THE WAR FOR VENICE
1864-1866
The Prussian Alliance--Custoza--Lissa--The Volunteers--Acquisition of
Venetia.
The change of capital was carried out in 1865, and the lull which
followed gave an appearance of correctness to the surmise that if the
September Convention had not solved the Roman question, it had,
anyhow, reduced it to a state of quiescence. But there were other
reasons why Rome was kept, for the moment, not indeed out of mind, but
out of sight. The opinion grew that the emancipation of Venice, too
long delayed, ought to take precedence of every other political
object. On this point there was no disagreement among the 22,000,000
free Italians, who felt the servitude of Venice to be an hourly
disgrace and reproach; no one even ventured to preach patience. A
curious chapter might be written on the schemes woven between the
Peace of Villafranca and the year 1866, for the realisation of the
unfulfilled promise of freedom from Alps to sea. Foremost among the
schemers was Victor Emmanuel, and if some persons may be shocked by
the idea of a royal conspirator, more will admire the patriotism which
made the King hold out his hand to Mazzini, whose sentiments about
monarchy, and especially about the Savoy dynasty, were a secret to no
one, least of all to him. But as Mazzini placed those sentiments on
second rank to the grand end of Italian unity, so the King, to serve
the same end, showed himself superior to prejudices which in most men
would have proved insuperable. The fact that Victor Emmanuel opened
negotiations with Mazzini, and maintained them, off and on, for years,
proves amongst other things, that he knew the exiled patriot better
than the world yet knew him. He may have understood that by turning
republican sympathies into the groove of unity (not their necessary or
even their most natural groove), Mazzini made an Italian kingdom
possible. There is reason to think that the King's ministers were
kept entirely ignorant of his correspondence with the Agitator. The
letters were impersonal drafts carried to and fro by means of trusted
emissaries; each party freely expounded his views, and stated the
terms on which his support could be given. Victor Emmanuel's favourite
idea was a revolution in Galicia. When Garibaldi returned from England
he was nearly commissioned to start for Constantinople, whence he was
to lead an expedition through Roumania into Galicia. It seems to have
been due to Garibaldi's own good sense that so extremely unpromising a
project was abandoned. General Klapka was another of Victor Emmanuel's
secret revolutionary correspondents. The very wildness of the plans
that floated in the air betokened the feverish anxiety to do something
which had taken hold of all minds.
In 1865 a scheme of a different sort, and of momentous consequences,
grew into shape. It was a scheme of which Cavour first guessed the
possibility, as well as the far-reaching results. In August 1865 Count
Bismarck asked General La Marmora whether Italy would join Prussia in
the contingency of a war with Austria? Only a year before he was still
thinking of carrying out his policy with the aid of Austria, and he
had offered to help her to wrench Lombardy from Italy (and from France
if she intervened), in payment for her consent to his designs. But
now, though the Austrians did not even remotely suspect it, his
thoughts were resolutely turned to the Italian alliance. Without this
alliance Italy might, indeed, have acquired Venice, but would the
German Empire have been founded?
For a time the proposal was suspended, owing to the temporary
understanding concluded between Prussia and Austria at Gastein; and
in the interim, General La Marmora urged the Viennese Government to
cede Venetia in return for a compensation of five hundred million
francs. But those whom the gods would destroy they make mad. Austria
preserved her infatuated sense of security almost till the rude
awakening caused by the rifle-shots that ushered in the campaign of
Sadowa.
One thing which contributed to keeping Europe in the dark as to the
impending cataclysm was the character and known tendencies of King
William I. of Prussia, whose conservative, not to say retrograde
sentiments made it difficult to picture him at the head of what was
really a great revolutionary movement, in spite of the militarism that
surrounded it. With consummate art, Count Bismarck little by little
concentrated all his master's ideas about royal divinity in general
into one overwhelming belief in his own divine right to be German
Emperor, and so transformed an obstacle into the corner-stone of the
edifice he wished to build. But this could hardly be foreseen. At the
New Year's Day reception of 1866, Napoleon announced an era of
universal peace; henceforth all nations were to arrange their
differences amicably, as had been done at Gastein If the illusion was
complete, it was destined to be of short duration.
In the spring the Prussian proposal to Italy was formally renewed, and
this time it was accepted. The secret treaty of an offensive and
defensive alliance for three months was signed on the 8th of April.
Less than three weeks later, Austria, which was slowly beginning to
feel some uneasiness, proposed to Napoleon the cession of Venetia,
while exacting from Italy only a simple promise of neutrality in case
of war. General La Marmora held the honour of the country and his own
to compel fidelity to the prior arrangement with Prussia, and he
refused the tempting offer. His choice has been variously
characterised as one of common honesty and of uncommon magnanimity; at
all events, it was of incalculable advantage to Prussia, which already
gave signs of not being a particularly delicate-minded ally. When La
Marmora asked Bismarck whether, in case Austria took the initiative of
attacking Italy, Prussia would intervene, the answer was 'No.'
