WHY WAS THE AUTOMATIC SYSTEM INTERFERED WITH?

Some thirteen years ago, as Chairman of the Monetary Commission

appointed by Congress to investigate the causes of the changes in the

relative values of the precious metals, I submitted to this body a

report, in which I took occasion to refer to the motives which evidently

influenced the creditor classes of the western world in destroying the

automatic system of money. From that Report I quote as follows:

The world has generally favored, theoretically if not

practically, the automatic metallic system, and adjusted its

business to it. Some nations adopted one metal as their standard,

and some the other, and some adopted both. Those that adopted

both metals served as a balance-wheel to steady with exactness

their relative value. The practical effect of all of this was the

same as if all nations had adopted both, because it secured the

entire stock of both at a fixed equivalency for the transaction

of the business of the world. While some nations have changed

their money metal, or, having had paper money, have resumed

specie payments in one metal, the policy of a general

demonetization of one of the metals was first broached only about

twenty years ago. About ten years later a formidable propaganda

was organized to fasten that policy upon the commercial world.

This new school of financial theorists advocate the retention of

metal as the material of money, but favor its subjection to

governmental interference in every respect. Whenever new mines

are discovered, or old ones yield or promise to yield more

abundantly, instead of freely accepting their product in

accordance with the automatic theory, they advocate its rejection

through the restriction or the absolute prohibition of the

coinage of either or both metals, or through the limitation or

the abolition of the legal-tender function of one of them.

Whenever the interests of the creditor and income classes seem to

be in danger of being impaired by an increase in the volume and

decrease in the value of money, or in other words, by a general

rise in prices, these modern theorists are clamorous in

double-standard countries for the demonetization of one of the

money metals, and in single-standard countries for the shifting

of the money function from the metal which promises the most to

the one that promises the least abundant supply. They are

extremely anxious for the retention of the _material_ of which

the money-standard is composed when such material is rising in

value and prices are falling, and exceedingly apprehensive of the

evil and inconvenience which they predict as sure to result from

changing it.

Whenever a fall in prices occurs, through either a natural or

artificial contraction in the volume of money, they maintain that

it is due to antecedent inflation and extravagance, or to

overproduction through persistent and reckless industry; if the

contraction be natural, that it can not be helped, and if

artificial, that though it may inflict great temporary losses on

the masses of the people, it will be sure to result in their

ultimate benefit, and they console the sufferers with the

comforting assurance that such contraction is necessary in order

to reach the lowest depths of that "_hard pan_" whose foundations

they have previously undermined by demonetizing one of the

metals, and upon which alone they claim that money, capital, and

labor can securely and harmoniously rest. But when the material

composing the standard is falling in value and prices are rising,

they immediately discover that the maintenance of the value of

the standard is the all-important consideration, and that its

material is of no importance whatever and should be at once

changed to "_redress the situation_." After having reduced one of

the metals to a commodity by depriving it of the money function,

these theorists complacently point to the resulting fluctuations

in the value as a justification of the act producing them, and as

a conclusive proof of the unfitness for money of the demonetized

metal. * * *

Metallic money, on this theory, is no longer automatic, but is as

completely subjected to governmental control for all injurious

purposes as paper money. But, unlike paper money, the control

over this kind of metallic money can only be exercised in the

baneful direction of decreasing its volume, and thereby making

property cheaper and money scarcer and dearer.

This is a one-sided system, which can operate only in the

interest of the security creditor, the usurer, and pawnbroker,

whom it enables, through the falling prices which itself

occasions, to swallow up the shrunken resources of the debtor,

but is impotent to protect the interests of the unsecured

business creditor, the debtor, or society, when, from any cause,

the supply of the money metals becomes deficient.

The world has expended a vast amount of labor in the production

of the precious metals, and has made great sacrifices in

upholding the automatic metallic system of money, and has a right

to insist that it shall be consistently let alone to work out its

own conclusions, or that it be abandoned.

The history of the subsequent struggle to remonetize silver only serves

to illustrate and emphasize the correctness of that statement of the

case.

Between 1810 and 1849, according to Tooke and Newmarch (recognized

authorities on the subject), gold increased in value 145 per cent. which

is equivalent to a fall in the general range of prices of 59 per cent.

No movement was then made or suggestion offered by the debtors, or by

any class of the community, to add any new money-metal to the metals

already in use, with the view of increasing the volume of money, so that

the equity of time contracts might be maintained, and the value of the

unit of money kept at a steady and unchanging level.

But as soon as the discoveries of gold were made in the alluvial

deposits of California and Australia, or rather as soon as it was

suspected that money would thereby become considerably increased in

volume, the annuitants and income classes, the creditors everywhere,

took steps to avert what they characterized as a great calamity. They

openly declared their purpose, by every means in their power, to prevent

a decline in the value of money, so that the purchasing power of their

incomes might not be reduced. They determined to go to any length in

order to prevent the rise of prices which their aggressive instincts led

them to fear would follow the additions to the money volume of the world

by the natural and much needed yield of the mines.

The fiat therefore went forth that one of the metals must be discarded.

Money: Speech of Hon. John P. Jones, of Nevada, on the Free Coinage of Silver; in the United States Senate, May 12 and 13, 1890 · 第 12 / 165 题