Avenarius tells of an English couple who were speaking about angels’
wings. It was the man’s opinion that this angelic possession was
doubtful, the woman’s that it could not be. Many a woman witness has
reminded me of this story, and I have been able to explain by use of it
many an event. Woman says, “that must be” when she knows of no reason;
“that must be” when her own arguments bore her; “that must be” when she
is confused; when she does not understand the evidence of her opponent,
and particularly when she desires something. Unfortunately, she hides
this attitude under many words, and one often wishes for the simple
assertion of the English woman, “that must be.” In consequence, when we
want to learn their ratio sciendi from women, we get into difficulties.
They offer us a collection of frequently astonishing and important
things, but when we ask for the source of this collection we get “that
must be,” in variations, from a shrug of the shoulders to a flood of
words. The inexperienced judge may be deceived by the positiveness of
such expressions and believe that such certainty must be based on
something which the witness can not utter through lack of skill. If,
now, the judge is going to help the “unaided” witness with “of course
you mean because,” or “perhaps because,” etc., the witness, if she is
not a fool, will say “yes.” Thus we get apparently well-founded
assertions which are really founded on nothing more than “that must be.”
Cases dealing with divisions, distinctions and analysis rarely contain
ungrounded assertions by women. Women are well able to analyse and
explain data, and what one is capable of and understands, one succeeds
in justifying. Their difficulty is in synthetic work, in progressive
movement, and there they simply assert. The few observations of this
characteristic confirm this statement. For example, Lafitte says that at
medical examinations women are unable to do anything which requires
synthetic power. Women’s judgments of men further confirm this position,
for they are said to be more impressed with a minimal success, than with
a most magnificent effort. Now there is no injustice, no superficiality
in this observation; its object is simply parallel to their incapacity
for synthesis. Inasmuch as they are able to follow particular things
they will understand a single success, but the growth of efficiency
toward the future requires composition and wide horizon, hence they can
not understand it. Hence, also, the curious contradictions in women’s
statements as suspicion rises and falls. A woman, who to-day knows of a
hundred reasons for the guilt of some much-compromised prisoner, tries
to turn everything the other way when she later learns that the prisoner
has succeeded in producing some apparent alibi. So again, if the
prosecution seems to be successful, the women witnesses for the defence
often become the most dangerous for the defenders.
But here, also, women find a limit, perhaps because like all weaklings
they are afraid to draw the ultimate conclusions. As Leroux says in “De
l’Humanité,” “If criminals were left to women they would kill them all
in the first burst of anger, and if one waited until this burst had
subsided they would release them all.” The killing points to the easy
excitability, the passionateness, and the instinctive sense of justice
in women which demands immediate revenge for evil deeds. The liberation
points to the fact that women are afraid of every energetic deduction of
ultimate consequences, i.e., they have no knowledge of real justice.
“Men look for reasons, women judge by love; women can love and hate, but
they can not be just without loving, nor can they ever learn to value
justice.” So says Schiller, and how frequently do we not hear the
woman’s question whether the accused’s fate is going to depend on her
evidence. If we say yes, there is as a rule a restriction of testimony,
a titillation and twisting of consequences, and this circumstance must
always be remembered. If you want to get truth from a woman you must
know the proper time to begin, and what is more important, when to stop.
As the old proverb says, and it is one to take to heart: “Women are wise
when they act unconsciously; fools when they reflect.”
It is a familiar fact that women, committing crimes, go to extremes. It
may be correct to adduce, as modern writers do, the weakness of feminine
intelligence to social conditions, and it may, perhaps, be for this
reason that the future of woman lies in changing the feminine milieu.
But also with regard to environment she is an extremist. The most pious
woman, as Richelieu says, will not hesitate to kill a troublesome
witness. The most complicated crimes are characteristically planned by
women, and are frequently swelled with a number of absolutely
purposeless criminal deeds.
In this circumstance we sometimes find the explanation for an otherwise
unintelligible crime which, perhaps, indicates also, that the first
crime was committed by woman. It is as if she has in turpitude a certain
pleasure to which she abandons herself as soon as she has passed the
limit in her first crime.