The three countries now pushed on their war preparations: Austria with
less ardour than the others, as she still failed to more than faintly
realise her danger. The Italian army, which the opening of the year
found in a deplorably unserviceable condition, was rapidly placed on a
war-footing, and, considering the shortness of the time allowed for
the work, and the secrecy with which, at the outset, it had to be
conducted, it is generally agreed that La Marmora produced surprising
results. As was natural in an army which, except for the old
Piedmontese nucleus, might almost be called improvised, the weakest
points were the cavalry and the artillery. The infantry was good; not
only the picked corps of Bersaglieri, but also the line regiments were
equal to any troops likely to be opposed to them. No one can see the
fine appearance of a line regiment marching down the streets of an
Italian town without receiving the impression that, however much the
other branches of the service may have improved since the Sixties, the
fondest hopes of Italy in case of war still lie in that common soldier
who best supported the rigours of the Russian snows.
Unfortunately, the attention paid to the army was not extended to the
fleet, which continued totally unready; nor was the organisation of
the volunteers carried out in an efficient manner. The excuse
afterwards advanced was that not more than 15,000 enrolments were
expected, while the actual figure reached 35,000. Besides being from
its very bulk less manageable than the 'few and good' of 1859, this
mass of men was ill-provided with officers who could inspire and keep
discipline. Garibaldi's own generals, Bixio, Medici, Cosenz and
Sirtori, were now all in the regular army, and therefore not free to
join him. He begged for the loan of a few regular officers, indicating
amongst other names that of Colonel Pallavicini, who commanded against
him at Aspromonte: a trait characteristic of the man. But this
assistance, though promised, was not granted, and the same was the
case with the guns which were vainly asked for. Without charging La
Marmora with a deliberate intention of neglecting the volunteers, it
must be owned that under the influence of the prejudice which holds
irregular troops in small esteem, he did not do for them what ought to
have been done if their services were accepted at all.
The Austrian Southern Army, excellent in discipline and equipment
though weak in numbers, was commanded up to the outbreak of the war by
Field-Marshal Benedek, but he was called to Vienna to take command of
the unfortunate army of operation against Prussia, and was succeeded
in Italy by the Archduke Albrecht, with General Von John, an officer
of the first capacity, as chief of the staff.
The numerical strength of the forces which could be put in the field
has been stated with startling divergence by different military
writers on the war, but every calculation gives the Italian side
(exclusive of the volunteers) a superiority of not less than two to
one. The Austrian mobilised army has been reckoned at as low a figure
as 63,000, certainly an understatement, as it appears that the
Archduke mustered not less than 70,000 at the battle of Custoza. That
he mustered on that day every man he could produce is probably a fact.
Had the Italian generals followed the same rule, however enormous
their other errors might have been, they would have won. Of all
conceivable faults in a military commander that which is the least
pardonable is the neglect to crush his antagonist by force of superior
numbers when he has them at his disposal. How many great military
reputations have been built up, and justly built up, on the care never
to meet an enemy without the odds being largely in your favour!
For obvious political reasons the King of Italy assumed the supreme
command of the army, with General La Marmora as chief of the staff.
Cialdini had been offered the latter post, but he declined it,
objecting, it is said, to the arrangement by which the real head of
the army has no guarantee against the possible interference of its
nominal head. When La Marmora went to the front, Baron Ricasoli took
his place as Prime Minister; Visconti-Venosta became Minister of
Foreign Affairs; and the Ministry of the Marine was offered to
Quintino Sella, who refused it on the ground that he knew nothing of
naval matters. It was then offered to and accepted by a man who knew
still less, because he did not even know his own ignorance, Agostino
Depretis, a Piedmontese advocate.
Before the commencement of hostilities a secret treaty was concluded
between Napoleon III. and the Austrian Government, according to which
Venetia was to be ceded to the Emperor for Italy, even if Austrian
arms were victorious both on the Mincio and on the Maine. Napoleon's
real purpose in this singular transaction is not perfectly clear; but
he was probably acting under a semi-romantic desire to have the
appearance of completing his programme of freeing Italy from the Alps
to the Adriatic which had been interrupted at Villafranca. In spite of
his enmity towards Italian unity, there is no reason to doubt that he
was in very few things as sincere as in the wish to see the Austrians
out of Italy. His reckonings at this time were all founded on the
assumption that Prussia would be defeated; he even seems to have had
some hopes of getting the Rhine bank in return for his good offices on
behalf of that Power with triumphant Austria. Be this as it may, he
inspired the Italian Government (or rather La Marmora, for there were
then two Italian Governments, and the real one was on the Mincio) with
his own expectation of Prussian disasters, and it is possible that
this expectation had a material and unfavourable influence on the
manner of conducting the war in Italy.
