CHAPTER III.

Produced by David Widger

PERSONAL MEMOIRES OF P. H. SHERIDAN, VOLUME 2.

By Philip Henry Sheridan

CHAPTER I.

ORGANIZING SCOUTS--MISS REBECCA WRIGHT--IMPORTANT INFORMATION--DECIDE

TO MOVE ON NEWTOWN--MEETING GENERAL GRANT--ORGANIZATION OF THE UNION

ARMY--OPENING OF THE BATTLE OF THE OPEQUON--DEATH OF GENERAL RUSSELL

--A TURNING MOVEMENT--A SUCCESSFUL CAVALRY CHARGE--VICTORY--THREE

LOYAL GIRLS--APPOINTED A BRIGADIER-GENERAL IN THE REGULAR ARMY

--REMARKS ON THE BATTLE.

While occupying the ground between Clifton and Berryville, referred

to in the last chapter of the preceding volume, I felt the need of an

efficient body of scouts to collect information regarding the enemy,

for the defective intelligence-establishment with which I started out

from Harper's Ferry early in August had not proved satisfactory. I

therefore began to organize my scouts on a system which I hoped would

give better results than bad the method hitherto pursued in the

department, which was to employ on this service doubtful citizens and

Confederate deserters. If these should turn out untrustworthy, the

mischief they might do us gave me grave apprehension, and I finally

concluded that those of our own soldiers who should volunteer for the

delicate and hazardous duty would be the most valuable material, and

decided that they should have a battalion organization and be

commanded by an officer, Major H. K. Young, of the First Rhode Island

Infantry. These men were disguised in Confederate uniforms whenever

necessary, were paid from the Secret-Service Fund in proportion to

the value of the intelligence they furnished, which often stood us in

good stead in checking the forays of Gilmore, Mosby, and other

irregulars. Beneficial results came from the plan in many other ways

too, and particularly so when in a few days two of my scouts put me

in the way of getting news conveyed from Winchester. They had

learned that just outside of my lines, near Millwood, there was

living an old colored man, who had a permit from the Confederate

commander to go into Winchester and return three times a week, for

the purpose of selling vegetables to the inhabitants. The scouts had

sounded this man, and, finding him both loyal and shrewd, suggested

that he might be made useful to us within the enemy's lines; and the

proposal struck me as feasible, provided there could be found in

Winchester some reliable person who would be willing to co-operate

and correspond with me. I asked General Crook, who was acquainted

with many of the Union people of Winchester, if he knew of such a

person, and he recommended a Miss Rebecca Wright, a young lady whom

he had met there before the battle of Kernstown, who, he said, was a

member of the Society of Friends and the teacher of a small private

school. He knew she was faithful and loyal to the Government, and

thought she might be willing to render us assistance, but he could

not be certain of this, for on account of her well known loyalty she

was under constant surveillance. I hesitated at first, but finally

deciding to try it, despatched the two scouts to the old negro's

cabin, and they brought him to my headquarters late that night. I

was soon convinced of the negro's fidelity, and asking him if he was

acquainted with Miss Rebecca Wright, of Winchester, he replied that

he knew her well. There upon I told him what I wished to do, and

after a little persuasion he agreed to carry a letter to her on his

next marketing trip. My message was prepared by writing it on tissue

paper, which was then compressed into a small pellet, and protected

by wrapping it in tin-foil so that it could be safely carried in the

man's mouth. The probability, of his being searched when he came to

the Confederate picketline was not remote, and in such event he was

to swallow the pellet. The letter appealed to Miss Wright's loyalty

and patriotism, and requested her to furnish me with information

regarding the strength and condition of Early's army. The night

before the negro started one of the scouts placed the odd-looking

communication in his hands, with renewed injunctions as to secrecy

and promptitude. Early the next morning it was delivered to Miss

Wright, with an intimation that a letter of importance was enclosed

in the tin-foil, the negro telling her at the same time that she

might expect him to call for a message in reply before his return

home. At first Miss Wright began to open the pellet nervously, but

when told to be careful, and to preserve the foil as a wrapping for

her answer, she proceeded slowly and carefully, and when the note

appeared intact the messenger retired, remarking again that in the

evening he would come for an answer.

On reading my communication Miss Wright was much startled by the

perils it involved, and hesitatingly consulted her mother, but her

devoted loyalty soon silenced every other consideration, and the

brave girl resolved to comply with my request, notwithstanding it

might jeopardize her life. The evening before a convalescent

Confederate officer had visited her mother's house, and in

conversation about the war had disclosed the fact that Kershaw's

division of infantry and Cutshaw's battalion of artillery had started

to rejoin General Lee. At the time Miss Wright heard this she

attached little if any importance to it, but now she perceived the

value of the intelligence, and, as her first venture, determined to

send it to me at once, which she did with a promise that in the

future she would with great pleasure continue to transmit information

by the negro messenger.

"SEPTEMBER 15, 1864.

"I learn from Major-General Crook that you are a loyal lady, and

still love the old flag. Can you inform me of the position of

Early's forces, the number of divisions in his army, and the strength

of any or all of them, and his probable or reported intentions? Have

any more troops arrived from Richmond, or are any more coming, or

reported to be coming?

"You can trust the bearer."

"I am, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

"P. H. SHERIDAN, Major-General Commanding."

"SEPTEMBER 16, 1864.

"I have no communication whatever with the rebels, but will tell you

what I know. The division of General Kershaw, and Cutshaw's

artillery, twelve guns and men, General Anderson commanding, have

been sent away, and no more are expected, as they cannot be spared

from Richmond. I do not know how the troops are situated, but the

force is much smaller than represented. I will take pleasure

hereafter in learning all I can of their strength and position, and

the bearer may call again.

"Very respectfully yours,"

............

Miss Wright's answer proved of more value to me than she anticipated,

for it not only quieted the conflicting reports concerning Anderson's

corps, but was most important in showing positively that Kershaw was

gone, and this circumstance led, three days later, to the battle of

the Opequon, or Winchester as it has been unofficially called. Word

to the effect that some of Early's troops were under orders to return

to Petersburg, and would start back at the first favorable

opportunity, had been communicated to me already from many sources,

but we had not been able to ascertain the date for their departure.

Now that they had actually started, I decided to wait before offering

battle until Kershaw had gone so far as to preclude his return,

feeling confident that my prudence would be justified by the improved

chances of victory; and then, besides, Mr. Stanton kept reminding me

that positive success was necessary to counteract the political

dissatisfaction existing in some of the Northern States. This course

was advised and approved by General Grant, but even with his powerful

backing it was difficult to resist the persistent pressure of those

whose judgment, warped by their interests in the Baltimore and Ohio

railroad, was often confused and misled by stories of scouts (sent

out from Washington), averring that Kershaw and Fitzhugh Lee had

returned to Petersburg, Breckenridge to southwestern Virginia, and at

one time even maintaining that Early's whole army was east of the

Blue Ridge, and its commander himself at Gordonsville.

During the inactivity prevailing in my army for the ten days

preceding Miss Wright's communication the infantry was quiet, with

the exception of Getty's division, which made a reconnoissance to the

Opequon, and developed a heavy force of the enemy at Edwards's

Corners. The cavalry, however, was employed a good deal in this

interval skirmishing heavily at times to maintain a space about six

miles in width between the hostile lines, for I wished to control

this ground so that when I was released from the instructions of

August 12, I could move my men into position for attack without the

knowledge of Early. The most noteworthy of these mounted encounters

was that of McIntosh's brigade, which captured the Eighth South

Carolina at Abraham's Creek September 13.

It was the evening of the 16th of September that I received from Miss

Wright the positive information that Kershaw was in march toward

Front Royal on his way by Chester Gap to Richmond. Concluding that

this was my opportunity, I at once resolved to throw my whole force

into Newtown the next day, but a despatch from General Grant

directing me to meet him at Charlestown, whither he was coming to

consult with me, caused me to defer action until after I should see

him. In our resulting interview at Charlestown, I went over the

situation very thoroughly, and pointed out with so much confidence

the chances of a complete victory should I throw my army across the

Valley pike near Newtown that he fell in with the plan at once,

authorized me to resume the offensive, and to attack Early as soon as

I deemed it most propitious to do so; and although before leaving

City Point he had outlined certain operations for my army, yet he

neither discussed nor disclosed his plans, my knowledge of the

situation striking him as being so much more accurate than his own.

[Extract from "Grant's Memoirs," page 328.]

"....Before starting I had drawn up a plan of campaign for Sheridan,

which I had brought with me; but seeing that he was so clear and so

positive in his views, and so confident of success, I said nothing

about this, and did not take it out of my pocket...."

The interview over, I returned to my army to arrange for its movement

toward Newtown, but while busy with these preparations, a report came

to me from General Averell which showed that Early was moving with

two divisions of infantry toward Martinsburg. This considerably

altered the state of affairs, and I now decided to change my plan and

attack at once the two divisions remaining about Winchester and

Stephenson's depot, and later, the two sent to Martinsburg; the

disjointed state of the enemy giving me an opportunity to take him in

detail, unless the Martinsburg column should be returned by forced

marches.

While General Early was in the telegraph office at Martinsburg on the

morning of the 18th, he learned of Grant's visit to me; and

anticipating activity by reason of this circumstance, he promptly

proceeded to withdraw so as to get the two divisions within

supporting distance of Ramseur's, which lay across the Berryville

pike about two miles east of Winchester, between Abraham's Creek and

Red Bud Run, so by the night of the 18th Wharton's division, under

Breckenridge, was at Stephenson's depot, Rodes near there, and

Gordon's at Bunker Hill. At daylight of the 19th these positions of

the Confederate infantry still obtained, with the cavalry of Lomax,

Jackson, and Johnson on the right of Ramseur, while to the left and

rear of the enemy's general line was Fitzhugh Lee, covering from

Stephenson's depot west across the Valley pike to Applepie Ridge.

