MINOR CONFLICTS: SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER.
Leaving for a while the affairs of Lucknow—which by the progress of
events had become far more important than those of Delhi or of any other
city in India—we may conveniently devote the present chapter to a rapid
glance at the general state of affairs during the months of September
and October: noticing only such scenes of discord, and such military
operations, as arose immediately out of the Revolt. The subject may be
treated in the same style as in Chapter xvii., relating to the months of
July and August, but more briefly; for, in truth, so few Bengal native
regiments now remained ‘true to their salt,’ that the materials for
further mutiny were almost exhausted.
Of Calcutta, and the region around it on all sides, little need be said.
Mutiny in that neighbourhood would not have been easy during the autumn
months; for British troops were gradually arriving, who would speedily
have put down any rebellious risings. Sometimes alarms agitated the
civilians and traders in the city; but nothing really serious called for
notice. The ex-king of Oude continued to be watched carefully at
Calcutta. Whatever honeyed phrases may have been used to render his
detention more palatable, none of the government officers placed any
reliance on his fidelity or peacefulness. In truth, if he _had_
displayed those qualities, after being compelled to witness the
annexation of his country to the British raj, he would have been
something more (or less) than oriental. At various times during the
summer and autumn months, scrutinising inquiries were made into the
conduct of the king and his retainers. Thus, on the 16th of August, a
person who had for some time resided at Calcutta, under the assumed
title of Bishop of Bagdad, but whose real name was Syed Hossein Shubber,
was with five others arrested, for complicity in plots affecting the
British government; and, consequent on papers discovered, three
retainers of the king were arrested about a week afterwards. The
government kept secret the details of these affairs, pending further
inquiry; but it was apparent enough that mischief was fermenting in the
minds of the royal prisoner’s retainers. Unquestionably many natives
sincerely believed the king to have been an ill-used man—an opinion
shared also by many Europeans—and they did not deem it treason to aid
him in his misfortunes.
Much to the vexation of the government, the district of Assam, little
known to Europeans except as a region where tea is experimentally grown,
was drawn into the vortex of trouble early in September. Many of the
sepoys of the 1st Assam native infantry came from the neighbourhood of
Arrah, and were closely related to one regiment (the 40th) of the
Dinapoor mutineers; while others were from the estates of Koer Singh.
When, therefore, the news of the Dinapoor mutiny became known, the Assam
regiment was thrown into much agitation. There was a rajah in Assam, one
Saring Kunderpessawar Singh, who secretly engaged in treasonable
correspondence, and who received offers of support from the Arrah men of
the Assam regiment, if he would openly break with the British. There
were also Hindustanis in the 2d Assam native regiment; while the
artillery companies at Debrooghur were entirely Hindustanis. It was
known likewise that many of the neighbouring tribes were in a
disaffected state, and that a religious mendicant was rapidly moving
about with some secret but apparently mischievous purpose. By degrees a
plot was discovered. The conspirators planned on a given day to murder
all the Christians in Assam, and then plunder the stations. Fortunately
this project was known in time. The Calcutta government having no
soldiers to spare, organised a force of English seamen, trained as
gunners, and sent them by a steamer up the Brahmaputra to Debrooghur, to
be employed as the local authorities might deem advisable. One of the
circumstances connected with this movement illustrates the antagonism
between governing authorities and newspaper writers on military
matters—an antagonism frequently felt during the Indian Revolt as during
the Russian war. A responsible leader wishes to keep his plans of
strategy secret from the enemy; a newspaper writer wishes to give as
much news as possible on all subjects; and these two modes of
procedure do not always flow in harmonious concord. Mr Halliday,
lieutenant-governor of Bengal, in reporting on this Assam affair, said:
‘The utmost care was taken to despatch the force to Assam with the
secrecy necessary to prevent its destination being known; but it is
feared that this intention has been frustrated by the ill-judged
publication of the departure of the steamer, and notification of its
objects, by the Calcutta papers. It is hoped that this injudicious
proceeding may not be attended with the serious results that would ensue
from a revolt in the province in its present unprotected state. Such an
untoward contingency was feared by the officers in Assam, who pointed
out the urgent necessity of extreme care being observed in preventing
the promulgation of the transmission, before its arrival, of any
European force that might be sent; lest the knowledge of the approach of
aid should cause a premature explosion of the expected revolt.’ The
force consisted of 100 armed sailors, with two 12-pounder guns; they set
out on the 11th of September, under the charge of Lieutenant Davies, in
the steamer _Horungotta_; and were to be at the disposal of Colonel
Jenkins on arriving in Assam. As a curious example of the different
light in which different tribes were at this time viewed, it may be
stated that all the men of the 1st Assam infantry who were _not_
Hindustanis were called in from the outposts to Debrooghur, as a
protection in case the remainder of the regiment should mutiny. Captain
Lowther, commanding a corps of Goorkhas, was sent from another station
to capture the rajah; this he managed admirably, and in so doing,
effectually crushed the incipient mutiny. The captain, in a private
letter, told in excellent style the story of his expedition; from which
we will extract so much as relates to the night-scene in the rajah’s
palace at Debrooghur.[105]
Some weeks afterwards, towards the close of October, Mr Halliday
entertained much distrust of the 73d Bengal native infantry, of which
two companies were at Dacca, and the main body at Jelpigoree, near the
Bhotan frontier. By precautionary measures, however, he prevented for a
time any actual outbreak of this particular regiment.
There were reasons why the towns on the banks of the Lower Ganges
remained tolerably free from rebellion during the months now under
notice. English regiments, in wings or detachments, were sent up the
river in flats tugged by steamers, from Calcutta towards Upper India;
and the turbulent rabble of the towns were awed into quietness by the
vicinity of these red-coats. Berhampore, Moorshedabad, Rajmahal,
Bhagulpore, Monghir, Patna, Dinapoor, Buxar, Ghazeepore, Benares,
Mirzapore—all felt the benefit of this occasional passing of British
troops along the Ganges, in the moral effect produced on the natives.
True, the arrivals at Calcutta were few and far apart until October was
well advanced; true, many of the troops were sent by land along the main
trunk-road, for greater expedition; true, those who went by water were
too urgently needed in the Doab and in Oude to be spared for
intermediate service at the towns above named; but, nevertheless, the
mere transit of a few English regiments effected much towards the
tranquillising of Bengal. Early in the month of August, Lord Elgin had
come to Calcutta, and placed at the disposal of Lord Canning two
war-steamers, the _Shannon_ and the _Pearl_; and from among the
resources of these steamers was organised a splendid naval brigade,
consisting of 400 able British seamen, and no less than ten of the
enormous 68-pounder guns which such seamen know so well how to handle.
They started from Calcutta up the Hoogly and the Ganges, under the
command of Captain Peel, who had so gallantly managed a naval-battery in
the Crimea during the siege of Sebastopol. If such a man could fret, he
would have fretted at the slowness of his voyage. Week after week
elapsed, without his reaching those districts where his services would
be invaluable. Half of August and the whole of September thus passed
wearily away in this most tedious voyage. The upward passage is always
tardy, against the stream; and his ponderous artillery rendered slowness
still more slow. It was not until the 30th of September that he, with
286 men of his brigade, arrived at Benares. Hastening on, he arrived
with 94 men at Allahabad on the 3d of October; and four days afterwards
the rest joined him, with their enormous guns and store of ammunition. A
small naval brigade, under Captain Sotheby, was placed at the disposal
of the Patna authorities, to be used against certain insurgents in the
neighbourhood.
The portion of Bengal north of the Ganges was almost entirely free from
disturbance during these two months; but the parallel portion of Behar
was in a very different state. The actual mutinies there had been few in
number, for in truth there had not been many native troops quartered in
that region; but the rebellious chieftains and zemindars were many, each
of whom could command the services of a body of retainers ready for any
mischief. Patna, in September, as in earlier months, was disturbed
rather by anarchy in other regions than by actual mutinies within the
city itself. In what way the Dinapoor troubles affected it, we have seen
in an earlier chapter. Its present difficulties lay rather with the
districts north and northwest of the city, where the revenue collectors
had been driven from place to place by mutinous sepoys, and by petty
chieftains who wished to strengthen themselves at the expense of the
English ‘raj.’ The abandonment of Goruckpore by the officials, in a
moment of fright, had had the effect of exposing the Chupra, Chumparun,
and Mozufferpoor districts to the attacks of rebels, especially such as
had placed themselves under the banner of the Mussulman chieftain
Mahomed Hussein Khan, the self-appointed ‘ruler in the name and on
behalf of the King of Oude.’ This man had collected a considerable
force, and had organised a species of government at Goruckpore. The
military power in the hands of the Company’s servants in the Chupra and
Tirhoot districts consisted chiefly of a few Sikhs of the police
battalion, quite unequal to the resistance of an incursion by Mahomed
Hussein. The civilians of those districts sent urgent applications to
Patna for military aid. But how could this be furnished? Troops and
artillery were so imperatively demanded at Cawnpore, to aid the
operations at Lucknow, that none could be detained on their passage up
the river; the Dinapoor garrison, reduced by the mutiny and its
consequences, could only spare a few troops for Patna itself; the troops
going up the main trunk-road from Calcutta to Upper India could barely
afford time and strength to encounter the Ramgurh insurgents, without
attempting anything north of the Ganges. There happened, however, to be
a Madras regiment passing up by steamer to Allahabad; and permission was
obtained to detain a portion of this regiment for service in the
Goruckpore region; while the Rajahs of Bettiah and Hutwah were
encouraged to maintain a friendly attitude in support of the British
authorities. The rebel or rather rabble forces under Mahomed Hussein
were ill armed and worse disciplined; and it was probable that a few men
of the 17th M. N. I., with a few Sikhs, could have beaten them at any
time; but it was felt necessary to reoccupy Goruckpore at once, to
prevent the neighbouring zemindars and thalookdars from joining the
malcontents.
That Lord Canning accepted an offer of several Goorkha regiments, from
Jung Bahadoor of Nepaul, has been stated in a former chapter; but a very
long time elapsed before those hardy little troops were enabled to
render much service. The process of collecting them at Khatmandoo and
elsewhere occupied several weeks, and it was not until the beginning of
September that they reached Jounpoor, a station in the very heart of the
disturbed districts. Even then, there was much tardiness in bringing
them into active service; for the English officers appointed to command
them did not at first understand the difference of management required
by Hindustani sepoys and Nepaulese Goorkhas. Happily, an opportunity
occurred for remedying this defect. A smart affair on the 20th of
September afforded the Goorkhas an opportunity of shewing their
gallantry. Colonel Wroughton, military commandant at Jounpoor, having
heard that Azimghur was threatened with an attack by 8000 rebels under
Madhoo Singh of Atrowlia, resolved to send a regiment of Goorkhas from
Jounpoor to strengthen the force already at Azimghur. They started at
once, marched the distance in a day and a half, and reached the
threatened city on the evening of the 19th. This was the Shere regiment
of Jung Bahadoor’s force, under Colonel Shumshere Singh, a Nepaulese
officer. At a very early hour on the morning of the 20th, it was
ascertained that a large body of rebels had assembled in and near the
neighbouring village of Mundoree. A force of 1200 men, mostly belonging
to three Goorkha regiments, was immediately sent out to disperse
them—Captain Boileau commanding, Colonel Shumshere Singh heading the
Goorkhas, and Mr Venables (whose prowess had already been displayed in
the same district) taking charge of a small body of local horse. Finding
that the rebels were posted in a clump of trees and in a jheel behind
the village, Captain Boileau directed Shumshere Singh to advance his
Goorkhas at double pace. This was done, despite the fire from several
guns; the little Goorkhas charged, drove the enemy away towards
Captangunje, and captured three brass guns and all the camp-equipage. Mr
Venables was seen wherever the fighting was thickest; he was up at the
first gun taken, and killed three of the enemy with his own hand. About
200 of the enemy were laid low in this brief encounter, and one-sixth of
this number on the part of the victors.