Through the Prussian Minister at Florence, General La Marmora received
the draft of a plan of campaign which is known to have been prepared
by Count Moltke; in it the great feature was a descent on the
Dalmatian coast. From an independent quarter he received another plan
in which a descent on the east coast of the Adriatic was contemplated,
the main difference being that Istria, instead of Dalmatia, was
proposed for the landing-point. This second plan was modestly
submitted to him by Garibaldi, who was thus in substantial accord with
the Prussian strategist. The prospect which either of these plans
opened was one of great fascination. What Italian can look across the
sea to where the sun rises and forget that along that horizon lies a
land colonised by Rome and guarded for four hundred years by Venice?
Istria was marked out by Dante as the frontier province of Italy:
Si come a Pola presso del Quarnero
Che Italia chiude e i suoi termini bagna.
It forms, with the Trentino, what is called _Italia Irredenta_.
Although the feeling of Italians for unredeemed Italy is not what
their feeling was for Lombardy or Venetia, it is a mistake to imagine
that they have renounced all aspirations in that direction. Only
fanatics of the worst kind would be disposed to attempt, in the
present situation, to win those provinces by force, but that has
nothing to do with the matter. The aspiration exists and cannot help
existing. It has always been shared by patriots of all denominations.
An English statesman who called on Pius IX. was somewhat surprised by
the Pope saying that Italian unity was very well, but it was a pity it
did not include Trento and Trieste.
The case of Dalmatia is different; there the mass of the population is
unquestionably of a non-Italian race, though that race is one which,
whenever left to itself, seems created to amalgamate with the Italian.
Slav and Teuton are racially antagonistic, but the Slav falls into
Italian ways, speaks the Italian language and mixes his blood with
Italian blood: with what results Venice can tell. For more than two
thousand years the civilisation of Dalmatia has been exclusively
Latin; the Roman column points to the Venetian Campanile; all the
proudest memories are gathered round the Lion of St Mark, which in
every town, almost in every village, recalls the splendid though not
blameless suzerainty of the Serene Republic. The sky, the
olive-groves, the wild pomegranates make us think of Salerno; by the
spoken tongue we are often reminded of Tuscany, for few Italian
dialects are so pure. The political subjection of the country to Italy
dates from Augustus; its political subjection to Austria dates from
Napoleon. Dalmatia, with the glorious little commonwealth of Ragusa,
and the free city of Cattaro, was bartered away with Venice at Campo
Formio; and as with Venice, so with Dalmatia, the Holy Alliance
violated its own principle of restoring the proe-Napoleonic state of
things and confirmed the sale.
At the beginning of the war, Austria did not ignore that her loss of
territory might exceed Venetia. The Archduke Albrecht, in his
proclamation to his soldiers, appealed to them to protect their
mothers, wives and sisters from being ruled by a foreign race.
Even a successful raid upon Dalmatia or Istria need not have given
those districts to Italy, but it would have brought such an event
within the range of a moderately strong political telescope. The Slavs
(erected since into a party hostile to their Italian fellow-citizens
by a fostering of Panslavism which may not, in the long run, prove
sound policy for Austria) were then ready to make friends with anyone
opposed to their actual rulers. They would not have been easy to
govern after an Italian invasion; still less easy to govern would the
Latin element have been, which was and is _Italianissimo_. Since
Prussia became the German Empire, she has set her face against Italian
extension eastward, but in 1866, had her advice been intelligently
acted upon, it might have generated facts the logic of which none
would have had the power to stay.
Moltke's plan more than hinted at a march on Vienna by the Semmering,
and this is what is supposed to have induced La Marmora to treat it with
scorn. With the bogey of Prussia vanquished before his eyes, he
doubtless asked what the Italians would do at Vienna if they got there?
He put the plan in his pocket, and showed it neither to his staff nor to
the King, who would certainly have been attracted by it, as he had set
his heart on the volunteers, at least, crossing the Adriatic. With
regard to the campaign at home, both Moltke and Garibaldi counselled
turning the Quadrilateral in preference to a direct attack upon
fortresses which had been proved impregnable except with the assistance
of hunger, and at present they were better provisioned than in 1848. The
turning of the Quadrilateral meant the adoption of a route into Venetia
across the Po below Mantua. An objection not without gravity to that
route was the unfavourable nature of the ground which, being marshy, is
liable after heavy rains to become impassable. But against this
disadvantage had to be weighed the advantage of keeping out of the
mouse-trap, the fatality of which needed no new demonstration.
