The quantitative method of modern psychophysics may lead to an exact
experimental determination of such false conceptions and
misunderstandings as those indicated above, but it is still too young to
have any practical value. It is vitiated by the fact that it requires
artificial conditions and that the results have reference to artificial
conditions. Wundt has tried to simplify apparatus, and to bring
experiment into connection with real life. But there is still a far cry
from the psychological laboratory to the business of life. With regard
to misunderstandings the case is certainly so. Most occur when we do not
hear distinctly what another person is saying and supplement it with our
own notions. Here the misunderstanding is in no sense linguistic, for
words do not receive a false meaning. The misunderstanding lies in the
failure to comprehend the sense of what we have heard, and the
substitution of incorrect interpretations. Sometimes we may quite
understand an orator without having heard every word by simply adding
these interpretations, but the correctness of the additions is always
questionable, and not only nature and training, but momentary conditions
and personal attitude, make a considerable difference. The worst thing
about the matter is the fact that nobody is likely to be aware that he
has made any interpretations. Yet we do so not only in listening, but in
looking. I see on a roof in the distance four white balls about the
nature of which I am uncertain. While looking, I observe that one of the
balls stretches out head and tail, flaps its wings, etc., and I
immediately think, “Oh, those are four pigeons.” Now it may be true that
they are four pigeons, but what justification had I for such an
interpretation and generalization from the action of one pigeon? In this
instance, no doubt, it would have been difficult for me to make a
mistake, but there are many cases which are not so obvious and where the
interpretation is nevertheless made, and then the misunderstanding is
ready to hand. Once my wife and I saw from our seats in the car a
chimney-sweep who stood in a railroad station. As he bent over, looking
for a lost coin, my very myopic wife cried out, “Look at the beautiful
Newfoundland dog.” Now this is a conceivable illusion for a
short-sighted individual, but on what basis could my good lady interpret
what she saw into the judgment that it was a Newfoundland dog, and a
beautiful one at that? Taine illustrates a similar process with the
story of a child who asked why his mother had put on a white dress. He
was told that his mother was going to a party and had to put on her
holiday clothes for that purpose. After that, whenever the child saw
anybody in holiday attire, green or red or any other color, it cried
out,--“Oh, you have a white dress on!” We adults do exactly the same
thing. As Meinong says so well, we confuse identity with agreement. This
proposition would save us from a great many mistakes and
misunderstandings if kept in mind.
How frequently and hastily we build things out is shown by a simple but
psychologically important game. Ask anybody at hand how the four and the
six look on his watch, and let him draw it. Everybody calmly draws, IV
and VI, but if you look at your watch you will find that the four looks
so, IIII, and that there is no six. This raises the involuntary
question, “Now what do we see when we look at the watch if we do not see
the figures?” and the further question, “Do we make such beautiful
mistakes with all things?”
I assert that only that has been reliably seen which has been drawn. My
father asked my drawing teacher to teach me not to draw but to observe.
And my teacher, instead of giving me copies, followed the instruction by
giving me first one domino, then two, then three, one upon the other,
then a match box, a book, a candlestick, etc. And even today, I know
accurately only those objects in the household which I had drawn. Yet
frequently we demand of our witnesses minutely accurate descriptions of
things they had seen only once, and hastily at that.
And even if the thing has been seen frequently, local and temporal
problems may make great difficulties. With regard to the first class of
problems, Exner[331] cites the example of his journey from Gmunden to
Vienna in which, because of a sharp curve in the road, he saw everything
at Lambach reversed, although the whole stretch of road was familiar to
him. The railroad trains, the public buildings, the rivers, all the
notable places seemed to lie on the wrong side. This is particularly
characteristic if a city is entered, especially at night, through a
railroad terminal, and the locomotive is attached to the rear of the
train. In the daily life the alteration of objects by locations is
familiar. How different a landscape seems at night or in winter,
although it has been observed hundreds of times during the day or in
summer. It is good to look around frequently on the road, particularly
at cross-roads, if the way back is to be kept in mind. Even the starting
point may have a disturbing effect on the sense of place. For example,
if you have traveled numerous times on the train from A to B, and for
once you start your journey from C, which is beyond A, the familiar
stretch from A to B looks quite different and may even become
unrecognizable. The estimation of time may exercise considerable
influence on such and similar local effects. Under most circumstances we
tend, as is known, to reduce subjectively great time-spans, and hence,
when more time than customary is required by an event, this becomes
subjectively smaller, not only for the whole event but also for each of
its parts. In this way what formerly seemed to extend through an
apparently long period seems now to be compressed into a shorter one.