My army moved at 3 o'clock that morning. The plan was for Torbert to

advance with Merritt's division of cavalry from Summit Point, carry

the crossings of the Opequon at Stevens's and Lock's fords, and form

a junction near Stephenson's depot, with Averell, who was to move

south from Darksville by the Valley pike. Meanwhile, Wilson was to

strike up the Berryville pike, carry the Berryville crossing of the

Opequon, charge through the gorge or canyon on the road west of the

stream, and occupy the open ground at the head of this defile.

Wilson's attack was to be supported by the Sixth and Nineteenth

corps, which were ordered to the Berryville crossing, and as the

cavalry gained the open ground beyond the gorge, the two infantry

corps, under command of General Wright, were expected to press on

after and occupy Wilson's ground, who was then to shift to the south

bank of Abraham's Creek and cover my left; Crook's two divisions,

having to march from Summit Point, were to follow the Sixth and

Nineteenth corps to the Opcquon, and should they arrive before the

action began, they were to be held in reserve till the proper moment

came, and then, as a turning-column, be thrown over toward the Valley

pike, south of Winchester.

McIntosh's brigade of Wilson's division drove the enemy's pickets

away from the Berryville crossing at dawn, and Wilson following

rapidly through the gorge with the rest of the division, debouched

from its western extremity with such suddenness as to capture a

small earthwork in front of General Ramseur's main line; and

not-withstanding the Confederate infantry, on recovering from its

astonishment, tried hard to dislodge them, Wilson's troopers

obstinately held the work till the Sixth Corps came up. I followed

Wilson to select the ground on which to form the infantry. The Sixth

Corps began to arrive about 8 o'clock, and taking up the line Wilson

had been holding, just beyond the head of the narrow ravine, the

cavalry was transferred to the south side of Abraham's Creek.

The Confederate line lay along some elevated ground about two miles

east of Winchester, and extended from Abraham's Creek north across

the Berryville pike, the left being hidden in the heavy timber on Red

Bud Run. Between this line and mine, especially on my right, clumps

of woods and patches of underbrush occurred here and there, but the

undulating ground consisted mainly of open fields, many of which were

covered with standing corn that had already ripened.

Much time was lost in getting all of the Sixth and Nineteenth corps

through the narrow defile, Grover's division being greatly delayed

there by a train of ammunition wagons, and it was not until late in

the forenoon that the troops intended for the attack could be got

into line ready to advance. General Early was not slow to avail

himself of the advantages thus offered him, and my chances of

striking him in detail were growing less every moment, for Gordon and

Rodes were hurrying their divisions from Stephenson's depot

--across-country on a line that would place Gordon in the woods south

of Red Bud Run, and bring Rodes into the interval between Gordon and

Ramseur.

When the two corps had all got through the canyon they were formed

with Getty's division of the Sixth to the left of the Berryville

pike, Rickett's division to the right of the pike, and Russell's

division in reserve in rear of the other two. Grover's division of

the Nineteenth Corps came next on the right of Rickett's, with Dwight

to its rear in reserve, while Crook was to begin massing near the

Opequon crossing about the time Wright and Emory were ready to

attack.

Just before noon the line of Getty, Ricketts, and Grover moved

forward, and as we advanced, the Confederates, covered by some heavy

woods on their right, slight underbrush and corn-fields along their

Centre, and a large body of timber on their left along the Red Bud,

opened fire from their whole front. We gained considerable ground at

first, especially on our left but the desperate resistance which the

right met with demonstrated that the time we had unavoidably lost in

the morning had been of incalculable value to Early, for it was

evident that he had been enabled already to so far concentrate his

troops as to have the different divisions of his army in a connected

line of battle, in good shape to resist.

Getty and Ricketts made some progress toward Winchester in connection

with Wilson's cavalry, which was beyond the Senseny road on Getty's

left, and as they were pressing back Ramseur's infantry and Lomax's

cavalry Grover attacked from the right with decided effect. Grover

in a few minutes broke up Evans's brigade of Gordon's division, but

his pursuit of Evans destroyed the continuity of my general line, and

increased an interval that had already been made by the deflection of

Ricketts to the left, in obedience to instructions that had been

given him to guide his division on the Berryville pike. As the line

pressed forward, Ricketts observed this widening interval and

endeavored to fill it with the small brigade of Colonel Keifer, but

at this juncture both Gordon and Rodes struck the weak spot where the

right of the Sixth Corps and the left of the Nineteenth should have

been in conjunction, and succeeded in checking my advance by driving

back a part of Ricketts's division, and the most of Grover's. As

these troops were retiring I ordered Russell's reserve division to be

put into action, and just as the flank of the enemy's troops in

pursuit of Grover was presented, Upton's brigade, led in person by

both Russell and Upton, struck it in a charge so vigorous as to drive

the Confederates back in turn to their original ground.

The success of Russell enabled me to re-establish the right of my

line some little distance in advance of the position from which it

started in the morning, and behind Russell's division (now commanded

by Upton) the broken regiments of Ricketts's division were rallied.

Dwight's division was then brought up on the right, and Grover's men

formed behind it.

The charge of Russell was most opportune, but it cost many men in

killed and wounded. Among the former was the courageous Russell

himself; killed by a piece of shell that passed through his heart,

although he had previously been struck by a bullet in the left

breast, which wound, from its nature, must have proved mortal, yet of

which he had not spoken. Russell's death oppressed us all with

sadness, and me particularly. In the early days of my army life he

was my captain and friend, and I was deeply indebted to him, not only

for sound advice and good example, but for the inestimable service he

had just performed, and sealed with his life, so it may be inferred

how keenly I felt his loss.

As my lines were being rearranged, it was suggested to me to put

Crook into the battle, but so strongly had I set my heart on using

him to take possession of the Valley pike and cut off the enemy, that

I resisted this advice, hoping that the necessity for putting him in

would be obviated by the attack near Stephenson's depot that

Torbert's cavalry was to make, and from which I was momentarily

expecting to hear. No news of Torbert's progress came, however, so,

yielding at last, I directed Crook to take post on the right of the

Nineteenth Corps and, when the action was renewed, to push his

command forward as a turning-column in conjunction with Emory. After

some delay in the annoying defile, Crook got his men up, and posting

Colonel Thoburn's division on the prolongation of the Nineteenth

Corps, he formed Colonel Duval's division to the right of Thoburn.

Here I joined Crook, informing him that I had just got word that

Torbert was driving the enemy in confusion along the Martinsburg pike

toward Winchester; at the same time I directed him to attack the

moment all of Duval's men were in line. Wright was instructed to

advance in concert with Crook, by swinging Emory and the right of the

Sixth Corps to the left together in a half-wheel. Then leaving

Crook, I rode along the Sixth and Nineteenth corps, the open ground

over which they were passing affording a rare opportunity to witness

the precision with which the attack was taken up from right to left.

Crook's success began the moment he started to turn the enemy's left;

and assured by the fact that Torbert had stampeded the Confederate

cavalry and thrown Breckenridge's infantry into such disorder that it

could do little to prevent the envelopment of Gordon's left, Crook

pressed forward without even a halt.

Both Emory and Wright took up the fight as ordered, and as they did

so I sent word to Wilson, in the hope that he could partly perform

the work originally laid out for Crook, to push along the Senseny

road and, if possible, gain the valley pike south of Winchester. I

then returned toward my right flank, and as I reached the Nineteenth

Corps the enemy was contesting the ground in its front with great

obstinacy; but Emory's dogged persistence was at length rewarded with

success, just as Crook's command emerged from the morass of Red Bud

Run, and swept around Gordon, toward the right of Breckenridge, who,

with two of Wharton's brigades, was holding a line at right angles

with the Valley pike for the protection of the Confederate rear.

Early had ordered these two brigades back from Stephenson's depot in

the morning, purposing to protect with them his right flank and line

of retreat, but while they were en route to this end, he was obliged

to recall them to his left to meet Crook's attack.

To confront Torbert, Patton's brigade of infantry and some of

Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry had been left back by Breckenridge, but, with

Averell on the west side of the Valley pike and Merritt on the east,

Torbert began to drive this opposing force toward Winchester the

moment he struck it near Stephenson's depot, keeping it on the go

till it reached the position held by Breckenridge, where it

endeavored to make a stand.

The ground which Breckenridge was holding was open, and offered an

opportunity such as seldom had been presented during the war for a

mounted attack, and Torbert was not slow to take advantage of it.

The instant Merritt's division could be formed for the charge, it

went at Breckenridge's infantry and Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry with such

momentum as to break the Confederate left, just as Averell was

passing around it. Merritt's brigades, led by Custer, Lowell, and

Devin, met from the start with pronounced success, and with sabre or

pistol in hand literally rode down a battery of five guns and took

about 1,200 prisoners. Almost simultaneously with this cavalry

charge, Crook struck Breckenridge's right and Gordon's left, forcing

these divisions to give way, and as they retired, Wright, in a

vigorous attack, quickly broke Rodes up and pressed Ramseur so hard

that the whole Confederate army fell back, contracting its lines

within some breastworks which had been thrown up at a former period

of the war, immediately in front of Winchester.

Here Early tried hard to stem the tide, but soon Torbert's cavalry

began passing around his left flank, and as Crook, Emory, and Wright

attacked in front, panic took possession of the enemy, his troops,

now fugitives and stragglers, seeking escape into and through

Winchester.

When this second break occurred, the Sixth and Nineteenth corps were

moved over toward the Millwood pike to help Wilson on the left, but

the day was so far spent that they could render him no assistance,

and Ramseur's division, which had maintained some organization, was

in such tolerable shape as to check him. Meanwhile Torbert passed

around to the west of Winchester to join Wilson, but was unable to do

so till after dark. Crook's command pursued the enemy through the

town to Mill Greek, I going along.

