If it is true that by the earnest and repeated study of the meanings of
words we are likely to find them in the end containing much deeper sense
and content than at the beginning, we are compelled to wonder that
people are able to understand each other at all. For if words do not
have that meaning which is obvious in their essential denotation, every
one who uses them supplies according to his inclination, and status the
“deeper and richer sense.” As a matter of fact many more words are used
pictorially than we are inclined to think. Choose at random, and you
find surprisingly numerous words with exaggerated denotations. If I say,
“I posit the case, I press through, I jump over, the proposition, etc.,”
these phrases are all pictures, for I have posited nothing, I have
pressed through no obstacle, and have jumped over no object. My words,
therefore, have not stood for anything real, but for an image, and it is
impossible to determine the remoteness of the latter from the former, or
the variety of direction and extent this remoteness may receive from
each individual. Wherever images are made use of, therefore, we must, if
we are to know what is meant, first establish how and where the use
occurred. How frequently we hear, e.g., of a “four-cornered” table
instead of a square table; a “very average” man, instead of a man who is
far below the average. In many cases this false expression is
half-consciously made for the purpose of beautifying a request or making
it appear more modest. The smoker says: “May I have some light,”
although you know that it is perfectly indifferent whether much or
little light is taken from the cigar. “May I have just a little piece of
roast,” is said in order to make the request that the other fellow
should pass the heavy platter seem more modest. And again: “Please give
me a little water,” does not modify the fact that the other fellow must
pass the whole water flask, and that it is indifferent to him whether
afterwards you take much or little water. So, frequently, we speak of
borrowing or lending, without in the remotest thinking of returning. The
student says to his comrade, “Lend me a pen, some paper, or some ink,”
but he has not at all any intention of giving them back. Similar things
are to be discovered in accused or witnesses who think they have not
behaved properly, and who then want to exhibit their misconduct in the
most favorable light. These beautifications frequently go so far and may
be made so skilfully that the correct situation may not be observed for
a long time. Habitual usage offers, in this case also, the best
examples. For years uncountable it has been called a cruel job to earn
your living honestly and to satisfy the absolute needs of many people by
quickly and painlessly slaughtering cattle. But, when somebody, just for
the sake of killing time, because of ennui, shoots and martyrs harmless
animals, or merely so wounds them that if they are not retrieved they
must die terrible deaths, we call it noble sport. I should like to see a
demonstration of the difference between killing an ox and shooting a
stag. The latter does not require even superior skill, for it is much
more difficult to kill an ox swiftly and painlessly than to shoot a stag
badly, and even the most accurate shot requires less training than the
correct slaughter of an ox. Moreover, it requires much more courage to
finish a wild ox than to destroy a tame and kindly pheasant. But usage,
once and for all, has assumed this essential distinction between men,
and frequently this distinction is effective in criminal law, without
our really seeing how or why. The situation is similar in the difference
between cheating in a horse trade and cheating about other commodities.
It occurs in the distinction between two duellists fighting according to
rule and two peasant lads brawling with the handles of their picks
according to agreement. It recurs again in the violation of the law by
somebody “nobly inspired with champagne,” as against its violation by
some “mere” drunkard. But usage has a favoring, excusing intent for the
first series, and an accusing, rejecting intent for the latter series.
The different points of view from which various events are seen are the
consequence of the varieties of the usage which first distinguished the
view-points from one another.
There is, moreover, a certain dishonesty in speaking and in listening
where the speaker knows that the hearer is hearing a different matter,
and the hearer knows that the speaker is speaking a different matter. As
Steinthal[246] has said, “While the speaker speaks about things that he
does not believe, and the reality of which he takes no stock in, his
auditor, at the same time, knows right well what the former has said; he
understands correctly and does not blame the speaker for having
expressed himself altogether unintelligibly.” This occurs very
frequently in daily routine, without causing much difficulty in human
intercourse, but it ought, for this reason, to occur inversely in our
conversation with witnesses and accused. I know that the manner of
speaking just described is frequently used when a witness wants to
clothe some definite suspicion without expressing it explicitly. In such
cases, e.g., the examiner as well as the witness believes that X is the
criminal. For some reason, perhaps because X is a close relation of the
witness or of “the man higher up,” neither of them, judge nor witness,
wishes to utter the truth openly, and so they feel round the subject for
an interminable time. If now, both think the same thing, there results
at most only a loss of time, but no other misfortune. When, however,
each thinks of a different object, e.g., each thinks of another
criminal, but each believes mistakenly that he agrees with the other,
their separating without having made explicit what they think, may lead
to harmful misunderstandings. If the examiner then believes that the
witness agrees with him and proceeds upon this only apparently certain
basis, the case may become very bad. The results are the same when a
confession is discussed with a suspect, i.e., when the judge thinks that
the suspect would like to confess, but only suggests confession, while
the latter has never even thought of it. The one thing alone our work
permits of is open and clear speaking; any confused form of expression
is evil.
