CHICAGO IN THE REVOLUTION
The years from 1754 to 1760 witnessed the overthrow of the power
of France in the new world. For the fourth time in two generations
England and France had joined in deadly combat. Twice the issue ended
in a drawn contest; twice France was overwhelmed, and the English
gained a decisive victory. Each of these great wars had its American
counterpart, and the outcome of each was reflected in the disposition
made in the treaty of peace of the territories of the warring nations
in America. At the close of the two drawn contests there were no
territorial changes. By the Treaty of Utrecht, which closed the
Spanish Succession War, however, England made substantial territorial
gains in North America at the expense of her defeated rival. Finally,
by the Treaty of Paris of 1763, which registered the results of the
Seven Years' War, France lost all of her vast American possessions on
the mainland. Canada passed into the hands of the English, while the
imperial domain of Louisiana, in the establishment of which La Salle
and Tonty and many another intrepid Frenchman had toiled and died, was
divided; all that lay west of the Mississippi was given to Spain, while
the portion drained by the eastern tributaries of that stream fell to
the English.
What the dividing line between Canada and Louisiana had been in the
French period is not easy to determine. Nor is it necessary to our
purpose to do so, for whether it had belonged to Canada or Louisiana,
the region tributary to Chicago, since known as the old Northwest, was
now the property of England. Her civilized rival crushed, however,
another foe arose to resist the assumption by England of possession
of her new-won territory. The idea of passing under the control of
the English was extremely distasteful to a large proportion of the
northwestern Indians. Under the leadership of Pontiac a conspiracy
was formed in the spring of 1763 to wipe out in a day all the English
posts from Pennsylvania to Lake Superior.[168] The execution of this
terrible project stopped short of complete success. Fort Pitt and
Detroit withstood the attacks of the savages. But Green Bay and Sault
Ste. Marie were abandoned; the forts at Mackinac, Sandusky, Miami, St.
Joseph, Ouiatanon, Presque Isle, and Venango were taken; and over two
thousand frontier settlers were slain.
[Footnote 168: The classic account of these events is Parkman's
Conspiracy of Pontiac. For a brief narrative see Winsor, _Mississippi
Basin_, chaps, xxii, xxiii.]
The storm had not broken entirely without warning, and the effort to
relieve the posts that still held out and to subdue the obstreperous
savages was promptly begun. In August Colonel Bouquet threw a relieving
force into Fort Pitt, having beaten off the savages at Bushy Run in a
bloody battle of two days' duration. The following season two armies
were sent into the Indian country between the Great Lakes and the Ohio.
A force under Bradstreet passed by way of Niagara and the southern
shore of Lake Erie to Detroit, from which place detachments were sent
out to take possession of Sault Ste. Marie, Mackinac, and Green Bay. In
the fall of 1764 Bouquet with the second army crossed the Ohio River
and advanced into the valley of the Muskingum where, in November, the
tribes of the surrounding region were forced to subscribe to the terms
of peace which the invader imposed upon them.
Not until another year had passed did the English gain possession of
the country bordering on the Illinois and the Wabash.[169] A force
of four hundred men with which Major Loftus attempted to ascend the
Mississippi to Fort Chartres in the spring of 1764 was defeated and
driven back, when only two hundred and forty miles above New Orleans.
A year later Lieutenant Fraser was sent down the Ohio from Fort
Pitt to warn the tribes and the French of the prospective approach
of a force of troops which was to follow after him. He succeeded in
reaching the Illinois villages, but was glad to flee in disguise down
the Mississippi. He owed his life to the protection of Pontiac, but
before granting it that terrible chieftain had "kept him all one night
in dread of being boiled alive."[170] A second herald now set out, in
the person of the redoubtable George Croghan, to descend the Ohio from
Fort Pitt to Fort Chartres. Near the mouth of the Wabash, however, he
was seized by a band of Indians and carried prisoner to Vincennes. He
was subsequently released at Ouiatanon, and made a treaty with the
neighboring tribes; proceeding to Detroit he repeated his success
with the savages there, and then returned to Niagara. On the receipt
of Croghan's report of his success in treating with the Indians, a
force of one hundred and twenty Highlanders of the famous Black Watch
Regiment proceeded down the Ohio from Fort Pitt, and on October 10,
1765, at Fort Chartres of the Illinois, in the heart of the Mississippi
Valley, the last banner of France east of the Mississippi was hauled
down. "The lilies of France gave place to the red cross of St. George,
and the long struggle was ended."[171] The control of the British
over this region which was thus at last established was to continue
unchallenged by a civilized power less than a decade and a half.
[Footnote 169: For the facts given here I have relied on Winsor,
_Mississippi Basin_. Edward G. Mason has written charmingly of these
events in his _Chapters from Illinois History_.]
[Footnote 170: Mason, _op. cit._, 234.]
[Footnote 171: _Ibid._, 235.]
The old Northwest, to which Chicago belonged, did not participate
actively in the Revolutionary struggle during its earlier stages. At
the beginning of the war the British were, of course, in possession
of all the Northwest. The vantage points from which they directed
the affairs of this region were, in general, the old French posts,
now occupied by British garrisons. Among these may be named Detroit,
Mackinac, Fort Gage, and Cahokia. The first named of these was easily
the most important center of British influence in the Northwest, being
looked upon as the headquarters of the posts and the key to the fur
trade and to the control of the Indian tribes of this region.[172]
The fort was defended by a palisade of pickets and contained at the
beginning of the year 1776 a garrison of one hundred and twenty men.
In the town and country adjoining were three hundred and fifty men,
mostly French, capable of bearing arms; and to complete the tale of
Detroit's military resources, there floated in the river opposite the
fort several tiny public vessels with crews aggregating thirty "seamen
and servants."
[Footnote 172: James, "Indian Diplomacy and Opening of the Revolution
in the West," in _Wisconsin State Historical Society, Proceedings_,
1909, 125.]
The only other considerable centers of white population in the
Northwest were the old French posts on the Wabash, Ouiatanon and
Vincennes, and, most populous of all, the settlements along the eastern
shore of the Mississippi from the mouth of the Missouri to the mouth
of the Ohio, on what later came to be known as the "American Bottom."
At Ouiatanon, at the beginning of the Revolution there were about a
dozen French families.[173] Vincennes had, in 1776, according to the
report of Lieutenant Fraser, about sixty farmers.[174] This would
imply a total population of between two and three hundred, and this
estimate is borne out by a "census" of Indiana of 1769. This lists
the names of sixty-six "Inhabitants" and states that in addition
there are fifty women and one hundred and fifty children "belonging
to the Inhabitants."[175] There were, at this time, fifty men capable
of bearing arms, and during the next half-dozen years the population
increased somewhat.
