indians alone, and,
providing the supply of provisions held out, this expectation would
ordinarily have been realized. Even so, however, they could do nothing
toward defending the scattered settlements against the attacks of
the Indians, and the sequel showed that the garrisons were not even
able to defend themselves. Mackinac surrendered without resistance to
a combined force of Indians and Canadian traders; Fort Dearborn was
abandoned, and the garrison was destroyed while seeking to escape; and
Fort Wayne was saved from impending capture only by the approach of a
large force of militia under General Harrison.
[Footnote 529: _American State Papers, Indian Affairs_, I, 781.]
Against this frontier could be launched, in the event of an Indian
war alone, several thousand warriors.[530] If war were joined with
Great Britain at the same time, it was believed by both sides, and with
good reason, that several thousand men employed in the Indian trade
and in sympathy with the British would co-operate in the attack on the
American frontier.[531] Potentially the Americans possessed in the
population of Ohio and Kentucky resources vastly greater than those
their opponents could bring to bear on the Northwest; and in the end
the superiority of population made itself manifest in the triumph of
the American cause in this region. But this triumph came only after
more than a year of fighting, during the greater part of which the
Americans met with disaster after disaster. For the immediate present
the northwestern frontier was practically undefended while in the
traders and Indians the British possessed a force immediately available
for action which constituted to all intents and purposes a formidable
standing army.
[Footnote 530: In the memorial cited above (note 527) of the
inhabitants of Michigan Territory to the President and Congress,
December 8 and 10, 1811, the number of warriors that might be brought
against Detroit was estimated at five thousand.]
[Footnote 531: _Michigan Pioneer Collections_, XV, 61-63, 70-72;
Drennan Papers, Hull to Eustis, March 6, 1812. The Americans estimated
the number of traders who would assist the British at four thousand.]
That this force was not such as could safely be despised both the words
and actions of the frontiersmen gave testimony. In more recent years on
the western plains the forces of the regular army of the United States
have time and again manifested their superiority over the Indians in
open battle; and only rarely, when the advantage of numbers or position
was greatly in their favor, have the red men won a victory over them.
But in the old Northwest, where advantage could be taken of the heavy
timber which covered so much of the country, the Indian warriors
fighting on their own ground were superior, man for man, to any regular
force that could be sent against them. In fifty years of warfare with
the whites the northwestern Indians had never been defeated in open
battle where the strength on both sides was nearly equal,[532] while
time and again the forces of the whites had succumbed to inferior
numbers. The one decisive American victory over these tribes down to
the War of 1812 was that of Fallen Timbers in 1794. But this victory
was won by a largely superior force under the command of the ablest
general, with the possible exception of Clark, that the Americans
had ever sent into the Northwest, and after two years of arduous
preparation for the contest.
[Footnote 532: Adams, _op. cit._, VI, 100; Dawson, _Harrison_, 216,
250.]
The battle of Tippecanoe afforded the most recent illustration of
the prowess of the native warriors. Harrison was probably better
fitted to command in a campaign against the Indians than any other
man in the Northwest, and in this campaign he had a force of one
thousand soldiers[533] of as high quality, on the whole, as America
could produce. In the actual battle his force outnumbered the Indians
in the proportion of two to one.[534] Yet it was only with extreme
difficulty and at the cost in killed and wounded of one-fourth of his
army that the Indian attack was beaten off. Even this success was due
in part to good fortune for the savages had purposely neglected far
more favorable opportunities for attacking Harrison than the one they
finally embraced. Furthermore, even Harrison's advocate grants that
they fought with inferior arms and under circumstances which sacrificed
the advantages which their style of fighting ordinarily afforded.[535]
But for the absence of Tecumseh and the reluctance of the Indians to
fight at all, it is not improbable that Harrison's army would have been
overwhelmed.[536]
[Footnote 533: The number of Harrison's troops cannot be stated with
entire precision. For a discussion of this point see Adams, _op. cit._,
W, 96, and note 534 below.]