Just after entering the town, Crook and I met, in the main street,

three young girls, who gave us the most hearty reception. One of

these young women was a Miss Griffith, the other two Miss Jennie and

Miss Susie Meredith. During the day they had been watching the

battle from the roof of the Meredith residence, with tears and

lamentations, they said, in the morning when misfortune appeared to

have overtaken the Union troops, but with unbounded exultation when,

later, the tide set in against the Confederates. Our presence was,

to them, an assurance of victory, and their delight being

irrepressible, they indulged in the most unguarded manifestations and

expressions. When cautioned by Crook, who knew them well, and

reminded that the valley had hitherto been a race-course--one day in

the possession of friends, and the next of enemies--and warned of the

dangers they were incurring by such demonstrations, they assured him

that they had no further fears of that kind now, adding that Early's

army was so demoralized by the defeat it had just sustained that it

would never be in condition to enter Winchester again. As soon as we

had succeeded in calming the excited girls a little I expressed a

desire to find some place where I could write a telegram to General

Grant informing him of the result of the battle, and General Crook

conducted me to the home of Miss Wright, where I met for the first

time the woman who had contributed so much to our success, and on a

desk in her school-room wrote the despatch announcing that we had

sent Early's army whirling up the valley.

My losses in the battle of the Opequon were heavy, amounting to about

4,500 killed, wounded, and missing. Among the killed was General

Russell, commanding a division, and the wounded included Generals

Upton, McIntosh and Chapman, and Colonels Duval and Sharpe. The

Confederate loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners about equaled

mine, General Rodes being of the killed, while Generals Fitzhugh Lee

and York were severely wounded.

We captured five pieces of artillery and nine battle-flags. The

restoration of the lower valley--from the Potomac to Strasburg--to

the control of the Union forces caused great rejoicing in the North,

and relieved the Administration from further solicitude for the

safety of the Maryland and Pennsylvania borders. The President's

appreciation of the victory was expressed in a despatch so like Mr.

Lincoln that I give a facsimile of it to the reader:

[In the handwriting of President Lincoln]

"EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

"WASHINGTON, Sep. 20, 1864

"MAJOR-GENERAL SHERMAN

"WINCHESTER, VA.

"Have just heard of your great victory. God bless you all, officers

and men. Strongly inclined to come up and see you.

"A. LINCOLN."

This he supplemented by promoting me to the grade of

brigadier-general in the regular army, and assigning me to the

permanent command of the Middle Military Department, and following that

came warm congratulations from Mr. Stanton and from Generals Grant,

Sherman, and Meade.

The battle was not fought out on the plan in accordance with which

marching orders were issued to my troops, for I then hoped to take

Early in detail, and with Crook's force cut off his retreat. I

adhered to this purpose during the early part of the contest, but was

obliged to abandon the idea because of unavoidable delays by which I

was prevented from getting the Sixth and Nineteenth corps through the

narrow defile and into position early enough to destroy Ramseur while

still isolated. So much delay had not been anticipated, and this

loss of time was taken advantage of by the enemy to recall the troops

diverted to Bunker Hill and Martinsburg on the 17th, thus enabling

him to bring them all to the support of Ramseur before I could strike

with effect. My idea was to attack Ramseur and Wharton,

successively, at a very early hour and before they could get succor,

but I was not in condition to do it till nearly noon, by which time

Gordon and Rodes had been enabled to get upon the ground at a point

from which, as I advanced, they enfiladed my right flank, and gave it

such a repulse that to re-form this part of my line I was obliged to

recall the left from some of the ground it had gained. It was during

this reorganization of my lines that I changed my plan as to Crook,

and moved him from my left to my right. This I did with great

reluctance, for I hoped to destroy Early's army entirely if Crook

continued on his original line of march toward the Valley pike, south

of Winchester; and although the ultimate results did, in a measure

vindicate the change, yet I have always thought that by adhering to

the original plan we might have captured the bulk of Early's army.

CHAPTER 11.

PURSUING EARLY--A SECRET MARCH--FISHER'S HILL--A GREAT SUCCESS

--REMOVAL OF AVERELL--THE RETREAT--CAPTURING AN OLD COMRADE

--THE MURDER OF LIEUTENANT MEIGS.

The night of the 19th of September I gave orders for following Early

up the valley next morning--the pursuit to begin at daybreak--and in

obedience to these directions Torbert moved Averell out on the Back

road leading to Cedar Creek, and Merritt up the Valley pike toward

Strasburg, while Wilson was directed on Front Royal by way of

Stevensburg. Merritt's division was followed by the infantry,

Emory's and Wright's columns marching abreast in the open country to

the right and left of the pike, and Crook's immediately behind them.

The enemy having kept up his retreat at night, presented no

opposition whatever until the cavalry discovered him posted at

Fisher's Hill, on the first defensive line where he could hope to

make any serious resistance. No effort was made to dislodge him, and

later in the day, after Wright and Emory came up, Torbert shifted

Merritt over toward the Back road till he rejoined Averell. As

Merritt moved to the right, the Sixth and Nineteenth corps crossed

Cedar Creek and took up the ground the cavalry was vacating, Wright

posting his own corps to the west of the Valley pike overlooking

Strasburg, and Emory's on his left so as to extend almost to the road

leading from Strasburg to Front Royal. Crook, as he came up the same

evening, went into position in some heavy timber on the north bank of

Cedar Creek.

A reconnoissance made pending these movements convinced me that the

enemy's position at Fisher's Hill was so strong that a direct assault

would entail unnecessary destruction of life, and, besides, be of

doubtful result. At the point where Early's troops were in position,

between the Massanutten range and Little North Mountain, the valley

is only about three and a half miles wide. All along the precipitous

bluff which overhangs Tumbling Run on the south side, a heavy line of

earthworks had been constructed when Early retreated to this point in

August, and these were now being strengthened so as to make them

almost impregnable; in fact, so secure did Early consider himself

that, for convenience, his ammunition chests were taken from the

caissons and placed behind the breastworks. Wharton, now in command

of Breckenridge's division--its late commander having gone to

southwest Virginia--held the right of this line, with Gordon next

him; Pegram, commanding Ramseur's old division, joined Gordon.

Ramseur with Rodes's division, was on Pegram's left, while Lomax's

cavalry, now serving as foot-troops, extended the line to the Back

road. Fitzhugh Lee being wounded, his cavalry, under General

Wickham, was sent to Milford to prevent Fisher's Hill from being

turned through the Luray Valley.

In consequence of the enemy's being so well protected from a direct

assault, I resolved on the night of the 20th to use again a

turning-column against his left, as had been done on the 19th at the

Opequon. To this end I resolved to move Crook, unperceived if possible,

over to the eastern face of Little North Mountain, whence he could

strike the left and rear of the Confederate line, and as he broke it

up, I could support him by a left half-wheel of my whole line of

battle. The execution of this plan would require perfect secrecy,

however, for the enemy from his signal-station on Three Top could

plainly see every movement of our troops in daylight. Hence, to escape

such observation, I marched Crook during the night of the 20th into

some heavy timber north of Cedar Creek, where he lay concealed all day

the 21st. This same day Wright and Emory were moved up closer to the

Confederate works, and the Sixth Corps, after a severe fight, in which

Ricketts's and Getty were engaged, took up some high ground on the

right of the Manassas Gap railroad in plain view of the Confederate

works, and confronting a commanding point where much of Early's

artillery was massed. Soon after General Wright had established this

line I rode with him along it to the westward, and finding that the

enemy was still holding an elevated position further to our right, on

the north side of Tumbling Run, I directed this also to be occupied.

Wright soon carried the point, which gave us an unobstructed view of

the enemy's works and offered good ground for our artillery. It also

enabled me to move the whole of the Sixth Corps to the front till its

line was within about seven hundred yards of the enemy's works; the

Nineteenth Corps, on the morning of the 22d, covering the ground

vacated by the Sixth by moving to the front and extending to the right,

but still keeping its reserves on the railroad.

In the darkness of the night of the gist, Crook was brought across

Cedar Creek and hidden in a clump of timber behind Hupp's Hill till

daylight of the 22d, when, under cover of the intervening woods and

ravines, he was marched beyond the right of the Sixth Corps and again

concealed not far from the Back road. After Crook had got into this

last position, Ricketts's division was pushed out until it confronted

the left of the enemy's infantry, the rest of the Sixth Corps

extending from Ricketts's left to the Manassas Gap railroad, while

the Nineteenth Corps filled in the space between the left of the

Sixth and the North Fork of the Shenandoah.

When Ricketts moved out on this new line, in conjunction with

Averell's cavalry on his right, the enemy surmising, from information

secured from his signal-station, no doubt, that my attack was to be

made from Ricketts's front, prepared for it there, but no such

intention ever existed. Ricketts was pushed forward only that he

might readily join Crook's turning-column as it swung into the

enemy's rear. To ensure success, all that I needed now was enough

daylight to complete my arrangements, the secrecy of movement imposed

by the situation consuming many valuable hours.

While Ricketts was occupying the enemy's attention, Crook, again

moving unobserved into the dense timber on the eastern face of Little

North Mountain, conducted his command south in two parallel columns

until he gained the rear of the enemy's works, when, marching his

divisions by the left flank, he led them in an easterly direction

down the mountain-side. As he emerged from the timber near the base

of the mountain, the Confederates discovered him, of course, and

opened with their batteries, but it was too late--they having few

troops at hand to confront the turning-column. Loudly cheering,

Crook's men quickly crossed the broken stretch in rear of the enemy's

left, producing confusion and consternation at every step.

About a mile from the mountain's base Crook's left was joined by

Ricketts, who in proper time had begun to swing his division into the

action, and the two commands moved along in rear of the works so

rapidly that, with but slight resistance, the Confederates abandoned

the guns massed near the centre. The swinging movement of Ricketts

was taken up successively from right to left throughout my line, and

in a few minutes the enemy was thoroughly routed, the action, though

brief, being none the less decisive. Lomax's dismounted cavalry gave

way first, but was shortly followed by all the Confederate infantry

in an indescribable panic, precipitated doubtless by fears of being

caught and captured in the pocket formed by Tumbling Run and the

North Fork of the Shenandoah River. The stampede was complete, the

enemy leaving the field without semblance of organization, abandoning

nearly all his artillery and such other property as was in the works,

and the rout extending through the fields and over the roads toward

Woodstock, Wright and Emory in hot pursuit.

Midway between Fisher's Hill and Woodstock there is some high ground,

where at night-fall a small squad endeavored to stay us with two

pieces of artillery, but this attempt at resistance proved fruitless,

and, notwithstanding the darkness, the guns were soon captured. The

chase was then taken up by Devin's brigade as soon as it could be

passed to the front, and continued till after daylight the next

morning, but the delays incident to a night pursuit made it

impossible for Devin to do more than pick up stragglers.