[Footnote 173: _Indiana Historical Society, Publications_, II, 338.]
[Footnote 174: _Ibid._, 410.]
[Footnote 175: _Ibid._, 439. Hamilton, who captured the place in 1778,
states, however, that he found 621 inhabitants of whom 217 were able
to bear arms (Michigan Pioneer and Historical Society Collections,
IX, 495). This work will be cited henceforth as _Michigan Pioneer
Collections_.]
In the Illinois settlements of the American Bottom in 1778 there was
a population of about one thousand whites, and as many Indians and
negroes.[176] The more populous settlements were Cahokia, with three
hundred white inhabitants, and Kaskaskia, with five hundred whites and
almost as many negroes.
[Footnote 176: For an account of these settlements see the
introduction to the Cahokia Records, _Illinois Historical Collections_,
II, pp. xiii ff.]
For the rest, the vast region which now teems with a population as
prosperous and as highly civilized as any on the face of the globe was
a wilderness. The Indian tribes could muster, according to the usual
estimates, about eight thousand warriors, which would imply a total
population several times as large.[177] The Chippewas alone numbered
over half of this total. Our interest, however, is concerned rather
with certain of the smaller tribes. Around the southern end of Lake
Michigan, with a village at Chicago but with their principal seat on
the St. Joseph River, were the Pottawatomies, numbering some four
hundred warriors. To the south and southeast of these, in the modern
states of Indiana and Ohio, were the Miamis, Shawnees, and other
tribes, who were to contest the possession of the Northwest with the
Americans even more fiercely than did Great Britain herself. To the
north, at Milwaukee, was located a "horrid set of refractory Indians,"
according to the picturesque language of Colonel De Peyster, which
seems to have been composed of the off-scourings of various tribes and
bands. To the west and northwest, in northern Illinois and the state of
Wisconsin, were the descendants of the Sacs and Foxes, the Winnebagoes,
and other tribes.
[Footnote 177: James, _op. cit._, 137; Walker, _The Northwest during
the Revolution_, 12.]
The advancing wave of English settlement pouring into the upper Ohio
Valley had precipitated the French and Indian War. As yet this tidal
wave of civilization had not crossed the Ohio, although it had spread
out along its eastern valley as far south as Tennessee. The most
important point along this extensive frontier was still, as in the days
of the old war. Fort Pitt at the Forks of the Ohio.[178] It was the
center, therefore, from which radiated the American efforts to control
the northwestern tribes, just as, at a later date, it afforded the
principal gateway through which the flood of civilization poured into
this region.[179]
[Footnote 178: James, _op. cit._, 126.]
[Footnote 179: On the rival efforts to control the northwestern tribes
in the early period of the Revolution see _ibid._, 125 ff.]
The Americans at first strove to secure the neutrality of the Indians
in the impending contest. But the disposition of the red man did not
permit him to stand idly by while a war was going on, and the British
more wisely directed their efforts to securing his active support. This
policy was shortly copied by the Americans, and soon the perplexed red
men were being plied with rival solicitations for alliance, accompanied
by corresponding threats of punishment and prophecies of disaster which
were to follow their failure to comply. The British urged them on to
assail the outlying settlements of the American frontiers, counseling
humanity to the vanquished, but effectually nullifying this counsel
by offering rewards for all scalps brought in. Lieutenant-governor
Hamilton at Detroit was particularly zealous in hounding the Indians on
to the work of devastation.[180] The Americans, to their honor, offered
rewards for prisoners but none for scalps. Two courses of action were
open to the Americans in view of this situation. They might endeavor to
punish the hostile Indians by launching retaliatory expeditions against
them; or they might by capturing Detroit, from whence issued alike
the supplies for the marauders and payment for the scalps they took,
destroy the opposition at its fountain-head.[181] The latter course was
urged by Colonel Morgan, the Indian agent for the Middle Department, a
man of much experience among the Indians of the Northwest. The reasons
which he advanced in support of this policy and against the alternative
one were telling,[182] but his advice went unheeded. Seeing this,
and believing a general Indian war was about to be precipitated, he
resigned his office; the control of the Western Department passed into
incompetent hands, and it seemed probable that the western frontier
was about to be overrun by the British and Indians when an important
diversion occurred. The advent of the Virginia "Hannibal," George
Rogers Clark, in the Illinois country, compelled the British at Detroit
to turn their attention to the defense of the Northwest, and shortly of
Detroit itself, against the invader.
[Footnote 180: James, _op. cit._; Thwaites, How George Rogers Clark Won
the Northwest, 8-10. Hamilton himself vigorously denied the charges of
inhumanity which the Americans preferred against him. _Michigan Pioneer
Collections_, IX, 490.]
[Footnote 181: James, _op. cit._, 141-42.]
[Footnote 182: For a statement of them, see _ibid._]
In 1776 Clark had cast in his lot with the young settlements of
Kentucky.[183] These were nominally a part of Virginia, but in fact
they were too remote to receive much protection from the mother colony.
It was congenial, too, to the spirit of the American frontiersman to
depend upon himself, and Clark, who had come to the conclusion that
the only means of obtaining safety was to carry the war into the
enemy's country, was one of those who favored action independently of
authorization from the government of Virginia.
[Footnote 183: Many of the original documents pertaining to Clark's
career in the Northwest have been printed in the _Illinois Historical
Collections_, Vol. I; the _Michigan Pioneer Collections_; and the
_Wisconsin Historical Collections_. Among the secondary accounts may
be mentioned Dunn, _Indiana_; Winsor, _Westward Movement_, chap, viii;
Thwaites, _How George Rogers Clark Won the Northwest_.]
Other counsels prevailed, however. The protection of the parent
colony was sought, and as a result the Virginia Assembly declared the
extension of its authority over the region and in December, 1776,
created the county of Kentucky.[184] The next summer Clark learned
from spies whom he had sent into the Illinois settlements that the
French settlers were lukewarm in their allegiance to Great Britain and
that only a few of them were participating in the raids against the
Americans, which, fomented from Detroit, made these settlements their
starting-point and base of operations. Fired by these reports with the
purpose to conquer the Illinois settlements, he proceeded the same
summer to Virginia. Here he laid his project before Governor Henry and
received his authorization to raise and equip a force of troops for
the work, and with this and a scanty supply of money he returned to
Kentucky and launched the enterprise.