[Footnote 534: Harrison himself stated his number in the battle as
"very little above seven hundred men," aside from sixty dragoons whom
he omitted from consideration because they were "unable to do us much
service." They were present in the battle, however, and it is obvious
that the mere fact of Harrison's failure to make effective use of them
does not justify their omission from a statement of the strength of his
army. The statement of Dawson, his biographer, therefore, that on the
day before the battle he had "something more than eight hundred men,"
may be regarded as approximately correct. The number of the Prophet's
followers can only be estimated. Harrison was "convinced that there
were at least six hundred," but he admits that he had no data from
which to form a correct statement. Henry Adams, allowing for "the law
of exaggeration," concludes that there were not more than four hundred
Indians in the battle. On the size of the two armies see _American
State Papers, Indian Affairs_, I, 778; Dawson, _Harrison_, 216; Adams,
_op. cit._, VI, 104-5.]
[Footnote 535: Dawson, _Harrison_, 211-12, 236-37.]
[Footnote 536: See in this connection the account of the campaign, and
particularly of the plight of the army after the battle, in Dawson,
_Harrison_, 233, 238-39; see also, Adams, _op. cit._, VI, chap. v.]
An indecisive blow had thus been struck, after which Harrison's
forces were disbanded or scattered, and the frontier again became as
defenseless as before the Tippecanoe campaign. With the series of
depredations and murders which marked the spring of 1812 the settlers
became panic-stricken. Large numbers abandoned their farms and either
took refuge in temporary stockade forts or fled to a safer retreat
in the older settlements.[537] The peril from which they fled was
graphically painted by the citizens of Detroit in their appeal to the
government for protection, in December, 1811. "The horrors of savage
belligerence, description cannot paint. No picture can resemble the
reality. No effort can bring the imagination up to the standard of
fact. Nor sex, nor age, have claims. The short remnant of life left
to the hoary head, trembling with age and infirmities, is snatched
away. The tenderest infant, yet imbibing nutrition from the mamilla
of maternal love, and the agonized mother herself, alike await the
stroke of the relentless tomahawk. No vestige is left of what fire
can consume. Nothing which breathes the breath of life is spared.
The animals reared by the care of civilized man are involved in his
destruction. No human foresight can divine the quarter which shall be
struck. It is in the dead of the night, in the darkness of the morn, in
the howling of the storm, that the demoniac deed is done."[538]
[Footnote 537: Adams, _op. cit._, VI, 110; Dawson, _Harrison_, 236.]
[Footnote 538: _American State Papers, Indian Affairs_, I, 781.]
The nation entered upon the war in June, 1812, with a large portion
of its best citizens and one entire section of the country bitterly
opposed to the measure. Apathy and opposition combined with the
incompetence of the administration at Washington to produce a state
of unpreparedness which, in view of the seriousness of the situation,
seems today incredible. Congress voted men for the army, but there was
little disposition on the part of the country to supply them. The money
that was no less essential to the conduct of a war not even Congress
was willing to vote, except to a ludicrously inadequate degree.[539]
Great Britain had stood undaunted for years between Napoleon and the
realization of his ambition of European if not of world supremacy.
Through generations of warfare her people had become habituated to
devoting their treasure to this end, and had developed a strong
military tradition. Both government and army had been brought to the
greatest possible state of efficiency for the conduct of war by the
experience gained in the two decades of practically constant warfare
which the French Revolutionary era had opened. That the greater part of
this schooling had been gained in combat with Napoleon, the greatest
military genius of modern times, did not detract from its value. On the
sea the power of England was superior to that of all the rest of the
world combined.
[Footnote 539: On this whole subject see Adams, _op. cit._, Vol. VI,
_passim_; Babcock, _Rise of American Nationality, chaps_, iv and v.]
The contrast presented by the United States in 1812 in all that
pertained to military affairs could hardly have been more striking.
