CHAPTER XVIII.

THE SIEGE OF DELHI: FINAL OPERATIONS.

After eleven weeks of hostile occupation, after seven weeks of

besieging, the great city of Delhi still remained in the hands of a

mingled body of mutineers and rebels—mutineers who had thrown off their

soldierly allegiance to their British employers; and rebels who

clustered around the shadowy representative of an extinct Mogul dynasty.

Nay, more—not only was Delhi still unconquered at the end of July; it

was relatively stronger than ever. The siege-army had been increased;

but the besiegers had increased in number in a still larger ratio.

General Anson[78] had had thirteen days of command, in reference to the

preparations for the reconquest of the city, before his death; General

Barnard, forty, before he likewise died; General Reed, twelve, before

his retirement; General Wilson, thirteen, by the end of July; and now

the last-named commander was called upon to measure the strength with

which he could open the August series of siege-operations.

It may be convenient slightly to recapitulate a few events, and to

mention a few dates, connected with the earlier weeks of the siege, as a

means of refreshing the memory of the reader concerning the train of

operations which, in the present chapter, is to be traced to an end.

It will be remembered, then, that as soon as the startling mutinies at

Delhi and Meerut became known to the military authorities at the

hill-stations, the 75th foot were ordered down from Kussowlie, the 1st

Europeans from Dugshai, and the 2d Europeans from Subathoo—all to

proceed to Umballa, there to form portions of a siege-army for Delhi;

that a siege-train was prepared at Phillour; that Generals Anson and

Barnard, and other officers, held a council of war at Umballa on the

16th of May, and concerted such plans as were practicable on the spur of

the moment; and that troops began at once to march southeastward towards

Delhi. We have further seen that Anson was troubled by the presence of

Bengal native troops whom he could not trust, and by the scarcity of

good artillerymen to accompany his siege-train; and that his operations

were suddenly cut off by a fatal attack of cholera, under which he sank

on the 27th. Next we traced twelve days’ operations of Sir Henry

Barnard, during which he had advanced to Raneeput, Paniput, Rhye,

Alipore, Badulla Serai, and Azadpore, to the ridge northward of Delhi,

on which he established his siege-camp on the 8th of June; he had just

been joined by General Wilson, who had beaten the enemy at Ghazeeoodeen

Nuggur, and had crossed the Jumna from Meerut near Bhagput. Then came

the diversified siege-operations of the month of June, with a force

which began about 3000 strong, aided by 22 field-guns and 17 siege-guns

and mortars—the arrival on the 9th of the Guide corps, after their

surprising march in fiercely hot weather from Peshawur; the bold attack

made by the rebels on the same day; the manifest proofs that the

siege-guns were too light, too few, and too distant, to batter the

defences of the city; the commencement on the 13th, but the speedy

abandonment as impracticable, of a project for storming the place; the

continual arrival of mutineers to swell the number of defenders within

Delhi; the daily sallies of the enemy; the daily weakening of the small

British force; and the necessity for employing one-half of the whole

siege-army on picket-duty, to prevent surprises. We have seen how Hindoo

Rao’s house became a constant target for the enemy’s guns, and Metcalfe

House for attacks of less frequency; how Major Reid, with his Goorkhas

and Guides, guarded the ridge with indomitable steadiness, and made

successful attacks on the Eedghah and Kissengunje suburbs; and how

sedulously Barnard was forced to watch the movements of the enemy in the

rear of his camp. Passing from June to July, the details of the former

chapter told us that the siege-army became raised to about 6000 men, by

various reinforcements early in the last-named month; that an assault of

the city was again proposed, and again abandoned; that insurgent troops

poured into Delhi more rapidly than ever; that Sir Henry Barnard died on

the 5th, worn down by anxiety and cholera; that numerous canal-bridges

were destroyed, to prevent the enemy from gaining access to the rear of

the camp; that the British were continually thrown on the defensive,

instead of actively prosecuting the siege; that the few remaining Bengal

native troops in the siege-army were either sent to the Punjaub, or

disarmed and unhorsed, in distrust of their fidelity; that on the 17th,

General Reed gave up the command which had devolved upon him after the

death of Barnard, and was succeeded by Brigadier-general Wilson; and

that towards the close of the month the enemy made many desperate

attempts to turn the flanks and rear of the siege-camp, requiring all

the skill of the British to frustrate them.[79]