This little battle of Mundoree had a moral effect, superadded to the
immediate dispersing of a body of rebels. It shewed the soldierly
conduct of the Goorkhas, who had marched fifty miles in two days, and
then won a battle in a kind of country to which they were unaccustomed.
It proved the intrepidity of one of the civil servants of the Company,
whose sterling qualities were brought forth at a critical time.
Moreover, it dissipated a prejudice against the Goorkhas formed by some
of the British officers. These troops had hitherto remained nearly
inactive in the region between Nepaul and the Ganges. Jung Bahadoor had
sent them, under a native officer, Colonel Puhlwan Singh, to be employed
wherever the authorities deemed best. Colonel Wroughton, and other
British officers, formed an opinion that the Nepaulese troops were
incapable of rapid movement, and that their native officers dreaded the
responsibility of independent action. Mr Grant, lieutenant-governor of
the Central Provinces, in an official letter to Colonel Wroughton after
the battle of Mundoree, pointed out that this opinion had been very
detrimental to the public service, in discouraging any employment of the
Goorkhas. He added: ‘It was natural to expect that foreigners, and those
foreigners mountaineers, unaccustomed either to the plains or to their
inhabitants, should at first feel some awkwardness in the new position
in which they were placed, with everything strange around them. The
sagacity of Jung Bahadoor had already foreseen this difficulty; and it
was at his earnest desire that British officers were attached to the
Goorkha force, to encourage the officers and men, and to explain how
operations should be carried on in such a country and such a climate as
that in which they now for the first time marched, and against such an
enemy as they now for the first time met.... The lieutenant-governor
will now confidently look to you that the Goorkha force is henceforth
actively employed in the service for which it was placed at the disposal
of the British government by the Nepaulese.’ It must be borne in mind,
to prevent confusion, that this Goorkha force, lent by Jung Bahadoor,
was distinct from the Goorkha battalions of Sirmoor and Kumaon, often
mentioned in former chapters; those battalions were part of the Bengal
native army, fortunately consisting of Goorkhas instead of ‘Pandies;’
whereas the new force was a Nepaulese army, lent for a special purpose.
Mr Grant, the temporarily appointed lieutenant-governor just mentioned,
employed all his energies throughout September and October in promoting
the transit of British troops from the lower to the upper provinces, to
aid in the operations at Cawnpore and Lucknow. He could not, however,
forget the fact that the eastern frontier of Oude adjoined the British
districts of Goruckpore, Jounpoor, and Azimghur; and that the Oude
rebels were continually making demonstrations on that side. He longed
for British troops, to strengthen and encourage the Goorkhas in his
service, and occasionally applied for a few; but he, as all others, was
told that the relief of the residents at Lucknow must precede, and be
paramount over, all other military operations whatever. Writing to Lord
Canning from Benares on the 15th of October, he said: ‘It is a point for
consideration, how much longer it will be otherwise than imprudent to
continue to send the whole of the daily arrivals of Europeans nearly
half-way round the province of Oude, in order to create a pressure upon
the rear of the mutineers and insurgents of that province from the
direction of Cawnpore and Lucknow, whilst our home districts are left
thus open to them in their front.’ He expressed a hope that the Punjaub
and Delhi regions would be able to supply nearly troops enough for
immediate operations at Lucknow; and that a portion of the British
regiments sent up from the lower provinces would be permitted to form
the nucleus of a new army at Benares, for operations on the eastern
frontier of Oude. Many weeks elapsed, however, before this suggestion
could meet with practical attention.
Thus it was throughout the districts of Goruckpore, Jounpoor, Azimghur,
and others eastward of Oude and north of the Ganges. If the British had
had to contend only with mutinied sepoys and sowars, victory would more
generally and completely have attended their exertions; but rebellious
chieftains were numerous, and these, encouraged by the newly established
rebel government at Lucknow, continually harassed the British officials
placed in charge of those districts. The colonels, captains, judges,
magistrates, collectors—all cried aloud for more European troops; their
cries were heeded at Calcutta, but could not be satisfied, for reasons
already sufficiently explained.
Let us cross the Ganges, and watch the state of affairs in the
southwestern districts of Bengal and Behar during the months of
September and October.
Throughout this wide region, the troubles arose rather from sepoys
already rebellious, than from new instances of mutiny. Preceding
chapters have shewn that the 8th Bengal native infantry mutinied at
Hazarebagh on the 30th of July; that the infantry of the Ramgurh
battalion followed the pernicious example on the next day; that the 5th
irregular cavalry mutinied at Bhagulpore on the 14th of August; and that
the 7th, 8th, and 40th regiments of native infantry which mutinied at
Dinapoor on the 25th of July, kept the whole of Western Bengal in
agitation throughout August, by rendering uncertain in which direction
they would march, under the rebel chieftain, Koer Singh. The only
additional mutiny, in this region, was that of the 32d native infantry,
presently to be noticed. The elements of anarchy were, however, already
numerous and violent enough to plunge the whole district into disorder.
Some of the towns were the centres of opium-growing or indigo-producing
regions; many were surrounded simply by rice or cornfields; others,
again, were military stations, at which the Company were accustomed to
keep troops; while several were dâk or post stations, for the
maintenance of communication along the great trunk-road from Calcutta to
Benares. But wherever and whatever they may have been, these towns were
seldom at peace during the months now under notice. The towns-people and
the surrounding villagers were perpetually affected by rumours that the
mutinous 5th cavalry were coming, or the mutinous 8th infantry, or the
Ramgurh mutineers, or those from Dinapoor. For, it must be borne in
mind, we are now treating of a part of India inhabited chiefly by
Bengalees, a race too timid to supply many fighting rebels—too fond of
quiet industry willingly to belt on the sword or shoulder the matchlock.
They may or may not have loved the British; if not, they would rather
intrigue than fight against them. In the contest arising out of the
mutiny, these Bengalees suffered greatly. The mutineers, joined by the
released vagabonds from the jails, too frequently plundered all alike,
Feringhee and native; and the quiet trader or cultivator had much reason
to dread the approach of such workers of mischief. The Europeans, few in
number, and oppressed with responsibility, knew not which way to turn
for aid. Revenue collectors, with many lacs of the Company’s rupees,
feared for the safety of their treasure. Military officers, endeavouring
with a handful of troops to check the passage of mutineers, were
bewildered by the vague and conflicting intelligence which reached them.
Officials at the dâk-stations, impressed daily by stringent orders from
Calcutta to keep open the main line of road for the passage of English
troops to Upper India, were in perpetual anxiety lest bands of mutineers
should approach and cut off the dâks altogether. Every one begged and
prayed the Calcutta government to send him a few trusty troops; every
one assured the government that the salvation of that part of India
depended on the request being acceded to.
Dorunda, sixty miles south of Hazarebagh, was a scene of violence on the
11th of September. The Ramgurh mutineers destroyed the public and
private buildings at this place, plundered the town, committed great
atrocities on the towns-people, beheaded a native surgeon belonging to
the jail, and marched off in the direction of Tikhoo Ghat, taking with
them four guns and a large amount of plunder and ammunition. Their
apparent intention was to march through the Palamow district, and effect
a junction with Koer Singh, with whom they had been in correspondence.
Only four men of the Ramgurh irregular cavalry were of the party; all
the rest were infantry. The cavalry, remaining faithful as a body,
seized the first opportunity of joining their officers at Hazarebagh.
This was another instance of divergence between the two parts of one
corps, wholly inexplicable to the British officers, who could offer no
reason why the infantry had lapsed, while the cavalry remained faithful.
In this part of India the mutineers were not supported by the zemindars
or landowners, as in other districts; and hence the few British troops
were better enabled to lay plans for the frustration of these workers of
mischief. Captain Fischer, Captain Dalton, Major English, Captain Oakes,
Captain Davies, Captain Rattray, Lieutenant Graham, Lieutenant Birch,
and other officers, were in command of small bodies of troops in this
region during the greater part of the month; these troops consisted of
Madras natives, Sikhs, and a very few British; and the numerous trifling
but serviceable affairs in which they were engaged bore relation to the
regiments which had mutinied at Ramgurh, Bhagulpore, and Dinapoor, and
to the chieftains and marauders who joined those disloyal soldiers.
For the reasons already assigned, however, the British troops were very
few in number; while the Madras troops were so urgently needed in the
more turbulent Saugor provinces, that they could barely be spared for
service in Bengal. Regiments had not at that time begun to arrive very
rapidly from England; the few that did land at Calcutta, were eagerly
caught up for service in the Doab and Oude. In most instances, the aid
which was afforded by English troops to the region now under notice,
depended on a temporary stoppage of a regiment or detachment on its
passage to the upper provinces; in urgent cases, the government ordered
or permitted a small British force to diverge from its direct line of
march, and render aid to a Bengal town or station at a particular
juncture. Such was the case with H.M. 53d foot. Major English, with a
wing of this regiment, had a contest with the Ramgurh mutineers on the
29th of September. He marched from Hazarebagh to Sillis Chowk, where he
heard news of these insurgents; and by further active movements he came
up with them on the 2d of October, just as they had begun to plunder the
town of Chuttra. The mutineers planted two guns so as to play upon the
British; but the latter, in the way which had by this time become quite
common with their comrades in India, determined to attack and take the
guns by a fearless advance. On they went, through rice-fields, behind
rocks and underwood, through lanes and round buildings, running and
cheering, until they had captured four guns in succession, together with
ammunition, ten elephants, and other warlike appliances, and sent the
enemy fleeing. The officers dashed on at the head of their respective
parties of men in a way that astonished the enemy; and the major,
viewing these enterprises with the eye of a soldier, said in his
dispatch: ‘It was splendid to see them rush on the guns.’ His loss was,
however, considerable; 5 killed and 33 wounded out of three companies
only. In addition to military trophies, Major English took fifty
thousand rupees of the Company’s treasure from the mutineers, who, like
mutineers elsewhere, regarded the revenue collections as fair booty when
once they had thrown off allegiance. During the operations of the 53d in
this region—one, in many parts of which British soldiers had never been
seen—an instance was afforded of the dismay into which the civilians
were sometimes thrown by the withdrawal of trusty troops; it was
narrated in a letter written by an officer of that regiment.[106]
The native regiments were often distributed in detachments at different
stations; and it frequently happened—as just adverted to—for reasons
wholly inexplicable to the authorities, that some of those component
elements remained faithful long after others had mutinied. Such was the
case in reference to the 32d B. N. I. Two companies of that regiment,
stationed at Deoghur in the Sonthal district, rose in mutiny on the 9th
of October, murdered Lieutenant Cooper and the assistant-commissary,
looted the bazaar, and then marched off to Rohnee, taking with them
Lieutenant Rennie as a prisoner. Two other companies of the regiment
were at that time _en route_ from Burhait to Soorie, while the
headquarter companies were at Bowsee. The authorities at Calcutta at
once sought to ascertain what was the feeling among the men at the
stations just named; but, pending these inquiries, orders were given to
despatch a wing of H.M. 13th foot from Calcutta to the Sonthal district,
to control the mutineers. Major English was at that time going to the
upper provinces with a detachment of H.M. 53d foot; but he was now
ordered to turn aside for a while, and aid in pacifying the district
before pursuing his journey to Benares. Although the remaining companies
of the native 32d did afterwards take rank among the mutineers, they
were ‘true to their salt’ for some time after the treachery of their
companions had become known.
