The question of association is essentially significant for lawyers
because, in many cases, it is only by use of it that we can discover the
conditions of the existence of certain conceptions, by means of which
witnesses may be brought to remember and tell the truth, etc., without
hypnotizing them, or overtesting the correctness of their statements. We
will cursorily make a few general observations only:
Concerning the law of association, very little has been learned since
the time of Aristotle. It is determined by:
1. Similarity (the common quality of the symbol).
2. Contrast (because every image involves opposition between its
extremes).
3. Co-existence, simultaneity (the being together of outer or inner
objects in space).
4. Succession (images call each other out in the same order in which
they occur).
Hume recognized only three grounds of association of
objects--similarity, contact in time and space, and causality. Theo.
Lipps recognizes as the really different grounds of association only
similarity and simultaneity (the simultaneity of their presence in the
mind, especially).
If, however, simultaneity is to be taken in this sense it may be
considered the sole ground of association, for if the images are not
simultaneous there can be no question of association. Simultaneity in
the mind is only the second process, for images are simultaneous in the
mind only because they have occurred simultaneously, existed in the same
space, were similar, etc. Münsterberg,[211] who dealt with the matter
and got important results, points out that all so-called inner
associations, like similarity, contrast, etc., may be reduced to
external association, and all the external associations, even that of
temporal sequence, may be reduced to co-existence, and all
co-existence-associations are psychophysically intelligible. Further:
“The fundamental error of all association processes leading to incorrect
connection of ideas, must be contained in their incompleteness. One idea
was associated with another, the latter with a third, and then we
connect the first with the third ... a thing we should not have done,
since the first, while it co-existed with the second, was also connected
with many others.”
But even this account does not account for certain difficulties, because
some associations are simply set aside, although they should have
occurred. Man is inclined, according to Stricker, to inhibit
associations which are not implied in his “funded” complexes.
If we find direct contradiction with regard to associations, the way out
is not easy. We have then, first, to consider how, by comparatively
remote indirection, to introduce those conditions into the “funded”
complex, which will give rise to the association. But such a
consideration is often a big problem in pedagogy, and we are rarely in
the position of teaching the witness.
There is still the additional difficulty that we frequently do not know
the circumstance with the help of which the witness has made his
association. Thomas Hobbes tells the story of an association which
involved a leap from the British Civil War to the value of a denarius
under the Emperor Tiberius. The process was as follows: King Charles I
was given up by the Scotch for $200,000, Christ was sold for 30 denarii,
what then was a denarius worth? In order to pursue the thread of such an
association, one needs, anyway, only a definite quantity of historical
knowledge, but this quantity must be possessed. But such knowledge is a
knowledge of universal things that anybody may have, while the personal
relations and purely subjective experiences which are at the command of
an individual are quite unknown to any other person, and it is often
exceedingly difficult to discover them.[212] The case is simplest when
one tries to aid the memory of a witness in order to make him place
single dates, e.g., when the attempt is made to determine some time and
the witness is reminded of certain events that occurred during the time
in question in order to assist him in fixing the calendar time. Or
again, when the witness is brought to the place of the crime and the
individual conditions are associated with the local situation. But when
not merely single dates are to be associated, when complete events are
to be associated, a profound knowledge of the situation must precede,
otherwise no association is successful, or merely topsy-turvy results
are attained. The difficulties which here ensue depend actually upon the
really enormous quantity of knowledge every human being must possess in
making use of his senses. Anything that a man has learned at school, in
the newspapers, etc., we know approximately, but we have no knowledge of
what a man has thought out for himself and what he has felt in his
localized conditions, e.g., his home, his town, his travels, his
relations and their experiences, etc.--However important this may be, we
have no means of getting hold of it.
Those associations which have physical expression are of importance only
in particular cases. For example, the feeling of ants all over the body
when you think that you have been near an anthill, or the feeling of
physical pain on hearing the description of wounds. It is exceedingly
funny to see how, during the lectures of dermatologists, the whole
audience scratches that part of the body which is troubling the patient
who is being described.