Our success was very great, yet I had anticipated results still more

pregnant. Indeed, I had high hopes of capturing almost the whole of

Early's army before it reached New Market, and with this object in

view, during the manoeuvres of the 21st I had sent Torbert up the

Luray Valley with Wilson's division and two of Merritt's brigades, in

the expectation that he would drive Wickham out of the Luray Pass by

Early's right, and by crossing the Massanutten Mountain near New

Market, gain his rear. Torbert started in good season, and after

some slight skirmishing at Gooney Run, got as far as Milford, but

failed to dislodge Wickham. In fact, he made little or no attempt to

force Wickham from his position, and with only a feeble effort

withdrew. I heard nothing at all from Torbert during the 22d, and

supposing that everything was progressing favorably, I was astonished

and chagrined on the morning of the 23d, at Woodstock, to receive the

intelligence that he had fallen back to Front Royal and Buckton ford.

My disappointment was extreme, but there was now no help for the

situation save to renew and emphasize Torbert's orders, and this was

done at once, notwithstanding that I thought, the delay, had so much

diminished the chances of his getting in the rear of Early as to make

such a result a very remote possibility, unless, indeed, far greater

zeal was displayed than had been in the first attempt to penetrate

the Luray Valley.

The battle of Fisher's Hill was, in a measure, a part of the battle

of the Opequon; that is to say, it was an incident of the pursuit

resulting from that action. In many ways, however, it was much more

satisfactory, and particularly so because the plan arranged on the

evening of the 20th was carried out to the very letter by Generals

Wright, Crook, and Emory, not only in all their preliminary

manoeuvres, but also during the fight itself. The only drawback was

with the cavalry, and to this day I have been unable to account

satisfactorily for Torbert's failure. No doubt, Wickham's position

near Milford was a strong one, but Torbert ought to have made a

fight. Had he been defeated in this, his withdrawal then to await

the result at Fisher's Hill would have been justified, but it does

not appear that he made any serious effort of all to dislodge the

Confederate cavalry: his impotent attempt not only chagrined me very

much, but occasioned much unfavorable comment throughout the army.

We reached Woodstock early on the morning of the 23d, and halted

there some little time to let the troops recover their organization,

which had been broken in the night march they had just made. When

the commands had closed up we pushed on toward Edinburg, in the hope

of making more captures at Narrow Passage Creek; but the

Confederates, too fleet for us, got away; so General Wright halted

the infantry not far from Edinburg, till rations could be brought the

men. Meanwhile I, having remained at Woodstock, sent Dedin's brigade

to press the enemy under every favorable opportunity, and if possible

prevent him from halting long enough to reorganize. Notwithstanding

Devin's efforts the Confederates managed to assemble a considerable

force to resist him, and being too weak for the rearguard, he awaited

the arrival of Averell, who, I had informed him, would be hurried to

the front with all possible despatch, for I thought that Averell must

be close at hand. It turned out, however, that he was not near by at

all, and, moreover, that without good reason he had refrained from

taking any part whatever in pursuing the enemy in the flight from

Fisher's Hill; and in fact had gone into camp and left to the

infantry the work of pursuit.

It was nearly noon when Averell came up, and a great deal of precious

time had been lost. We had some hot words, but hoping that he would

retrieve the mistake of the night before, I directed him to proceed

to the front at once, and in conjunction with Devin close with the

enemy. He reached Devin's command about 3 o'clock in the afternoon,

just as this officer was pushing the Confederates so energetically

that they were abandoning Mount Jackson, yet Averell utterly failed

to accomplish anything. Indeed, his indifferent attack was not at

all worthy the excellent soldiers he commanded, and when I learned

that it was his intention to withdraw from the enemy's front, and

this, too, on the indefinite report of a signal-officer that a

"brigade or division" of Confederates was turning his right flank,

and that he had not seriously attempted to verify the information, I

sent him this order:

"HEADQUARTERS MIDDLE MILITARY DIVISION,

"Woodstock, Va., Sept. 23, 1864

"BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL AVERELL

"Your report and report of signal-officer received. I do not want

you to let the enemy bluff you or your command, and I want you to

distinctly understand this note. I do not advise rashness, but I do

desire resolution and actual fighting, with necessary casualties,

before you retire. There must now be no backing or filling by you

without a superior force of the enemy actually engaging you.

"P. H. SHERIDAN,

"Major-General Commanding."

Some little time after this note went to Averell, word was brought me

that he had already carried out the programme indicated when

forwarding the report of the expected turning of his right, and that

he had actually withdrawn and gone into camp near Hawkinsburg. I

then decided to relieve him from the command of his division, which I

did, ordering him to Wheeling, Colonel William H. Powell being

assigned to succeed him.

The removal of Averell was but the culmination of a series of events

extending back to the time I assumed command of the Middle Military

Division. At the outset, General Grant, fearing discord on account

of Averell's ranking Torbert, authorized me to relieve the former

officer, but I hoped that if any trouble of this sort arose, it could

be allayed, or at least repressed, during the campaign against Early,

since the different commands would often have to act separately.

After that, the dispersion of my army by the return of the Sixth

Corps and Torbert's cavalry to the Army of the Potomac would take

place, I thought, and this would restore matters to their normal

condition; but Averell's dissatisfaction began to show itself

immediately after his arrival at Martinsburg, on the 14th of August,

and, except when he was conducting some independent expedition, had

been manifested on all occasions since. I therefore thought that the

interest of the service would be subserved by removing one whose

growing indifference might render the best-laid plans inoperative.

"HEADQUARTERS MIDDLE MILITARY DIVISION.

"HARRISONBURG, VA., SEPT. 25, 1864 11:30 P. M.

"LIEUT-GENERAL GRANT, Comd'g, City Point, Va.

"I have relieved Averell from his command. Instead of following the

enemy when he was broken at Fisher's Hill (so there was not a cavalry

organization left), he went into camp and let me pursue the enemy for

a distance of fifteen miles, with infantry, during the night.

"P. H. SHERIDAN, Major-General."

The failure of Averell to press the enemy the evening of the 23d gave

Early time to collect his scattered forces and take up a position on

the east side of the North Fork of the Shenandoah, his left resting

on the west side of that stream at Rude's Hill, a commanding point

about two miles south of Mt. Jackson. Along this line he had

constructed some slight works during the night, and at daylight on

the 24th, I moved the Sixth and Nineteenth corps through Mt. Jackson

to attack him, sending Powell's division to pass around his left

flank, toward Timberville, and Devin's brigade across the North Fork,

to move along the base of Peaked Ridge and attack his right. The

country was entirely open, and none of these manoeuvres could be

executed without being observed, so as soon as my advance began, the

enemy rapidly retreated in line of battle up the valley through New

Market, closely followed by Wright and Emory, their artillery on the

pike and their columns on its right and left. Both sides moved with

celerity, the Confederates stimulated by the desire to escape, and

our men animated by the prospect of wholly destroying Early's army.

The stern-chase continued for about thirteen miles, our infantry

often coming within range, yet whenever we began to deploy, the

Confederates increased the distance between us by resorting to a

double quick, evading battle with admirable tact. While all this was

going on, the open country permitted us a rare and brilliant sight,

the bright sun gleaming from the arms and trappings of the thousands

of pursuers and pursued.

Near New Market, as a last effort to hold the enemy, I pushed Devin's

cavalry--comprising about five hundred men--with two guns right up on

Early's lines, in the hope that the tempting opportunity given him to

capture the guns would stay his retreat long enough to let my

infantry deploy within range, but he refused the bait, and after

momentarily checking Devin he continued on with little loss and in

pretty good order.

All hope of Torbert's appearing in rear of the Confederates vanished

as they passed beyond New Market. Some six miles south of this place

Early left the Valley Pike and took the road to Keezletown, a move

due in a measure to Powell's march by way of Timberville toward

Lacy's Springs, but mainly caused by the fact that the Keezletown

road ran immediately along the base of Peaked Mountain--a rugged

ridge affording protection to Early's right flank--and led in a

direction facilitating his junction with Kershaw, who had been

ordered back to him from Culpeper the day after the battle of the

Opequon. The chase was kept up on the Keezeltown road till darkness

overtook us, when my weary troops were permitted to go into camp; and

as soon as the enemy discovered by our fires that the pursuit had

stopped, he also bivouacked some five miles farther south toward Port

Republic.

The next morning Early was joined by Lomax's cavalry from

Harrisonburg, Wickham's and Payne's brigades of cavalry also uniting

with him from the Luray Valley. His whole army then fell back to the

mouth of Brown's Gap to await Kershaw's division and Cutshaw's

artillery, now on their return.

By the morning of the 25th the main body of the enemy had disappeared

entirely from my front, and the capture of some small, squads of

Confederates in the neighboring hills furnished us the only incidents

of the day. Among the prisoners was a tall and fine looking officer,

much worn with hunger and fatigue. The moment I saw him I recognized

him as a former comrade, George W. Carr, with whom I had served in

Washington Territory. He was in those days a lieutenant in the Ninth

Infantry, and was one of the officers who superintended the execution

of the nine Indians at the Cascades of the Columbia in 1856. Carr

was very much emaciated, and greatly discouraged by the turn events

had recently taken. For old acquaintance sake I gave him plenty to

eat, and kept him in comfort at my headquarters until the next batch

of prisoners was sent to the rear, when he went with them. He had

resigned from the regular army at the commencement of hostilities,

and, full of high anticipation, cast his lot with the Confederacy,

but when he fell into our hands, his bright dreams having been

dispelled by the harsh realities of war, he appeared to think that

for him there was no future.

Picking up prisoners here and there, my troops resumed their march

directly south on the Valley pike, and when the Sixth and Nineteenth

corps reached Harrisonburg, they went into camp, Powell in the

meanwhile pushing on to Mt. Crawford, and Crook taking up a position

in our rear at the junction of the Keezletown road and the Valley

pike. Late in the afternoon Torbert's cavalry came in from New

Market arriving at that place many hours later than it had been

expected.