This 32d mutinous regiment succeeded in crossing the Sone river, with
the intention of joining Koer Singh and the Dinapoor mutineers—a feat
managed in a way that greatly mortified Major English’s 53d. On the 20th
of October the wing of this latter regiment proceeded from Sheergotty to
Gayah, to reassure the uneasy officials at that station; and on the 22d
they started again, to intercept the mutineers. After much hot and
wearying marching, they returned to Gayah, without having encountered
the mutineers, one portion of whom had crossed the Sone. Some days
later, news arrived that the second portion of the 32d, that which had
not at first mutinied, was, in like manner, marching towards the river.
On the 1st of November the 53d started in pursuit, marched thirty miles
during the night to Hurwa, rested a while, marched ten miles further to
Nowada during the evening, and came up with the mutineers in the night.
A skirmish by moonlight took place, greatly to the advantage of the
rebels, who had a better knowledge of the country than their opponents.
The sepoys did not want to fight, they wished to march towards the Sone;
and this they did day after day until the 6th, followed closely all the
way by the British. The pursued outstripped the pursuers, and safely
crossed the river—much to the vexation of the major and his troops. One
of the officers present has said: ‘This was very provoking; for if we
had but caught them, we should have got as much credit for it as for
Chuttra. The country we went through was, for the most part, over swampy
rice-fields; when we gave up the pursuit we had gone 130 miles in 108
hours; and, on our return to Gayah, we had been 170 miles in exactly one
week. After the second day we sent our tents and bedding back; so that
we marched as lightly as possible, and were by that means able to give
the men an occasional lift on the elephants.’
Throughout these miscellaneous and often desultory operations in Bengal,
if the Sikhs had proved faithless, all would have gone to ruin. It was
more easy to obtain a thousand Sikhs than a hundred British, and thus
they were made use of as a sort of military police, irrespective of the
regular regiments raised in the Punjaub. Few circumstances are more
observable throughout the Revolt, than the fidelity of these men.
Insubordination there was, certainly, in some instances, but not in
sufficient degree to affect the character of the whole. Captain
Rattray’s Sikhs have often been mentioned. These were a corps of
military police, formed for rendering service in any part of Bengal; and
in the rendering of this service they were most admirable. The
lieutenant-governor of Bengal, in a paper drawn up early in September,
said: ‘The commandant of the Sikh Police Battalion has pleaded strongly
on his own behalf, and on that of his men, for the assembling of the
scattered fragments of his corps, to enable them to strike such a blow
as to prove the high military spirit and discipline of the regiment. The
urgent necessities which caused the separation of Captain Rattray’s
regiment renders it impossible, in existing circumstances, to call in
all detachments to head-quarters; but its admirable discipline, daring,
and devotion at Arrah and Jugdispore, and its good conduct everywhere,
have fully established its character for soldierly qualities of the
highest order. It would be difficult to exaggerate the value of the
services which it has rendered to the state since the commencement of
the present troubles; and the trust and confidence everywhere reposed in
it, prove that these services are neither underrated nor disregarded. Of
the men, all who have distinguished themselves for conspicuous deeds of
valour and loyalty, have already been rewarded.’ As individuals, too,
the Sikhs were reliable in a remarkable degree, when Hindustanis were
falling away on all sides. When the troubles broke out at Benares, early
in the mutiny, a Sikh chieftain, by name Rajah Soorut Singh, rendered
invaluable service to the British residents, which they did not fail
gratefully to remember at a later period. A few of the Company’s
servants, civil and military, at Benares and other towns in that part of
India, caused to be manufactured by Mr Westley Richards of Birmingham,
for presentation to Soorut Singh, a splendid set of firearms, effective
for use as well as superb in appearance.
We will now cross the Sone, and trace the progress of affairs in the
Bundelcund and Saugor provinces.
It will be remembered, from the details given in former chapters, that
the native inhabitants of Bundelcund, and other regions south of the
Jumna and the Central Ganges, displayed a more turbulent tendency than
those of Bengal. They had for ages been more addicted to war, and had
among them a greater number of chieftains employing retainers in their
pay, than the Bengalese; and they were within easier reach of the
temptations thrown out by Nena Sahib, the King of Delhi, Koer Singh, and
the agents of the deposed King of Oude. Lieutenant (now Captain)
Osborne, the British resident at Rewah, was one who felt the full force
of this state of circumstances. As he had been in August, so was he now
in September, almost the only Englishman within a wide range of country
southwest of Allahabad; the rajah of Rewah was faithful, but his native
troops were prone to rebellion; and it was only by wonderful sagacity
and firmness that he could protect both the rajah and himself from the
vortex.
In a wide region eastward of Rewah, the question arose, every day
throughout September, where is Koer Singh? This treacherous chieftain,
who headed the Dinapoor mutineers from the day of their entering Arrah,
was continually marching about with his rebel army of something like
3000 men, apparently uncertain of his plans—an uncertainty very
perplexing to the British officials, who, having a mere handful of
troops at their disposal, did not know where that handful might most
profitably be employed. On one day Koer Singh, with his brother Ummer
Singh, would be reported at Rotas, on another day at Sasseram; sometimes
there was a rumour of the rebels being about to march to Rewah and
Bundelcund; at others, that they were going to join the Goruckpore
insurgents; and at others, again, that the Dinapoor and Ramgurh
mutineers would act in concert. Wherever they went, however, plunder and
rapine marked their footsteps. At one of the towns, the heirs of a
zemindar, whose estates had been forfeited many years before, levied a
thousand men to aid in seizing the property from the present
proprietors. This was one among many proofs afforded during the mutiny,
that chieftains and landowners sought to make the revolt of the native
soldiery a means for insuring their own private ends, whether those ends
were justifiable or not. The authorities at Patna and elsewhere
endeavoured to meet these varied difficulties as best they could with
their limited resources. They sent to Calcutta all the ladies and
children from disturbed districts, so far as they possessed means of
conveyance. They empowered the indigo-planters to raise small bodies of
police force in their respective districts. They obtained the aid of two
regiments of Goorkhas in the Chumparun district, by which the
restoration of tranquillity might reasonably be expected. They seized
the estates of Koer Singh and Ummer Singh at Arrah, as traitors. They
imposed heavy fines on villages which had sent men to take active part
in the disturbances. Lastly, they used all their energies to protect
that part of the main trunk-road which passes near the river Sone;
seeing that the march of European troops from Calcutta to the upper
provinces would be materially affected by any interruption in that
quarter. The newly arrived British regiments could not go up as an army,
but as small detachments in bullock-wagons, and therefore were not
prepared for sudden encounters with large numbers of the enemy.
The 5th irregular cavalry, who had mutinied in this part of India some
weeks before, continued a system of plundering, levying contributions,
and destroying public property. Every day that transpired, leaving these
daring atrocities unchecked, weakened British prestige, and encouraged
marauders on all sides to imitate the example so fatally set before
them. The authorities felt and acknowledged this; yet, for the reasons
already noticed, they could do little to check it. Captain Rattray, at
the head of a portion of his Sikh police, encountered the 5th irregulars
on the 8th of the month; but, as a cavalry force, they were too strong
for him; they beat him in action, out-generalled him in movement,
released four hundred prisoners from one of the jails, and then marched
west toward the river Sone. The mutinous sowars were subsequently heard
of at Tikane, Daoodnuggur, Baroon, and other places; everywhere
committing great depredations. Thus was a large and important region, on
either side of the main trunk-road, and extending two hundred miles
along that road, kept in a state of daily agitation. The 5th irregular
cavalry in one quarter, Koer Singh in another, and his brothers Ummer
Singh and Nishan Singh in a third, were all busily employed in
depredation; patriotism or nationality had little hold on their thoughts
just then; for they plundered whomsoever had property to lose, without
much regard to race or creed. The government offered large rewards for
the capture of these leaders, but without effect: the rebels generally
resisted this kind of temptation. Opium-crops to the value of half a
million sterling were at that time ripening in the Behar and Arrah
districts alone; and it was feared that all these would be devastated
unless aid arrived from Calcutta.
Mr Wake, and the other civil servants who had so gallantly defended
themselves at Arrah, against an enormous force of the enemy, returned to
that station about the middle of September, to resume their duties; but
as it was feared that Ummer Singh and the 5th irregulars would effect a
junction, and attempt to reoccupy Jugdispore, those officers were
authorised to fall back upon Dinapoor or Buxar, in the event of being
attacked; although they themselves expressed a wish rather to remain at
their posts and fortify themselves against the rebels as they had done
before. The necessity of making this choice, however, did not arise. The
5th cavalry, after their victory over Rattray’s Sikhs, and during their
visits to the towns and villages near the Sone, committed, as we have
just said, every kind of atrocity—plundering houses, levying
contributions, breaking open the zenanas of Hindoo houses, abusing the
women, and destroying property too bulky to be carried away—all this
they did; but for some unexplained reason, they avoided the redoubtable
little band at Arrah.
The Saugor and Nerbudda provinces, of which the chief towns and stations
were Banda, Jaloun, Jhansi, Saugor, Jubbulpoor, Nagode, Dumoh, Nowgong,
Mundlah, and Hosungabad, were, as we have seen, in a very precarious
state in the month of August. At Saugor, so early as the month of June,
Brigadier Sage had brought all the Europeans into a well-armed and amply
provisioned fort, guarded by a body of European gunners, and by the
still faithful 31st regiment of Bengal infantry; and there the Europeans
remained at the close of August, almost cut off from communication with
their fellow-countrymen elsewhere. Jubbulpoor had passed through the
summer months without actual mutiny; but the revolt of the 42d infantry
and the 3d irregular cavalry, at neighbouring stations, and certain
suspicious symptoms afforded by the 52d at Jubbulpoor itself, led Major
Erskine to fortify the Residency, and provision it for six months.
Banda, Jhansi, and Jaloun, had long fallen into the hands of the rebels;
Mundlah and Hosungabad were at the mercy of circumstances occurring at
other places; Nagode would be reliable only so long as the 50th native
infantry remained true; and Dumoh would be scarcely tenable if
Jubbulpoor were in danger. Thus, at the end of August, British supremacy
in the Saugor and Nerbudda territories hung by a thread. The Calcutta
authorities, unable to supply British troops for Bengal or Behar, were
equally debarred from rendering assistance to these territories.
September opened very gloomily for the officers intrusted with duties in
this quarter. The Punjaub and Calcutta could only furnish trustworthy
troops for the Jumna and Doab regions, where the war raged with greatest
fierceness; it was from Madras and Bombay alone that aid could be
expected. Fortunately, the large regions of Nagpoor and Hyderabad were
nearly at peace, and thus a passage could be afforded for troops from
the south which would not have been practicable had those countries been
plunged in anarchy.