[Footnote 184: Winsor, _Westward Movement_, 116.]
In the spring of 1778 Clark collected a little army of about one
hundred and fifty men at Redstone, now Brownsville, Pennsylvania,
and dropped down the Monongahela and Ohio, taking on supplies and
reinforcements at Pittsburgh and other places along the way. At the
Falls of the Ohio, where the metropolis of Kentucky now stands, he
paused long enough to build a blockhouse on Corn Island. On June 24,
while the sun was obscured by a great eclipse, the journey was renewed,
the objective being Kaskaskia, the principal settlement of the Illinois
country. At Fort Massac the little party landed and began the overland
march of one hundred and twenty miles to Kaskaskia. On the way the
hunter who had been engaged to guide them lost his bearings. This
created some excitement, and caused Clark, who suspected treachery, to
threaten him with death unless he found the way that evening. In this
he succeeded, and accordingly the afternoon of July 4 found the party
within three miles of the goal.
Clark halted his little army until nightfall, when he advanced to
a farmhouse a mile from the town, and seizing the family secured
information of the conditions that prevailed there. Thus armed, the
party moved forward in two divisions and surrounded the place. We may
safely dismiss to the limbo of myth the romantic story of Clark's
appearance, alone, at the ball where garrison and villagers were
disporting themselves, and his dramatic announcement to the merrymakers
that the dance might go on, but it must be under the banner of
Virginia.[185] The story betrays too conspicuously the handiwork of
the romancer. It is clear, however, that garrison and townsmen were
completely surprised, and surrendered without a blow being struck or a
gun fired. By a judicious mixture of bluster and leniency Clark soon
succeeded in gaining the hearty support of the villagers. One of his
most effective allies was the priest. Father Gibault, who assured Clark
that although, by reason of his calling, he had "nothing to do with
temporal business, that he would give them such hints in the Spiritual
way, that would be very conducive to the business."[186]
[Footnote 185: On this see Thwaites, _op. cit._ , 28-31. I have drawn
freely on this reference and on Winsor, _Westward Movement_, for the
facts concerning Clark's expedition.]
[Footnote 186: Thwaites, _op. cit._, 33. That he kept his promise is
sufficiently attested by Hamilton, who describes him as a "wretch,"
"who absolved the French inhabitants from their allegiance to the
King of Great Britain," and "an active agent for the rebels & whose
vicious & immoral conduct was sufficient to do infinite mischief in a
country where ignorance & bigotry give full scope to the depravity of a
licentious ecclesiastic."--_Michigan Pioneer Collections_, XIX, 487.]
The Cahokians readily followed the lead of the Kaskaskians in
submitting to Clark's rule; so, too, did the inhabitants of Vincennes,
to whom Father Gibault went as an emissary of Clark. Thus far Clark's
success had been unchecked; as far as the French settlers were
concerned, the British power had crumbled. But the Indians were still
to be reckoned with, and the British at Detroit to be heard from, and
Clark's resources were pitifully inadequate for the task in hand. Even
a large part of his Virginia troops abandoned him on the expiration of
their term of enlistment. With such as consented to remain, augmented
by enlistments on the part of the French whom he had come to conquer,
Clark maintained his position throughout the winter. None knew better
than he how to combine in the right proportions terrible energy,
braggadocio, tact, and cajolery. Friendly relations were established
with De Leyba, the Spanish commander at St. Louis. The Indians were
handled so adroitly that an "Amazeing number" flocked in from five
hundred miles around to treat for peace and learn the will of the Big
Knife Chief.
Meanwhile on August 6, 1778, the news had come to Hamilton at Detroit
of the capture of Kaskaskia, and he promptly began preparations for
the recovery of the posts that had been lost.[187] On October 7 he
set out from Detroit by boat with nearly two hundred whites, chiefly
volunteers, and three hundred Indians. The destination was Vincennes,
and the route followed led up the Maumee and down the Wabash River.
Although expedition was all-important, the progress made was tedious
and slow. Not until December 17 was Vincennes reached. On the news
of Hamilton's approach the French militia of Captain Helm, Clark's
representative, deserted him. Again, as in the case of the capture
of Kaskaskia by Clark, a melodramatic tale is told of the capture
of the fort. Helm, with his garrison dwindled to a single man, is
represented as standing, lighted match in hand, by a well-charged
cannon which he has placed in the fort gate, halting the British force,
and surrendering with the honors of war. The story is without adequate
historical foundation and may properly be dismissed as a pleasing bit
of fiction.
[Footnote 187: For Hamilton's own narrative of his course see _Michigan
Pioneer Collections_, IX, 489 ff. His correspondence is printed in
_Illinois Historical Collections_, I, 330 ff.]
Although Vincennes surrendered without resistance, the delays which
had been encountered proved fatal to Hamilton's project. If he had
pushed on to Kaskaskia at once it seems certain that Clark must have
succumbed. But winter having now arrived, Hamilton decided to remain
at Vincennes until spring, when he would not only retake the Illinois
settlements but turn the tables on the invaders by sweeping the
Americans from Kentucky.
Pending the arrival of spring, the greater part of Hamilton's force was
dispersed. Not until the last of January did full news of the situation
at Vincennes and the projected vernal attack upon Kaskaskia come to
Clark. As soon as he had quelled the panic which the tidings caused
among the Kaskaskians, he projected a counter-assault upon Vincennes.
An armed galley was sent around by water, down the Mississippi and
up the Ohio and the Wabash to a point ten leagues below Vincennes,
where it was to await the arrival of Clark, who, meanwhile, would
lead a force overland across Illinois. The story of the difficulties
encountered and vanquished on the march of this little force across the
Illinois swamps and prairies surpasses many a flight of fiction. It was
February and a thaw that had set in had flooded the lowlands and driven
away the game. To the fatigues and discomforts of wading swollen rivers
and marching through boggy and oftentimes "drowned" land in midwinter
were added the pangs of hunger. The last stage necessitated the
crossing of miles of bottom land overflowed to the depth of three feet
and upward by the swollen waters of the rivers. Here the sufferings
of the party were such that Clark avers that the bare recital of them
would be "too incredible for any Person to believe except those that
are well acquainted with me."