That the Americans were brave and potentially capable of making
good soldiers does not, of course, admit of question. But this is
equally true of the members of the mob which flees in terror before a
detachment of regulars one-tenth as numerous as itself. The lack of
a well-trained army was less serious, however, than was the absence
of a disposition to submit to the labors and discipline necessary to
create one. Of capable military leaders we had none. Yet this, while
deplorable enough, was not so serious, probably, as was the contempt
which all Americans outside the army itself evinced for regular
military training and experience. Even after the bitter lessons taught
us on land by the War of 1812, a sixteen-year-old runaway boy could
convince as intelligent a man as Calhoun that he had a greater claim
to preferment in the army than had the graduate of West Point.[540]
And in the early stages of our next war with a civilized nation the
President of the United States deliberately determined to appoint all
of the officers of a newly created regiment from civil life, on the
double ground that since he could not promote all of the officers of
the existing army he would not promote any of them, and that it was
"generally expected that they should be selected from citizens."[541]
[Footnote 540: Andrews, Biographical Sketch of James Watson Webb, 5-7.]
[Footnote 541: Diary of James K. Polk, I, 412. The same contempt for
trained military leaders, and preference for political appointees, was
manifested during the early years of the Civil War.]
On the sea we opposed sixteen ships,[542] excellent enough for
their class, to the eight hundred odd of England. Their showing in
the ensuing war is worthy of all praise. Yet it was probably as
genuinely a matter of surprise to the Americans as it was to the
British themselves. The glamor which resulted from the success of the
Americans in a number of single-ship duels has blinded the eyes of
later generations to the facts that during the greater part of the war
the British vessels maintained a close blockade of the American coast,
insulting our sea ports with impunity, and that the navy committed
blunders almost as serious as those of the army on land.
[Footnote 542: Adams, _op. cit._, VI, 362. This statement omits from
consideration the gunboats of Jefferson's mosquito fleet.]
The army, when war was declared, was partly in the field and partly
on paper.[543] The former portion consisted of ten old regiments with
ranks partly filled, scattered in numerous garrisons from New England
to New Orleans. The latter consisted of thirteen new regiments which
had been authorized by Congress in January, but although recruiting
began in March, only four thousand men had been secured by the middle
of June. Shortly after the declaration of war Congress fixed the
regular establishment at thirty-two regiments with a strength of
thirty-six thousand seven hundred men, yet at this time, including the
four thousand new recruits, there were but ten thousand men under arms.
In February the raising of fifty thousand volunteers for one year was
authorized, and in April the President was given power to call out one
hundred thousand state militia. But in June less than one-twelfth of
the volunteers had been enrolled, and whether the states would heed the
call upon them for militia, or whether the militia when raised would
serve beyond the frontier, no one yet knew.
[Footnote 543: On the state of the army at this time see McMaster,
_History of the People of the United States_, III, chap, xxiii; Adams,
_op. cit._, VI, chap, xiv; Babcock, _op. cit._, chap. v.]
The main reliance of the Americans must obviously be the militia.
Fighting within their own boundaries, under competent officers of their
own choosing, and in their own way, they were capable of excellent,
and at times even brilliant service; Bennington, King's Mountain, and
New Orleans are sufficient evidence of this. But for prolonged service
in a national and offensive war they were of very little account. In
subservience to impulse and impatience of discipline they rivaled
the Indian himself. Said Amos Kendall, after witnessing a temporary
muster in Kentucky in the summer of 1814: "The soldiers are under
no more restraint than a herd of swine. Reasoning, remonstrating,
threatening, and ridiculing their officers, they show their sense of
equality, and their total want of subordination."[544] Even so popular
and experienced a frontiersman as Harrison, leading the citizens
of his own territory in defense of their own homes, found great
difficulty in controlling the militia in the short Tippecanoe campaign.
His biographer repeats with evident pride that he relied upon his
persuasive eloquence, rather than his authority, to prevent a general
desertion.[545]
[Footnote 544: Quoted in Babcock, _op. cit._, 79-80.]
[Footnote 545: Dawson, _Harrison_, 230-31.]