Towards the middle of September, Lieutenant Clark, deputy-commissioner
of Jubbulpoor, learned a few facts that put him on the track of a
conspiracy. It came out, on inquiry, that Rajah Shunker Shah, and many
other chieftains and zemindars in the neighbourhood of Jubbulpoor,
acting in concert with some of the sepoys of the 52d B. N. I., intended
to attack the cantonment on the last day of the Mohurrum, murder all the
Europeans, burn the cantonments, and plunder the treasury and city. By a
bold and prompt movement, the chief conspirators were seized on the
14th. The lieutenant, writing to the commissioner of Nagpoor, announced
the result in brief but significant language. ‘I have been fortunate
enough to get conclusive evidence by means of spies, without the
conspirators taking alarm; and this morning, with a party of sowars and
police, bagged thirty, and two rajahs (ringleaders) among them. Of
course they swing. Many of my principal zemindars, and some—I wish I
knew how many—of the 52d, are in the plot.’ In Rajah Shunker’s house,
among other treasonable papers, was found a sort of prayer, invoking his
deity to aid him in the destruction of all Europeans, the overturning of
the government, and the re-establishment of his own power. The paper was
found in a silk bag in which he kept his fan, and was a scrap torn from
a government proclamation issued after the massacre at Meerut. In this
instance, therefore, the official expression of horror and wrath at the
opening scene of the mutiny, instead of deterring, encouraged others to
walk in the same bloody path. The prayer or invocation was afterwards
translated from the Hindee into English, and published among the
parliamentary papers.[107] The execution of the rajah and his son was
something more terrible than was implied by the lieutenant’s curt
announcement, ‘of course they swing.’ It was one among many examples of
that ‘blowing away from guns’ to which the records of the mutiny
habituated English newspaper readers. An officer stationed at Jubbulpoor
at the time, after noticing the complicity of these two guilty men,
describes the execution in a brief but painfully vivid way. ‘At the head
of the conspiracy was Shunker Shah, the Ghond rajah, and his son. Their
place of abode is about four miles from Jubbulpoor. In former days this
family ruled over all this part of the country; they can trace their
descent for sixty generations. The family had been deprived of
everything by the Mahrattas, and were in great poverty when we took
possession. Our government raised them up from this state, and gave them
sufficient to support themselves comfortably; and now they shewed their
gratitude by conspiring against us in our time of sore trial. The family
have neither much property nor power, but the ancient name and prestige
was a point on which to rally.... On the 18th, at 11 o’clock A.M., our
two guns were advanced a few hundred yards in front of the Residency,
covered by a company of the 33d and a few troopers, and it became known
that the Ghond rajah and his son were about to be blown away from the
cannon’s mouth. The old man walked up to the guns with a firm stride;
the son appeared more dejected. The old man, with his snow-white hair
and firm manner, almost excited compassion; and one had to remember,
before such feelings could be checked, how atrociously he intended to
deal with us had his conspiracy succeeded; the evidence of his guilt was
overwhelming. All was over in a few minutes. The scattered remains were
pounced upon by kites and vultures, but what could be collected was
handed over to the ranee.’
Although Lieutenant Clark was thus enabled, by mingled caution and
decision, to frustrate the atrocious plot of which Jubbulpoor was to
have been the theatre, he could not prevent the mutiny of the 52d native
regiment. That corps revolted, albeit without perpetrating the cruelties
and rapine intended. It was on the 18th that this rising took place, the
troops at once marching off quietly towards Dumoh. One old subadar they
tied on a horse, because he did not wish to join, and because they did
not choose to leave him behind. It was supposed that the 52d had gone
towards Dumoh, to capture guns there, and then return to plunder
Jubbulpoor. Two days before this, namely, on the 16th, the greater part
of the 50th regiment Bengal infantry threw off allegiance. Being
stationed at Nagode, they suddenly rose, released the prisoners from the
jail, burned the bungalows, and rendered the place no longer safe for
Europeans. Mr Ellis and the other civilians fled to Paunna, while
Colonel Hampton and the other military officers made their escape
towards Jokhie—leaving every vestige of their property behind, except
the clothes on their backs. Two companies of the regiment, remaining
faithful, accompanied their officers safely to Mirzapore, a journey
which occupied them twelve days.
The Europeans at Dumoh, a civil station on the road from Saugor to
Jubbulpoor, were thrown into much tribulation by news of these mutinies
at other places. When both the 50th and 52d regiments had ‘gone’—a term
that acquired much significance in India at that time—Major Erskine,
chief-commissioner of the Saugor and Nerbudda territories, who happened
to be at Dumoh, summoned a council of war on the 20th of September, to
consider what was best to be done. It was resolved that Dumoh could not
long be held against any considerable body of mutineers; and that
advantage should be taken of the temporary presence of a column of
Madras native troops to employ that column as an escort for the
civilians and the Company’s treasure from Dumoh to Jubbulpoor. There was
a detachment of the still faithful 31st at Dumoh; and this was sent to
join the main body of the regiment at Saugor, to be out of the way of
temptation from mutinous sepoys.
This convoy of men and money from Dumoh led to a smart military
encounter. The Madras movable column which afforded the required
protection numbered about 500 men of all arms, under Colonel Miller.
Leaving Dumoh on the 21st, and being much obstructed in passing the
river Nowtah, Colonel Miller reached Sigrampore on the 26th; where he
heard that the main body of the mutineers were at Konee, on the banks of
a river which the column would need to cross on its way to Jubbulpoor.
The colonel at once despatched a force of about 100 men, under
Lieutenant Watson, to secure the boats on the river; but the enemy
baffled this officer, who had much difficulty in preserving his men.
Miller then advanced with his whole column, met the enemy, and fought a
brief but decisive battle, which ended in the utter rout of the rebel
sepoys. If it had been a purely military affair, the colonel was strong
enough to defeat a more numerous body of the enemy; but he was hampered
by the presence of civilians, treasure, and 120 sepoys of the 52d, who
had been disarmed at Dumoh on news of the revolt of the main body, and
whom it was necessary to take with the column. It was, indeed, a strange
state of things; for the disarmed men were of course eager enough to
rush over and join their companions of the same regiment.
It is not matter for censure if men placed in authority at different
stations, in time of peril, occasionally differed concerning the
relative importance of those stations. Thus, when the 50th and 52d
native regiments mutinied, a question arose which principal city, Saugor
or Jubbulpoor, should be regarded as a last stronghold in the event of
the British being nearly overpowered. Major Erskine, at Jubbulpoor,
urged the claims of that city, as having certain facilities for the
receipt of reinforcements, should such happily be afforded; and as
having many European women and children within the fort, who could not
be removed without danger. Brigadier Sage, on the other hand,
urged—‘Whatever you do, let me retain Saugor. It is the key to Central
India. It has a good fort and magazine. It is provisioned for six or
eight months for three hundred men, and has thirty thousand maunds of
grain in addition. It has a siege-train, which will fall into the hands
of the enemy if we leave the place. It contains 170 women and children,
who could not be withdrawn without danger.’ In such or similar words was
the retention of Saugor advocated. The discussion happily ended by both
towns being retained. Those officials of the Company, military or civil,
who resolutely fortified, instead of abandoning their positions, were in
most instances rewarded with success—unless the enemy were in unusually
overwhelming force.
Nearly all parts of the Saugor and Nerbudda territories were in wild
confusion at the close of September. The Kamptee column of Madras troops
had, as we have just seen, broken up the 52d mutineers; but still those
rebels lay concealed in jungles, ready for mischief whenever an
opportunity might offer; while the Madrasses, distracted by many
applications from different quarters, had been unable to prevent the
mutinous 50th regiment, at Nagode, from marching off to join the
Dinapoor mutineers near Banda. At Saugor, Brigadier Sage and the British
were safe, because they were in a strong and well-provisioned fort, and
because the 31st native infantry exhibited no signs of disaffection;
nevertheless the whole country around was in the hands of rebellious
chieftains. On one occasion he sent out the greater part of his force to
attack the Rajah of Bankipore at Nurriowlee, ten miles from Saugor; but
the attack was unskilfully made—it failed, and greatly lowered British
prestige in the neighbourhood.
As in September, so in October, these provinces were held by a very
slender tie. Nearly all the chiefs of Bundelcund, on the border, were
ready to rise in rebellion at news of any discomfiture of the British.
Numerous thakoors had risen, and, with their followers, were plundering
the villages in every direction. At Jubbulpoor, Hosungabad, Nursingpore,
Jaloun, Jhansi, Saugor, Mundlah, Dumoh, there was scarcely an English
soldier; and the presence of a few hundred Madras troops alone stood
between the authorities and frightful anarchy. Indeed, Jaloun, Jhansi,
and Dumoh were out of British hands altogether. The commissioner of
Nagpoor was unable to send up any more Madrasses from the south; Mr
Grant was unable to send any from Benares; the independent and
half-distrusted state of Rewah lay on one border; the thoroughly
rebellious state of Banda on another—and thus Major Erskine looked with
gloomy apprehensions on the fate of the provinces under his charge. As
the month drew to a close, his accounts were still more dismal. In one
letter he said: ‘The mass of native chiefs disbelieve in the existence
of a British army; and nothing but the presence of troops among them
will convince them of their error.’ Again find again were such messages
and representations sent to Viscount Canning, as chief authority in
India; again and again did he announce that he had no British troops to
spare. To Major Erskine’s letters he replied that he ‘must say broadly
and plainly that he would consider the sacrifice of the garrison in
Lucknow as a far greater calamity and reproach to the government than an
outbreak of the Rewah or Bundelcund states, even if followed by
rebellion and temporary loss of our authority in our own territories on
the Nerbudda.’ At the close of the month, Koer Singh and the Dinapoor
mutineers were somewhere between Banda and Calpee; while Captain
Osborne-one of the most remarkable men whom the Indian Revolt brought
into notice—still maintained his extraordinary position at Rewah.
We pass now further to the west—to the cities and towns on the Jumna
river, and to the regions of Central India between that river and
Bombay. Here, little need detain us until we come to Agra. Futtehpoor,
Cawnpore, and Futteghur, though not in Oude, were on its frontier, and
were involved in the fortunes of that province. Captain Peel’s movements
with his naval brigade, in the Doab, may be left for treatment in
connection with the affairs of Lucknow.
Agra experienced a loss early in September, in the death of John Russell
Colvin, the lieutenant-governor of the Northwest Provinces. He fell from
sickness, brought on mainly by the intense anxieties arising out of his
position. He was a remarkable man, a true specimen of those civilians
developed into usefulness by the unique policy of the East India
Company. In England a public man becomes a statesman through a multitude
of minor and exceptional causes; in India, under the Company’s ‘raj,’
statesmen were educated professedly and designedly for their work. In
England, we have seen the same statesman transferred from the Exchequer
to the India Board, and from thence to the Admiralty, as if the same
kind of knowledge were required for all three situations; in India, the
statesman’s education bore more close relation to the duties of the
offices he was likely to fill. No defects in the Company’s government,
no evils arising out of ‘traditional policy,’ no favouritism or
nepotism—can blot out the fact that the system brought out the best
qualities of the men in their service. Well will it be if the imperial
government, in future ages, is served so faithfully, skilfully, and
energetically in India as the Company’s government, during the last
half-century, has been served by the Malcolms, Metcalfes, Munros, Birds,
Thomasons, Elphinstones, Montgomerys, Outrams, Lawrences, and
Colvins—most of them civilians, whose apprenticeship to Indian
statesmanship began almost from boyhood.