August arrived. The besieged, in every way stronger than the besiegers,

continued their attacks on various sides of the heights. They gave

annoyance, but at the same time excited contempt by the manner in which

they avoided open hand-to-hand conflicts. An officer of engineers,

commenting on this matter in a private letter, said: ‘At Delhi, they are

five or six to one against us, and see the miserable attempts they make

to turn us out of our position. They swarm up the heights in front of

our batteries by thousands; the ground is so broken and full of ravines

and rocks, that they can come up the whole way unseen, or you may depend

upon it they would never venture. If they had the pluck of a goose,

their numbers might terrify us. It is in the Subzee Mundee that most of

the hard fighting goes on; they get into and on the tops of the houses,

and fire into our pickets there; this goes on until we send a force from

camp to turn them out, which we invariably do, but not without loss. We

have now cleared the ground all around of the trees, walls, and houses;

as a consequence, there is a large clear space around our pickets, and

Pandy will not venture out of cover; so we generally let him pop away

from a distance until he is tired.’ Early in the month, an attempt was

made to destroy the bridge of boats over the Jumna; the rains had set

in, the river was high, the stream strong, and these were deemed

favourable conditions. The engineers started three ‘infernal machines,’

each consisting of a tub containing fifty pounds of powder, a stick

protruding from the tub, and a spring connected with an explosive

compound; the theory was, that if the tubs floated down to the bridge,

any contact with the stick would explode the contents of the tub, and

destroy one or more of the boats of the bridge; but there is no record

of success attending this adventure. The bridge of boats being a mile

and a half distant from the batteries on the ridge, it could not be

harmed by any guns at that time possessed by the British; and thus the

enemy, throughout the siege, had free and unmolested passage over the

Jumna. The supply of ammunition available to the mutineers seemed to be

almost inexhaustible; the British collected 450 round shot that had been

fired at them from the enemy’s guns in one day; and as the British

artillerymen were few in number, they were worked nearly to exhaustion

in keeping up the necessary cannonade to repel the enemy’s fire.

Although the ‘Pandies’ avoided contests in the open field, many of their

movements were made with much secrecy and skill—especially that of the

1st of August, when at least 5000 troops appeared in the vicinity of the

British position, by a combined movement from two different quarters,

and made an attack which nothing but the courage and skill of Major Reid

and his handful of brave fellows could have withstood. In some of these

numerous operations, when the rainy season commenced, the amount of

fatigue borne by the troops was excessive. It was the special duty of

the cavalry, not being immediately available for siege-services, to

guard the rear of the camp from surprise; and to insure this result,

they held themselves ready to ‘boot and saddle’ at a few minutes’

notice—glad if they could insure only a few hours of sleep in the

twenty-four. Many an officer, on picket or reconnoitring duty, would be

in the saddle twelve hours together, in torrents of rain, without food

or refreshment of any kind. Yet, with all their trials, they spoke and

wrote cheerfully. An artillery-officer said: ‘Our position here is

certainly by nature a wonderfully secure one; and if the Pandies could

not have found a better place than Delhi as the head-quarters of their

mutiny, with an unlimited magazine at their disposal, I doubt if _we_

could have been so well off anywhere else. Providence has assisted us in

every way. From the beginning, the weather has been most propitious; and

in cantonments I have never seen troops so healthy as they are here now.

Cholera occasionally pays us a visit, but that must always be expected

in a large standing camp. The river Jumna completely protects our left

flank and front; while the large jheel (water-course) which runs away to

the southwest is at this season quite impassable for miles, preventing

any surprise on our right flank; so that a few cavalry are sufficient as

a guard for three faces of our position’—that is, a few, if constantly

on the alert, and never shirking a hard day’s work in any weather.

The enemy gradually tired of attacks on the rear of the camp, which

uniformly failed; but they did not cease to maintain an aggressive

attitude. Early in the month, they commenced a series of efforts to

drive the British from the Metcalfe post or picket. This Metcalfe House,

the peaceful residence of a civil-service officer until the disastrous

11th of May, had become an important post to the besiegers. As early as

four days after the arrival of the siege-army on the ridge, the enemy

had emerged from the city, concealed themselves in some ravines around

Sir T. Metcalfe’s house, and thence made a formidable attack on the

Flagstaff Tower. To prevent a recurrence of this danger, a large picket

was sent to occupy the house, and to form it into a river-side or left

flank to the siege-position. This picket was afterwards thrown in

advance of the house, and divided into three portions—one on a mound

near the road leading from the Cashmere Gate to the cantonment Sudder

bazaar; a second in a house midway between this mound and the river; and

a third in a range of stables close to the river. All the portions of

this picket were gradually strengthened by the engineers, as

reinforcements reached them. The Flagstaff Tower was also well guarded;

and as the night-sentries paced the whole distance between the tower and

the Metcalfe pickets, the belt of rugged ground between the ridge and

the river was effectually rendered impassable for the enemy. These

various accessions of strength, however, were made only at intervals, as

opportunity offered; at the time now under notice, they were very

imperfectly finished. The enemy plied the Metcalfe picket vigorously

with shot and shell, from guns brought out of the Cashmere Gate and

posted a few hundred yards in advance of the city wall; while a number

of infantry skirmishers, many of whom were riflemen, kept up a nearly

incessant fire from the jungle in front. Although the losses at the

Metcalfe picket were not numerous, owing to the good cover, the approach

to it for reliefs, etc., was rendered extremely perilous; and as this

species of attack was in many ways annoying to the British, General

Wilson resolved to frustrate it. He placed under the command of

Brigadier Showers a force of about 1300 men,[80] by whom the insurgents

were suddenly surprised on the morning of the 12th, and driven off with

great loss. It was a sharp contest, for the brigadier had more than a

hundred killed and wounded. Showers himself was in the list of wounded;

as were also Major Coke, Captain Greville, Lieutenants Sherriff, James,

Lindesay, Maunsell, and Owen. Four guns belonging to the enemy were

captured and brought into camp; but the chief advantage derived from the

skirmish was in securing the abandonment of a mode of attack likely to

be very annoying to the besiegers. The insurgents, it is true, by

placing guns on the opposite side of the Jumna, frequently sent a shot

or shell across; but the danger here was lessened by shifting the camp

of the 1st Punjaub infantry.