Equally typical of the volunteer militia of this period was the action
of the Ohioans on receipt of the news, in the summer of 1812, that
Fort Wayne was in imminent danger from the Indians. Their ardor to
serve was such that "every road to the frontiers was crowded with
unsolicited volunteers."[546] Yet this zeal, praiseworthy as it was
in itself, only resulted in the consumption of the provisions which
by General Hull's orders had been accumulated at the outposts for his
use. When Harrison was finally ready to start upon the expedition for
the relief of Fort Wayne he paraded his troops, "read several articles
of war, prescribing the duty of soldiers, and explained the necessity
for such regulations," and gave those who were unwilling to submit to
them an opportunity to withdraw from the force. The enthusiasm of the
troops was such that only one man availed himself of this opportunity;
and he was conveyed astride a rail by his disgusted associates to the
banks of the Big Miami, "in the waters of which they absolved him from
the obligations of courage and patriotism." Yet not all of Harrison's
eloquence sufficed ten days later to prevent the Ohio militia from
abandoning his army in a body and returning to their homes with the
campaign but half completed.[547]
[Footnote 546: _Ibid._, 288.]
[Footnote 547: McAfee, _History of the Late War in the Western
Country_, 128.]
However excellent the quality of the rank and file may have been, it
still would have availed little in the absence of competent leaders.
The painful experience of the government in the early years of the
Civil War has burned this lesson deeply into the consciousness of the
American people. Though the War of 1812 was waged on a far smaller
scale, the lack of competent generals in the earlier years is even more
painfully apparent. The officers appointed by the President to command
the army in 1812 have been well described as "old, vain, respectable,
and incapable."[548] Of the two major generals and five brigadiers
the youngest was fifty-five years of age, and the average age was
fifty-nine. Most of them were veterans of the Revolutionary War, and
only one had ever commanded a regiment in the face of an enemy.
[Footnote 548: McMaster, _United States_, III, 546.]
The general plan proposed by Dearborn for the campaign provided for a
main expedition against Montreal by way of Lake Champlain, flanked by
invasions of Canada from Detroit, Niagara, and Sackett's Harbor. Such
a plan vigorously pushed with proper forces would have compelled the
British forces to stand strictly on the defensive, the Indians would
have had no encouragement to rise, and the northwestern frontier might
have been spared the horrors of the warfare that soon broke upon it.
But while a force was sent to Detroit under Hull to begin the campaign
in that quarter, elsewhere hostilities lagged. Hull's campaign,
therefore, on the issue of which hung the fate of the Northwest, may
receive our undivided attention.
Hull had neither sought nor desired the appointment to the command
of the army in the Northwest. As a soldier of the Revolution and in
various capacities since that war he had acquitted himself with credit,
when, in 1805, he was appointed by Jefferson governor of the newly
created Michigan Territory. In this office he remained when the War
of 1812 began, notwithstanding the fact that his career as governor
had been marked by discord and disappointment, due largely to Hull's
inability to adjust himself to the environment, new to him, of the
frontier.[549] He had urged upon the government the desirability of
rendering Michigan defensible from a military point of view, advocating
as essential to this end the control by armed vessels of Lake
Erie.[550] In the early part of 1812 he was in Washington urging the
same subject again upon the government. While thus engaged the military
appointment of commander of the forces in that quarter was tendered
to him by Madison and declined.[551] Colonel Jacob Kingsbury, who had
commanded at Detroit, Mackinac, and Belle Fontaine from 1804 to 1811,
and was now on leave of absence, was ordered to the West to resume his
old command. He was, however, incapacitated by illness, whereupon Hull,
urged a second time by the administration, accepted the appointment.
[Footnote 549: On Hull's career as governor see Cooley, _Michigan_,
chap. viii.]
[Footnote 550: Cooley, _Michigan_, 164; Hull, _Campaign of 1812_,
19-21; _Drennan Papers_, Hull to Eustis, March 6, 1812.]
[Footnote 551: Cooley, _Michigan_, 167; Hull, _Campaign of 1812_,
14-18.]