In Italy it is common to hear it said that it was necessary to station
a large army on the Mincio to bar the Archduke's path to Milan. But
apart from the rumoured existence of a promise to the French Emperor
not to invade Lombardy, it was unlikely that so good a general as the
Archduke would have taken his small army far from the security it
enjoyed among the four fortresses which, if the worst came to the
worst, assured him a safe line of retreat.
The plan adopted by La Marmora is vaguely said to have been that which
was prepared by the French and Sardinian staffs for use in 1859, had
the war been continued. But in what it really consisted is not to this
day placed beyond dispute. The army, roughly speaking, was divided
into halves; one (the larger) half under the King and La Marmora was
to operate on the Mincio; the other, under Cialdini, was to operate on
the lower Po. It is supposed that one of these portions was intended
to act as a blind to deceive the enemy as to the movements of the
other portion; the undecided question is, which was meant to be the
principal and which the accessory?
The volunteers were thrown against the precipices of the Tridentine
mountains, where a detachment of the regular army, well-armed and
properly supplied with artillery, would have been better suited for
the work. The Garibaldian headquarters was at Salò on the Lake of
Garda. Less than half of the 35,000 volunteers who appear upon paper,
were ever ready to be sent to the front. It was widely said that only
patriotism prevented Garibaldi from throwing up his command, so
dissatisfied was he with the conduct of affairs.
Prussia invaded Hanover and Saxony on the 16th of June, and declared
war with Austria on the 21st, one day after the Italian declaration of
war had been delivered to the Archduke Albrecht. On the 23rd La
Marmora's army began to cross the Mincio. It consisted of three _corps
d'armée_ under the command of Generals Durando, Cucchiari and Delia
Rocca, each corps containing four divisions. The force under Cialdini
was composed of eight divisions forming one _corps d'armée._ An
Italian military writer rates the numbers at 133,000 and 82,000
respectively. La Marmora acquired the belief that the Archduke's
attention was absorbed by Cialdini's movements on the Po, and that his
own operations on the Mincio would pass unobserved.
While the Italian commander had no information of what was going on in
the enemy's camp, the Archduke's intelligence department was so
efficient that he knew quite well the disposition of both Italian
armies. Cialdini's advance, if he meant to advance, was checked by
floods. On the night of the 23rd most of La Marmora's force bivouacked
on the left (Venetian) bank of the Mincio. No reconnaissances were made;
everyone supposed that the Austrians were still beyond the Adige, and
that they intended to stay there. The King slept at Goito.
Before the early dawn next morning the whole Italian army of the
Mincio had orders to advance. The soldiers marched with heavy
knapsacks and empty stomachs, and with no more precautions than in
time of peace. The Austrian Archduke was in the saddle at four a.m.,
and watched from an eminence the moving clouds of dust which announced
the approach of his unsuspecting foe.
La Marmora's intention had been to occupy the heights of Santa
Giustina, Sona and Somma Campagna, but the Archduke anticipated his
design, and while the Italians were moving from the Mincio, the
Austrians were ranging themselves in those positions. At half-past
five on the midsummer Sunday morning, the Austrian advance guard led
by Colonel Pulz came up with Prince Humbert's division near
Villafranca. The battle began dramatically, with a charge of the
splendid Polish and Hungarian Hussars, who dashed their horses against
the Italian squares, in one of which, opportunely formed for his
shelter, was the gallant heir to the throne. Bixio's division was also
engaged in this prelude, which augured not ill for the Italians, since
at about eight o'clock Pulz received the Archduke's orders to retire.
The first hours of the battle were spent in fortuitous encounters
along the extensive chain of hillocks which La Marmora had intended to
occupy. As the Italians approached each position they found it in the
possession of a strong force of the enemy. On the right, however,
Custoza and the heights between it and Somma Campagna had not been
occupied by the Austrians. Here La Marmora placed the flower of his
army, the Sardinian and Lombard Grenadiers, the latter commanded by
Prince Amedeo. The fighting continued through the day over very
widely distributed ground, but from about nine in the morning the
supreme interest was concentrated at and near Custoza, in which the
Archduke promptly detected the turning-point of the battle. To wrest
Custoza from the hold of the Italians was to the Austrians on the 24th
of June 1866, what the taking of the crest of Solferino had been to
the French on the 24th of June 1859. La Marmora in person led the
Grenadiers into action; they proved worthy of their reputation, but
after losing a great many men, Prince Amedeo being among the wounded,
they were obliged to retreat. At about midday, however, the Italian
prospects improved so much that in the opinion of Austrian military
writers, with moderate reinforcements they would have had a strong
probability of winning the battle. La Marmora saw the importance of
getting fresh troops into the field, but, instead of sending for the
divisions under Bixio and Prince Humbert, which since eight a.m. had
been fretting in inaction close by, at Villafranca, he rode himself to
Goito, a great distance away, to look after the reserves belonging to
the 2nd _corps d'armée_; a task which any staff officer could have
performed as well. This inexplicable proceeding left the army without
a commander-in-chief. The generals of division followed their
individual inspirations, Govone, Pianel and Cugia especially
distinguishing themselves: it is sad to think that death has removed
these three officers from the Italian ranks. But the Austrians fatally
gained ground, and as the afternoon closed in the Archduke began to
feel sure that the Italian reinforcements whose arrival he had so much
feared, were never coming. He therefore prepared for the final effort
which was to give him the well-deserved honours of the day. Towards
seven o'clock in the evening, his soldiers succeeded in storming the
heights of Custoza, and Austria could write a second battle of that
name among her victories.
