Section 95. (e) Passion and Affection.

Passion and affection occasion in our own minds and in those of

witnesses considerable confusion of observations, influence, or even

effect the guilt of the defendant and serve to explain many things at

the moment of examination. The essence of passion or affection, its

definition and influence, its physical and physiological explanation, is

discussed in any psychology. The use of this discussion for the lawyer’s

purposes has been little spoken of, and possibly can not have more said

about it. Things that are done with passion show themselves as such, and

require no particular examination in that respect. What we have to do is

to discover what might have happened without passion, and especially to

protect ourselves from being in person overcome by passion or affection.

It is indubitable that the most “temperamental” of the criminalists are

the best, for phlegm and melancholy do not carry one through an

examination. The lively and the passionate judges are the most

effective, but they also have the defects of their virtues. No one will

deny that it is difficult to maintain a calm demeanor with an impudent

denying criminal, or in the face of some very cruel, unhuman, or

terrible crime. But it is essential to surmount this difficulty.

Everyone of us must recall shameful memories of having, perhaps justly,

given way to passion. Of course the very temperamental Count Gideon

Raday freed his county in a short time from numberless robberies by

immediately hanging the mayor of the town in which the robberies

occurred, but nowadays so much temperament is not permissible. It is

well to recall the painful position of an excellent presiding justice at

a murder trial, who attacked the defendant passionately, and had to

submit to the latter’s really justified reprimand.

The only means of avoiding such difficulties is not to begin

quarrelling. Just as soon as a single word is uttered which is in any

way improper in polite society, everything is lost. The word is the

rolling snow-ball, and how much momentum it may gather depends upon the

nature and the training of the judge. Lonely insults are not frequent,

and a single improper word breaks down the boundaries. The criminal

knows this and often makes use of his knowledge. A man who has “cussed

out” the other fellow is no longer dangerous, he becomes calm and kind,

and feels instinctively the need of repairing the damage he has

committed by “going too far.” He then exhibits an exaggerated geniality

and care upon which many criminals count, and hence intentionally

provoke the examiner until he does things and says things he is sorry

for.

The emotions of witnesses, especially of those who have been harmed by

the crime and of those who have seen something terrible and disgusting,

and who still tend to get excited over it, constitute a great many

difficulties. Against the unconditional reliability of such persons’

testimony experienced judges take measures of defence. The participant

of this class is never calm; passion, anxiety, anger, personal interest,

etc., either anticipate or exaggerate trouble. Of course, we are not

speaking of cases in which a wound is considerably exaggerated, or even

invented for the sake of money, but of those in which people under

emotional stress often say unthinkable things about their enemy, just to

get him punished. This, however, is comparatively rare where the damage

has been very great. A man who has lost his eye, the father of a raped

daughter, the victim impoverished by arson, often behaves very calmly

toward the criminal. He makes no especial accusation, does not

exaggerate, and does not insult. A person, however, whose orchard has

suffered damage, may behave much worse.

It frequently happens that the sufferer and the defendant really hate

each other. Not necessarily because one had broken the other’s head, or

robbed him; frequently the ostensible reason for coming to trial is the

result of a long and far-reaching hatred. That this emotion can go to

any length is well known and it is therefore necessary, though not

always easy, to seek it out. Hatred is possible among peers, or people

who are peers in one connection or another. As a rule, the king will not

be able to hate his musketeer, but he will when they are both

passionately in love with the same girl, for they are peers in love.

Similarly, the high-bred lady will hardly hate her maid, but if she

observes the maid’s magnificent hair and believes that it is better than

her own, she will hate the maid, for there is no difference in rank with

regard to the love of hair.

Real hate has only three sources: pain, jealousy, or love. Either the

object of hatred has caused his enemy a great irremediable pain or

jealousy, or hatred is, was, or will become love. Some authorities

believe that there is another source of hatred which becomes apparent

when we have done harm to somebody. That this might show itself as

hatred or passion similar to hatred is possible, but in most cases it

will probably be a feeling of deep shame and regret, which has certain

particular characteristics in common with hatred. If it is really

hatred, it is hatred through pain. Hatred is difficult to hide, and even

criminalists of small experience will overlook it only in exceptional

cases. The discovery of envy, which is less forgiving than hatred, less

explosive, much profounder and much more extensive, is incomparably more

difficult. Real hatred, like exquisite passion, requires temperament,

and under circumstances may evoke sympathy, but friendless envy, any

scamp is capable of. Possibly no other passion endangers and destroys so

many lives, chokes off so much service, makes impossible so many

significant things, and finally, judges so falsely an endless number of

persons. When you remember, moreover, its exaggerated extent, and the

poor-spirited, easy trick of hiding it, its dangerous nature can not be

overestimated. We lawyers are even more imperilled by it because we do

not easily allow people to be praised before us; we require witnesses,

etc., to speak incriminatingly most of the time, and we cannot easily

see whether they are envious.