From every point of view this was a calamity. Hull's opinion that the
control of the lakes was essential to the safety of Detroit and the
Northwest had been repeatedly expressed, the last time as recently as
March 6, 1812. Since that control had not been gained, it followed that
Hull believed himself at the mercy of the enemy in the event of war.
Holding such views it was impossible for him to enter upon the invasion
of Canada with any confidence or determination. Kingsbury had seen much
of the Northwest. Having had years of military service there, he was
familiar with Heald, Whistler, and the other post commanders, and was
possessed of energy and decision of character. Under him, even though
the invasion of Canada had not been carried out, it is not likely that
Detroit would have surrendered without a light, and Fort Dearborn have
been left to its fate.
The force put at Hull's disposal consisted of three regiments of Ohio
militia, the Fourth United States Infantry, which had constituted the
nucleus of Harrison's force at Tippecanoe, a troop of Ohio dragoons,
and some scattering companies of volunteers, amounting in all to about
two thousand men. With this force he must cut a road through the
wilderness of northern Ohio, establish blockhouses to protect his line
of communication for two hundred miles through the Indian country,
protect the settlements, and, according to the expectations of the
government, conquer Upper Canada. The mere statement of the task is
sufficient to demonstrate the impossibility of executing it with the
means at his disposal.
On April 25 Hull reached Pittsburgh on his way to the West,[552] and
twelve days later was at Cincinnati, having come from Baltimore, a
distance of over eight hundred miles, in sixteen days.[553] Meanwhile
Governor Meigs with praiseworthy expedition was recruiting and
organizing the regiments of militia. On May 25 he turned them over
to Hull with a spirited speech worthy of Napoleon's best style and
containing withal much good advice.[554] The failure of the dragoons
and the regiment of regulars to arrive was causing Hull much anxiety,
but he announced his intention to proceed without them.[555] At last,
on June 10, the regulars joined him at Urbana.[556] The whole army
marched out a mile to meet and escort them ceremoniously into camp.
A triumphal arch had been erected near the camp, with the American
eagle displayed on the keystone, and inscribed in capitals on one
side the word "Tippecanoe," and on the other "Glory." In the place of
honor at the head of the army, preceded only by the troops of mounted
dragoons, the regulars made their way into camp. Arrived at the arch,
the cavalry opened out, allowing them to pass beneath it, while the
militia regiments passed by on the outside, "hoping soon to be entitled
to similar honors."
[Footnote 552: _Drennan Papers_, Hull to Eustis, April 26, 1812.]
[Footnote 553: _Ibid._, Hull to Eustis, May 8, 1812.]
[Footnote 554: _Ibid._, Meigs's address to the "First Army of Ohio,"
May 25, 1812; Hull to Eustis, May 26, 1812.]
[Footnote 555: _Ibid._, Hull to Eustis, May 17, 1812.]
[Footnote 556: _Ibid._, Hull to Eustis, June 11, 1812.]
This pleasing ceremony ended, and permission having been gained from
the Indian chiefs to open a road through their country and protect
it with blockhouses,[557] the advance was pressed with vigor. The
obstacles to be overcome were many: a new road fit for the passage of
an army must be cut, blockhouses were to be erected at intervals of
twenty miles through the Indian country, and the provisions needed for
the army must be brought forward from the settled portion of Ohio.
The equipment of the army was notably deficient in certain important
respects. On reaching Cincinnati, Hull had found the supply of powder
so inadequate as to necessitate sending at once to Lexington for
more.[558] The guns were in such poor condition that to render them
fit for use Hull was compelled to carry a traveling forge and create a
company of artificers to repair them as the army advanced. In this way
they were rendered serviceable at the rate of fifty a day.[559]
[Footnote 557: The agreement entered into is given in _Drennan Papers_,
Hull to Eustis, June 9, 1812.]
[Footnote 558: Drennan Papers, Hull to Eustis, May 8, 1812.]
[Footnote 559: _Ibid._, Hull to Eustis, June 11, 1812.]
