EFFECTS OF A SHRINKING VOLUME OF MONEY.

As to the benumbing consequences following a shrinkage in the volume of

money, the testimony of history is briefly reviewed in the report of the

Monetary Commission to which I have already referred, and from which I

read the following:

At the Christian era the metallic money of the Roman Empire

amounted to $1,800,000,000. By the end of the fifteenth century

it had shrunk to less than $200,000,000. During this period a

most extraordinary and baleful change took place in the condition

of the world. Population dwindled and commerce, arts, wealth, and

freedom all disappeared. The people were reduced by poverty and

misery to the most degraded conditions of serfdom and slavery.

The disintegration of society was almost complete. The conditions

of life were so hard that individual selfishness was the only

thing consistent with the instinct of self-preservation. All

public spirit, all generous emotions, all the noble aspirations

of man shriveled and disappeared as the volume of money shrunk

and as prices fell.

History records no such disastrous transition as that from the

Roman Empire to the Dark Ages. Various explanations have been

given of this entire breaking down of the frame-work of society,

but it was certainly coincident with a shrinkage in the volume of

money, which was also without historical parallel. The crumbling

of institutions kept even step and pace with the shrinkage in the

stock of money and the falling of prices. All other attendant

circumstances than these last have occurred in other historical

periods unaccompanied and unfollowed by any such mighty

disasters. It is a suggestive coincidence that the first glimmer

of light only came with the invention of bills of exchange and

paper substitutes, through which the scanty stock of the precious

metals was increased in efficiency. But not less than the

energizing influence of Potosi and all the argosies of treasure

from the New World were needed to arouse the Old World from its

comatose sleep, to quicken the torpid limbs of industry, and to

plume the leaden wings of commerce. It needed the heroic

treatment of rising prices to enable society to reunite its

shattered links, to shake off the shackles of feudalism, to

relight and uplift the almost extinguished torch of civilization.

That the disasters of the Dark Ages were caused by decreasing

money and falling prices, and that the recovery therefrom and the

comparative prosperity which followed the discovery of America

were due to an increasing supply of the precious metals and

rising prices, will not seem surprising or unreasonable when the

noble functions of money are considered. Money is the great

instrument of association, the very fiber of social organism, the

vitalizing force of industry, the protoplasm of civilization, and

as essential to its existence as oxygen is to animal life.

Without money civilization could not have had a beginning; with a

diminishing supply it must languish, and, unless relieved,

finally perish.

Symptoms of disasters similar to those which befell society

during the Dark Ages were observable on every hand during the

first half of this century. In 1809 the revolutionary troubles

between Spain and her American colonies broke out. These troubles

resulted in a great diminution in the production of the precious

metals, which was quickly indicated by a fall in general prices.

As already stated in this report, it is estimated that the

purchasing power of the precious metals increased between 1809

and 1848 fully 145 per cent., or, in other words, that the

general range of prices was 60 per cent. lower in 1848 than it

was in 1809. During this period there was no general

demonetization of either metal and no important fluctuation in

the relative value of the metals, and the supply was sufficient

to keep their stock good against losses by accident and abrasion.

But it was insufficient to keep the stock up to the proper

correspondence with the increasing demand of advancing

populations.

The world has rarely passed through a more gloomy period than

this one. Again do we find falling prices and misery and

destitution inseparable companions. The poverty and distress of

the industrial masses were intense and universal, and, since the

discovery of the mines of America, without a parallel. In England

the suffering of the people found expression in demands upon

Parliament for relief, in bread riots, and in immense Chartist

demonstrations. The military arm of the nation had to be

strengthened to prevent the all-pervading discontent from

ripening into open revolt. On the Continent the fires of

revolution smoldered everywhere, and blazed out at many points,

threatening the overthrow of states and the subversion of social

institutions.

Whenever and wherever the mutterings of discontent were hushed by

the fear of increased standing armies, the foundations of society

were honey-combed by powerful secret political associations. The

cause at work to produce this state of things was so subtle, and

its advance so silent, that the masses were entirely ignorant of

its nature. They had come to regard money as an institution fixed

and immovable in value, and when the price of property and the

wages of labor fell, they charged the fault, not to the money,

but to the property and the employer. They were taught that the

mischief was the result of overproduction. Never having observed

that overproduction was complained of only when the money stock

was decreasing, their prejudices were aroused against

labor-saving machinery. They were angered at capital, because it

either declined altogether to embark in industrial enterprises or

would only embark in them upon the condition of employing labor

at the most scanty remuneration. They forgot that falling prices

compelled capital to avoid such enterprises on any other

condition, and for the most part to avoid them entirely. They did

not comprehend that money in shrinking volume was the prolific

parent of enforced idleness and poverty, and that falling prices

divorced money capital, from labor, but they none the less felt

the paralyzing pressure of the shrinking metallic shroud that was

closing around industry.

The increased yield of the Russian gold fields in 1846 gave some

relief and served as a parachute to the fall in prices, which

might otherwise have resulted in a great catastrophe. But the

enormous metallic supplies of California and Australia were all

needed to give substantial and adequate relief. Great as these

supplies were, their influence in raising prices was moderate and

soon entirely arrested by the increasing populations and commerce

which followed them. In the twenty-five years between 1850 and

1876 the money stock of the world was more than doubled, and yet

at no time during this period was the general level of prices

raised more than 18 per cent. above the general level of 1848.

A comparison of this effect of an increasing volume of money

after 1848 with the effect of a decreasing volume between 1809

and 1848 strikingly illustrates how largely different in degree

is the influence upon prices of an increasing or decreasing

volume of money. The decrease of the yield of the mines since

about 1865, while population and commerce have been advancing,

has already produced unmistakable symptoms of the same general

distrust, non-employment of labor, and political and social

disquiet, which have characterized all former periods of

shrinking money.

The time that has elapsed since that report was written has but served

to verify and emphasize its statements.

Money: Speech of Hon. John P. Jones, of Nevada, on the Free Coinage of Silver; in the United States Senate, May 12 and 13, 1890 · 第 30 / 165 题