Mr Colvin, whose death has suggested the above few remarks, had seen as
much political service as almost any man in India. He was born in
Calcutta, the son of a merchant engaged in the Calcutta trade. After
receiving his education in England, and carrying off high honours at
Haileybury, he went to India in the Company’s service in 1826; and for
thirty-one years was seldom free from public duties, mostly special and
local. The number of offices he served in succession was remarkably
large. He was assistant to the registrar of the Sudder Court at
Calcutta; assistant to the British resident at Hyderabad;
assistant-secretary in the revenue and judicial department at Calcutta;
secretary to the Board of Revenue in the Lower Provinces; private
secretary to Governor-general Lord Auckland; British resident in Nepaul;
commissioner of the Tenasserim provinces; judge of the Sudder Court; and
lastly, lieutenant-governor of the Northwest Provinces—ruler over a
territory containing as many inhabitants as the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Ireland. All these offices he filled in succession, and the
first eight qualified him for the onerous duties of the ninth and last.
Throughout the mutiny, the only point on which Mr Colvin differed from
Viscount Canning was in the policy of the proclamation issued on the
25th of May. It was at the time, and will ever remain, a point fairly
open to discussion, whether Colvin’s proclamation[108] was or was not
too lenient towards the rebellious sepoys. If Canning’s decision partook
more of that of John Lawrence, it is equally certain that Colvin’s views
were pretty nearly shared by Henry Lawrence, in the early stages of the
mutiny. Irrespective of this question of the proclamation, Colvin’s
position at Agra was one of painful difficulty. He was not so successful
as Sir John Lawrence in the Punjaub, and his name has not found a place
among the great men whom the mutiny brought into notice; but it would be
unfair to leave unnoticed the circumstances which paralysed the ruler of
Agra. A distinguished civilian, who knew both Colvin and Lawrence, and
who has written under the assumed name of ‘Indophilus,’ thus compares
the position of the two men: ‘Colvin, with a higher official position,
had less real command over events than his neighbour in the Punjaub.
John Lawrence ruled a people who had for generations cherished a
religious and political feud with the people of Hindostan Proper; and
Delhi was, in Sikh estimation, the accursed city drunk with the blood of
saints and martyrs. John Colvin’s government was itself the focus of the
insurrection. Lawrence may be said to have been his own
commander-in-chief; and after a European force had been detached to
Delhi immediately on the outbreak, he still had at his disposal seven
European regiments, including the one sent from Bombay to Moultan,
besides European artillery and a local Sikh force of about 20,000
first-rate irregulars of all arms. Colvin was merely the civil governor
of the Northwest Provinces; and as the posts (dâks) were stopped, he
could not even communicate with the commander-in-chief, with whom the
entire disposal of the military force rested. Lawrence had three days’
exclusive knowledge by telegraph of what had taken place at Meerut and
Delhi, during which interval he made his arrangements for disarming the
sepoy regiments stationed in the Punjaub. Colvin had no warning; and the
military insurrection had actually broken out within his government, and
the mutineers were in possession of Delhi, before he could begin to act;
but he promptly and vigorously did what was in his power.’ We have seen
in former chapters what course Mr Colvin adopted between May and
August.[109] He opened communications with the authorities all around
him, as soon as he knew that the mutiny had begun; he disarmed the 44th
and 67th native infantry on the 1st of June; he raised a corps of
volunteer horse for service in the neighbourhood; he organised a
foot-militia among the civilians and traders, for the protection of the
city; and he kept a close watch on the proceedings of the Gwalior
mutineers. In July occurred the mutiny of the troopers of the Kotah
Contingent; then the ill-managed battle outside Agra on the 5th; then
the shutting up of Mr Colvin and six thousand persons within the fort;
and then the passing of two weary months, during which the
lieutenant-governor was powerless through his inability to obtain trusty
troops from any quarter whatever. His health and spirits failed, and he
died on the 9th of September—still hemmed within the walls of the fort
at Agra. Mr Reade, the leading civilian, assumed authority until orders
could be received from Calcutta; Colonel Frazer afterwards received the
appointment—not of lieutenant-governor of the Northwest Provinces, for
that government had by this time disappeared under the force of the
mutiny—but of chief-commissioner at Agra. Viscount Canning, in a
government order, gracefully and properly acknowledged the merits of Mr
Colvin.[110]
[Illustration:
Camp within the Fort, Agra.—From a Photograph.
]
The Europeans resident in Agra, after Mr Colvin’s decease, were still
unable to liberate themselves; for Delhi had not yet fallen, nor had
English prestige been yet restored by Havelock’s success at Lucknow. The
English officers felt their enforced idleness very irksome. They, like
all the other Europeans, were confined within the fort; no daring
military exploits could be looked forward to hopefully, because there
ware scarcely any troops to command. For three months the Gwalior
mutineers had been their _bête noir_, their object of apprehension, as
being powerful and not far distant. They occasionally heard news from
Gwalior, but of too uncertain a nature to satisfy their doubts. Early in
September one of the officers wrote: ‘A portion of the rebel army of
Gwalior has marched; but their intentions are not yet known. They still
say they are coming to turn us out of the fort, and perform all sorts of
gallant deeds. Had they come at first, they would have given us a good
deal of trouble, as we were not prepared for a siege—guns not mounted,
magazines not shell-proof, provisions not in sufficient quantity, and
(worst of all) two thousand women and children without any protection
from the enemy’s fire. All this is now being rapidly remedied, and now
we could stand a siege with comfort. One of the greatest wants is that
of tobacco; the soldiers have none; and few men know so well as they do
the comfort of a pipe after a hard day’s work, whether under a broiling
sun or in drenching rain.’ The British officers at Agra were embittered
by becoming acquainted with the fact, that many influential natives now
in rebellion were among those who made the most fervent demonstrations
of loyalty when the mutiny first began.
Of the affairs of Delhi we shall speak presently. Meanwhile, it may be
well to describe the movements of a distinct corps, having its origin in
the capture of that city. Although General Wilson seized all the gates
and buildings of the imperial city one by one, he could not prevent the
escape of the mutineers from the southern gate, the opposite to that
where the siege-works had been carried on. By the 21st of September,
when the conquest was completed, large bodies of the rebels were far
away, on their march to other scenes of struggle. The chief body marched
down the right bank of the Jumna on the Muttra road, with the intention
of crossing over into the Doab. Brigadier Showers was sent with a force
to pursue another body of rebels in another direction; but the
operations now under notice were those of the column under Colonel E. H.
Greathed (of H.M. 8th foot), organised at Delhi on the 23d of
September—about 3000 strong.[111] Starting on the 24th, Greathed crossed
the Jumna, and marched towards Bolundshuhur. Here a body of fugitive
mutineers was encountered on the 28th. A sharp action ensued, which
ended in the flight of the enemy, leaving behind them two guns and much
ammunition. As a consequence of this defeat, a newly set-up rajah, one
Waladad Khan, abandoned the fort of Malagurh, and fled. It was in the
blowing-up of this fort, by order of the colonel, that Lieutenant Home,
who had so distinguished himself at the storming of the Cashmere Gate,
was killed. One of his brother-officers said in a letter: ‘The loss of
poor Home has thrown a cloud over all our successes. He was brave among
brave men, and an honour to our service.’ Greathed advanced day after
day, burning villages which were known to have been nests of insurgents.
In one of those places, Koorjah, he found the skeleton of a European
woman, the head cut off, and the legs hacked and cut. On the 5th of
October, the column reached Allygurh, scoured through the town, and cut
up a large body of rebels, taking eleven guns from them. Greathed was at
Akerabad the next day, where Mungal Singh and his brother had raised the
standard of rebellion; but these chieftains were killed, as well as most
of their retainers. On the 9th, he reached Hattrass. At this place his
movements were suddenly disturbed; he had intended to march down the
Doab to aid Havelock, Outram, and Inglis; but now news from Agra reached
him that led to a change of plan. To understand this, attention must be
turned to the state of affairs in the Mahratta dominions of Scindia, the
northern boundary of which approached very near Agra.
From the day when Scindia’s Gwalior Contingent rose in mutiny against
British authority, on the 14th of June, nothing but the personal
faithfulness of Scindia himself prevented the mutineers from joining
their compatriots at Delhi or elsewhere. Every British officer being
driven away from Gwalior, the powerful army forming the Contingent might
easily have made itself master of all that part of the Mahratta
dominions; but Scindia, by a remarkable exercise of steadiness and
shrewdness, kept them near him. He would not make himself personally an
enemy to them; neither, on the other hand, would he express approval of
their act of mutiny. He still remained their paymaster, and held his
power over them partly by keeping their pay in arrear. All through the
months of July and August did this singular state of affairs continue. A
few detachments of the Contingent had marched off from other stations,
but the main body remained quiet. The Indore mutineers from Holkar’s
Contingent had for some time been encamped near them at Gwalior, much
against Scindia’s inclination. Early in September the two bodies
disagreed concerning future plans—the Indore men wishing to speed to
Delhi, the Gwalior men to Cawnpore. Some of the maharajah’s own troops,
distinct from the Contingent, were seduced from their allegiance by the
Indore men, and marched off with them on the 5th, with seven guns and a
good store of ammunition. Some of the budmashes or vagabonds of Gwalior
joined them; but the Gwalior Contingent proper still remained quiet near
that city. This quietness, however, did not promise to be of long
continuance. On the 7th, the native officers went to Scindia, and
demanded from him food and conveyance for a march either to Agra or to
Cawnpore. The maharajah’s response not being satisfactory to them, they
began to seize oxen, buffaloes, mules, horses, camels, and carts from
the neighbouring villagers, and a few elephants from the richer men.
Some violence against Scindia himself appeared probable; but he found
the main body of his own little army disposed to remain faithful, and
hence the Contingent had little inducement to attack him. The landowners
in the neighbourhood offered to aid him with their retainers, thus
lessening the danger to which he might otherwise have been exposed.
About the middle of the month a fierce struggle seemed imminent; but
Scindia and his supporters continued firm, and the Contingent did not
for some time attempt any manœuvre likely to be serious to the British.
We can therefore follow the steps of the other army of mischief-workers.
When the miscellaneous body of Indore mutineers, Gwalior traitors, and
budmashes left Gwalior, they proceeded towards the river Chumbul, which
they crossed on the 7th of September, and then took possession of the
fort of Dholpore, a place about thirty miles from Agra—at the point
where the trunk-road from Delhi to Bombay crosses the Chumbul, and
therefore a very important spot in relation to any arrival of
reinforcements for the British. In that very week the final bombardment
of Delhi began; and if the mutineers had marched thither, they might
seriously have embarrassed General Wilson’s operations. They appear,
however, to have remained near Dholpore, supporting and strengthening
themselves by plunder in the neighbouring region. When Delhi fell, and
its defenders escaped, the Dholpore mutineers—as we may now conveniently
call them—had no motive for marching towards the imperial city; but,
near the close of the month, they began to lay plans for an attack on
Agra.
When October arrived, Mr Reade, and Colonels Cotton and Frazer, had to
direct their attention not only to these Dholpore mutineers, but to
dangerous neighbours from other quarters. A glance at a map will shew
that when mutineers and marauders escaped from Delhi towards the Lower
Ganges, Agra would necessarily be not far from the line of route. When,
therefore, the authorities at the last-named city heard of the fall of
Delhi, they naturally looked with some anxiety to the course pursued by
the fugitives. They speedily heard that a crowd of mutineers, fanatics,
felons, and miscreants of every description, had found their way to
Muttra, and were engaged in constructing a bridge of boats over the
Jumna; in order, as appeared probable, to open a communication with the
Indore or Dholpore mutineers. Hence the extreme anxiety of the Agra
authorities that Greathed’s column, in pursuit of the fugitive rebels,
should march down the right instead of the left bank of the Jumna, in
order to aid Agra, and cut off the communication with Dholpore; and
hence great disappointment, when it was found that the active leader of
that column was marching rapidly on towards Cawnpore—without thinking of
Agra. At such a time, each officer naturally thought first and
principally of the safety of the city or station for which he was
responsible; and the commanders of movable columns were often
embarrassed by conflicting requisitions from different quarters.