However freely one man may speak against another, we may assume that he

is telling the truth, or at worst, that he has a false notion of the

matter, or was badly instructed, but we rarely think that his envy

dictates it all. This idea occurs to us when he is to praise the other

man. Then he exhibits a cautious, tentative, narrowing attitude, so that

even a person of little experience infers envy. And here the

much-discussed fact manifests itself, that real envy requires a certain

equality. By way of example the petty shop-keeper is cited as envying

his more fortunate competitor, but not the great merchant whose ships go

round the world. The feeling of the private toward his general, the

peasant toward his landlord, is not really envy, it is desire to be like

him. It is anger that the other is better off, but inasmuch as the

emotion lacks that effective capacity which we require for envy, we can

not call it envy. It becomes envy when something by way of intrigue or

evil communication, etc., has been undertaken against the envied person.

Thus the mere _feeling_ is confessed at once. People say, “How I envy

him this trip, his magnificent health, his gorgeous automobile, etc.”

They do not say: “I have enviously spoken evil of him, or done this or

that against him.” Yet it is in the latter form that the actual passion

of envy expresses itself.

The capacity of the envious for false representation makes them

particularly dangerous in the court-room. If we want to discover

anything about an individual we naturally inquire of his colleagues, his

relatives, etc. But it is just among these that envy rules. If you

inquire of people without influence you learn nothing from them, since

they do not understand the matter; if you ask professional people they

speak enviously or selfishly, and that constitutes our dilemma. Our

attention may be called to envy by the speaker’s hesitation, his

reserved manner of answering. This is the same in all classes, and is

valuable because it may warn us against very bad misunderstandings.

As a rule, nothing can be said about passion as a source of crime. We

may assume that passion passes through three periods. The first is

characterized by the general or partial recurrence of older images; in

the second, the new idea employs its dominating place negatively or

positively with respect to the older one,--the passion culminates; and

in the third, the forcibly-disturbed emotional equilibrium is restored.

Most emotions are accompanied by well-known physical phenomena. Some

have been thoroughly studied, e.g., the juristically important emotion

of fear. In fear, breathing is irregular, inspiration is frequently

broken, a series of short breaths is followed by one or more deep ones,

inspiration is short, expiration is prolonged, one or the other is

sobbing. All these phenomena are only a single consequence of the

increase of respiratory changes. The irregularity of the latter causes

coughing, then a disturbance of speech, which is induced by the

irregular action of the muscles of the jaw, and in part by the

acceleration of the breathing. In the stages of echoing fear, yawning

occurs, and the distention of the pupils may be noticed as the emotion

develops. This is what we often see when a denying defendant finds

himself confounded by evidence, etc.

The most remarkable and in no way explicable fact is, that these

phenomena do not occur in innocent people. One might think that the fear

of being innocently convicted would cause an expression of dread, anger,

etc., but it does not cause an expression of real terror. I have no

other than empirical evidence of the fact, so that many more

observations are required before any fresh inferences are deduced

therefrom anent a man’s guilt or innocence. We must never forget that

under such circumstances passions and emotions often change into their

opposites according to rule. Parsimony becomes extravagance, and

conversely; love becomes hate. Many a man becomes altogether too

foolhardy because of despairing fear. So it may happen that terror may

become petrifying coldness, and then not one of the typical marks of

terror appears. But it betrays itself just as certainly by its icy

indifference as by its own proper traits. Just as passions transmute

into their opposites, so they carry a significant company of subordinate

characteristics. Thus, dread or fear is accompanied by disorderly

impertinence, sensuality by cruelty. The latter connection is of great

importance to us, for it frequently eliminates difficulties in the

explanation of crime. That cruelty and lasciviousness have the same

root has long been known. The very ecstasy of adventurous and passionate

love is frequently connected with a certain cruel tendency. Women are,

as a rule, more ferocious than men.[308] It is asserted that a woman in

love is constantly desiring her man. If this be true, the foregoing

statement is sufficiently explained. In one sense the connection between

sexual passion and cruelty is bound up with that unsatiability which is

characteristic of several passions. It is best to be observed in

passions for property, especially such as involve the sense-perception

of money. It is quite correct to speak of the overwhelming, devilish

power of gold, of the sensual desire to roll in gold, of the

irresistible ring of coins, etc. And it is also correctly held that

money has the same definite influence on man as blood on preying

animals. We all know innumerable examples of quite decent people who

were led to serious crimes by the mere sight of a large sum of money.

Knowledge of this tendency may, on occasion, lead to clues, and even to

the personality of the criminal.

Criminal Psychology: A Manual for Judges, Practitioners, and Students · 第 62 / 79 章