The Italians lost 720 killed, 3112 wounded and 3608 prisoners. The
Austrian loss was 960 killed, 3690 wounded and 1000 prisoners. Both
sides were much tried by the scorching midsummer sun, but the Italians
laboured under the additional drawback of having to fight fasting. In
his report, the Archduke Albrecht mentioned that the prisoners said
they had not tasted food for twenty-four hours. In the same report, he
did ample justice to the courage of the Italian soldiers.
As has been stated, the Archduke fought Custoza with not less,
probably with rather more, than 70,000 men. The force which La Marmora
placed in the field was actually inferior in number. The divisions of
Bixio and Prince Humbert were kept doing nothing all day at a stone's
throw from the scene of action. Of the whole 2nd _corps d'armée_ only
a trifling detachment ever reached the ground. Inexplicably little use
was made of the Italian cavalry.
This bungling had lost the battle, but the fact that on the morrow,
six divisions of the army of the Mincio were practically fresh, might
have suggested to a general of enterprise to try again, since it was
known that the Archduke had not a single new man to fall back on. And
there was Cialdini on the Po with his eight divisions that had not
been engaged at all. But, instead of adopting a spirited course, the
Italian authorities gave way to unreasoning panic. It appears,
unfortunately, that the King was the first to be overcome by this
moral vertigo. The long and fiercely discussed question of who
telegraphed to Cialdini: 'Irreparable disaster; cover the capital,'
seems to have been settled since that general's death in 1892. It is
now alleged that the telegram, the authorship of which was disowned by
La Marmora, was signed by the King's adjutant, Count Verasio di
Castiglione. Cialdini obeyed the order and fell back on Modena.
Whether he was bound to obey an almost anonymous communication signed
by an irresponsible officer is a moot point; it is reported that he
repented having done so to the last day of his life.
A great event now happened across the Alps; one of the decisive
battles of the world was lost and won on the 5th of July at Sadowa
near Königgrätz in Bohemia. The fate of Europe was shaped on that day
for decades, if not for centuries. Of the immediate results, the first
was the scattering to the wind of all calculations based upon a long
continuance of the war, the issue of which, as far as Prussia was
concerned, could not be regarded as doubtful. In respect to Italy,
Austria's first thought was to prevent her from taking a revenge for
Custoza. She attempted to compass this by ceding Venetia to Napoleon
two days after Sadowa. It was making a virtue of necessity, as she was
bound in any case to cede it at the conclusion of the war; but as the
secret of the treaty had been well kept, the step caused great
surprise, and in Italy, where the public mind had leapt from profound
discouragement to buoyant hope, the impression was one of
embarrassment and mortification. Italy was distinctly precluded by her
engagement with Prussia from accepting Napoleon's invitation to
conclude a separate peace. Meanwhile, Austria gained by the move, as
it set her at liberty to recall the larger part of her troops from
Venetia for the defence of Vienna. Her honour did not require her to
contest the ground in a province which she had already given away.
When Cialdini, at the head of the reorganised Italian army of which he
now held the chief command, advanced across the Po to Padua, he found
the path practically open.
It was still possible for Italy to accomplish two things which would
have in a great measure retrieved her _prestige_. The first was to
occupy the Trentino; the second was to destroy the Austrian fleet.
With the means at her disposal she ought to have been able to do both.