Hull reported the spirit of the army as excellent, yet a serious
case of insubordination occurred at Urbana over a grievance, real or
fancied, on the part of the militia with respect to their pay.[560] The
officers had promised the men an advance for the year's clothing, which
was not forthcoming. Papers were accordingly posted on trees the night
before the departure from Urbana, warning Hull not to march until the
army had been paid. He announced his determination to proceed, and when
the assembly beat all but one company obeyed the order. A detachment
from the Fourth Regiment of regulars was immediately marched toward it,
which cowed the mutineers into submission. Three of the ringleaders
were tried by a court martial which sentenced them to have one-half
their heads shaved, their hands tied behind their backs, to be marched
around the lines with the label "Tory" between the shoulders, and be
drummed out of the army.
[Footnote 560: _Ibid._, Hull to Eustis, June 18, 1812.]
This exhibition of firmness on Hull's part seems to have had the
desired effect. The culprits felt the disgrace keenly, considering the
punishment worse than death, and at the solicitation of their officers
Hull consented to pardon them.[561] Heavy and incessant rains, combined
with the other obstacles, prevented the army from making the progress
the commander desired.[562] On June 26, when Hull received a message
warning him of the impending hostilities and urging him to press
forward with all possible speed, he had covered only about seventy-five
miles from Urbana and was still thirty-five miles from the Maumee
Rapids.[563] He reached this point four days later, and thereupon
committed his first blunder. To save transportation, his personal
baggage, papers, hospital stores, and other material were embarked on
a schooner for Detroit. Meanwhile war had been declared by Congress
on June 18; and the British forces at Malden, receiving prompt notice
of this, seized the schooner with all it contained. Thus they became
apprised of Hull's strength and of his instructions from his government.
[Footnote 561: _Ibid._]
[Footnote 562: _Ibid._, Hull to Eustis, June 24 and 26, 1812.]
[Footnote 563: Adams, _United States_, VI, 298-99; _Drennan Papers_,
Hull to Eustis, June 26, 1812.]
On July 5 Hull reached Detroit, and four days later received word from
Washington to begin the invasion of Canada.[564] His reply expressed
confidence in his ability to drive the British from the opposite bank
of the river, but he did not believe he could take Maiden. A week
later he crossed the river and occupied Sandwich, the British retiring
before him without a blow. From Sandwich a proclamation was issued to
the Canadians, designed to secure their acquiescence in the American
conquest.[565] To some extent this hope was realized, and numbers of
the Canadian militia deserted to the Americans. Instead, however, of
pressing the attack on Maiden at once, from this time Hull delayed
until, with the enemy growing stronger and his own position more
precarious, he lost all hope of success and retreated to Detroit. The
factors responsible for this decision were the news of the capture of
Mackinac with the prospect of the approach of a large number of traders
and Indians upon Detroit in his rear, and the attacks by Tecumseh's
Indians upon his line of communications with Ohio.
[Footnote 564: Adams, _op. cit._, VI, 302.]
[Footnote 565: _Ibid._, VI, 303-4.]
While Hull had thus been conducting affairs at Detroit, Dearborn, who
had command of the army in New York, was dallying at Boston and Albany,
doing nothing to engage the British by pushing the attack upon Canada
from New York, a measure which was essential to Hull's success. On
August 9 he even entered into an armistice with the British which bound
him to act only on the defensive until the government at Washington
should decide upon the effect of the repeal of the obnoxious orders.
This inactivity in the East left Brock, the British commander in Upper
Canada, entirely free to direct his attention to Hull; and the attack
upon Niagara on which Hull on July 19 had declared all his own success
would depend was not made. Moving with a vigor and daring conspicuously
wanting in the American generals. Brock transferred all of his
available forces from the Niagara frontier to Maiden. On arriving there
he quickly determined to cross the river and assail Hull in Detroit.
Although Hull's force was the larger, the audacity of Brock, combined
with the senility displayed by Hull, rendered the movement a complete
success. Without awaiting the assault, Hull surrendered his entire
army, together with Detroit and Michigan Territory, to the British.