[Illustration:
LIEUTENANT HOME, Bengal Engineers.
]
Such was the state of feeling in Agra at the end of September. Early in
October, matters became more serious. The authorities received news that
an attack on Agra was meditated by the rebels—comprising the 23d B. N.
I. and the 1st B. N. C. of the Indore Contingent, from Mhow; a part of
the fugitive forces from Delhi; and malcontents from Dholpore and the
neighbourhood. Means were immediately sought for frustrating this
attack. The rebels were known to be on the advance on the 6th; it was
also known that on that day Colonel Greathed had arrived with his column
at Akrabad, one day’s march from Allygurh, on his way towards Cawnpore.
It was thereupon resolved to obtain the aid of Greathed at Agra, before
he further prosecuted his march. This energetic officer, who was rapidly
following up a fugitive brigade from Delhi, very unwillingly postponed
an object on which he had set his heart; but the danger to Agra becoming
very imminent, he turned aside to lend his aid at that point. After
marching forty-four miles in twenty-eight hours—a tremendous achievement
in an Indian climate—Greathed arrived at the parade-ground of Agra on
the morning of the 10th of October. Before his tired troops could enjoy
even three hours’ rest, they found themselves engaged in battle with the
enemy, who suddenly attacked their camp. The rebels made a spirited dash
with their cavalry, and opened a brisk fire with artillery half hidden
behind luxuriant standing corn. Not a moment did Greathed delay. He
moved to the right with a view of outflanking the enemy and capturing
their guns on that side; and his arrangements in other quarters soon
enabled him to charge and capture the enemy’s guns and standards. On
they went, the mutineers retreating and Greathed following them up,
until he reached a village three miles out on the Gwalior road. Here
Colonel Cotton came up, and assumed the command; the infantry drove the
rebels to the five-mile point, and the cavalry and artillery continued
the pursuit; until at length the enemy were utterly routed. They lost
twelve guns, and the whole of their tents, baggage, ammunition, and
vehicles of every description. It was a complete discomfiture. Colonel
Greathed obtained, and deservedly, high praise for the celerity and
energy of his movements. By the time the battle and pursuit were over,
his cavalry had marched sixty-four and his infantry fifty-four miles in
thirty-six hours; while Captain Bourchier’s 9-pounder battery had come
in from Hattrass, thirty miles distant, during the night without a halt.
Greathed’s loss in the action was 11 killed and 56 wounded. It was a
strange time for the mutineers to make an attack on Agra. During the
siege of Delhi, Wilson could not have spared a single regiment from his
siege-camp, nor could any other general have brought resources to bear
on the relief of Agra; whereas now, in this second week of October,
Greathed with a strong column was within two days’ march of the city. If
they were not aware of this fact, then was their information less
complete than usual; if they hoped to check his advance down the Doab,
then did they wofully underrate his strength and gallantry.
While tracing briefly the progress of the movable column after this
battle of Agra, it may be well to advert to a source of vexation that
sometimes presented itself during the wars of the mutiny, at Agra as
elsewhere. Many of the gallant men concerned in struggling against the
mutineers were occasionally much perplexed by questions of seniority, at
times and places when they could refer for solution neither to the
governor-general nor to the commander-in-chief. Such was the case in
reference to Greathed’s column. General Gowan in Sirhind, General Penny
at Delhi, the chief-commissioner at Agra, all had some authority in
military matters in the Northwest Provinces. Colonel Cotton, at Agra,
finished the battle which Greathed began—not because it had been badly
fought, but because Cotton was senior to Greathed. Again, while Greathed
was marching quickly and fighting valiantly on the road to Cawnpore,
after the battle of Agra, Colonel Hope Grant of the 9th Lancers, made
brigadier in order that he might assume higher command, was sent out
from Delhi viâ Agra to supersede him—not because he was a better officer
than Greathed, but because he was senior in rank. Grant joined the
column on the 19th of October, and became its leader. The change caused
a busy paper-war between the generals and commissioners who had made the
respective appointments, and who could not, at such a troubled time,
rightly measure the relative strength of their own claims to authority.
Whether under Hope Grant, however, or under Greathed, the column was in
good hands. On the 19th, the column marched twenty-four miles, and
entered Minpooree. A native rajah had long ruled that place during the
anarchy of the provinces; but no sooner did he hear of the approach of
the British than he fled—leaving behind him several guns, 14,000 pounds
of powder, 230,000 rupees, and much other property, which had been taken
from the Company’s officers when the mutiny began. There was no
fighting, only a re-occupation. After another severe punishment of the
rebels at Kanouge on the 23d, the column marched towards Cawnpore, which
was reached on the 26th.
Returning to the affairs of the various Mahratta states, it may now be
mentioned that the Gwalior Contingent did at last, in the month of
October, make a move. They marched slowly and heavily (six regiments,
four batteries, and a siege-train), leaving Gwalior on the 15th, and
advancing eastward towards Jaloun and Calpee, as if with the intention
of crossing the Jumna at the last-named place into the Doab; but the
month came to an end without any serious demonstration on their part.
Had Nena Sahib been as bold and skilful as he was vicious, he might have
wrought great mischief to the English at this time. If he had placed
himself at the head of the Gwalior Contingent (which was fully
expected), and had marched with them southward through Bundelcund to the
Saugor and Nerbudda territories, he would have picked up rebellious
Bundelas at every village, and have advanced towards the Nerbudda in
such strength as to render it very doubtful whether the available Madras
and Bombay troops could have confronted him. He had ambition enough to
place himself at the head of all the Mahratta princes, but neither skill
nor courage for such a position. So far as concerns Agra, the residents
continued in the fort, in no great danger, but too weak in military to
engage in any extensive operations. The only contest, indeed, during the
rest of the month was on the 28th, when a party from the fort sallied
out, and dispersed a body of rebels assembled at Futtehpore Sikri.
The wide region comprised within the political limits of the Mahratta
and Rajpootana states was in a very disturbed condition during September
and October. Besides the Gwalior Contingent in Scindia’s dominions,
there were Holkar’s Contingent, the Bhopal and Kotah Contingents, the
Jhodpore legion, and other bodies of native troops, the partial mutiny
of which kept the country in perpetual agitation. All Bengal troops were
sources of mischief, for they were the very elements among which the
disaffection grew up; European troops could be sent neither from
Calcutta nor the Punjaub; and therefore it depended either on Bombay or
Madras (chiefly the former) to send troops by whom the insurgents could
be put down. These troops, for reasons already sufficiently explained,
were few in number; and it was a work of great difficulty to transfer
them from place to place where anarchy most prevailed; indeed, the
commanding officers were often distracted by appeals to them from
various quarters for aid—appeals incompatible one with another.
Colonel Lawrence had a contest with the mutineers of the Jhodpore
legion, about the middle of September, in Rajpootana. He marched to and
through various places, the names of which have hardly been heard of in
England, such as Beaur, Chiliamas, Barr, Peeplia, Bugree, Chaputtia, and
Awah; these movements took place between the 14th and the 18th of the
month; and on the last-named date he encountered the rebels at Awah. He
had with him 200 of H.M. 83d foot, 250 Mhairwara battalion, two
squadrons of Bombay native cavalry, and 5 guns. It was an artillery
attack on both sides, lasting three hours. Lawrence seems to have
distrusted his own strength; he would not bring his infantry and cavalry
into action, fearful of losing any of his men just at that place and
time. In short, his attack failed; the rebels retained hold of Awah, and
Lawrence, finding his supplies running short, retired to Beaur. The
rebels had the guns of the legion with them, and worked them well. It
was an untoward affair; for the Rajah of Jhodpore, friendly to the
English, had just before met with a defeat of his own troops by the same
legion, in an action which involved the death of Captain Monck Mason,
the British resident; and now prestige was still further damaged by the
retreat of Lawrence after a desultory action. The colonel had come with
a small Bombay column to Ajmeer, to watch the movements of rebels in and
near Ajmeer, Nuseerabad, Awah, and other places in that part of
Rajpootana; and any discomfiture at such a time was likely to afford a
bad example. At Kotali, Neemuch, Mundisore, Mehidpore, Indore, Mhow,
Bhopal, &c., an uneasy feeling similarly prevailed, arising out of
disturbances too small to be separately noticed here, but important as
indicating a wide belt of disaffected country between the Jumna and the
Bombay presidency. The strange character of the whole of that region, in
a political sense, was well expressed by an English officer, who,
writing from Neemuch, said: ‘This station is in the heart of Rajpootana,
a country abounding in and surrounded by native states which compose
anything but one family, and between any two of which it is very
difficult to determine at any given time what relation exists. There are
Holkar’s troops, and Scindia’s troops, and Salomba’s troops, and the
mercenary troops of Odeypore, the Kotah Contingent, the Jeypoor,
Jhodpore, Meywar, and Malwar corps, and a host more; and when any little
dispute arises in the country, a sort of jumble takes place between
these bodies, during which two of them at least are pretty sure to come
into collision.’ These petty quarrels among the chieftains were
sometimes advantageous to the British; but the soldiery were so strongly
affected with mutinous tendencies, that a friendly rajah could seldom
give practical value to his friendliness.
It is unnecessary to notice in detail the petty military operations of
that region. No great success attended any of them. One was at Nimbhera,
or Nimbhaira, between Neemuch and Nuseerabad. Here a contest took place
on the 20th of September, in which a native rajah was worsted by Colonel
Jackson and 350 miscellaneous troops. Another occurred some weeks later,
when the Mundisore insurgents, on the 22d of October, made an attack on
Jeerun, a town about ten miles from Neemuch. A force of about 400 men
was at once sent out from this station, chiefly Bombay native troops,
but headed by 50 of H.M. 83d foot, under Captains Simpson, Bannister,
and Tucker. The enemy were found drawn up in force. Tucker brought two
guns and a mortar to bear upon them, and sent his infantry to attack the
town; but the enemy checked them by overpowering numbers, and captured
the mortar. The cavalry now made an attack, followed by the infantry,
and the mortar was speedily retaken. The enemy were driven into the
fort, and their fire entirely silenced. The Neemuch force was not strong
enough to take the fort at that time, but the insurgents evacuated it
during the night, and marched off. The encounter was rather severe to
the British officers engaged; for two of them (Captains Tucker and Read)
were killed, and five wounded. The miscreants cut off Captain Tucker’s
head as soon as he had fallen.
One of the most pathetic stories of that period had relation, not to a
battle or a wholesale slaughter, but to the assassination of a father
and two sons under very cowardly and inexplicable circumstances. Major
Burton was British political agent at Kotah, a Rajpootana state of which
the chief town lies northeast of Neemuch—a situation he had filled for
thirteen years, always on friendly terms with the native rajah and the
people generally. He had been four months at Neemuch, but returned to
Kotah on the 12th of October, accompanied by two sons scarcely arrived
at manhood. On the 15th, two regiments of the rajah’s native army
revolted, and surrounded the Residency in which Major Burton and his
sons had just taken up their abode. What followed may best be told in
the words of a third son, Mr C. W. Burton, of Neemuch.[112]
Let us on to Delhi, and watch how the imperial city fared after the
siege.