Nevertheless, confusions often occur involuntarily, and as they can not
be avoided they must be understood. Thus, it is characteristic to
understand something unknown in terms of some known example, i.e., the
Romans who first saw an elephant, called it “bos lucani.” Similarly
“wood-dog” = wolf; “sea-cat” = monkey, etc. These are forms of common
usage, but every individual is accustomed to make such identifications
whenever he meets with any strange object. He speaks, therefore, to some
degree in images, and if his auditor is not aware of the fact he can
not understand him. His speaking so may be discovered by seeking out
clearly whether and what things were new and foreign to the speaker.
When this is learned it may be assumed that he will express himself in
images when considering the unfamiliar object. Then it will not be
difficult to discover the nature and source of the images.
Similar difficulties arise with the usage of foreign terms. It is of
course familiar that their incorrect use is not confined to the
uneducated. I have in mind particularly the weakening of the meaning in
our own language. The foreign word, according to Volkmar, gets its
significance by robbing the homonymous native word of its definiteness
and freshness, and is therefore sought out by all persons who are
unwilling to call things by their right names. The “_triste_ position”
is far from being so sad as the “sad” position. I should like to know
how a great many people could speak, if they were not permitted to say
_malheur_, _méchant_, _perfide_, etc.--words by means of which they
reduce the values of the terms at least a degree in intensity of
meaning. The reason for the use of these words is not always the
unwillingness of the speaker to make use of the right term, but really
because it is necessary to indicate various degrees of intensity for the
same thing without making use of attributes or other extensions of the
term. Thus the foreign word is in some degree introduced as a technical
expression. The direction in which the native word weakens, however,
taken as that is intended by the individual who uses its substitute, is
in no sense universally fixated. The matter is entirely one of
individual usage and must be examined afresh in each particular case.
The striving for abbreviated forms of expression,--extraordinary enough
in our gossipy times,--manifests itself in still another direction. On
my table, e.g., there is an old family journal, “From Cliff to Sea.”
What should the title mean? Obviously the spatial distribution of the
subject of its contents and its subscribers--i.e., “round about the
whole earth,” or “Concerning all lands and all peoples.” But such titles
would be too long; hence, they are synthesized into, “From Cliff to
Sea,” without the consideration that cliffs often stand right at the
edge of the sea, so that the distance between them may be only the
thickness of a hair:--cliff and sea are not local opposites.
Or: my son enters and tells me a story about an “old semester.” By “old
semester” he means an old student who has spent many terms, at least
more than are required or necessary, at the university. As this
explanation is too long, the whole complex is contracted into “old
semester,” which is comfortable, but unintelligible to all people not
associated with the university. These abbreviations are much more
numerous than, as a rule, they are supposed to be, and must always be
explained if errors are to be avoided. Nor are silent and monosyllabic
persons responsible for them; gossipy individuals seek, by the use of
them, to exhibit a certain power of speech. Nor is it indifferent to
expression when people in an apparently nowise comfortable fashion give
approximate circumlocutive figures, e.g., _half-a-dozen_, four
syllables, instead of the monosyllable _six_; or “the bell in the dome
at St. Stephen’s has as many nicks as the year has days,” etc. It must
be assumed that these circumlocutive expressions are chosen, either
because of the desire to make an assertion general, or because of the
desire for some mnemonic aid. It is necessary to be cautious with such
statements, either because, as made, they only “round out” the figures
or because the reliability of the aid to memory must first be tested.
Finally, it is well-known that foreign words are often changed into
senseless words of a similar sound. When such unintelligible words are
heard, very loud repeated restatement of the word will help in finding
the original.
TITLE B. DIFFERENTIATING CONDITIONS OF GIVING TESTIMONY.
Topic 1. GENERAL DIFFERENCES.
(a) Woman.