That the siege-army was weakened by these perpetual encounters, need

hardly be said. Every day witnessed the carrying of many gallant fellows

to the camp-hospital or to the grave. At about the middle of August, the

force comprised 3571 European officers and men, and 2070 native officers

and men, fit for duty; with 28 horse-artillery guns (6 and 9 pounders)

and a small supply of siege-artillery. A detail of the component

elements of the force, and of the ratio which the effectives bore to the

sick and wounded, will be more usefully given presently in connection

with the September operations. Knowing well from dearly-bought

experience that he could not successfully assault and capture Delhi with

his present force, General Wilson looked anxiously for reinforcements

from the Punjaub, which were due about the middle of the month. Indeed,

all in camp were prepared to welcome one who, from the daring and energy

which characterised nearly all the operations with which he had been

intrusted, had earned from some the title of the ‘Lion,’ from others

that of the ‘Bayard,’ of the Punjaub. This was Brigadier-general

Nicholson, a soldier who had attained to that rank at an unusually early

age. About the end of June, Sir John Lawrence had intrusted to him a

flying column which had been organised at Wuzeerabad,[81] but which had

undergone many vicissitudes; for Nicholson had been compelled to disarm

all the Bengal native troops who were in his column. As we have seen in

former pages, the brigadier struck terror into the mutineers, and swept

away bands of rebels in front and on either side of him in the region

between the Chenab and the Sutlej. He nearly annihilated the Sealkote

mutineers near Goordaspore,[82] and then cleared the country during a

long march, in fearfully hot weather, to Delhi. He himself with a few

companions reached the city on the 8th of August; but the bulk of his

column did not arrive till the 14th. Its composition had undergone some

change; and it now comprised H.M. 52d foot, the remaining wing of the

61st foot, the 2d Punjaub infantry, 200 Moultan horse, and a small force

of artillery—in all, about 1100 Europeans and 1400 Punjaub troops.

Valuable, however, as was this accession of strength, it could not

immediately affect the siege-operations; seeing that it was necessary to

await the arrival of another siege-train, which Sir John Lawrence had

caused to be collected at Ferozpore, and which was on its way to Delhi,

with great stores of ammunition.

As soon as General Wilson found himself aided by the energetic

Nicholson, he gave additional efficiency to his army by grouping the

infantry into four brigades, thus constituted: _First_ brigade, under

Brigadier Showers, H.M. 75th foot, 2d Bengal Europeans, and the Kumaon

battalion of Goorkhas; _Second_, under Colonel Lenfield, H.M. 52d foot,

H.M. 60th Rifles, and the Sirmoor battalion of Goorkhas; _Third_, under

Colonel Jones, H.M. 8th foot, H.M. 61st foot, and Rothney’s Sikhs;

_Fourth_, under Brigadier Nicholson, 1st Bengal Europeans, 1st Punjaub

infantry (Coke’s rifles), and 2d Punjaub infantry (Green’s Rifles). The

Guides were not brigaded, but were left free for service in any quarter.

The cavalry was placed under Brigadier Grant, and the artillery under

Brigadier Garbett. Nicholson had brought with him a few guns;

nevertheless it was necessary, as just remarked, to wait for a regular

siege-train before a bombardment of the city could be attempted. The

camp, organised as it now was, although it put on a somewhat more

regular appearance than before, was a singular phenomenon, owing to the

mode in which European and Asiatic elements were combined in it. An

officer who was present through all the operations has given, in a

letter which went the round of the newspapers, a graphic account of the

camp, with its British and native troops, its varieties of costume, its

dealers and servants, its tents and animals, and all the details of a

scene picturesque to an observer who could for a moment forget the stern

meaning which underlay it.[83] About the time of Nicholson’s arrival,

Lieutenant Hodson was intrusted by General Wilson with an enterprise

small in character but useful in result. It was to watch a party of the

enemy who had moved out from Delhi on the Rohtuk road, and to afford

support, if necessary, either to Soneeput or to the Jheend rajah, who

remained faithful to his alliance with the British. Hodson started on

the night of the 14th of August with a detachment of about 350 cavalry,

comprising 230 of the irregular horse named after himself, 100 Guide

cavalry, and a few Jheend cavalry. The enemy were known to have passed

through Samplah on the way to Rohtuk; and Hodson resolved to anticipate

them by a flank-movement. On the 15th, at the village of Khurkowdeh, he

captured a large number of mutineer cavalry, by a stratagem at once bold

and ingenious. On the 16th the enemy marched to Rohtuk, and Hodson in

pursuit of them. On the 17th skirmishes took place near Rohtuk itself;