The succeeding day I sent Merritt to Port Republic to occupy the

enemy's attention, while Torbert, with Wilson's division and the

regular brigade, was ordered to Staunton, whence he was to proceed to

Waynesboro' and blow up the railroad bridge. Having done this,

Torbert, as he returned, was to drive off whatever cattle he could

find, destroy all forage and breadstuffs, and burn the mills. He

took possession of Waynesboro' in due time, but had succeeded in only

partially demolishing the railroad bridge when, attacked by Pegram's

division of infantry and Wickham's cavalry, he was compelled to fall

back to Staunton. From the latter place he retired to Bridgewater,

and Spring Hill, on the way, however, fully executing his

instructions regarding the destruction of supplies.

While Torbert was on this expedition, Merritt had occupied Port

Republic, but he happened to get there the very day that Kershaw's

division was marching from Swift Run Gap to join Early. By accident

Kershaw ran into Merritt shortly after the latter had gained the

village. Kershaw's four infantry brigades attacked at once, and

Merrit, forced out of Port Republic, fell back toward Cross Keys; and

in anticipation that the Confederates could be coaxed to that point,

I ordered the infantry there, but Torbert's attack at Wavnesboro' had

alarmed Early, and in consequence he drew all his forces in toward

Rock-fish Gap. This enabled me to re-establish Merritt at Port

Republic, send the Sixth and Nineteenth corps to the neighborhood of

Mt. Crawford to await the return of Torbert, and to post Crook at

Harrisonburg; these dispositions practically obtained till the 6th of

October, I holding a line across the valley from Port Republic along

North River by Mt. Crawford to the Back road near the mouth of Briery

Branch Gap.

It was during this period, about dusk on the evening of October 3,

that between Harrisonburg and Dayton my engineer officer, Lieutenant

John R. Meigs, was murdered within my lines. He had gone out with

two topographical assistants to plot the country, and late in the

evening, while riding along the public road on his return to camp, he

overtook three men dressed in our uniform. From their dress, and

also because the party was immediately behind our lines and within a

mile and a half of my headquarters, Meigs and his assistants

naturally thought that they were joining friends, and wholly

unsuspicious of anything to the contrary, rode on with the three men

some little distance; but their perfidy was abruptly discovered by

their suddenly turning upon Meigs with a call for his surrender. It

has been claimed that, refusing to submit, he fired on the

treacherous party, but the statement is not true, for one of the

topographers escaped--the other was captured--and reported a few

minutes later at my headquarters that Meigs was killed without

resistance of any kind whatever, and without even the chance to give

himself up. This man was so cool, and related all the circumstances

of the occurrence with such exactness, as to prove the truthfulness

of his statement. The fact that the murder had been committed inside

our lines was evidence that the perpetrators of the crime, having

their homes in the vicinity, had been clandestinely visiting them,

and been secretly harbored by some of the neighboring residents.

Determining to teach a lesson to these abettors of the foul deed--a

lesson they would never forget--I ordered all the houses within an

area of five miles to be burned. General Custer, who had succeeded

to the command of the Third Cavalry division (General Wilson having

been detailed as chief of cavalry to Sherman's army), was charged

with this duty, and the next morning proceeded to put the order into

execution. The prescribed area included the little village of

Dayton, but when a few houses in the immediate neighborhood of the

scene of the murder had been burned, Custer was directed to cease his

desolating work, but to fetch away all the able-bodied males as

prisoners.

CHAPTER III.

REASONS FOR NOT PURSUING EARLY THROUGH THE BLUE RIDGE--GENERAL

TORBERT DETAILED TO GIVE GENERAL ROSSER A "DRUBBING"--GENERAL ROSSER

ROUTED--TELEGRAPHED TO MEET STANTON--LONGSTREET'S MESSAGE--RETURN TO

WINCHESTER--THE RIDE TO CEDAR CREEK--THE RETREATING ARMY--RALLYING

THE TROOPS--REFORMING THE LINE--COMMENCING THE ATTACK--DEFEAT OF THE

CONFEDERATES--APPOINTED A MAJOR-GENERAL IN THE REGULAR ARMY--RESULTS

OF THE BATTLE.

While we lay in camp at Harrisonburg it became necessary to decide

whether or not I would advance to Brown's Gap, and, after driving the

enemy from there, follow him through the Blue Ridge into eastern

Virginia. Indeed, this question began to cause me solicitude as soon

as I knew Early had escaped me at New Market, for I felt certain that

I should be urged to pursue the Confederates toward Charlottesville

and Gordonsville, and be expected to operate on that line against

Richmond. For many reasons I was much opposed to such a plan, but

mainly because its execution would involve the opening of the Orange

and Alexandria railroad. To protect this road against the raids of

the numerous guerrilla bands that infested the region through which

it passed, and to keep it in operation, would require a large force

of infantry, and would also greatly reduce my cavalry; besides, I

should be obliged to leave a force in the valley strong enough to

give security to the line of the upper Potomac and the Baltimore and

Ohio railroad, and this alone would probably take the whole of

Crook's command, leaving me a wholly inadequate number of fighting

men to prosecute a campaign against the city of Richmond. Then, too,

I was in doubt whether the besiegers could hold the entire army at

Petersburg; and in case they could not, a number of troops sufficient

to crush me might be detached by Lee, moved rapidly by rail, and,

after overwhelming me, be quickly returned to confront General Meade.

I was satisfied, moreover, that my transportation could not supply me

further than Harrisonburg, and if in penetrating the Blue Ridge I met

with protracted resistance, a lack of supplies might compel me to

abandon the attempt at a most inopportune time.

I therefore advised that the Valley campaign be terminated north of

Staunton, and I be permitted to return, carrying out on the way my

original instructions for desolating the Shenandoah country so as to

make it untenable for permanent occupation by the Confederates. I

proposed to detach the bulk of my army when this work of destruction

was completed, and send it by way of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad

through Washington to the Petersburg line, believing that I could

move it more rapidly by that route than by any other. I was

confident that if a movement of this character could be made with

celerity it would culminate in the capture of Richmond and possibly

of General Lee's army, and I was in hopes that General Grant would

take the same view of the matter; but just at this time he was so

pressed by the Government and by public-opinion at the North, that he

advocated the wholly different conception of driving Early into

eastern Virginia, and adhered to this plan with some tenacity.

Considerable correspondence regarding the subject took place between

us, throughout which I stoutly maintained that we should not risk, by

what I held to be a false move, all that my army had gained. I being

on the ground, General Grant left to me the final decision of the

question, and I solved the first step by determining to withdraw down

the valley at least as far as Strasburg, which movement was begun on

the 6th of October.

The cavalry as it retired was stretched across the country from the

Blue Ridge to the eastern slope of the Alleghanies, with orders to

drive off all stock and destroy all supplies as it moved northward.

The infantry preceded the cavalry, passing down the Valley pike, and

as we marched along the many columns of smoke from burning stacks,

and mills filled with grain, indicated that the adjacent country was

fast losing the features which hitherto had made it a great magazine

of stores for the Confederate armies.

During the 6th and 7th of October, the enemy's horse followed us up,

though at a respectful distance. This cavalry was now under command

of General T. W. Rosser, who on October 5 had joined Early with an

additional brigade from Richmond. As we proceeded the Confederates

gained confidence, probably on account of the reputation with which

its new commander had been heralded, and on the third day's march had

the temerity to annoy my rear guard considerably. Tired of these

annoyances, I concluded to open the enemy's eyes in earnest, so that

night I told Torbert I expected him either to give Rosser a drubbing

next morning or get whipped himself, and that the infantry would be

halted until the affair was over; I also informed him that I proposed

to ride out to Round Top Mountain to see the fight. When I decided

to have Rosser chastised, Merritt was encamped at the foot of Round

Top, an elevation just north of Tom's Brook, and Custer some six

miles farther north and west, near Tumbling Run. In the night Custer

was ordered to retrace his steps before daylight by the Back road,

which is parallel to and about three miles from the Valley pike, and

attack the enemy at Tom's Brook crossing, while Merritt's

instructions were to assail him on the Valley pike in concert with

Custer. About 7 in the morning, Custer's division encountered Rosser

himself with three brigades, and while the stirring sounds of the

resulting artillery duel were reverberating through the valley

Merritt moved briskly to the front and fell upon Generals Lomax and

Johnson on the Valley pike. Merritt, by extending his right, quickly

established connection with Custer, and the two divisions moved

forward together under Torbert's direction, with a determination to

inflict on the enemy the sharp and summary punishment his rashness

had invited.

The engagement soon became general across the valley, both sides

fighting mainly mounted. For about two hours the contending lines

struggled with each other along Tom's Brook, the charges and counter

charges at many points being plainly visible from the summit of Round

Top, where I had my headquarters for the time.

The open country permitting a sabre fight, both sides seemed bent on

using that arm. In the centre the Confederates maintained their

position with much stubbornness, and for a time seemed to have

recovered their former spirit, but at last they began to give way on

both flanks, and as these receded, Merritt and Custer went at the

wavering ranks in a charge along the whole front. The result was a

general smash-up of the entire Confederate line, the retreat quickly

degenerating into a rout the like of which was never before seen.

For twenty-six miles this wild stampede kept up, with our troopers

close at the enemy's heels; and the ludicrous incidents of the chase

never ceased to be amusing topics around the camp-fires of Merritt

and Custer. In the fight and pursuit Torbert took eleven pieces of

artillery, with their caissons, all the wagons and ambulances the

enemy had on the ground, and three hundred prisoners. Some of

Rosser's troopers fled to the mountains by way of Columbia Furnace,

and some up the Valley pike and into the Massamitten Range,

apparently not discovering that the chase had been discontinued till

south of Mount Jackson they rallied on Early's infantry.

After this catastrophe, Early reported to General Lee that his

cavalry was so badly demoralized that it should be dismounted; and

the citizens of the valley, intensely disgusted with the boasting and

swaggering that had characterized the arrival of the "Laurel Brigade"

in that section, baptized the action (known to us as Tom's Brook) the

"Woodstock Races," and never tired of poking fun at General Rosser

about his precipitate and inglorious flight. (When Rosser arrived

from Richmond with his brigade he was proclaimed as the savior of the

Valley, and his men came all bedecked with laurel branches.)