It had been Clark's purpose to take the garrison by surprise but on
learning from some villagers whom he captured that the force of British
and French largely outnumbered his own, and that the villagers were not
ill-disposed toward the Americans, he changed his plan. Fearing that
in the fight that would doubtless ensue some of the French and Indians
would be slain and that this would embitter the rest, he determined to
bluff the garrison and the town into a surrender. Halting his little
army in sight of the town, but concealed from the view of the garrison,
he sent a menacing letter ahead, designed to awe the townsmen into
submission. At nightfall, with the garrison still ignorant of his
approach, Clark's men moved into the village. The Creoles greeted them
with enthusiasm, and the fickle Indians, who made up the larger portion
of Hamilton's force, either offered to join Clark or drew aside to
await the issue of the contest between the palefaces.
The British had been attracted by the commotion and the discharge of
guns, but not until a sergeant received a bullet in the breast did they
know whether to attribute the cause to some jollification or to the
arrival of the "Virginians." Throughout the night and early morning
Clark's riflemen harassed the garrison. About eight o'clock, while
his men stopped for breakfast, a summons to surrender was dispatched
to Hamilton. It was received by the garrison with mingled feelings of
defiance and despair. According to Hamilton, the British assured him
they would stick to him "as the shirt to my back," while the French
"hung their heads." The firing was resumed, but later in the day
Hamilton agreed to surrender. The next morning, February 25, 1779, the
fort changed hands and name as well, for the Americans now christened
it Fort Patrick Henry, in honor of the governor of Virginia.
Clark's ultimate goal was the capture of Detroit, but with his small
force and scanty supplies he could not at once move forward. While
waiting for reinforcements he applied himself vigorously to the work of
governing his newly won territory, establishing satisfactory relations
with the Indians, and preparing the way for the greater exploit which
he was destined never to perform. To this work the ensuing spring and
summer were devoted.
Meanwhile certain events were taking place in the region west of Lake
Michigan and the vicinity of Chicago which now demand our attention.
When Hamilton began preparations for his expedition in the autumn
of 1778, he sent word to De Peyster, who commanded at Mackinac, to
raise the Indians tributary to that post and co-operate with him by
an expedition down the Illinois River.[188] Many of the Indians who
frequented Mackinac had dispersed, however, and the lateness of the
season rendered those who could be reached indisposed to engage in such
an enterprise. Nevertheless De Peyster, whom Winsor describes as "a
somewhat rattle-brained person, given to writing illiterate letters,
but in some ways an enterprising and prudent commander,"[189] did what
he could. He sent Langlade, the man who had destroyed Pickawillany in
1752, to the Ottawas and Chippewas in Michigan, and Gautier to the
Pottawatomies of St. Joseph, to lead them to Hamilton's assistance.
At the same time he suggested to Haldimand the project of sending an
Indian party from Green Bay by way of the Fox-Wisconsin route and the
Mississippi, directly against the Illinois posts. The Grand River
Indians declined to start until spring, and Gautier did not reach St.
Joseph until December. What few Pottawatomies could then be raised were
taken on by Louis Chevalier, a trader who resided among them; Langlade
returned to Green Bay and Gautier to his station on the Mississippi,
carrying speeches and belts to exhort the Indians to be ready for an
expedition in the spring.[190]
[Footnote 188: _Illinois Historical Collections_, I, 364.]
[Footnote 189: Winsor, _Westward Movement_, 130.]
[Footnote 190: _Wisconsin Historical Collections_, XI, 122-23.]
During the winter Hamilton sent orders to Langlade at Green Bay
requiring him and Gautier to join him early in the spring in an attack
upon Kaskaskia.[191] Langlade was to proceed from Green Bay down Lake
Michigan, and thence by way of the Illinois River, while Gautier was to
gather the Indians from the upper Mississippi and descend that stream.
Thus a grand converging attack from three directions would be made on
the Illinois settlements. How Hamilton took and then lost Vincennes
has already been seen. In ignorance of the latter occurrence, Langlade
set out from Green Bay with a band of Indians, and proceeded as far as
Milwaukee.[192] Here they learned the news of Hamilton's capture, which
so disheartened the Indians that they refused to go farther. Clark's
emissaries were in the neighborhood, purchasing horses and threatening
to be at "Labaye" soon with three hundred men, but Langlade's Indians
were so disaffected that he was unable to capture them.[193]
[Footnote 191: _Illinois Historical Collections_, I, 436-38.]
[Footnote 192: _Ibid._]
[Footnote 193: _Ibid._]
Gautier's experience was even more discouraging. With a party of two
hundred Indians, made up of Foxes, Ottawas, and others, he crossed by
the Fox and Wisconsin rivers to the Mississippi, and proceeded down
that stream as far as the mouth of the Rock.[194] Here a party of Sacs
whom he stopped to harangue not only mocked his arguments and threats
but had the "insollance" to force him to release one hundred and twenty
of his followers. Other bands whom he addressed replied by threatening
to carry news of his measures to the "Bostonnais," as the Americans
were called. Like Langlade, therefore, he was forced to return to Green
Bay.
[Footnote 194: _Wisconsin Historical Collections_, XI, 126.]
The news of Hamilton's surrender filled the British at Detroit
and Mackinac with forebodings of an immediate attack. Appeals were
sent to Haldimand for reinforcements, while the defenses at the
two posts were put in readiness to withstand an assault.[195] The
Indians reported to De Peyster that the "Virginians" were building
boats near Milwaukee, and also that they were near Chicago, but it
shortly developed that these statements were the inventions of some
"evil minded" Indians.[196] De Peyster professed not to care how soon
"Mr. Clark" might appear, provided he "come by Lake Michigan & the
Indians prove staunch & above all that the Canadians do not follow
the example of their brethren at the Illinois who have joined the
Rebels to a man."[197] Since there was little likelihood that these
conditions would be realized, it is evident his confidence was not very
deep-seated.
[Footnote 195: _Michigan Pioneer Collections_, IX, 387 _et passim_;
James, "Some Problems of the Northwest in 1779," in _Essays in American
History_, 62.]
[Footnote 196: _Illinois Historical Collections_, I, 436.]
[Footnote 197: _Illinois Historical Collections_, I, 437.]