but on the 18th Hodson succeeded in drawing forth the main body of

rebels, who suffered a speedy and complete defeat. They were not simply

mutineers from Delhi; they comprised many depredatory bodies that

greatly troubled such of the petty rajahs as wished to remain faithful

to or in alliance with the British. Lieutenant Hodson, by dispersing

them, aided in pacifying the district around the siege-camp—a matter of

much consideration. A letter from one of the officers of the Guides will

afford a good idea of the manner in which all fought in those stirring

times, and of the language in which the deeds were narrated when the

formality of official documents was not needed.[84]

For ten days after Nicholson’s arrival, little was effected on either

side save this skirmish of Hodson’s at Rohtuk. Wilson did not want to

begin; it was not his strategy; he steadily held his own until the

formidable siege-train could arrive. On the other hand, the enemy were

foiled in every movement; all their attacks had failed.

Nicholson was on the alert to render good service; and the opportunity

was not long in presenting itself. His energy as a soldier and his skill

as a general were rendered very conspicuous in his battle of Nujuffghur,

resembling in its tactics some of those in which Havelock had been

engaged. General Wilson obtained intelligence that a force of the enemy

was advancing from Delhi towards Bahadoorghur, with the apparent

intention of attacking the siege-camp in the rear; the distance between

the city and the town being about twenty miles, and the latter being

nearly due west of the former. Or, as seems more probable (seeing that

all attacks on the rear of the camp had signally failed), the enemy may

have intended to cross the Nujuffghur jheel or water-course, and

intercept the siege-train which they as well as the British knew to be

on the way from Ferozpore. One account of the matter is, that Bukhtar

Singh, a rebel who had gained unenviable notoriety at Bareilly, had got

into disfavour with the King of Delhi for his want of success as one of

the military leaders within the city; that he had offered, if a good

force were only placed at his disposal, to wipe off the discredit by a

crowning victory over the Feringhees; and that, in pursuance of this

object, he proposed to get in rear of the siege-camp, intercept the

expected siege-train, capture it, and cut off all communication between

the camp and Umballa. Whatever may have been the main purpose, the

expeditionary force was of considerable strength, amounting to 7000 men,

and comprising the whole or large portions of six mutinied infantry

regiments, three of irregular cavalry, and numerous artillery. The

general, on receipt of this information, at once placed a column[85]

under the command of Brigadier Nicholson, with instructions to frustrate

the operations of the enemy. The brigadier started at daybreak on the

25th of August, crossed two difficult swamps, and arrived at Nanglooe, a

village about midway between Delhi and Bahadoorghur. During a halt and a

reconnoitre, it was found that the enemy had crossed a bridge over the

Nujuffghur jheel, and would probably encamp in the afternoon near the

town of the same name. Nicholson determined to push on against them that

same evening. After another ten-mile march, during which his troops had

to wade through a sheet of water three feet deep, he came up with the

enemy about five o’clock, and found them posted in a position two miles

in length, extending from the bridge to the town: they had thirteen

guns, of which four were in a strong position at an old serai on their

left centre. The brigadier, after a brief reconnaissance, resolved first

to attack the enemy’s left centre, which was their strongest point, and

then, ‘changing front to the left,’ sweep down their line of guns

towards the bridge. His guns having fired a few rounds, the critical

moment for a charge arrived; he addressed his men, told them what a

bayonet charge had always been in the British army, and

shouted—‘Advance!’ The infantry charged, and drove the enemy out of the

serai with great impetuosity. He then changed front to the left, and so

completely outflanked the enemy that they fled at once from the field,

leaving thirteen guns behind them. While this was being done, Lieutenant

Lumsden advanced to Nujuffghur, and cleared it of insurgents. A small

number of the enemy concealed themselves in the neighbouring village of

Nuglee; and when attacked, in a way that left no loophole for escape,

they fought so desperately as to bring down a considerable number of

Lumsden’s party, including the lieutenant himself. The enemy’s cavalry

effected little or nothing; while Nicholson’s was employed chiefly in

guarding baggage and escorting guns. Nicholson passed the night near the

bridge, which had been the object of a fierce attack and defence during

the evening, and which he succeeded in blowing up about two o’clock in

the morning—thus cutting off one of the few approaches by which the

mutineers from the city could get to the main line of road behind the

camp. Nicholson returned to camp on the 26th, after a few hours’ rest

for his exhausted troops. They had indeed had a hard day’s labour on the

25th; for they marched eighteen miles to the field of battle—starting at

daybreak, and crossing two difficult swamps before they could arrive at

Nanglooe; and, to use the words of their commander in his dispatch, ‘as

it would not have been prudent to take the baggage across the ford at

Baprowla, they were obliged, after fourteen hours’ marching and

fighting, to bivouac on the field without food or covering of any kind.’