On the 10th my army, resuming its retrograde movement, crossed to the

north side of Cedar Creek. The work of repairing the Manassas Gap

branch of the Orange and Alexandria railroad had been begun some days

before, out from Washington, and, anticipating that it would be in

readiness to transport troops by the time they could reach Piedmont,

I directed the Sixth Corps to continue its march toward Front Royal,

expecting to return to the Army of the Potomac by that line. By the

12th, however, my views regarding the reconstruction of this railroad

began to prevail, and the work on it was discontinued. The Sixth

Corps, therefore, abandoned that route, and moved toward Ashby's Gap

with the purpose of marching direct to Washington, but on the 13th I

recalled it to Cedar Creek, in consequence of the arrival of the

enemy's infantry at Fisher's Hill, and the receipt, the night before,

of the following despatch, which again opened the question of an

advance on Gordonsville and Charlottesville:

(Cipher.)

"WASHINGTON, October 12, 1864, 12 M.

"MAJOR-GENERAL SHERIDAN:

"Lieutenant-General Grant wishes a position taken far enough south to

serve as a base for further operations upon Gordonsville and

Charlottesville. It must be strongly fortified and provisioned.

Some point in the vicinity of Manassas Gap would seem best suited for

all purposes. Colonel Alexander, of the Engineers, will be sent to

consult with you as soon as you connect with General Augur.

"H. W. HALLECK, Major-General."

As it was well known in Washington that the views expressed in the

above despatch were counter to my convictions, I was the next day

required by the following telegram from Secretary Stanton to repair

to that city:

"WASHINGTON, October 13, 1864.

"MAJOR-GENERAL SHERIDAN

(through General Augur)

"If you can come here, a consultation on several points is extremely

desirable. I propose to visit General Grant, and would like to see

you first.

"EDWIN M. STANTON,

"Secretary of War."

I got all ready to comply with the terms of Secretary Stanton's

despatch, but in the meantime the enemy appeared in my front in

force, with infantry and cavalry, and attacked Colonel Thoburn, who

had been pushed out toward Strasburg from Crook's command, and also

Custer's division of cavalry on the Back road. As afterward

appeared, this attack was made in the belief that all of my troops

but Crook's had gone to Petersburg. From this demonstration there

ensued near Hupp's Hill a bitter skirmish between Kershaw and

Thoburn, and the latter was finally compelled to withdraw to the

north bank of Cedar Creek. Custer gained better results, however, on

the Back road, with his usual dash driving the enemy's cavalry away

from his front, Merritt's division then joining him and remaining on

the right.

The day's events pointing to a probability that the enemy intended to

resume the offensive, to anticipate such a contingency I ordered the

Sixth Corps to return from its march toward Ashby's Gap. It reached

me by noon of the 14th, and went into position to the right and rear

of the Nineteenth Corps, which held a line along the north bank of

Cedar Creek, west of the Valley pike. Crook was posted on the left

of the Nineteenth Corps and east of the Valley pike, with Thoburn's

division advanced to a round hill, which commanded the junction of

Cedar Creek and the Shenandoah River, while Torbert retained both

Merritt and Custer on the right of the Sixth Corps, and at the

same time covered with Powell the roads toward Front Royal. My

head-quarters were at the Belle Grove House, which was to the west of

the pike and in rear of the Nineteenth Corps. It was my intention to

attack the enemy as soon as the Sixth Corps reached me, but General

Early having learned from his demonstration that I had not detached as

largely as his previous information had led him to believe, on the

night of the 13th withdrew to Fisher's Hill; so, concluding that he

could not do us serious hurt from there, I changed my mind as to

attacking, deciding to defer such action till I could get to

Washington, and come to some definite understanding about my future

operations.

To carry out this idea, on the evening of the 15th I ordered all of

the cavalry under General Torbert to accompany me to Front Royal,

again intending to push it thence through Chester Gap to the Virginia

Central railroad at Charlottesville, to destroy the bridge over the

Rivanna River, while I passed through Manassas Gap to Rectortown, and

thence by rail to Washington. On my arrival with the cavalry near

Front Royal on the 16th, I halted at the house of Mrs. Richards, on

the north bank of the river, and there received the following

despatch and inclosure from General Wright, who had been left in

command at Cedar Creek:

"HEADQUARTERS MIDDLE MILITARY Division,

"October 16, 1864.

"GENERAL:

"I enclose you despatch which explains itself. If the enemy should

be strongly reenforced in cavalry, he might, by turning our right,

give us a great deal of trouble. I shall hold on here until the

enemy's movements are developed, and shall only fear an attack on my

right, which I shall make every preparation for guarding against and

resisting.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"H. G. WRIGHT, Major-General Commanding.

"MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN,

"Commanding Middle Military Division."

[INCLOSURE.] "To LIEUTENANT-GENERAL EARLY:

"Be ready to move as soon as my forces join you, and we will crush

Sheridan.

"LONGSTREET, Lieutenant-General."

The message from Longstreet had been taken down as it was being

flagged from the Confederate signal-station on Three Top Mountain,

and afterward translated by our signal officers, who knew the

Confederate signal code. I first thought it a ruse, and hardly worth

attention, but on reflection deemed it best to be on the safe side,

so I abandoned the cavalry raid toward Charlottesville, in order to

give General Wright the entire strength of the army, for it did not

seem wise to reduce his numbers while reinforcement for the enemy

might be near, and especially when such pregnant messages were

reaching Early from one of the ablest of the Confederate generals.

Therefore I sent the following note to General Wright:

"HEADQUARTERS MIDDLE MILITARY DIVISION,

"Front Royal, October 16, 1864.

"GENERAL: The cavalry is all ordered back to you; make your position

strong. If Longstreet's despatch is true, he is under the impression

that we have largely detached. I will go over to Augur, and may get

additional news. Close in Colonel Powell, who will be at this point.

If the enemy should make an advance, I know you will defeat him.

Look well to your ground and be well prepared. Get up everything

that can be spared. I will bring up all I can, and will be up on

Tuesday, if not sooner.

"P. H. SHERIDAN, Major-General.

"MAJOR-GENERAL H. G. WRIGHT,

"Commanding Sixth Army Corps."

At 5 o'clock on the evening of the 16th I telegraphed General Halleck

from Rectortown, giving him the information which had come to me from

Wright, asking if anything corroborative of it had been received from

General Grant, and also saying that I would like to see Halleck; the

telegram ending with the question: "Is it best for me to go to see

you?" Next morning I sent back to Wright all the cavalry except one

regiment, which escorted me through Manassas Gap to the terminus of

the railroad from Washington. I had with me Lieutenant-Colonel James

W. Forsyth, chief-of-staff, and three of my aides, Major George A.

Forsyth, Captain Joseph O'Keefe, and Captain Michael V. Sheridan. I

rode my black horse, Rienzi, and the others their own respective

mounts.

Before leaving Cedar Creek I had fixed the route of my return to be

by rail from Washington to Martinsburg, and thence by horseback to

Winchester and Cedar Creek, and had ordered three hundred cavalry to

Martinsburg to escort me from that point to the front. At Rectortown

I met General Augur, who had brought a force out from Washington to

reconstruct and protect the line of railroad, and through him

received the following reply from General Halleck:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,

"WASHINGTON, D.C., October 16 1864

"To MAJOR-GENERAL SHERIDAN,

"Rectortown, Va.

General Grant says that Longstreet brought with him no troops from

Richmond, but I have very little confidence in the information

collected at his headquarters. If you can leave your command with

safety, come to Washington, as I wish to give you the views of the

authorities here.

"H. W. HALLECK, Major-General, Chief-of-Staff."

In consequence of the Longstreet despatch, I felt a concern about my

absence which I could hardly repress, but after duly considering what

Halleck said, and believing that Longstreet could not unite with

Early before I got back, and that even if he did Wright would be able

to cope with them both, I and my staff, with our horses, took the

cars for Washington, where we arrived on the morning of the 17th at

about 8 o'clock. I proceeded at an early hour to the War Department,

and as soon as I met Secretary Stanton, asked him for a special train

to be ready at 12 o'clock to take me to Martinsburg, saying that in

view of existing conditions I must get back to my army as quickly as

possible. He at once gave the order for the train, and then the

Secretary, Halleck, and I proceeded to hold a consultation in regard

to my operating east of the Blue Ridge. The upshot was that my views

against such a plan were practically agreed to, and two engineer

officers were designated to return with me for the purpose of

reporting on a defensive line in the valley that could be held while

the bulk of my troops were being detached to Petersburg. Colonel

Alexander and Colonel Thom both of the Engineer Corps, reported to

accompany me, and at 12 o'clock we took the train.

We arrived about dark at Martinsburg, and there found the escort of

three hundred men which I had ordered before leaving Cedar Creek. We

spent that night at Martinsburg, and early next morning mounted and

started up the Valley pike for Winchester, leaving Captain Sheridan

behind to conduct to the army the Commissioners whom the State of New

York had sent down to receive the vote of her troops in the coming

Presidential election. Colonel Alexander was a man of enormous

weight, and Colonel Thom correspondingly light, and as both were

unaccustomed to riding we had to go slowly, losing so much time, in

fact, that we did not reach Winchester till between 3 and 4 o'clock

in the afternoon, though the distance is but twenty-eight miles. As

soon as we arrived at Colonel Edwards's headquarters in the town,

where I intended stopping for the night, I sent a courier to the

front to bring me a report of the condition of affairs, and then took

Colonel Alexander out on the heights about Winchester, in order that

he might overlook the country, and make up his mind as to the utility

of fortifying there. By the time we had completed our survey it was

dark, and just as we reached Colonel Edwards's house on our return a

courier came in from Cedar Creek bringing word that everything was

all right, that the enemy was quiet at Fisher's Hill, and that a

brigade of Grover's division was to make a reconnoissance in the

morning, the 19th, so about 10 o'clock I went to bed greatly

relieved, and expecting to rejoin my headquarters at my leisure next

day.

