Section 47. (b) The Mechanism of Thinking.

Since the remarkable dissertation of W. Ostwald,[205] on Sept. 20, 1905,

we have been standing at a turning point which looks toward a new view

of the world. We do not know whether the “ignorabimus” of some of the

scientists will hold, or whether we shall be able to think everything in

terms of energy. We merely observe that the supposedly invincible

principles of scientific materialism are shaken.

Frederick the Great, in a letter to Voltaire, says something which

suggests he was the first to have thought of the purely mechanical

nature of thought. Cabanis had said briefly, that the brain secretes

thought as the liver bile. Tyndall expressed this conception more

cautiously, and demanded merely the confession that every act of

consciousness implies a definite molecular condition of the brain, while

Bois-Reymond declared that we could not explain certain psychical

processes and events by knowledge of the material processes in the

brain. “You shall make no picture or comparison, but see as directly as

the nature of our spirit will permit,” Ostwald tells us, and it is well

to stick to this advice. We need neither to cast aside the mechanical

view of the world nor to accept energism; neither of them is required.

But according to the teachings of the latter, we shall be enabled to

recognize the meaning of natural law in the determination of how actual

events are conditioned by possible ones. And thus we shall see that the

form that all natural laws turn to expresses the mediation of an

invariable, a quantity that remains unchangeable even when all the other

elements in the formula of a possible event alter within the limits

defined by the law.[206]

Every science must provide its own philosophy, and it is our duty to

know properly and to understand clearly how far we may perceive

connections between the physical qualities of any one of our witnesses

and his psychic nature. We will draw no inferences ourselves, but we

will take note of what does not explain itself and apply to experts to

explain what we can not. This is especially necessary where the relation

of the normal to the abnormal becomes a question. The normal effects to

be spoken of are very numerous, but we shall consider only a few. The

first is the connection of symbol and symbolized. “The circumstance that

the symbol, on its side of the union of the two, becomes perfectly clear

while the symbolized object is rather confused, is explained by the fact

that the symbol recalls its object more quickly than the object the

symbol; e.g., the tool recalls its use more quickly than the purpose its

instrument. Name and word recall more quickly, reliably, and

energetically the objects they stand for than do the objects their

symbols.”[207] This matter is more important than it looks at first

glance, inasmuch as the particles of time with which we are dealing are

greater than those with which modern psychologists have to deal,--so

large indeed, that they may be perceived in practice. We lay stress

during the examination, when we are in doubt about the correctness of

the expected answer, upon the promptness and rapidity with which it is

given. Drawn out, tentative, and uncertain answers, we take for a sign

that the witness either is unable or unwilling to give his replies

honestly. If, however, psychologically there are real reasons for

variation in the time in which an answer is given, reasons which do not

depend on its correctness, we must seek out this correctness. Suppose

that we have before us a case in which the name awakens more quickly and

reliably the idea of the person to whom it belongs than conversely. This

occurs to any one of us, and often we can not remember the name of even

a close friend for a greater or shorter period. But we very rarely find

that we do not think of the appearance of the individual whose name we

hear mentioned. But it would be wrong to relate this phenomenon to

certain qualities which contradict it only apparently. E. g., when I

examine old statutes which I myself have worked with and review the

names of the series, I recall that I had something to do with this

Jones, Smith, Black, or White, and I recall what the business was, but I

do not recall their appearance. The reason is, first of all, the fact

that during the trial I did not care about the names which served as a

means of distinguishing one from the other, and they might, for that

purpose, have been _a_, _b_, _c_, etc. Hence, the faces and names were

not as definitely associated as they ordinarily are. Moreover, _this_

failure to recall is a substitution for each other of the many tanti

quanti that we take up in our daily routine. When we have had especial

business with any particular individual we do remember his face when his

name is mentioned.

If, then, a witness does not quickly recall the name of something he is

thinking of, but identifies it immediately when the name is given him,

you have a natural psychological event which itself has no bearing on

the truth or falsity of his testimony.

The same relation is naturally to be found in all cases of parallel

phenomena, i.e., names, symbols, definitions, etc. It applies, also, to

the problem of the alteration in the rapidity of psychical processes

with the time of the day. According to Bechterew and Higier there is an

increase in psychical capacity from morning to noon, then a dropping

until five o’clock in the afternoon, then an increase until nine o’clock

in the evening, and finally a sinking until twelve o’clock midnight.

There is, of course, no doubt that these investigators have correctly

collected their material; that their results shall possess general

validity is, however, not so certain. The facts are such that much

depends, not only on the individual character, but also on the instant

of examination. One hears various assertions of individuals at times

when they are most quick to apprehend and at their best, and hence it is

hardly possible to draw a general rule from such phenomena. One may be

wide awake in the morning, another in the forenoon, a third at night,

and at each time other people may be at their worst. In a similar

fashion, the psychic disposition varies not only during the day, but

from day to day. So far as my observations go the only thing

uncontradicted is the fact that the period between noon and five o’clock

in the afternoon is not a favorable one. I do not believe, however, that

it would be correct to say that the few hours after the noon dinner are

the worst in the day, for people who eat their dinners at about four or

five o’clock assure me that from one to five in the afternoon, they

cannot work so well. These facts may have a value for us in so far as we

can succeed in avoiding the trial of important cases which require

especial consideration during the time mentioned.

Criminal Psychology: A Manual for Judges, Practitioners, and Students · 第 14 / 79 章