There seems to have been something wrong here. One of the officers has

said: ‘Unfortunately, through some mistake, I suppose, the grog for the

men had not arrived, nor commissariat rations; and it is wonderful how

they bore up against the privations of a long march, some hard fighting,

and no food. A little grumbling was occasionally heard, but good-humour

and cheerfulness were the order of the day.’ Such of them as had time to

sleep at all during the night, slept on the damp ground; but all these

exigencies of a soldier’s life were soon forgotten, and the troops

returned to camp in high spirits at their success. Nicholson had relied

fully on the Punjaubees in the day of battle, and they justified his

reliance, for they emulated the courage and soldierly qualities of the

European troops who formed the _élite_ of the force. He had to regret

the loss of 25 killed, including Lieutenants Lumsden and Gabbett; and of

70 wounded, including Major Jacob and Lieutenant Elkington. The

brigadier’s official dispatch contained some curious particulars not

always given in such documents. It appears that during the day his men

fired off 17,000 musket and rifle charges, and 650 cannon-shot and

shells—a murderous torrent, that may perhaps convey to the mind of a

reader some faint idea of the terrible ordeal of a battle. He captured

all the enemy’s guns and ammunition; but a better result was, the

frustration of an attack which might have been very annoying, if not

dangerous, on the rear of the camp. Of the guns captured, nine were

English field-pieces, formerly belonging to the regular Bengal army;

while the other four were native brass guns belonging to the imperial

palace at Delhi.

The Delhi insurgents, whether well or ill commanded, manifested no

careless inattention to what was occurring outside the city walls. They

were nearly always well informed of the proceedings of the besiegers.

They knew that a large siege-train was expected, which they much longed

to intercept; they knew that Brigadier Nicholson had gone out to

Nujuffghur on the morning of the 25th; they knew that he had not

returned to camp on the morning of the 26th; and they resolved on

another attack on the camp in its then weakened state. All was in vain,

however; in this as in every similar attempt they were beaten. As soon

as they made their appearance, General Wilson strengthened his pickets.

The enemy commenced by a fire with field-guns from Ludlow Castle against

the Mosque picket; but the attack never became serious; it was steadily

met, and the enemy, after suffering severely, retired into the city.

During the later days of August, the enemy attempted little more than a

series of skirmishing attacks on the pickets. If, once now and then,

they appeared in force outside the walls as though about to attack in a

body, the intention was speedily abandoned, and they disappeared again

within the city. No evidence was afforded that they were headed by any

officer possessing unity of command and military ability. There was no

Sevajee, no Hyder among them. ‘Often,’ as an eye-witness observed, ‘like

an undisciplined mob, at best merely an agglomeration of regiments, the

rebels have attacked us again and again, and fiercely enough when under

cover, but always with a poverty of conception and want of plan that

betrayed the absence of a master-mind. And now that they know strong

reinforcements have joined our army, and that the day of retribution is

not far distant—although they may make an attempt to intercept the

siege-train—yet by their vacillating and abortive gatherings outside the

walls, and by the dissensions and desertions that are rife within, they

shew that the huge body of the insurrection is still without a vigorous

and life-giving spirit.’

True as this may have been in the particular instance, it is

nevertheless impossible not to be struck with the fact that the

mutineers maintained a remarkable degree of organisation after they had

forsworn their allegiance; the men of all the corps rallied round the

colours belonging to each particular regiment; and those regiments which

had customarily been massed into brigades, long strove to maintain the

brigade character. Although the insurrection possessed few elements of

unity, although the rebels could not form an army, or operate

comprehensively in the field, they sought to maintain the organisation

which their late British masters had given to them. There had usually

been a brigade of two, three, or four native regiments at each of the

larger military stations; from the station the brigade took its name;

and when the mutiny was many months old, the mutineers were still

recognisable as belonging to the brigades which they had once loyally

served—such as the Bareilly brigade, the Neemuch brigade, the Dinapoor

brigade, the Nuseerabad brigade, &c. Although single regiments and

fragments of regiments entered Delhi, to maintain the standard of

rebellion against the English ‘raj,’ nevertheless the majority were

distinguishable as brigaded forces. The Delhi brigade itself, consisting

of the 38th, 54th, and 74th regiments native infantry, formed the

material on which the Meerut brigade had worked on the 11th of May. This

Meerut brigade comprised the 11th and 20th infantry, and the 3d cavalry.