Such associations may be legally valuable in so far as the accused who
plead innocence make unconscious movements which imply the denied
wounds. In any event, it is necessary to be cautious because frequently
the merely accurate description of a wound may bring about the same
effect in nervous persons as the sight of that wound. If, however, the
wound is not described and even its place not mentioned, and only the
general harm is spoken of, then if the accused reaches for that part of
his body in which the wound of his victim is located, you have a clew,
and your attention should be directed upon it. Such an index is worth no
more, but even as a clew it has some value.
All in all, we may say that the legally significant direction of
association falls in the same class with “getting an idea.” We need
association for the purpose of constructing an image and an explanation
of the event in question; something must “occur to us.” We must “get an
idea,” if we are to know how something happened. We need association,
moreover, in order to discover that something has occurred to the
witness.
“Getting an idea” or “occurrence” is essentially one and the same in all
its forms. We have only to study its several manifestations:
1. “Constructive occurrence,” by means of which the correct thing may
possibly be discovered in the way of combining, inferring, comparing
and testing. Here the association must be intentional and such ideas
must be brought to a fixed image, which may be in such wise associated
with them as to make a result possible. Suppose, e.g., that the case is
one of arson, and the criminal is unknown. Then we will require the
plaintiff to make local, temporal, identifying, and contrasting
associations with the idea of all and each of his enemies, or of
discharged servants, beggars, etc. In this wise we can attain to other
ideas, which may help us to approach some definite theory.
2. “Spontaneous occurrence” in which a thought appears with apparent
suddenness for no particular reason. As a matter of fact, such
suddenness is always caused by some conscious, and in most cases, some
unconscious association, the thread of which can not be later sought out
and exhibited because of its being subconscious, or of its being
overleaped so quickly and readily that it can not be traced. Very often
some particular sense-perception exercises an influence which unites
simultaneous ideas, now here again united. Suppose once during some
extraordinary sound, e.g., the ringing of a bell, which I do not often
hear, I had seen somebody. Now when I hear that bell ringing I will
think of the person without perhaps knowing the definite
association--i.e., the connection of the man with the tone of the bell
occurs unconsciously. This may go still further. That man, when I first
saw him, might have worn, perhaps, a red necktie, let us say
poppy-red--it may now happen that every time I hear that bell-note I
think of a field of poppy-flowers. Now who can pursue this road of
association?
3. “Accluding occurrence,” in which, in the process of the longest
possible calm retention of an idea, another appears of itself and
associates with the first. E. g., I meet a man who greets me although I
do not recognize him. I may perhaps know who he is, but I do not
spontaneously think of it and can not get at his identity
constructively, because of lack of material. I therefore expect
something from this “accluding occurrence” and with my eyes shut I try
as long as possible to keep in mind the idea of this man. Suddenly, I
see him before me with serious face and folded hands, on his right a
similar individual and a similar one on his left, above them a high
window with a curtain--the man was a juryman who sat opposite me. But
the memory is not exhausted with this. I aim to banish his image as
seated and keep him again before my eyes. I see an apparent gate beyond
him with shelves behind; it is the image of a shop-keeper in a small
town who is standing before the door of his shop. I hold this image
straining before my eyes--suddenly a wagon appears with just that kind
of trapping which I have only once seen to deck the equipage of a
land-owner. I know well who this is, what the little town near his
estate is called, and now I suddenly know that the man whose name I want
to remember is the merchant X of Y who once was a juryman in my court.
This means of the longest possible retention of an idea, I have made
frequent use of with the more intelligent witnesses (it rarely succeeds
with women because they are restless), and all in all, with surprising
effects.
4. “Retrospective occurrence,” which consists of the development of
associations backward. E. g.--do what I will, I can not remember the
name of a certain man, but I know that he has a title to nobility, which
is identical with the name of a small town in Obertfalz. Finally, the
name of the town Hirschau occurs to me, and now I easily associate
backwards, “Schaller von Hirschau.” It is, of course, natural that words
should unroll themselves forwards with habitual ease, but backwards only
when we think of the word we are trying to remember, as written, and
then associate the whole as a MS. image. This is unhappily difficult to
use in helping another.
Topic 6. RECOLLECTION AND MEMORY.