Meanwhile Clark, as a part of his preparations for the projected attack
upon Detroit, dispatched Captain Linctot, a trader who had recently
joined the Americans, and who was influential with the Indians, up the
Illinois River with a company of forty men to secure the neutrality of
the Indians, and to cover the design of his main expedition.[198] On
learning this, and that Linctot had reached Lake Peoria, De Peyster
sent Gautier with a party of Indians with orders to burn the fort,
hoping thus to intimidate the Americans from attempting an expedition
by this route.[199] A few days after receiving this information a
report came to De Peyster from St. Joseph to the effect that the
Americans were about to send seven hundred men against Detroit by
way of the Wabash River, and four hundred cavalry under Linctot were
to come up the Illinois and thence by St. Joseph to co-operate with
them.[200] In consequence of this intelligence he detached Lieutenant
Bennett with twenty men from his little force to go, with sixty traders
and canoemen and two hundred Indians, to intercept Linctot, or to
harass the "Rebels" in any way possible.[201] At the same time Langlade
was ordered, July I, 1779, to raise the savages of l'Arbre Croche,[202]
Milwaukee, and other places along the shore of Lake Michigan and join
Bennett at Chicago, or if he should have passed that point, to hasten
to join him before he should reach Peoria.[203]
[Footnote 198: _Michigan Pioneer Collections_, IX, 389; James, "Some
Problems of the Northwest in 1779," _op. cit._, 378.]
[Footnote 199: _Michigan Pioneer Collections_, IX, 389.]
[Footnote 200: _Ibid._, 390.]
[Footnote 201: _Ibid._]
[Footnote 202: A mission village on Little Traverse Bay, at this time
occupied by a band of Ottawas. See _Wisconsin Historical Collections_,
XVIII, 253, 375.]
[Footnote 203: _Ibid._, 375-76.]
Bennett carried a war belt a yard and a half long, containing twelve
thousand wampum beads, and early reports received from him were to
the effect that the savages were joining it "fast."[204] De Peyster
himself accompanied Langlade as far as l'Arbre Croche, where, on
July 4, he harangued the assembled Indians. At a later date he gave
vent to his poetical propensities by turning this speech into rhymed
verses which constitute one of the literary curiosities of the English
language.[205] Its chief interest for the history of Chicago consists
in the allusion to Baptiste Point Du Sable, who is said to have already
established himself here.
[Footnote 204: _Michigan Pioneer Collections_, IX, 391; _Wisconsin
Historical Collections_, XVIII, 390.]
[Footnote 205: Printed in De Peyster's _Miscellanies_; it may also be
found, with editorial notes, in _Wisconsin Historical Collections_,
XVIII, 377-90.]
From Peoria Linctot and his party crossed the country to Ouiatanon,
there to join Clark in his advance. He reached there in August,
accompanied by a large concourse of Indians.[206] By this time Clark
had abandoned the idea of an immediate advance on Detroit. Linctot,
therefore, conceived the idea of attacking St. Joseph, to which place
Bennett's party had meanwhile come.[207] He sent a message to Vincennes
for reinforcements, but the French refused to respond, and the
projected attack was abandoned.[208]
[Footnote 206: Said to have numbered 6,000, but this is obviously a
gross exaggeration. (_Wisconsin Historical Collections_, XVIII, 376.)]
[Footnote 207: _Ibid._, 286, 398.]
[Footnote 208: _Wisconsin Historical Collections_, XVIII, 376;
_Michigan Pioneer Collections_, XIX, 467.]
Bennett was sufficiently involved in difficulties, however, without
interference from Linctot. On reaching St. Joseph, July 23, he threw
up a slight intrenchment and sent out bands of Indians toward Peoria,
Ouiatanon, and the Miamis, to learn of his opponents' movements and
harass them if practicable.[209] These parties shortly returned in a
disaffected state without having seen the enemy. On July 26 Bennett
sent a message to Detroit informing Captain Lernault of his movements
and offering to co-operate with him in any practicable operation. While
awaiting an answer the greater portion of his Indians, having consumed
his supplies and rum, deserted. Langlade, meanwhile, arrived with sixty
Chippewas, who conducted themselves with even greater insolence than
the others. Finding himself helpless to accomplish anything Bennett
abandoned St. Joseph about the middle of August and returned to
Mackinac.[210]
[Footnote 209: _Wisconsin Historical Collections_, XVIII, 398.]
[Footnote 210: I have drawn this narrative from Bennett's Journal,
in _Wisconsin Historical Collections_, XVIII, 398-401, and the other
sources cited above.]
Active military operations in the Northwest for the year 1779 were now
at an end. Late in the year De Peyster was sent to Detroit to take
the place of Hamilton, who had been sent by his captors to languish
in a Virginia prison. Lieutenant-governor Patrick Sinclair was sent
by Haldimand to succeed De Peyster at Mackinac.[211] On the American
side Clark had retired to the Falls of the Ohio, his first base of
operations in the Northwest. Upon the declaration of war against Great
Britain by Spain in 1779, the British proceeded to plan a comprehensive
campaign which would sweep the whole western American frontier from
Canada to Florida and result in destroying the power of both Spain and
the colonists in the Mississippi Valley.[212] From Pensacola in the
South and Detroit in the Northwest as centers of operation, the British
forces were to converge upon lower Louisiana, having taken St. Louis en
route. Meanwhile, to cover these operations, De Peyster from Detroit
was to advance on Clark at the Falls of the Ohio by way of the Maumee
and Wabash rivers. The execution of this comprehensive program was
rendered impossible, even before its initiation, by the enterprise of
Galvez, the Spanish governor at New Orleans. In a series of operations
extending over two years of time, he cleared the British out of the
lower Mississippi Valley, concluding the process by the capture of
Pensacola in May, 1781.[213]
[Footnote 211: Winsor, _Westward Movement_, 142.]
[Footnote 212: For a statement of this project see James, "Significance
of the Attack on St. Louis," in _Mississippi Valley Historical
Association Proceedings_, II, 199 ff.]
[Footnote 213: _Ibid._, 203-4.]
Meanwhile, ignorant of the successes of Galvez in the South, the
British forces stationed in the Northwest began, early in the year
1780, the execution of their part of the general plan of operations.
The campaign was initiated by Sinclair, who early in February sent a
body of Indians to engage the noted Sioux chief, Wabasha, to descend
the Mississippi to Natchez with his two hundred warriors.[214] About
the middle of the same month Sinclair ordered Emanuel Hesse, a trader
who had formerly served in the British army, to assemble the Sacs,
Foxes, and other Wisconsin Indians at the Fox-Wisconsin Portage and
proceed with them to the mouth of the Wisconsin, where the Indians
from the upper Mississippi would join them in a descent upon St.