On the 16th of June arrived the Nuseerabad brigade, consisting of the

15th and 30th infantry, with horse and foot artillery; on the 22d, the

Jullundur and Phillour brigades entered, comprising the 3d, 36th, and

61st infantry, and the 6th cavalry; on the 1st and 2d of June came the

Bareilly or Rohilcund brigade, including the 18th, 28th, 29th, and 68th

infantry, and the 8th irregular cavalry; and later in the same month

came the Neemuch and Jhansi brigades. Even when combined within the

walls of Delhi, each brigade constituted a sort of family or community,

having to a great extent a way and a will of its own. The history of a

hundred years has shewn that the sepoys always fought well when well

commanded; and their ineffective fighting as mutineers may hence be

attributed in part to the fact that they were _not_ well commanded.

It was about this period, the latter half of August, that an unfortunate

English lady—unfortunate in being so long in the hands of brutal

men—escaped from Delhi under circumstances which were narrated by the

Bombay and Calcutta newspapers as below.[86] She was the wife of one of

the civil officers of the Company engaged at Delhi before the mutiny;

but as the newspaper narratives were not always correct in matters of

identification, the name will not be given here.

September arrived, and with it many indications that the siege would

soon present new and important features. Little is known of what passed

within Delhi during those days; but General Wilson learned from various

sources that the mutineers were in a very dissatisfied state at the

failure of all their attempts to dislodge the besiegers, or even to

disturb in any material degree the plan of the siege. They were without

a responsible and efficient leader, and were split up into small

sections; they had no united scheme of operations; nor were they

adequately provided with money to meet their daily demands.

With the besiegers, on the other hand, prospects were brightening. The

siege-train, when it arrived early in September, made a formidable

increase in the ordnance before Delhi. As the name implies, the guns

were larger, and carried shot and shell more weighty, than those used in

battles and skirmishes; their main purpose being to make breaches in the

defence-works of the city, through which infantry might enter and

capture the place. Sir John Lawrence had been able to collect in the

Punjaub, and send to Delhi from Ferozpore, a train of about thirty heavy

pieces of artillery, consisting of guns, howitzers, and mortars of large

calibre. The difficulty was not to obtain the guns, but to secure and to

forward men to escort them, animals to draw them, ammunition to serve

them, carriages to convey the auxiliary stores, food and camp-equipage

for the men, fodder for the animals—whether horses, oxen, camels, or

elephants. Such was the disturbed state of India at that time, that

Lawrence had not been able to send this reinforcement until September;

and even then, all his skill, influence, and energy, were required to

surmount the numerous difficulties. About the same time there arrived in

camp a Belooch battalion from Kurachee, the 4th Punjaub infantry, the

Patan Irregular Horse, and reinforcements to H.M. 8th, 24th, 52d, and

60th regiments. The siege-army now reached an aggregate of about 9000

men of all arms, effectives and non-effectives, including gun-lascars,

syce-drivers, Punjaubee Sappers and Miners, native infantry recruits,

and other men not comprised in regular regiments. There were also near

the camp or on their march to it, numerous troops belonging to the

Cashmere, Jheend, and Putialah Contingents. Out of the total number of

troops of all kinds, Wilson hoped to be enabled to find 9000 effective

infantry to make an assault on the city after a bombardment. To what

extent this hope was realised, we shall see presently.

It is important to bear clearly in mind the relative positions of the

besiegers and the besieged, the siege-camp and the fortified city, at

that time. Let it not be forgotten that the British position before

Delhi, from the early days of June to those of September, was purely a

defensive one. The besiegers could neither invest the city nor batter

down its walls; the troops being too few for the first of these

enterprises, and the guns too weak for the second; while an assault,

though twice intended, was not attempted, because there was no force

sufficient to hold the city, even if it were captured. The position on

the north of the city, from Metcalfe House to the Subzee Mundee, was the

only one which they could successfully maintain. Nevertheless, though

limited to that one side, it was invaluable, because it enabled the

British to keep open a road of communication with the northwest, whence

all supplies must necessarily be obtained. The English public, grieved

and irritated by the astounding news from India, often reproached

Barnard and Wilson for their delay in ‘taking Delhi;’ and many of the

officers and soldiers on the spot longed for some dashing movement that

would restore British prestige, and give them their hour of revenge

against the mutineers. Subsequent experience, however, has gone far to

prove that the generals were right. The grounds for so thinking have

been thus set forth by an artillery-officer whose account of the siege

has found a place among the Blue-books: ‘Whether the city might or might

not have been carried by a _coup de main_, as was contemplated first in

June and afterwards in July, it is needless now to inquire; but judging

from the resistance we afterwards experienced in the actual assault,

when we had been greatly reinforced in men and guns, it appears to me

fortunate the attempt was not made. The strength of the place was never

supposed to consist in the strength of its actual defences, though these

were much undervalued; but every city, even without fortifications, is,

from its very nature, strongly defensible, unless it can be effectually

surrounded or bombarded. Moreover, within Delhi, the enemy possessed a

magazine containing upwards of two hundred guns, and an almost

inexhaustible supply of ammunition; while their numbers were certainly

never less than double those of the besiegers.’ But, more than this,

Delhi was not so weak a place as public opinion in England at that time

represented it to be. The numerous bastions presented regular faces and

flanks of masonry, with properly cut embrasures. The portions of wall or

curtain between the bastions were twenty-four feet high, two-thirds of

the height being twelve feet thick, and the remainder near the top being

a parapet three feet in thickness. Outside the wall was a broad beam or

ledge, screened by a parapet as a place for musketeers; below the beam

was a ditch, sixteen feet deep by twenty feet wide at the bottom, with

well-constructed escarp and counterscarp; and a good sloping glacis,

descending from the outer edge of the ditch, covered nearly half the

height of the wall from all assaults by distant batteries. Captain

Norman, who was present during the whole of the siege as assistant

adjutant-general, and who wrote a very lucid semi-official account of

the siege-operations, fully corroborates this statement of the strength

of the position.