Then everything appears too soon and adds to the foreign aspect of the
matter.
The case is similar for time-differences. Uphues[332] cites an example:
“If a person has not heard a bell or anything else for some time and
then hears it again, the question whether the object existed in the
interval does not arise. It is recognized again and that is enough.”
Certainly it is enough for _us_, but whether the thing is true, whether
really the same phenomena or only similar ones have been noted, is
another question rarely asked. If the man or the bell is the same that
we now perceive anew, the inference is involuntarily drawn that they
must have persisted, but we eliminate altogether the lapse of time and
suppose unconsciously that the entity in question must have been on the
spot through the whole period. One needs only to observe how quickly
witnesses tend to identify objects presented for identification: e.g.
knives, letters, purses, etc. To receive for identification and to say
yes, is often the work of an instant. The witness argues, quite
unconsciously, in this fashion: “I have given the judge only one clew
(perhaps different from the one in question), now here again is a clew,
hence, it must be the one I gave him.” That the matter may have changed,
that there has been some confusion, that perhaps other witnesses have
given similar things, is not at all considered. Here again we have to
beware of confusing of identities with agreements.
Finally, we must consider fatigue and other conditions of excitation.
Everybody knows how things read late at night seem absolute nonsense,
and become simple and obvious the next morning. In the same way, we may
take a thing to be thus and so while tired in the evening, and in the
morning see our notion to be a coarse misunderstanding. Hoppe tells of a
hospital interne who became so excited and tired through frequent calls
that he heard the tick-tack of his watch as “Oh-doc-tor.” A witness who
has been subjected to a prolonged and fatiguing examination falls into a
similar condition and knows at the end much less than at the beginning.
Finally, he altogether misunderstands the questions put to him. The
situation becomes still worse when the defendant has been so subjected
to examination, and becomes involved, because of fatigue, etc., in the
famous “contradictions.” If “convincing contradictions” occur at the end
of a long examination of a witness or a defendant, it is well to find
out how long the examination took. If it took much time the
contradictions mean little.
The same phenomena of fatigue may even lead to suspicion of negligence.
Doctors, trained nurses, nursery maids, young mothers, etc., who became
guilty of “negligence” of invalids and children have, in many instances,
merely “misunderstood” because of great fatigue. It is for this reason
that the numerous sad cases occur in which machine-tenders,
switch-tenders, etc., are punished for negligence. If a man of this
class, year after year, serves twenty-three hours, then rests seven
hours, then serves twenty-three hours again, etc., he is inevitably
overtaken by fatigue and nervous relaxation in which signals, warnings,
calls, etc., are simply misunderstood. Statistics tend to show that the
largest number of accidents occur at the end of a period of service,
i.e., at the time of greatest fatigue. But even if this were not the
case some reference must be made to chronic fatigue. If a man gets only
seven hours’ rest after intense labor, part of the fatigue-elements must
have remained. They accumulate in time, finally they summate, and
exercise their influence even at the beginning of the service.
Socialists complain justly about this matter. The most responsible
positions are occupied by chronically fatigued individuals, and when
nature extorts her rights we punish the helpless men.
The case is the same with people who have much to do with money--tax,
post, bank, and treasury officials, who are obliged to attend rigorously
to monotonous work--the reception and distribution of money, easily grow
tired. Men of experience in this profession have assured me that they
often, when fatigued, take money, count it, sign a receipt and
then--return the money to the person who brought it. Fortunately they
recognize their mistake in the astonishment of the receiver. If,
however, they do not recognize it, or the receiver is sly enough calmly
to walk off with the money, if the sum is great and restitution not
easily possible, and if, moreover, the official happens to be in the bad
graces of his superiors, he does not have much chance in the prosecution
for embezzlement, which is more likely than not to be begun against
him.[333] Any affection, any stimulus, any fatigue may tend to make
people passive, and hence, less able to defend themselves.
A well known Berlin psychiatrist tells the following story: “When I was
still an apprentice in an asylum, I always carried the keys of the cells
with me. One day I went to the opera, and had a seat in the parquette.
Between the acts I went into the corridor. On returning I made a
mistake, and saw before me a door which had the same kind of lock as the
cell-doors in the asylum, stuck my hand into my pocket, took out my
key--which fitted, and found myself suddenly in a loge. Now would it not
be possible in this way, purely by reflex action, to turn into a
burglar?” Of course we should hardly believe a known burglar if he were
to tell us such a story.
(e) _The Lie._