Louis.[215] The services of Matchekewis, who had massacred the garrison
at Mackinac in 1763, but who now was zealously serving the British,
were also enlisted,[216] and it was planned that Langlade with a chosen
band of Canadians and Indians should join a party gathered at Chicago
and lead them down the Illinois River. Another party was to "watch
the Plains" between the Wabash and the Mississippi,[217] while still
another and larger expedition from Detroit under the command of Captain
Henry Bird was to descend the Wabash to "amuse" Clark at the Falls of
the Ohio.[218] Sinclair believed St. Louis could easily be surprised
and taken, and that the traders who would profit by the English thus
gaining control of the rich "furr Trade" of the Missouri River would
give their assistance to the enterprise.[219]
[Footnote 214: For a secondary account of this campaign see _ibid._
For the original documents pertaining to it see _Wisconsin Historical
Collections_, III, XI, XVIII; _Michigan Pioneer Collections_, IX;
_Missouri Historical Collections_, II, No. 6.]
[Footnote 215: _Wisconsin Historical Collections_, XI, 147-48.]
[Footnote 216: _Ibid._, 151.]
[Footnote 217: _Ibid._]
[Footnote 218: Winsor. _Westward Movement_, 171; _Michigan Pioneer
Collections_, X, 372, 377, 395.]
[Footnote 219: _Wisconsin Historical Collections_, XI, 148.]
On May 2, 1780, the force gathered at the mouth of the Wisconsin,
consisting of about a thousand men, Indians, traders, and servants,
began the descent of the Mississippi.[220] The news of its approach
was carried to St. Louis by a trader, and the Spaniards made hasty
preparations for defense.[221] De Leyba, the governor, ordered
a wooden tower to be erected at one end of the town in which he
placed five cannons, and intrenchments were constructed at the other
exposed places. To man these defenses he had a force of twenty-nine
regular soldiers and two hundred and eighty-one countrymen. On May
26 the hostile forces appeared and a vigorous firing began, to which
the besieged replied with their cannon. "Then were to be heard the
confusion and the lamentable cries of the women and children who had
been shut up in the house of the commandant, ... the dolorous echoes
of which seemed to inspire in the besieged an extraordinary valor
and spirit."[222] Finally the besiegers abandoned the assault on the
town itself, and devoted their attention to ravaging the surrounding
country, where they killed or captured a number of farmers and their
slaves. The Spaniards reported a loss of twenty-nine dead and wounded
and twenty-four prisoners at St. Louis itself, in addition to forty-six
taken captive in minor forays which attended the invasion.[223]
Sinclair, on the other hand, reported that sixty-eight of the enemy
were killed at St. Louis and eighteen taken prisoners.[224]
[Footnote 220: James, "Significance of the Attack on St. Louis," in
_Essays in American History_, 205.]
[Footnote 221: _Missouri Historical Collections_, II, No. 6, 45;
_Wisconsin Historical Collections_, XVIII, 407.]
[Footnote 222: _Wisconsin Historical Collections_, XVIII, 408.]
[Footnote 223: _Ibid._, 409. The British while proceeding down the
Mississippi had captured an armed boat with thirteen men near the mouth
of the modern Turkey River, and in a side expedition to the lead mines
seventeen more were taken (_Wisconsin Historical Collections_, XI,
151).]
[Footnote 224: _Wisconsin Historical Collections_, XI, 156.]
The attack having failed, the British began their retreat. According
to Sinclair the defeat was caused by the treachery of the traders
and part of the Indians. The attempt to surprise the Spaniards was a
failure, and in the actual assault the Sacs and Foxes, led by certain
of the traders, proved treacherous.[225] Another, and possibly the
chief, reason for the retreat of the British was the arrival of George
Rogers Clark at Cahokia with a small body of men shortly before the
attack on St. Louis began.[226] Although he took no part in the fight
at St. Louis, his presence at Cahokia across the river was probably an
important factor in determining the British to give up the enterprise,
and he promptly organized an expedition to pursue and punish the
retreating forces.
[Footnote 225: _Ibid._, 155-56.]
[Footnote 226: James, _op. cit._, 210-13.]
The British forces retreated in two divisions, one up the Mississippi,
the other overland to Lake Michigan and Mackinac.[227] Clark now
learned of the advance of the force from Detroit upon Kentucky and
made haste to return to its defense, having ordered Colonel Montgomery
to follow and harass the forces retreating from St. Louis while
the Indians were still demoralized from their recent defeat.[228]
Montgomery with three hundred and fifty men advanced up the Illinois
River as far as Lake Peoria,[229] and then crossed to Rock River,
destroying the crops and villages of the Indians on his way. At this
point he was compelled to stop through lack of provisions, and his
retreat to the French settlements was attended with great hardship and
suffering.
[Footnote 227: _Michigan Pioneer Collections_, IX, 558.]
[Footnote 228: _Virginia State Papers_, III, 443.]
[Footnote 229: Montgomery says he went "to the Lake open on the
Illinois River" (_Virginia State Papers_, III, 443). Peoria was
variously designated at this time as the Pee, Pey, Opie, etc. This
designation is said to have originated as a corruption of the French
words _au pied_, used with reference to the foot of the lake.
Montgomery's "Lake open" was, apparently, but another variant of the
original French form.]
The fortunes of the party led by Langlade by way of Chicago remain to
be told. While proceeding down the Illinois it learned of the advance
of Montgomery's force and thereupon beat a hasty retreat.[230] At
Chicago the party was rescued from threatened destruction at the hands
of a band of Indians in the "Rebel" interest by a relieving party which
Sinclair had sent down Lake Michigan in two small vessels. Sinclair
reported to Haldimand that five days after the vessels left Chicago two
hundred Illinois cavalry arrived there,[231] but this was evidently a
mistaken rumor caused by the advance of Montgomery's expedition, which,
as has been seen, came no farther than Lake Peoria.
[Footnote 230: _Wisconsin Historical Collections_, XVIII, 411; Michigan
Pioneer Collections, XI, 558.]
[Footnote 231: _Michigan Pioneer Collections_, XI, 558.]
The fugitives from the St. Louis expedition had no sooner gained
shelter at Mackinac than Sinclair began to plan for a new attack on the
Illinois settlements[232] the following year. The services of Wabasha
were engaged anew, and Sinclair assured Haldimand that one thousand
Sioux would be in the field under his leadership by April, 1781.[233]
To insure that secrecy the absence of which had proved so disastrous
to the expedition of 1780, Wabasha came in person to Mackinac to make
the necessary arrangements for the enterprise. But the attempt at
secrecy proved futile for in December, Cruzat, the new governor at St.
Louis,[234] was reporting to his superiors the news that Wabasha was
returning to his tribe from "Michely Makinak" with a great quantity
of merchandise to arouse his own and the neighboring tribes.[235] At
the same time Cruzat announced that he had decided upon measures for
checkmating the British design, but refrained from telling what they
were until after they should be executed.