In the earlier phases of Italian liberation, no one disputed that if
Lombardy and Venetia were lost to the Empire the Tridentine province,
wedged in as it is between them, would follow suit. When, in 1848,
Lord Palmerston offered his services as mediator between Austria and
revolted Italy, it was on a minimum basis of a frontier north of
Trento. The arguments for the retention of Trieste--that Austria had
made it what it was; that Germany needed it as a seaport, etc.--were
inapplicable here; and even after the defeat of Custoza, an occupation
of the Trentino, had it happened in conjunction with a naval victory,
would have opened a fair prospect to possession. But there was no time
to lose, and much time was lost by ordering Garibaldi to descend to
the southern extremity of the lake of Garda to 'cover Brescia' from an
imaginary attack. When the fear of an Austrian invasion subsided, and
Garibaldi returned to the mountains, he endeavoured to re-take the
position of Monte Suello which he had previously held, but the attempt
failed. The volunteers were forced to retire with great loss, and the
chief himself was wounded. On the 16th of July the volunteers renewed
their advance up the mountain ravines, and, after taking Fort Ampola,
reached the village of Bezzecca, where they were attacked by the
Austrians early on the 21st. Each side claimed that sanguinary day as
a victory; the Garibaldians remained masters of the ground, but the
Austrians, in retiring, took with them a large number of prisoners.
The losses of the volunteers on this and other occasions when they
were engaged were disproportionately heavy. They were spendthrift of
their lives, but in war, and especially in mountain warfare, caution
is as needful as courage, and in caution they were so deficient that
they were always being surprised. General Kuhn's numerically inferior
force of tried marksmen, supported by good artillery and favoured by
ground which may be described as one great natural fortification, had
succeeded up till now in holding the Trentino, but his position was
becoming critical, because while Garibaldi sought to approach Trento
from the west, Medici with 10,000 men detached from the main army at
Padua, was ascending the Venetian valleys that lead to the same
destination from the east. Kuhn was therefore on the point of being
taken between two fires when the armistice saved him.
These operations on the Tridentine frontier, though not without a real
importance, passed almost unnoticed in the excitement which attended
the first calamitous appearance of United Italy as a naval power.
When invited to assume the command of the Italian fleet, Admiral
Persano twice refused; it was only when the King pressed upon him a
third invitation that he weakly accepted a charge to which he felt
himself unequal. He had been living in retirement for some years, and
neither knew nor was known by most of the officers and men whom he was
now to command. The fleet under his orders comprised thirty-three
vessels, of which twelve were ironclads. The Austrian fleet numbered
twenty-seven ships, including seven ironclads. When the war broke out,
both fleets were far from ready for active service; but, while the
Austrian Admiral Tegethoff said nothing, but worked night and day at
Pola to make his ships and his men serviceable, Persano despatched
hourly lamentable reports to the Minister of Marine, without finding
the way to bring about a change for the better. He wasted time in
minutiæ, and took into his head to paint all the Italian ships a
light grey, which was of the greatest use to the Austrians in the
battle of Lissa, as it enabled them to distinguish between them and
their own dark-coloured ships.
After long delaying at Taranto, Persano brought his fleet to Ancona;
and, two days later, Tegethoff appeared in front of that town--not
knowing, it seems, that the Italian squadrons had arrived. Tegethoff
was bound on a simple reconnaissance, and, after firing a few shots,
he sailed away. On this occasion, Persano issued orders so hesitating
and confused that the Austrian admiral must have correctly gauged the
capacity of the man opposed to him, while the superior officers of the
Italian fleet were filled with little less than dismay. A strong
effort was made to induce Depretis to supersede Persano then and
there; he promised to do so, but it is said that the fear of offending
the King prevented him. Instead, he set about showering instructions
on the admiral, the worth of which may be easily imagined. The
mistrust felt by the fleet in its commander invaded all ranks; and if
it did not break out in open insubordination, it deprived officers and
men of all confidence in the issue of the campaign.
Left to himself, Persano would have stayed quietly at Ancona, but the
imperative orders of a cabinet council, presided over by the King,
forced him to take some action. Against the advice of Admiral Albini,
but in agreement with another admiral, Vacca, Persano decided to
attack the fortified island of Lissa, on the Dalmatian coast. Though
Lissa is a strong position, the usual comparison of it with Gibraltar
is exaggerated. It ought to have been possible to land the Italian
troops which Persano had with him under cover of his guns, and to take
the island before Tegethoff came up. The surf caused by the rough
weather, to which he chiefly attributed his failure, would not have
proved an insuperable obstacle had the ships' crews been exercised in
landing troops under similar circumstances.
Persano reached Lissa on the morning of the 18th of July, and began a
tremendous bombardment of the forts, which, though answered with the
highest spirit by the Austrians, did most deadly damage to their
batteries. In fact, by the evening, except one or two at a high
elevation, they were practically silenced. At six o'clock Captain
Saint Bon took the _Formidabile_ into the narrow harbour to silence
the inner works: a murderous fire rained on the corvette from Fort
Wellington, which was too high for the Italian guns to get it into
range. Though Saint Bon's attempt was not successful, the Italians had
effected most of what they aimed at, and might have effected the rest
had they continued the bombardment through the night, and so given the
Austrians no time to repair their batteries, but at sunset Persano
withdrew his fleet to a distance of eight miles. The Austrians worked
all night at mending the batteries that could still be used, and hoped
in the coming of Tegethoff.
