The passion for ruling, though most completely developed in despotisms,
is confined to no forms of government. It is the chief peril of free
States, the natural enemy of free institutions. It agitates our own
country, and still throws an uncertainty over the great experiment we
are making here in behalf of liberty.... It is the distinction of
republican institutions, that whilst they compel the passion for power
to moderate its pretensions, and to satisfy itself with more limited
gratifications, they tend to spread it more widely through the
community, and to make it a universal principle. The doors of office
being opened to all, crowds burn to rush in. A thousand hands are
stretched out to grasp the reins which are denied to none. Perhaps in
this boasted and boasting land of liberty, not a few, if called to state
the chief good of a republic, would place it in this: that every man is
eligible to every office, and that the highest places of power and
trust are prizes for universal competition. The superiority attributed
by many to our institutions is, not that they secure the greatest
freedom, but give every man a chance of ruling; not that they reduce the
power of government within the narrowest limits which the safety of the
State admits, but throw it into as many hands as possible. The despot's
great crime is thought to be that he keeps the delight of dominion to
himself, that he makes a monopoly of it; whilst our more generous
institutions, by breaking it into parcels and inviting the multitude to
scramble for it, spread this joy more widely. The result is that
political ambition infects our country and generates a feverish
restlessness and discontent, which to the monarchist may seem more than
a balance for our forms of liberty. The spirit of intrigue, which in
absolute governments is confined to courts, walks abroad through the
land; and as individuals can accomplish no political purposes
single-handed, they band themselves into parties, ostensibly framed for
public ends, but aiming only at the acquisition of power. The nominal
sovereign,--that is, the people,--like all other sovereigns, is courted
and flattered and told that it can do no wrong. Its pride is pampered,
its passions inflamed, its prejudices made inveterate. Such are the
processes by which other republics have been subverted, and he must be
blind who cannot trace them among ourselves. We mean not to exaggerate
our dangers. We rejoice to know that the improvements of society oppose
many checks to the love of power. But every wise man who sees its
workings must dread it as one chief foe.
This passion derives strength and vehemence in our country from the
common idea that political power is the highest prize which society has
to offer. We know not a more general delusion, nor is it the least
dangerous. Instilled as it is in our youth, it gives infinite excitement
to political ambition. It turns the active talents of the country to
public station as the supreme good, and makes it restless, intriguing,
and unprincipled. It calls out hosts of selfish competitors for
comparatively few places, and encourages a bold, unblushing pursuit of
personal elevation, which a just moral sense and self-respect in the
community would frown upon and cover with shame.