[Footnote 232: The settlements on both sides of the Mississippi were
referred to as the settlements of the Illinois. In Navarro's official
report concerning the attack on St. Louis in 1780 that place is
designated "San Luis de Ylinoises" (_Wisconsin Historical Collections_,
XVIII, 407).]
[Footnote 233: _Michigan Pioneer Collections_, IX, 559.]
[Footnote 234: De Leyba had died shortly after the British attack
of 1780 and before the arrival of the news that his government had
promoted him for his conduct on that occasion (_Wisconsin Historical
Collections_, XVIII, 410).]
[Footnote 235: _Ibid._, 414.]
Whether Cruzat alluded to the mysterious project of De la Balme against
Detroit, which had even then come to an unfortunate end, or to the
forthcoming Spanish expedition against St. Joseph must remain a matter
of conjecture. De la Balme was a French officer who appeared in the
Illinois villages in the summer of 1780, and rousing the villagers
with the story that their former king was coming to their assistance,
announced his own purpose to lead them in an assault on Detroit and
thence on Canada itself.[236] With a little band of French and Indians,
about eighty in number, flying the banner of France at its head, he
moved upon the British post of Miami near the modern Fort Wayne, and
captured and plundered it. The Indians, however, shortly attacked De
la Balme's party in turn and defeated it, the commander being numbered
among the slain.[237] This occurred at the beginning of November, 1780.
[Footnote 236: On De la Balme's mission see Burton, "Augustin Mottin de
la Balme," in _Illinois State Historical Society Transactions_, 1909,
104 ff.; _Illinois Historical Collections_, II, lxviii-xciv; _Wisconsin
Historical Collections_, XVIII, 416; _Missouri Historical Review_, II,
202-3.]
[Footnote 237: _Michigan Pioneer Collections_, XIX, 581-82.]
Thus ended De la Balme's projected invasion of Canada. But the episode
of his advent in the Northwest was attended by further interesting
consequences. Before his departure for Detroit he had sent a detachment
from Cahokia under command of Jean Baptiste Hamelin against the post
of St. Joseph.[238] There had been no regular garrison here since the
massacre of the British soldiers at the time of Pontiac's war; but the
post was advantageously located for trading purposes. It possessed
a further importance as the gathering-place of the Pottawatomie war
parties sent out to harass the Americans, while the fact that a large
stock of goods had been stored here by the British traders[239] served
to increase the zeal of Hamelin's men for the assault. According to a
census that has been preserved, St. Joseph contained in June, 1780,
a population of forty-eight French and half-breeds.[240] During the
summer some of the inhabitants had been carried off to Mackinac by
Sinclair's orders, so that at the time Hamelin fell upon it the post
contained a smaller population than it had in June.
[Footnote 238: _Missouri Historical Review_, II, 204.]
[Footnote 239: According to a memoir by the traders to Haldimand for
indemnity these amounted to 62,000 livres in value (_Michigan Pioneer
Collections_, X, 367).]
[Footnote 240: _Ibid._, 406-7.]
Hamelin's foray was so timed as to reach St. Joseph early in December,
1780, when the Indians were absent on their first hunt.[241] The
party numbered only seventeen men; but they overpowered the traders,
loaded their goods on packhorses, and with twenty-two prisoners beat
a hasty retreat around the lake toward Chicago.[242] Their triumph,
however, was short lived. In the spring of the year De Peyster, who
now commanded at Detroit, had stationed Lieutenant De Quindre at St.
Joseph to look after the interests of the British in that region. He
was temporarily absent at the time of Hamelin's attack, but, returning
shortly afterward, he assembled a party of Pottawatomies and set out
to punish the audacious intruders. Hamelin was overtaken on December
5 at a place called Petite Fort, a day's journey beyond the River
Chemin,[243] and in the fight that ensued all but three of his party
were killed or taken prisoners.
[Footnote 241: _Ibid._, XIX, 591.]
[Footnote 242: _Ibid._; Virginia State Papers, I, 465.]
[Footnote 243: The stream at the mouth of which Michigan City, Indiana,
now stands. Petite Fort has been said to have been near the Calumet
River. I have not succeeded in locating it more definitely than is
indicated above.]
This comparatively insignificant affair, which terminated at Chicago's
back door, as it were, was quickly followed by a second attack upon
St. Joseph, the echoes of which were heard in distant Europe. The
preparations which the English were making for a new descent upon St.
Louis in the spring of 1781 excited the genuine alarm of Cruzat, the
new Spanish governor.[244] Profiting, possibly, by the example set by
George Rogers Clark, in his attack upon Vincennes, Cruzat determined to
anticipate the blow. On January 2, 1781, less than a month after the
disaster to the Americans at the Petite Fort, a Spanish expedition set
out from St. Louis for St. Joseph.[245] It consisted in the beginning
of thirty Spaniards from St. Louis and twenty residents of Cahokia. On
the way across Illinois these were joined by a dozen Spanish soldiers
who had been sent up the Illinois River in the preceding November
to serve as an outpost against the British in that direction.[246]
In addition to this, and of greater importance doubtless, the party
was joined by two hundred Indians. Included in the latter were the
"runagates" from Milwaukee under the leadership of Siggenauk and
Nakewoin, whose tendency to side with the Americans had long disturbed
the British commanders in the Northwest.[247] In 1779 De Peyster, then
at Mackinac, had bribed a chief, Chambolee, to capture Siggenauk by
fair means or foul and turn him over to the English, promising that in
the event of success he would be "weall rewarded."[248] This attempt to
secure the obnoxious chieftain proved vain, however. At another time,
whether before or after this does not appear, De Peyster tried the plan
of buying off the "Runagade chiefs," but this too proved futile.[249]
Some time after the St. Joseph expedition, however, Siggenauk turned
against the Americans.
[Footnote 244: _Missouri Historical Review_, V, 223.]
[Footnote 245: Three detailed studies of this expedition have been
made. The conclusions of the first, by Edward G. Mason, were generally
accepted by scholars as valid until Professor Clarence W. Alvord's
study appeared. His conclusions differ materially from those reached
by Mason. More recently Frederick J. Teggart has challenged Alvord's
conclusions. For his study, with references to the earlier studies and
the sources, see "The Capture of St. Joseph, Michigan, by the Spaniards
in 1781," in _Missouri Historical Review_, V, 214 9.]