The telegraph cable connecting the neighbouring island of Lesina with
the coast, and so with Pola, had been cut by Persano's orders; but
either (as the writer was told on the spot last year) there was another
line that was not noticed, or before the cable was destroyed the
official in charge got off a message to Tegethoff, informing him of the
arrival of the Italian fleet. An answer, to the effect that Tegethoff
would come to the rescue as soon as possible, fell into the hands of the
Italians, but Persano appears not to have believed in it.
The 19th was spent in attempts at landing, which the surf and the
energetic play of the repaired batteries rendered fruitless. The
bombardment was renewed, but it was not well conducted. Saint Bon, who
made another plucky entry into the harbour, was unsupported, and,
after an hour's fighting, he was obliged to retire, his ship having
suffered severely.
Next morning there was a blinding summer storm, but at about eight
o'clock the _Esploratore_ distinguished the forms of ironclads through
the rain, and signalled to Persano: 'Suspicious vessels in sight.'
Persano answered: 'No doubt they are fishing-boats.' When obliged to
admit the truth he gave the order to unite, his ships being scattered
in all directions with everything on board at sixes and sevens. The
troops which had again been attempting to land, were in boats, tossed
about by the heavy sea. The surprise was complete.
Persano fought the battle of Lissa with nine ironclads, most of which
had received some injuries during the bombardment. He ordered his
wooden ships to keep out of the action altogether. Tegethoff had seven
ironclads and fourteen wooden vessels, all of which he turned to the
best account.
Just before the battle Persano left his flagship, the _Re_ _d'Italia_,
and went on board the _Affondatore_. By somebody's mistake it was a
long time before the _Affondatore_ hoisted the admiral's flag, and
the fleet continued to look to the _Re d'Italia_ for signals when he
was no longer on board.
Contrary to a well-known rule in naval science, Persano formed his
squadron in single file, and quite at the beginning of the battle
Tegethoff managed to break the line by dashing in between the first
and second division whilst they were going at full speed, and under a
furious cannonade from their guns. This daring operation placed him
in the middle of the Italian ironclads, which, well directed, could
have closed round him and destroyed him, but they were not directed
either well nor ill--they were not directed at all. Persano put up
contradictory signals, most of which were not seen, and those which
were seen meant nothing. The plan followed by Admiral Tegethoff may be
best described in his own words: 'It was hard to make out friend from
foe, so I just rammed away at anything I saw painted grey.' Two
Italian vessels had been already damaged, but not vitally injured, by
the _Ferdinand Max_, when in the dense smoke a vast wall of grey
appeared close to the bows of the Austrian flagship, which, to the cry
of 'Ram her!' put on full steam and crashed into the enemy's flank.
The shock was so great that the crew of the _Max_ were thrown about in
indescribable confusion. The Italian ship was the _Re d'Italia,_ the
flagship which did not carry the admiral. She quivered for one, two,
some say for three minutes in her death agony, and then went down in
two hundred fathoms of water.
After the _Re d'Italia_ was struck, one of her seamen, thinking to
assert a claim to pity, began to lower her flag, but a young officer
pushed him aside and hoisted it again; so the great ship sank with her
colours flying. The incident was noticed by the Austrians, who spoke
of it in feeling terms. Willing enough were they to help, for after
the first cheer of triumph they felt sick with horror at their own
work, the fearful work of modern naval warfare. There were 550 men on
board the doomed ship. Tegethoff shouted for the boats to be lowered,
and signalled to the despatch boat _Elisabeth_ to pick up all she
could, but two Italian ironclads were bearing down upon him, and
little could be done to save the drowning multitude either by the
Austrians or by their own people. Persano did not know of the
disaster till some hours after it happened.
The sea had scarcely closed over the _Re d'Italia_ when another
misfortune occurred; the gunboat _Palestro_ took fire. Her captain,
Alfredo Cappellini, disembarked the sick and wounded, but remained
himself with the rest of the crew, endeavouring to put out the fire.
The ship blew up at 2.30 p.m., and over two hundred perished with her.
Persano, still on the _Affondatore_, now led his fleet out of action,
and it was the first time he had led it during the day. Tegethoff
gazed after the vanishing squadron with anxiety, as had Persano turned
and renewed the battle from a distance, he could have revenged his
defeat at close quarters without receiving a shot, owing to the longer
range of his guns. But for such an operation skilful manoeuvring was
wanted, and also, perhaps, more precision in firing than the Italian
gunners possessed. At any rate, Persano had no mind for new
adventures. He took what remained of his fleet straight back to
Ancona, where the _Affondatore_ sank in the harbour from injuries
received during the battle. For three days the Italian people were
told that they had won a victory, then the bitter truth was known. The
admiral, tried before the Senate, was deprived of his rank and command
in the Italian navy. The politician who, when convinced of his
unfitness, yet had not the nerve to remove him from his post, died,
full of years and honours, Prime Minister of Italy.