Toward 6 o'clock the morning of the 19th, the officer on picket duty

at Winchester came to my room, I being yet in bed, and reported

artillery firing from the direction of Cedar Creek. I asked him if

the firing was continuous or only desultory, to which he replied that

it was not a sustained fire, but rather irregular and fitful. I

remarked: "It's all right; Grover has gone out this morning to make a

reconnoissance, and he is merely feeling the enemy." I tried to go to

sleep again, but grew so restless that I could not, and soon got up

and dressed myself. A little later the picket officer came back and

reported that the firing, which could be distinctly heard from his

line on the heights outside of Winchester, was still going on. I

asked him if it sounded like a battle, and as he again said that it

did not, I still inferred that the cannonading was caused by Grover's

division banging away at the enemy simply to find out what he was up

to. However, I went down-stairs and requested that breakfast be

hurried up, and at the same time ordered the horses to be saddled and

in readiness, for I concluded to go to the front before any further

examinations were made in regard to the defensive line.

We mounted our horses between half-past 8 and 9, and as we were

proceeding up the street which leads directly through Winchester,

from the Logan residence, where Edwards was quartered, to the Valley

pike, I noticed that there were many women at the windows and doors

of the houses, who kept shaking their skirts at us and who were

otherwise markedly insolent in their demeanor, but supposing this

conduct to be instigated by their well-known and perhaps natural

prejudices, I ascribed to it no unusual significance. On reaching

the edge of the town I halted a moment, and there heard quite

distinctly the sound of artillery firing in an unceasing roar.

Concluding from this that a battle was in progress, I now felt

confident that the women along the street had received intelligence

from the battle, field by the "grape-vine telegraph," and were in

raptures over some good news, while I as yet was utterly ignorant of

the actual situation. Moving on, I put my head down toward the

pommel of my saddle and listened intently, trying to locate and

interpret the sound, continuing in this position till we had crossed

Mill Creek, about half a mile from Winchester. The result of my

efforts in the interval was the conviction that the travel of the

sound was increasing too rapidly to be accounted for by my own rate

of motion, and that therefore my army must be falling back.

At Mill Creek my escort fell in behind, and we were going ahead at a

regular pace, when, just as we made the crest of the rise beyond the

stream, there burst upon our view the appalling spectacle of a

panic-stricken army-hundreds of slightly wounded men, throngs of others

unhurt but utterly demoralized, and baggage-wagons by the score, all

pressing to the rear in hopeless confusion, telling only too plainly

that a disaster had occurred at the front. On accosting some of the

fugitives, they assured me that the army was broken up, in full

retreat, and that all was lost; all this with a manner true to that

peculiar indifference that takes possession of panic-stricken men. I

was greatly disturbed by the sight, but at once sent word to Colonel

Edwards commanding the brigade in Winchester, to stretch his troops

across the valley, near Mill Creek, and stop all fugitives, directing

also that the transportation be, passed through and parked on the north

side of the town.

As I continued at a walk a few hundred yards farther, thinking all

the time of Longstreet's telegram to Early, "Be ready when I join

you, and we will crush Sheridan," I was fixing in my mind what I

should do. My first thought was too stop the army in the suburbs of

Winchester as it came back, form a new line, and fight there; but as

the situation was more maturely considered a better conception

prevailed. I was sure the troops had confidence in me, for

heretofore we had been successful; and as at other times they had

seen me present at the slightest sign of trouble or distress, I felt

that I ought to try now to restore their broken ranks, or, failing in

that, to share their fate because of what they had done hitherto.

About this time Colonel Wood, my chief commissary, arrived from the

front and gave me fuller intelligence, reporting that everything was

gone, my headquarters captured, and the troops dispersed. When I

heard this I took two of my aides-de-camp, Major. George A. Forsyth

and Captain Joseph O'Keefe, and with twenty men from the escort

started for the front, at the same time directing Colonel James W.

Forsyth and Colonels Alexander and Thom to remain behind and do what

they could to stop the runaways.

For a short distance I traveled on the road, but soon found it so

blocked with wagons and wounded men that my progress was impeded, and

I was forced to take to the adjoining fields to make haste. When

most of the wagons and wounded were past I returned to the road,

which was thickly lined with unhurt men, who, having got far enough

to the rear to be out of danger, had halted, without any

organization, and begun cooking coffee, but when they saw me they

abandoned their coffee, threw up their hats, shouldered their

muskets, and as I passed along turned to follow with enthusiasm and

cheers. To acknowledge this exhibition of feeling I took off my hat,

and with Forsyth and O'Keefe rode some distance in advance of my

escort, while every mounted officer who saw me galloped out on either

side of the pike to tell the men at a distance that I had come back.

In this way the news was spread to the stragglers off the road, when

they, too, turned their faces to the front and marched toward the

enemy, changing in a moment from the depths of depression, to the

extreme of enthusiasm. I already knew that even in the ordinary

condition of mind enthusiasm is a potent element with soldiers, but

what I saw that day convinced me that if it can be excited from a

state of despondency its power is almost irresistible. I said

nothing except to remark as I rode among those on the road: "If I had

been, with you this morning this disaster would not have happened.

We must face the other way; we will go back and recover our camp."

My first halt was made just north of Newtown, where I met a chaplain

digging his heels into the sides of his jaded horse, and making for

the rear with all possible speed. I drew up for an instant, and

inquired of him how matters were going at the front. He replied,

"Everything is lost; but all will be right when you get there"; yet

notwithstanding this expression of confidence in me, the parson at

once resumed his breathless pace to the rear. At Newtown I was

obliged to make a circuit to the left, to get round the village. I

could not pass through it, the streets were so crowded, but meeting

on this detour Major McKinley, of Crook's staff, he spread the news

of my return through the motley throng there.

When nearing the Valley pike, just south of Newtown I saw about

three-fourths of a mile west of the pike a body of troops, which

proved to be Ricketts's and Wheaton's divisions of the Sixth Corps,

and then learned that the Nineteenth Corps had halted a little to the

right and rear of these; but I did not stop, desiring to get to the

extreme front. Continuing on parallel with the pike, about midway

between Newtown and Middletown I crossed to the west of it, and a

little later came up in rear of Getty's division of the Sixth Corps.

When I arrived, this division and the cavalry were the only troops in

the presence of and resisting the enemy; they were apparently acting

as a rear-guard at a point about three miles north of the line we

held at Cedar Creek when the battle began. General Torbert was the

first officer to meet me, saying as he rode up, "My God! I am glad

you've come." Getty's division, when I found it, was about a mile

north of Middletown, posted on the reverse slope of some slightly

rising ground, holding a barricade made with fence-rails, and

skirmishing slightly with the enemy's pickets. Jumping my horse over

the line of rails, I rode to the crest of the elevation, and there

taking off my hat, the men rose up from behind their barricade with

cheers of recognition. An officer of the Vermont brigade, Colonel A.

S. Tracy, rode out to the front, and joining me, informed me that

General Louis A. Grant was in command there, the regular division

commander, General Getty, having taken charge of the Sixth Corps in

place of Ricketts, wounded early in the action, while temporarily

commanding the corps. I then turned back to the rear of Getty's

division, and as I came behind it, a line of regimental flags rose up

out of the ground, as it seemed, to welcome me. They were mostly the

colors of Crook's troops, who had been stampeded and scattered in the

surprise of the morning. The color-bearers, having withstood the

panic, had formed behind the troops of Getty. The line with the

colors was largely composed of officers, among whom I recognized

Colonel R. B. Hayes, since president of the United States, one of the

brigade commanders. At the close of this incident I crossed the

little narrow valley, or depression, in rear of Getty's line, and

dismounting on the opposite crest, established that point as my

headquarters. In a few minutes some of my staff joined me, and the

first directions I gave were to have the Nineteenth Corps and the two

divisions of Wright's corps brought to the front, so they could be

formed on Getty's division, prolonged to the right; for I had already

decided to attack the enemy from that line as soon as I could get

matters in shape to take the offensive. Crook met me at this time,

and strongly favored my idea of attacking, but said, however, that

most of his troops were gone. General Wright came up a little later,

when I saw that he was wounded, a ball having grazed the point of his

chin so as to draw the blood plentifully.

Wright gave me a hurried account of the day's events, and when told

that we would fight the enemy on the line which Getty and the cavalry

were holding, and that he must go himself and send all his staff to

bring up the troops, he zealously fell in with the scheme; and it was

then that the Nineteenth Corps and two divisions of the Sixth were

ordered to the front from where they had been halted to the right and

rear of Getty.

After this conversation I rode to the east of the Valley pike and to

the left of Getty's division, to a point from which I could obtain a

good view of the front, in the mean time sending Major Forsyth to

communicate with Colonel Lowell (who occupied a position close in

toward the suburbs of Middletown and directly in front of Getty's

left) to learn whether he could hold on there. Lowell replied that

he could. I then ordered Custer's division back to the right flank,

and returning to the place where my headquarters had been established

I met near them Ricketts's division under General Keifer and General

Frank Wheaton's division, both marching to the front. When the men

of these divisions saw me they began cheering and took up the double

quick to the front, while I turned back toward Getty's line to point

out where these returning troops should be placed. Having done this,

I ordered General Wright to resume command of the Sixth Corps, and

Getty, who was temporarily in charge of it, to take command of his

own division. A little later the Nineteenth Corps came up and was

posted between the right of the Sixth Corps and Middle Marsh Brook.

All this had consumed a great deal of time, and I concluded to visit

again the point to the east of the Valley pike, from where I had

first observed the enemy, to see what he was doing. Arrived there, I

could plainly see him getting ready for attack, and Major Forsyth now

suggested that it would be well to ride along the line of battle

before the enemy assailed us, for although the troops had learned of

my return, but few of them had seen me. Following his suggestion I

started in behind the men, but when a few paces had been taken I

crossed to the front and, hat in hand, passed along the entire length

of the infantry line; and it is from this circumstance that many of

the officers and men who then received me with such heartiness have

since supposed that that was my first appearance on the field. But

at least two hours had elapsed since I reached the ground, for it was

after mid-day, when this incident of riding down the front took

place, and I arrived not later, certainly, than half-past 10 o'clock.