As a memento of a remarkable event in the military history of India, it

may be acceptable to present here a detailed list of all the troops

constituting the siege-army of Delhi in the second week of September,

when the assault was about to be made. The number, it will be seen, was

9866,[87] besides ‘unarmed and undisciplined pioneers,’ of whom no

enumeration was given. These, it must be remembered, were all

_effective_ troops, and did not include those who were disabled by

wounds or sickness. It should also be observed, that the Cashmere,

Jheend, and Putialah Contingents find no place in this list; they were

scarcely mentioned by General Wilson in his dispatches, although from

other sources of information they seem to have reached nearly three

thousand in number. Why the general and his staff should have had to

make the entry ‘strength unknown,’ in reference to them, does not

clearly appear. Concerning the other or more important elements of the

army, many of the regiments were represented only by detachments or

wings in the camp, the rest being at other places; but all that need be

noted in the list is the exact number of men. Glancing over this list,

it is impossible to avoid being struck with the fact how nearly the

Oudian or Hindustani element is excluded from it. There are Europeans,

Goorkhas, Sikhs, Punjaubees, Beloochees, and mountaineers from the

Afghan frontier; but the only entry referring clearly to the Bengal

native army is that of 78 men of the 4th irregular cavalry, and these

appear in the unsoldierlike condition, ‘disarmed and unhorsed.’ The

horse-artillery were frequently referred to in dispatches by the names

of the officers in command—such as Tombs’, Turner’s, Renny’s, and

Remington’s troops; while two light field-batteries were named after

Scott and Bourchier. There were also several companies of foot-artillery

serving with the siege-guns, which altogether numbered more than sixty

heavy pieces of ordnance of various kinds. It has been said above that

the list of 9866 excluded sick and wounded; these latter numbered at

that time no less than 3074; therefore the total of all ranks and all

degrees of efficiency nearly reached 13,000 men, even excluding the

unenumerated pioneers and contingents. In five regiments alone there

were 1300 men sick and wounded, almost equalling in number those in an

effective state; the 52d royal regiment and the Sirmoor battalion

exhibited a greater number on the sick-list than on that of the

effectives.

Now commenced those operations of siege-warfare which depend more on

engineers and artillerymen than on infantry and cavalry—the arrangements

for bringing near the city guns numerous and powerful enough to batter

the walls. All hands were busy. The engineers and their assistants had

made 10,000 fascines, 10,000 gabions, and 100,000 sand-bags;

field-magazines, scaling-ladders, and spare platforms had been made in

great number. The north side of the city being that which was to be

assaulted, it was resolved to maintain the right of the position

strongly against the enemy, while the main attack was pushed on the

left—first, because the river would protect the left flank of the

advancing columns; and, secondly, because the troops would find

themselves in comparatively open ground in that part after a successful

assault, instead of being cooped up in narrow and fiercely defended

streets. One of the subsidiary measures taken was to form a trench to

the left of the Samee, and to construct at the end of it a battery for

four guns and two large howitzers. This Samee, better known to the

soldiers as the Sammy House, was an old temple, situated some way down

the slope of the ridge towards the city, and about half a mile distant

from the Moree Bastion; it had for some weeks been held by the British.

The purpose of this newly constructed Samee Battery was to prevent

sorties from the Lahore or Cabool Gates passing round the city wall to

annoy the breaching-batteries, and also to assist in keeping down the

fire of the Moree Bastion. The three main works on the north side of the

city were the Moree, Cashmere, and Water Bastions—all of which had been

strengthened by the British authorities some years before, when no one

dreamed that those strengthenings would be a disaster to the power which

ordered them to be effected.

It was on the 7th of September that the besiegers began to render

visible those works which pertain especially to the storming of a

fortified post. Until then, there had been few or no trenches,

parallels, or zigzags, intended to enable the besiegers to approach near

the beleaguered city, preparatory to a forcible entry. On that night,

however, a working-party was sent out to establish two batteries about

seven hundred yards distant from the Moree Bastion. The sappers,

attacked by the enemy and defended by infantry, prosecuted their work

amid the peril which always surrounds that species of military labour.