As soon as the conquest had been completely effected, on the 21st of
September,[113] it became necessary to make arrangements for the
internal government of the city, irrespective of any more permanent or
important appointments. Colonel Burn was made military governor. This
officer had been thirty years in the Company’s service—first in the
Bengal native infantry; then in raising three native regiments on the
Afghan frontier; next in the operations of the Afghan war; then in those
of the Sikh war; afterwards as secretary to the commissioners of the
Punjaub; and, lastly, as an officer in Nicholson’s movable column.
Colonel Burn being made military governor of Delhi, Colonel Innes
received the appointment of commandant of the palace. Mr Hervey Harris
Greathed, who had been appointed civil commissioner for Delhi as soon as
the murder of Mr Simon Fraser on the 11th of May became known, lived
through all the vicissitudes of the siege, but sank through illness
almost as soon as the victorious army entered the imperial city; he was
succeeded in his office by Mr Saunders. Another change may here be
mentioned. General Wilson, worn out by his anxieties and labours in the
siege-camp, retired two or three weeks after the conquest, for the
recovery of his health in the hill-country, and was succeeded in the
supreme command at Delhi by General Penny—subject to any more
authoritative change by order of the Calcutta government.
Within, the city of Delhi was a very desolation. Nearly all the native
inhabitants left it, in dread lest the English soldiers should retaliate
upon them the atrocities perpetrated by the insurgents upon defenceless
Europeans. The authorities had no wish for the immediate return of these
people, until it could be ascertained to what extent the traders and
working population had connived at the rebellion of the sepoys. Even
many weeks after all fighting had ceased in and near the city, one of
the officers wrote of the state of Delhi in the following terms: ‘Every
wall or bastion that faced our camp is in almost shapeless ruin; but the
white marble pavilions of the palace rise unharmed along the Jumna’s
bank. In one of these live the.... There is no describing the beauty and
quaintness of their rooms. I long for photographs to send home. They are
all of inlaid marble, with semianahs pitched in the zenana courts
between. But all around speaks of awful war—the rows on rows of captured
guns—the groups of English soldiers at every post; and not English only,
for our brave defenders the Goorkhas, Sikhs, and Punjaubees mingle among
them. A strange army indeed, with not a trace of pipeclay! It is a
frightful drive from the palace to the Cashmere Gate—every house rent,
riven, and tottering; the church battered, and piles of rubbish on every
side. Alas! the burnt European houses and deserted shops! Desolate
Delhi! and yet we are told it is clearing and much improved since the
storming of the place. It has only as yet a handful of inhabitants in
its great street, the Chandnee Chowk, who are all Hindoos, I believe.
Many miserable wretches prowl through the camps outside the city begging
for admission at the various gates; but none are admitted whose
respectability cannot be vouched for. Cart-loads of ball are being daily
dug out from the Moree Bastion, now a shapeless, battered mass.’
The conquerors of Delhi, wishing to prevent for ever the imperial city
from becoming a stronghold for rebels, proposed to destroy at once all
the fortifications. The Calcutta government, on receiving news of the
final capture, telegraphed to General Wilson to the following effect:
‘The governor-general in council desires that you will at once proceed
to demolish the defences of Delhi. You will spare places of worship,
tombs, and all ancient buildings of interest. You will blow up, or
otherwise destroy all fortifications; and you will so far destroy the
walls and gates of the city as to make them useless for defence. As you
will not be able to do this completely with the force at present
available at Delhi, you will select the points at which the work may be
commenced with the best effect, and operate there.’ After General Wilson
had retired, and General Penny had assumed command at Delhi, information
reached Sir John Lawrence at Lahore of the intended demolition. He
evidently did not approve of the plan in its totality, and suggested
delay even in commencing it, until further orders could be received from
Calcutta. He thus telegraphed to Delhi on the 21st of October: ‘I do not
think any danger could arise from delay. If the fortifications be
dismantled, I would suggest that it be done as was the case at Lahore;
we filled in the ditches by cutting down the glacis, lowered the walls,
and dismantled the covering-works in front of the gates and bastions. A
wall of ten or twelve feet high could do no harm, and would be very
useful for police purposes. Delhi, without any walls, would be exposed
to constant depredations from the Meeras, Goojurs, and other predatory
races. Even such a partial demolition will cost several lacs of rupees
and take a long time; at Lahore it cost two lacs, and occupied upwards
of two years.’
One subject connected with the capture of Delhi was curiously
illustrative of the state of the public mind as exhibited during the
autumn of 1857. Anything less than a sanguinary retaliation for the
atrocities committed by the natives in India was in many quarters
regarded almost as a treasonable shrinking from justice. Kill, kill,
kill all—was the injunction implied, if not expressed. Among the British
residents in India this desire for blood was so strong, that it
distempered the judgment of persons otherwise amiable and generous.
Instead of acting on the principle that it is better for a few guilty to
escape than for one innocent man to be punished, the doctrine
extensively taught at that time reversed this rule of conduct. It is of
course not difficult to account for this. The feelings of those who, a
few short months before, had been peacefully engaged in the usual
Anglo-Indian mode of life, were suddenly rent by a terrible calamity.
Husbands, brothers, sons—wives, sisters, daughters—were not only put to
death unjustly, but the black deed was accompanied by brutalities that
struck horror into the hearts of all survivors. It was not at such a
time that men could judge calmly. The subject is mentioned here because
it points to one of the difficulties, almost without parallel in
intensity, that pressed upon the nobleman whose fate it was to govern
India at such a time. Every proclamation or dispatch, issued by Viscount
Canning, which contained instructions to the Company’s officers tending
to leniency towards any of the dark skins, was misquoted,
misrepresented, violently condemned, and attributed to what in bitter
scorn was called the ‘clemency of Canning.’ It required great moral
courage, at such a time, to form a definite plan of action, and to
maintain it in spite of clamour. Differences of opinion on these
difficult matters of state policy are of course reasonable enough; the
point is mentioned here only in its historical relation to an almost
frenzied state of public opinion at a particular time.
[Illustration:
COLONEL BURN, Military Governor of Delhi.
]
The treatment of the King of Delhi was one of the subjects connected
with this state of feeling. When taken a prisoner, the dethroned monarch
was not shot. ‘Why is this?’ it was asked. Because Captain Hodson
promised the king his life if he would surrender quietly. For a long
time this gallant officer was an object of violent abuse for this line
of conduct. ‘Why did Hodson dare to do this?’ was the inquiry. It was
not until evidence clear and decisive had been afforded, of General
Wilson’s sanction having been given to this proceeding, that the subject
fell into its proper place as one open to fair and temperate discussion.
Again, letters written anonymously at Delhi appeared in the Calcutta
newspapers, announcing that the ex-royal family were treated with the
most obsequious deference; and the ‘clemency’ was again contrasted with
the ‘righteous demand for blood.’ So much of this as was untrue
gradually fell out of repute; and then the simple fact became known that
the king was to be tried as a traitor, but was not to be treated as a
felon until found guilty. Mrs Hodson, wife to the officer who effected
the capture, paid a visit to the royal captives, which she described in
a highly interesting letter to an English relation, afterwards made
public; whatever else it shewed, it afforded no indication that the aged
profligate was treated with a degree of luxurious attention offensive to
the European residents of the place.[114]
For all else, Delhi furnished nothing calling for special notice during
the six weeks following the siege.
Of two columns, despatched from Delhi to pursue and punish the rebels
after the siege, that under Colonel Greathed has already been noticed. A
second, under Brigadier Showers, was engaged throughout October, mostly
west and northwest of Delhi. Some of the petty rajahs between the Jumna
and the Sutlej were in an embarrassing position; they would have drawn
down on their heads eventual defeat by the British if they joined the
rebels; while they were in immediate danger from the enmity of marauders
and mutineers if they remained faithful to the British. To their credit
be it said, most of them remained true to their treaties; they assisted
the British in a time of trouble to the extent of their means.
Especially was this the case in relation to the Rajahs of Jheend and
Putialah, without whose friendly aid it would have scarcely been
possible for Sir John Lawrence to send reinforcements from the Punjaub
to General Wilson at Delhi. An exception was afforded by the Rajah of
Jhujjur, whose treacherous conduct earned for him a severe defeat by
Brigadier Showers about the middle of October. That officer was, later
in the month, actively engaged in defeating and punishing rebels at
Sonah, Bullubgurh, and other places.
Of the country north and northeast of Delhi, little need be said.
Rohilcund was almost wholly in the hands of the rebels during September
and October. In the districts of Bareilly, Boodayoun, Mooradabad,
Shahjehanpoor, and Bijnour, the English might be reckoned by tens—so
fierce had been the tempest which had swept them away. Happily Nynee Tal
still remained a refuge for many non-combatants, who could not yet be
safely removed to Calcutta or Bombay. Khan Bahadoor Khan—a notorious
offender whose name has more than once been mentioned in these pages,
and who, after being a well-paid deputy-collector in the Company’s
service, shewed his gratitude by committing great atrocities as
self-elected Nawab of Bareilly—planned an attack on Nynee Tal about the
middle of September. He sent a force of 800 men, under his nephew, Nizam
Ullie Khan. Major Ramsey, however, speedily mustered 300 Goorkhas, and
about 50 miscellaneous volunteers and troopers; this force, sallying
forth from Nynee Tal on the 18th, encountered the Bareilly rebels at
Huldwanee, near the foot of the hills, and gave so effective a defeat to
them as to prevent any repetition of the attack for a very long time.
All around the district of Meerut the movements of the rebels were
sensibly checked by the fact that that important military station still
remained in the hands of the British. After the first day of outbreak
(10th of May), Meerut was provisioned and intrenched in such a way as to
render it safe from all attacks, especially as the garrison had a good
store of artillery; and as small bands of trusty troops could
occasionally be spared for temporary expeditions, the mutineers were
kept from any very near approach to Meerut itself. The chief annoyance
was from the Goojurs and other predatory tribes, who sought to reap a
golden harvest from the social anarchy around them.
Happily, the extreme northwest remained nearly at peace. The Punjaub,
under the firm control of Sir John Lawrence, although occasionally
disturbed by temporary acts of lawlessness, was in general tranquil. A
few English troops ascended from Kurachee by way of the Indus and
Moultan; and a few native regiments came from Bombay and Sinde; but the
Sikhs and Mussulmans of the Punjaub itself were found to be for the most
part reliable, under the able hands of Cotton and Edwardes. In Sinde a
similar state of affairs was exhibited: a few isolated acts of
rebellion, sufficient to set the authorities on the alert without
seriously disquieting them. On one occasion a company of native
artillery was disarmed at Hydrabad, on suspicion of being tainted with
disloyalty. On another occasion the 21st native infantry was disarmed at
Kurachee, because twenty or thirty of the men displayed bad symptoms.
And on another, a few men of the 16th native infantry were detected in
an attempt to excite their companions to mutiny. All these instances
tended to shew, that if Sinde had been nearer to Hindostan or Oude, the
Bengal portion of the army there stationed would in all probability have
revolted; but being in a remote region, and among a people who had few
sympathies with Brahmin sepoys, the incendiarism died out for lack of
fuel.