After re-arranging the line and preparing to attack I returned again

to observe the Confederates, who shortly began to advance on us. The

attacking columns did not cover my entire front, and it appeared that

their onset would be mainly directed against the Nineteenth Corps,

so, fearing that they might be too strong for Emory on account of his

depleted condition (many of his men not having had time to get up

from the rear), and Getty's division being free from assault I

transferred a part of it from the extreme left to the support of the

Nineteenth Corps. The assault was quickly repulsed by Emory,

however, and as the enemy fell back Getty's troops were returned to

their original place. This repulse of the Confederates made me feel

pretty safe from further offensive operations on their part, and I

now decided to suspend the fighting till my thin ranks were further

strengthened by the men who were continually coming up from the rear,

and particularly till Crook's troops could be assembled on the

extreme left.

In consequence of the despatch already mentioned, "Be ready when I

join you, and we will crush Sheridan," since learned to have been

fictitious, I had been supposing all day that Longstreet's troops

were present, but as no definite intelligence on this point had been

gathered, I concluded, in the lull that now occurred, to ascertain

something positive regarding Longstreet; and Merritt having been

transferred to our left in the morning, I directed him to attack an

exposed battery then at the edge of Middletown, and capture some

prisoners. Merritt soon did this work effectually, concealing his

intention till his troops got close in to the enemy, and then by a

quick dash gobbling up a number of Confederates. When the prisoners

were brought in, I learned from them that the only troops of

Longstreet's in the fight were of Kershaw's division, which had

rejoined Early at Brown's Gap in the latter part of September, and

that the rest of Longstreet's corps was not on the field. The

receipt of this information entirely cleared the way for me to take

the offensive, but on the heels of it came information that

Longstreet was marching by the Front Royal pike to strike my rear at

Winchester, driving Powell's cavalry in as he advanced. This renewed

my uneasiness, and caused me to delay the general attack till after

assurances came from Powell denying utterly the reports as to

Longstreet, and confirming the statements of the prisoners.

Between half-past and 4 o'clock, I was ready to assail, and decided

to do so by advancing my infantry line in a swinging movement, so as

to gain the Valley pike with my right between Middletown and the

Belle Grove House; and when the order was passed along, the men

pushed steadily forward with enthusiasm and confidence. General

Early's troops extended some little distance beyond our right, and

when my flank neared the overlapping enemy, he turned on it, with the

effect of causing a momentary confusion, but General McMillan quickly

realizing the danger, broke the Confederates at the reentering angle

by a counter charge with his brigade, doing his work so well that the

enemy's flanking troops were cut off from their main body and left to

shift for themselves. Custer, who was just then moving in from the

west side of Middle Marsh Brook, followed McMillan's timely blow with

a charge of cavalry, but before starting out on it, and while his men

were forming, riding at full speed himself, to throw his arms around

my neck. By the time he had disengaged himself from this embrace,

the troops broken by McMillan had gained some little distance to

their rear, but Custer's troopers sweeping across the Middletown

meadows and down toward Cedar Creek, took many of them prisoners

before they could reach the stream--so I forgave his delay.

My whole line as far as the eye could see was now driving everything

before it, from behind trees, stone walls, and all such sheltering

obstacles, so I rode toward the left to ascertain how matters were

getting on there. As I passed along behind the advancing troops,

first General Grover, and then Colonel Mackenzie, rode up to welcome

me. Both were severely wounded, and I told them to leave the field,

but they implored permission to remain till success was certain.

When I reached the Valley pike Crook had reorganized his men, and as

I desired that they should take part in the fight, for they were the

very same troops that had turned Early's flank at Winchester and at

Fisher's Hill, I ordered them to be pushed forward; and the alacrity

and celerity with which they moved on Middletown demonstrated that

their ill-fortune of the morning had not sprung from lack of valor.

Meanwhile Lowell's brigade of cavalry, which, it will be remembered,

had been holding on, dismounted, just north of Middletown ever since

the time I arrived from Winchester, fell to the rear for the purpose

of getting their led horses. A momentary panic was created in the

nearest brigade of infantry by this withdrawal of Lowell, but as soon

as his men were mounted they charged the enemy clear up to the stone

walls in the edge of Middletown; at sight of this the infantry

brigade renewed its attack, and the enemy's right gave way. The

accomplished Lowell received his death-wound in this courageous

charge.

All our troops were now moving on the retreating Confederates, and as

I rode to the front Colonel Gibbs, who succeeded Lowell, made ready

for another mounted charge, but I checked him from pressing the

enemy's right, in the hope that the swinging attack from my right

would throw most of the Confederates to the east of the Valley pike,

and hence off their line of retreat through Strasburg to Fisher's

Hill. The eagerness of the men soon frustrated this anticipation,

however, the left insisting on keeping pace with the centre and

right, and all pushing ahead till we regained our old camps at Cedar

Creek. Beyond Cedar Creek, at Strasburg, the pike makes a sharp turn

to the west toward Fisher's Hill, and here Merritt uniting with

Custer, they together fell on the flank of the retreating columns,

taking many prisoners, wagons, and guns, among the prisoners being

Major-General Ramseur, who, mortally wounded, died the next day.

When the news of the victory was received, General Grant directed a

salute of one hundred shotted guns to be fired into Petersburg, and

the President at once thanked the army in an autograph letter. A few

weeks after, he promoted me, and I received notice of this in a

special letter from the Secretary of War, saying:

"--that for the personal gallantry, military skill, and just confidence

in the courage and patriotism of your troops, displayed by you on the

19th day of October at Cedar Run, whereby, under the blessing of

Providence, your routed army was reorganized, a great National

disaster averted, and a brilliant victory achieved over the rebels

for the third time in pitched battle within thirty days, Philip H.

Sheridan is appointed a major-general in the United States Army."

The direct result of the battle was the recapture of all the

artillery, transportation, and camp equipage we had lost, and in

addition twenty-four pieces of the enemy's artillery, twelve hundred

prisoners, and a number of battle-flags. But more still flowed from

this victory, succeeding as it did the disaster of the morning, for

the reoccupation of our old camps at once re-established a morale

which for some hours had been greatly endangered by ill-fortune.

It was not till after the battle that I learned fully what had taken

place before my arrival, and then found that the enemy, having

gathered all the strength he could through the return of

convalescents and other absentees, had moved quietly from Fisher's

Hill, in the night of the 18th and early on the morning of the 19th,

to surprise my army, which, it should be remembered, was posted on

the north bank of Cedar Creek, Crook holding on the left of the

Valley pike, with Thoburn's division advanced toward the creek on

Duval's (under Colonel Rutherford B. Hayes) and Kitching's

provisional divisions to the north and rear of Thoburn. The

Nineteenth Corps was on the right of Crook, extending in a

semi-circular line from the pike nearly to Meadow Brook, while the

Sixth Corps lay to the west of the brook in readiness to be used as a

movable column. Merritt's division was to the right and rear of the

Sixth Corps, and about a mile and a half west of Merrit was Custer

covering the fords of Cedar Creek as far west as the Middle road.

General Early's plan was for one column under General Gordon,

consisting of three divisions of infantry (Gordon's, Ramseur's, and

Pegram's), and Payne's brigade of cavalry to cross the Shenandoah

River directly east of the Confederate works at Fisher's Hill, march

around the northerly face of the Massanutten Mountain, and again

cross the Shenandoah at Bowman's and McInturff's fords. Payne's task

was to capture me at the Belle Grove House. General Early himself,

with Kershaw's and Wharton's divisions, was to move through

Strasburg, Kershaw, accompanied by Early, to cross Cedar Creek at

Roberts's ford and connect with Gordon, while Wharton was to continue

on the Valley pike to Hupp's Hill and join the left of Kershaw, when

the crossing of the Valley pike over Cedar Creek became free.

Lomax's cavalry, then in the Luray Valley, was ordered to join the

right of Gordon on the field of battle, while Rosser was to carry the

crossing of Cedar Creek on the Back road and attack Custer. Early's

conceptions were carried through in the darkness with little accident

or delay, Kershaw opening the fight by a furious attack on Thoburn's

division, while at dawn and in a dense fog Gordon struck Crook's

extreme left, surprising his pickets, and bursting into his camp with

such suddenness as to stampede Crook's men. Gordon directing his

march on my headquarters (the Belle Grove House), successfully turned

our position as he gained the Valley pike, and General Wright was

thus forced to order the withdrawal of the Nineteenth Corps from its

post at the Cedar Creek crossing, and this enabled Wharton to get

over the stream there unmolested and join Kershaw early in the

action.

After Crook's troops had been driven from their camps, General Wright

endeavored to form a line with the Sixth Corps to hold the Valley

pike to the left of the Nineteenth, but failing in this he ordered

the withdrawal of the latter corps, Ricketts, temporarily commanding

the Sixth Corps, checking Gordon till Emory had retired. As already

stated, Wharton was thus permitted to cross Cedar Creek on the pike,

and now that Early had a continuous line, he pressed his advantage so

vigorously that the whole Union army was soon driven from its camps

in more or less disorder; and though much disjointed resistance was

displayed, it may be said that no systematic stand was made until

Getty's division, aided by Torbert's cavalry, which Wright had

ordered to the left early in the action, took up the ground where, on

arriving from Winchester, I found them.

When I left my command on the 16th, little did I anticipate that

anything like this would happen. Indeed, I felt satisfied that Early

was, of himself, too weak to take the offensive, and although I

doubted the Longstreet despatch, yet I was confident that, even

should it prove true, I could get back before the junction could be

made, and at the worst I felt certain that my army was equal to

confronting the forces of Longstreet and Early combined. Still, the

surprise of the morning might have befallen me as well as the general

on whom it did descend, and though it is possible that this could

have been precluded had Powell's cavalry been closed in, as suggested

in my despatch from Front Royal, yet the enemy's desperation might

have prompted some other clever and ingenious scheme for relieving

his fallen fortunes in the Shenandoah Valley.