OF THE THINGS FOR WHICH MEN, AND ESPECIALLY PRINCES, ARE PRAISED OR
BLAMED
It remains now to be seen what are the methods and rules for a
prince as regards his subjects and friends. And as I know that many
have written of this, I fear that my writing about it may be deemed
presumptuous, differing as I do, especially in this matter, from the
opinions of others. But my intention being to write something of use to
those who understand it, it appears to me more proper to go to the real
truth of the matter than to its imagination; and many have imagined
republics and principalities which have never been seen or known to
exist in reality; for how we live is so far removed from how we ought
to live, that he who abandons what is done for what ought to be done,
will rather learn to bring about his own ruin than his preservation.
A man who wishes to make a profession of goodness in everything must
necessarily come to grief among so many who are not good. Therefore it
is necessary for a prince, who wishes to maintain himself, to learn how
not to be good, and to use it and not use it according to the necessity
of the case. Leaving on one side then those things which concern only
an imaginary prince, and speaking of those that are real, I state that
all men, when spoken of, and especially princes, who are placed at
a greater height, are noted for some of those qualities which bring
them either praise or blame. Thus one is considered liberal, another
miserly; one a free giver, another rapacious; one cruel, another
merciful; one a breaker of his word, another faithful; one effeminate
and pusillanimous, another fierce and high-spirited; one humane,
another proud; one lascivious, another chaste; one frank, another
astute; one hard, another easy; one serious, another frivolous; one
religious, another incredulous, and so on. I know that every one will
admit that it would be highly praiseworthy in a prince to possess all
the above-named qualities that are reputed good, but as they cannot all
be possessed or observed, human conditions not permitting of it, it is
necessary that he should be prudent enough to avoid the disgrace of
those vices which would lose him the state, and guard himself against
those which will not lose it him, if possible, but if not able to, he
can indulge them with less scruple. And yet he must not mind incurring
the disgrace of those vices, without which it would be difficult to
save the state, for if one considers well, it will be found that some
things which seem virtues would, if followed, lead to one's ruin, and
some others which appear vices result, if followed, in one's greater
security and well being.