Happily, again, the southern or peninsular portion of India was left
nearly free from the curse of rebellion during the two months now under
notice in Mysore, in the various provinces of the Madras presidency, in
the South Mahratta country, and in the provinces around Bombay, the
disturbances were few. In the Deccan, the Nizam and his prime minister
remained stanch throughout; and although the city of Hyderabad was kept
in much commotion by fanatical moulvies and fakeers, and by turbulent
Rohillas and Deccanees, there was no actual mutiny of entire regiments,
or successful scheme of rebellion. At Ahmedabad, midway between Bombay
and the disturbed region of Rajpootana, one of those terrible events
occurred on the 26th of October—a blowing away of five men from guns.
All the officers whose duty it was to attend on those fearful occasions
united in hoping that such a sight might never again meet their eyes.
[Illustration:
Ruins near Kootub Minar, Delhi.
]
-----
Footnote 105:
‘I told off my men rapidly, and formed them into parties, so as
completely to surround and cover every outlet and corner. The main
party, consisting mostly of my own particular sharpshooters and
body-guard, watched the front; another moved towards the town, there
to arrest an educated Bengalee, agent to the conspirators; another to
the rear, to cut off escape towards the town; while my friend the
Political crept quietly past some outhouses with his police, and under
the palace walls awaited my signal for opening the ball.
‘Before long the ominous barking of a disturbed cur in the direction
of the party sent after the prime-minister proclaimed that no time was
to be lost. Off I went towards the guard-shed in front of the palace,
my personal sharpshooters following at the double. The noise, of
course, awoke the sleeping guard, and as they started up from their
slumbers I caught one firmly by the throat; the little Goorkha next me
felled with a but-end blow another of them while they were getting to
arms, I having strictly forbidden my men to fire until obliged; the
remainder, as we rushed in, took to flight, and my eager party wished
to fire on them, which I prevented, not considering such valiant game
worth powder and shot. In the darkness and confusion, no means of
entrance could at once be found. My police guide, however, having been
often in the palace, knew every room in it, and, thrusting himself in
at a door, acted ferret to perfection, and by dint of activity, soon
brought me into the presence of the rajah, who, though young in years,
is old in sin: he refused to surrender or admit any one—a resolution
which cooled instanter on my calling my men to set fire to the palace;
he then with a bad grace delivered up to me his state-sword. A shout
from the opposite doors proclaimed an entry there. The queen-mother
and the rest of the female royalty and attendants were seized while
trying to descend on that side. Then came a chorus of shouting and
struggling, and bawling for lights and assistance; at last, a lamp
being procured, we proceeded to examine the palace: we wandered in
dark passages and cells, while I mounted a guard at every door. The
air being confined and heated within the royal residence, I sat
outside until after daybreak, and then proceeded to rummage for papers
and letters; several boxes of these we appropriated, and counted out
his treasure, all in gold vessels and ingots; we found a quantity of
arms, spiked some guns, one of them of French make; all day we were
hard at work, searching and translating papers. The prime-minister was
found at his house, fast asleep. In the heat of the afternoon, we went
to his residence in the town, and by dint of keeping fans going over
us, carried out a thorough search. We did not get as many of his
papers as we wanted, he having been told by his correspondents to
destroy all letters after reading them.
‘At sunset I carried off my prisoners over the same bad ground by
which we had so stealthily arrived. We were followed by about 2000
infuriated Mussulmans, crying, praying, and prostrating themselves to
the object of their lingering hope of rebellion (the rajah), but we
drove them off.’
Footnote 106:
‘The ejected civilians from Dorunda had come on ahead and offered our
small party breakfast, which we gladly accepted. While waiting until
it was ready, the chief-commissioner got an electric-telegraph
dispatch from the governor-general, ordering the whole of the 53d
party under Major English back again to the main trunk-road. You never
saw anything like the long faces they all had at this announcement;
for the commissioner had just had intelligence on which he thought he
could rely, that the mutineers were still kept at bay by the party at
the pass, through which they must get through to effect their escape
from us; and they did not think that 250 Madras sepoys with two guns
would be sufficient to attack 850 desperate men caught in a trap.
Moreover, the retirement of the Europeans would run like wildfire
through the district; and I heard them all say they would not answer
for what might happen.’ The column _did_ advance to Dorunda, and
dispersed the miscreants; but it had to hasten to other regions, and
then—‘All the residents are very much disgusted at our going back, as
the moral effect of our arrival must be great, the natives here having
as much idea of a European soldier as they have of a whale, never
having seen either; and the fact of their being put as prisoners under
a European guard frightens them more than a thousand deaths.’
Footnote 107:
Shut the mouth of slanderers, bite and
Eat up backbiters, trample down the sinners,
You, _Sutrsingharka_.
Kill the British, exterminate them,
_Mat Chundee_.
Let not the enemy escape, nor the offspring of such,
Oh, _Singharka_.
Shew favour to Shunker!
Support your slave!
Listen to the cry of religion,
_Mathalka_.
Eat up the unclean!
Make no delay!
Now devour them,
And that quickly,
_Ghormatkalka_.
The words in italics are various names of the goddess Devee or Deva,
‘the destroyer.’
Footnote 108:
See p. 111.
Footnote 109:
Chap. vii., pp. 109-111. Chap. x., pp. 173, 174. Chap. xvii., pp.
282-286.
Footnote 110:
‘It is the melancholy duty of the Right Honourable the
Governor-general in Council to announce the death of the Honourable
John Russell Colvin, the lieutenant-governor of the Northwest
Provinces.
‘Worn by the unceasing anxieties and labours of his charge, which
placed him in the very front of the dangers by which of late India has
been threatened, health and strength gave way; and the
Governor-general in Council has to deplore with sincere grief the loss
of one of the most distinguished among the servants of the East India
Company.
‘The death of Mr Colvin has occurred at a time when his ripe
experience, his high ability, and his untiring energy would have been
more than usually valuable to the state.
‘But his career did not close before he had won for himself a high
reputation in each of the various branches of administration to which
he was at different times attached, nor until he had been worthily
selected to fill the highest position in Northern India; and he leaves
a name which not friends alone, but all who have been associated with
him in the duties of government, and all who may follow in his path,
will delight to honour.
‘The Right Honourable the Governor-general in Council directs that the
flag shall be lowered half-mast high, and that 17 minute-guns shall be
fired at the seats of government in India upon the receipt of the
present notification.’
Footnote 111:
H.M. 8th foot.
H.M. 75th foot.
2d Punjaub infantry.
4th Punjaub infantry.
H.M. 9th Lancers.
1st Punjaub cavalry.
2d Punjaub cavalry.
5th Punjaub cavalry.
Two troops horse-artillery.
Light field-battery.
Pearson’s 9-pounder battery.
Footnote 112:
‘The political agent was himself the first to discover their approach;
and, as he had only returned to Kotah three days previously from an
absence of four months, he believed the number of people he saw
advancing merely to be some of the chief subordinates coming to pay
him the usual visit of ceremony and respect. In a second he was
cruelly undeceived. The mutineers rushed into the house; the servants,
both private and public, abandoned him with only one exception (a
camel-driver); and the agent, his boys, and this one solitary servant
fled to the top of the house for safety, snatching up such few arms as
were within their reach. The fiends pursued; but the cowardly ruffians
were driven back for the time by the youngest boy shooting one in the
thigh. When there, they naturally hoped the agency-servants or their
own would have returned with assistance from the chief; but no—all
fled, and no help came. In the meantime, the mutineers proceeded to
loot the house, and they (the major and his sons) saw from their
position all their property carried away. A little while and two guns
were brought to play upon the bungalow, the upper part of which caught
fire from the lighted sticks which the miscreants from time to time
threw up. Balls fell around them, the little room at the top fell in,
and they were yet unhurt—and this for five long and weary hours. Major
Burton wished to parley with the mutineers, in the hope they would be
contented if he gave himself up, and allow his boys to escape; but his
children would not allow of such a sacrifice for their sakes; and like
brave men and good Christians, they all knelt down and uttered their
last prayers to that God who will surely avenge their cause. All now
seemed comparatively quiet, and they began to hope the danger over,
and let down the one servant who was still with them on a mission to
the Sikh soldiers and others, who were placed by the chief for the
personal protection of the agent round his bungalow, and of whom at
the time there were not less than 140, to beg of them to loosen the
boat, that an escape might be attempted across the river. They said:
“We have had no orders.” At this moment a shot from a pistol was
fired. Scaling-ladders had been obtained, the murderers ascended the
walls, and the father and his sons were at one fell stroke
destroyed.... The maharajah was enabled to recover the bodies of the
agent and both his sons in the evening, and they were carefully buried
by his order. Dr Salder’s house was attacked at the same time with the
agency-house. He was cut down outside, in sight of the agent, as was
also Mr Saviell, the doctor of the dispensary in the city, and one or
two others whose names are not certain.’
Footnote 113:
Chap. xviii., pp. 295-315.
Footnote 114:
‘There is a report, which has been mischievously set about, and may
have mischievous consequences—namely, that the king has the whole of
his retinue, and has returned to his own apartments in the palace.
‘This is perfectly untrue. I went with Mr Saunders, the civil
commissioner, and his wife, to see the unfortunate and guilty wretch.
We mounted a flight of stone steps, at the bottom and top of which was
a European sentry. A small low door opened into a room, half of which
was partitioned off with a grass-matting called chitac, behind which
was a woman cooking some atrocious compound, if I might judge from the
smell. In the other half was a native bedstead—that is, a frame of
bamboo on four legs, with grass-rope strung across it; on this was
lying and smoking a hookah an old man with a long white beard; no
other article of furniture whatever was in the room, and I am almost
ashamed to say that a feeling of pity mingled with my disgust at
seeing a man recently lord of an imperial city, almost unparalleled
for riches and magnificence, confined in a low, close, dirty room,
which the lowest slave of his household would scarcely have occupied,
in the very palace where he had reigned supreme, with power of life
and death, untrammelled by any law, within the precincts of a royal
residence as large as a considerable-sized town; streets, galleries,
towers, mosques, forts, and gardens, a private and a public hall of
justice, and innumerable courts, passages, and staircases. Its
magnificence can only be equalled by the atrocities which have been
committed there. But to go back to the degraded king. The boy, Jumma
Bukht, repeated my name after Mr Saunders. The old man raised his head
and looked at me, then muttered something I could not hear, and at the
moment the boy, who had been called from the opposite door, came and
told me that his mother, the begum, wished to see me. Mrs Saunders
then took possession of me, and we went on into a smaller, darker,
dirtier room than the first, in which were some eight or ten women
crowding round a common “charpoy” or couch, on which was a dark, fat,
shrewd, but sensual-looking woman, to whom my attention was
particularly drawn. She took hold of my hand—I shuddered a little—and
told me that my husband was a great warrior; but that if the king’s
life and her son’s had not been promised them by the government, the
king was preparing a great army which would have annihilated us. The
other women stood round in silence till her speech was finished, and
then crowded round, asking how many children I had, and if they were
all boys; examined my dress, and seemed particularly amused by my
bonnet and parasol. They were, with one exception, coarse, low-caste
women, as devoid of ornament as of beauty. Zeenat Mahal asked me—a
great honour, I found, which I did not appreciate—to sit down on her
bed; but I declined, as it looked so dirty. Mr Saunders was much
amused at my refusal, and told me it would have been more than my life
was worth six months before to have done so; and I have no doubt of
it.’
[Illustration:
Lucknow, from the Observatory.
]