[Footnote 246: Teggart, _op. cit._, 216.]
[Footnote 247: De Peyster's characterization of them as "a horrid
set of refractory Indians" has already been mentioned (_Wisconsin
Historical Collections_, XVIII, 384). Probably it was this band which
had threatened to destroy the British force at Chicago retreating from
St. Louis in the preceding summer. For a sketch of Siggenauk's career
see _Wisconsin Historical Collections_, XVIII, 384.]
[Footnote 248: _Wisconsin Historical Collections_, XI, 210.]
[Footnote 249: _Michigan Pioneer Collections_, X, 454-55.]
[Illustration: THE FIRST FORT DEARBORN 1803-1812
From the model owned by the Chicago Historical Society, after Captain
Whistler's drawing of January 25, 1808]
The expedition proceeded up the Illinois River as far as Lake
Peoria.[250] Here, the river having frozen, it was found necessary
to leave the boats behind and continue the journey on foot. It was
midwinter, and before the Spaniards lay three hundred miles of
wilderness infested with savages, who might at any moment fall upon
them. At the end of their march lay the prospect of a hostile force
surrounded by savages friendly to it and hostile to them, with their
base of supplies, and their refuge in case of defeat, four hundred
miles away. Naturally our only knowledge of the experiences of the
party on the march comes from the Spaniards themselves. We may well
believe, however, that they suffered "the greatest inconveniences from
cold and hunger,"[251] not to mention the labor of carrying through the
trackless wilderness provisions for themselves and a supply of goods to
be used in placating the Indians.
[Footnote 250: _Missouri Historical Review_, V, 216.]
[Footnote 251: _Madrid Gazette_, March 12, 1782, quoted in _Missouri
Historical Review_, II, 195. For further details of the march see
Teggart, _op. cit._]
Three weeks were consumed in the march from Lake Peoria to St. Joseph.
On February 11 at nightfall the party was within two leagues of its
destination. It had had the good fortune to secure the assistance of
Louis Chevalier, who was intimately acquainted with the St. Joseph
Indians, his father having been the principal trader and resident of
St. Joseph for many years, until his arrest and removal by Sinclair's
order in the summer of 1781.[252] While the party halted an emissary
was sent on to the Indians at the post, and by promises of sharing
the booty with them a pledge of neutrality on their part was secured.
Early the next morning, February 12, the Spaniards crossed the river
on the ice and made themselves masters of the post without a blow
being struck. De Quindre was absent at the time, and all circumstances
conspired to render the traders an easy prey to the invaders. The goods
were divided between the St. Joseph Indians and those accompanying
the expedition, and a supply of corn, gathered in expectation of the
coming attack upon St. Louis, was destroyed. The party remained at St.
Joseph only twenty-four hours, but during this time the Spanish flag
was kept flying and formal possession was taken of the country in the
name of the king of Spain. A hasty retreat was then begun, and the
party arrived at St. Louis early in March without the loss of a man.
On the day after its departure from St. Joseph De Quindre returned
to that place. He sought to rouse the Indians, as he had done on the
former occasion, to pursue the invaders, but this time without success.
Their zeal for such exploits had evaporated, and they insisted on being
led in the opposite direction to Detroit, to make their excuses to De
Peyster for having allowed their traders to be carried off.
[Footnote 252: For the elder Chevalier see _Wisconsin Historical
Collections_, XVIII, 372.]
The importance which later came to be attached to this expedition was
due to its bearing upon the political rather than upon the military
situation. It has generally been supposed by historians that the
expedition was inspired by the Spanish Court to furnish the basis
for laying claim in the peace negotiations to the British Northwest.
The latest student of the subject rejects this supposition,[253] as
also the further one that when the news of the successful termination
of the exploit became known in Spain the Court proceeded to turn it
to political advantage by founding extravagant claims upon it. That
Vergennes, the French minister, and Aranda, the representative of Spain
in the negotiations for the treaty, made such use of it is admitted.
In 1780, the year before the expedition against St. Joseph occurred,
the French minister, Luzerne, announced to Congress the view of the
Spanish king that the territory east of the Mississippi and north of
the Ohio belonged to Great Britain and was a proper object of Spanish
conquest. Two years later, in the summer of 1782, in discussing with
Jay the boundary between the possessions of Spain and the United
States, the Spanish representative argued that the western country had
belonged to Great Britain until by conquest during the Revolution it
came into the possession of Spain. The contention was not established,
but the evident design of France and Spain to advance the interests
of the latter in America at the expense of the United States induced
the American negotiators to conclude a separate treaty with England,
in violation not only of their instructions but also of the treaty of
alliance between the United States and France in 1778.
[Footnote 253: Teggart, in _Missouri Historical Review_, V, 220-23.]
The remainder of the story of the Revolution in the Northwest can
quickly be told. Clark still dreamed of an expedition against Detroit,
and both Jefferson, governor of Virginia, and General Washington
looked with favor upon the project and held out promises of the
necessary assistance.[254] For the year 1781 a force of two thousand
men was promised Clark, and Colonel Brodhead at Fort Pitt was ordered
by Washington to assist him with troops and supplies. But Clark was
doomed again to disappointment. Jefferson resigned the gubernatorial
office, and Washington was engrossed in his contest with Clinton and
Cornwallis which was to end in the capture of the latter at York
town. The British on their part manifested great activity during
1781 in raiding the settlements along the Ohio River. The harassed
settlers, less far-sighted than Clark, were little disposed to engage
in a distant expedition; a force of over one hundred men descending
the Ohio to join Clark was cut to pieces in August by a combined
British and Indian force sent out from Detroit by De Peyster, every
man being killed or captured. The victors even considered the project
of attacking Clark, who was now in his stockade fort at the Falls of
the Ohio, impatiently awaiting the assembling of the forces for his
projected expedition. By order of the Virginia Assembly this was again
postponed. Clark's disappointment was keen, for as far as any positive
action was concerned, his projects for the year had completely failed.
From another point of view, however, the prospect was less dismal.
If he had failed to take Detroit, the failure of the British plans
for ousting the Americans from the Northwest had been no less signal.
And the sequel proved that Clark's stubborn retention of the grip on
this region, which he had gained in 1779, was the principal factor in
securing it to the United States in the negotiations which resulted in
the treaty of 1783.
[Footnote 254: Winsor, _Westward Movement_, chap, xi; James, "George
Rogers Clark and Detroit, 1780-1781," in _Mississippi Valley Historical
Association_, _Proceedings_, III, 291 ff.]