Lissa was fought on the 20th of July. On the 25th, Prussia signed the
preliminaries of peace with Austria without consulting her ally, who,
if unfortunate, had been eminently loyal to her. Thus the whole forces
of the Empire, not less than 350,000 men, were let loose to fall upon
Italy. Such was the wrathful disappointment of the Italians at their
defeats by land and sea, that if a vote had been taken they would
possibly have decided for a renewal of the struggle. Ricasoli was
inclined to risk war rather than bow to the Austrian demand that the
evacuation of the Trentino should precede the conclusion of an
armistice. At this crisis, La Marmora acted as a true patriot in
forcing the hand of the Ministry by ordering the recall of the troops
and sending General Petitti to treat directly with the Austrian
military authorities. 'They will say that we have betrayed the
country,' said the King in the interview in which these measures were
concerted; to which La Marmora answered: 'Come what may, I take the
whole responsibility upon myself.' 'This is too much,' replied Victor
Emmanuel with tears in his eyes; 'I, also, will have my part in it.'
In which brief dialogue the character of the two men stands revealed;
men who might fall short in talent or in judgment, not in honour.
The volunteers, so many of whose comrades lay dead along the mountain
gorges--who believed, too, that they were in sight of the reward of
their sacrifices--were thrown into a ferment, almost into a revolt by
the order to retreat. They had expected in a day or two to shake hands
with Medici, who, after some hard fighting, was within a march of
Trento. The order was explicit: instant evacuation of the enemy's
territory. Garibaldi, to whom from first to last had fallen an
ungrateful part, took up his pen and wrote the laconic telegram:
'Obbedisco.' 'I have obeyed,' he said to the would-be mutineers, 'do
you obey likewise.' Someone murmured 'Rome.' 'Yes,' said the chief,
'we will march on Rome.'
The armistice was signed at Cormons on the 12th of August, and the
treaty of peace on the 3rd of October at Vienna. Italy received Venice
from the hands of the French Emperor, whose interference since the
beginning of the campaign had incensed Prussia against her ally
without benefiting the Power which he affected and, perhaps, really
meant to serve. Italy would have received Venetia without his
interposition, for besides the Prussian obligation to claim it for
her, Austria had no further wish to keep it. Despite the fact that
Italian populations still remained under the rule of the Empire, the
melancholy book of Austrian dominion in Italy might be fairly said to
be closed forever. A new era was dawning for the House of Hapsburg,
which was to show that, unlike the Bourbons, it could learn and
unlearn.
The comedy of the cession of Venice to Napoleon was enacted between
General Le Boeuf and General Alemann, the Austrian military
commandant. Among other formalities, the French delegate went the
round of the museums and galleries to see that everything was in its
place. Suddenly he came upon a most suspicious blank. 'A picture is
missing here,' he said. 'It is, blandly assented the Austrian officer.
'Well, but it must be sent back immediately--where is it?' 'In the
Louvre.'
At last Austrians and French departed, and Italy shook off her
mourning, for however it had come about, the great object which had
cost so much blood, so many tears, was attained; the stranger was
gone!
Out of 642,000 votes, only 69 were recorded against the union of
Venetia with the Italian kingdom. When the plebiscite was presented
to the King, he said: 'This is the greatest day of my life: Italy is
made, though not complete.' On the 7th of November he entered Venice,
and of all the pageants that greeted him in the hundred cities of
Italy, the welcome of the Bride of the Adriatic was, if not the most
imposing, certainly the fairest to see. More touching, however, than
the glorious beauty of the Piazza San Marco and the Grand Canal in
their rich adornment, was the universal decoration of the poorest
quarters, which were all flagged and festooned so thickly that little
could be seen of the stones of Venice. One poor cobbler, however,
living at the end of a blind alley, had no flag, no garland to deck
his abode: he had therefore pasted three strips of coloured paper,
red, white and green, over his door, inscribing on the middle strip
these words, which in their sublime simplicity merit to be rescued
from oblivion: 'O mia cara Italia, voglio ma non posso fare più per
te.'
The Iron Crown of the Lombard Kings of Italy, which the Austrians had
taken away in 1859, was brought back and restored to the Cathedral of
Monza. Less presumptuous than Napoleon, Victor Emmanuel never placed
the mystical fillet upon his head, but it was carried after his coffin
to the Pantheon.