One battery, on the left, of four 24-pounders, was intended to hold the

Cashmere Bastion partially in check; while the other, of five

18-pounders and one 8-inch howitzer, was to silence the Moree Bastion,

and prevent it interfering with the attack on the left. A trench was

made to connect the two batteries, and extending beyond them a little to

the right and left, so as to communicate with a wide and deep ravine

which, extending very nearly up to the left attack, formed a sort of

first parallel, affording good cover to the guard of the trenches. All

this was completed during the night or by the forenoon of the 8th; and

the two portions, with the trench connecting them, became known as

Brind’s Battery, named after the officer who worked it.

At dusk on the evening of the 8th, a second working-party set forth, to

construct a battery to be called ‘No. 2.’ The enemy, influenced by an

opinion that the attack would be made on the right, had neglected the

ground at and near Ludlow Castle, a house situated barely seven hundred

yards from the Cashmere Gate. The British engineers, taking advantage of

this neglect, seized the position, occupied it with a strong detachment,

and employed the nights of the 9th and 10th in constructing a battery

upon it. The enemy, alarmed at this near approach, kept up a fierce

cannonade from the Cashmere and Water Bastions and from the Selimgurh;

but the besiegers had made their approach so carefully, that few of them

suffered. This battery, like Brind’s, was in two portions; one,

immediately in front of Ludlow Castle, for nine 24-pounders, was

intended to breach the wall between the Cashmere and Water Bastions, and

to render the parapet untenable by musketeers; the other, two hundred

yards further to the right, for seven 8-inch howitzers and two

18-pounders, was to aid in attaining the same objects. The ‘No. 2’

Battery, from its magnitude, and the important duty assigned to it, was

placed under the control of two officers; Major Kaye commanded the right

position; while the left was intrusted to Major Campbell, who, being

wounded soon afterwards, was succeeded by Captain Johnson.

[Illustration:

Jumana Musjid at Delhi. From a Photograph.

]

Still further was the powerful machinery for attack carried. On the

night of the 10th, Battery No. 3 was commenced, within two hundred yards

of the Water Bastion, behind a small ruined house in the custom-house

compound; it was bold and hazardous work to construct a battery in such

a spot, for the enemy kept up a destructive fire of musketry the whole

time. The object of No. 3, when mounted with six 18-pounders, was to

open a second breach in the Water Bastion. Battery No. 4 was in like

manner constructed during the nights of the 10th and 11th, at the

Koodseebagh near Ludlow Castle; it was mounted with ten heavy mortars,

placed under the charge of Major Tombs. Later in the siege a battery of

light mortars was worked by Captain Blunt from the rear of the

custom-house. To enable the whole of the siege-batteries to be armed,

most of the heavy guns were withdrawn from the ridge, leaving only a few

that were necessary to defend it from any attacks made by the enemy from

the Kissengunje and Subzee Mundee quarters. There being a deficiency of

foot-artillerymen to man the heavy guns and mortars, nearly all the

officers and men of the horse-artillery quitted the duties to which they

more especially belonged, and worked in the batteries during the

bombardment; as did likewise many volunteers from the British cavalry,

who were eager to take part in the fray. Even the infantry regiments

furnished volunteers from among the officers, who practised at the

ridge-batteries for many days before the breaching-batteries opened

their fire, when they transferred their services to the latter. The

newly raised Sikh artillerymen, proud to share the dangers and emulate

the courage of the British, were intrusted with the working of two of

the great guns, a duty which they afterwards performed to admiration.

It thus appears that the works at the newly constructed

breaching-batteries bristled with forty-four heavy pieces of ordnance,

besides guns of lighter weight and smaller calibre at more distant

points. The murderous conflict could not much longer be delayed. The

besieged knew well the danger impending over them, and made arrangements

for a desperate resistance. No sooner did Brind’s Battery open fire on

the 8th than the enemy made a sortie from the city, principally of

cavalry; but they were soon driven in by the artillery. From the broken

ground below the ridge, and from a trench in front of the battery, they

kept up a constant fire of musketry; grape-shot had to be used against

them, from a light gun-battery near the Samee House. In like manner,

during the construction of the remaining breaching-batteries, the enemy

kept up a fierce and continuous fire from every available point, causing

great loss to the besiegers—not only among the fighting-men, but among

the natives employed as porters, magazine lascars, ordnance-drivers, &c.

The enemy went to work on the night of the 11th, and constructed an

advanced trench parallel to the British left attack, three or four

hundred yards distant from it; and from this they opened a very hot fire

of musketry. They also got some light guns, and one of heavier calibre,

into the open ground on the right of the siege-position, from which they

maintained an annoying enfilade fire. At the Custom-house Battery,

within two hundred yards of the city, the British were continually

assailed with a storm of bullets, which rendered their passage to and

from the spot extremely perilous. On more than one occasion, before

Battery No. 2 was finished, the mutineers sallied out from the Cashmere

Gate, and poured forth a volley of musketry at that spot; and it

required a very strong guard of infantry to protect the battery from a

closer attack. Some of the enemy’s guns, planted to enfilade the

batteries Nos. 1 and 2, were so sheltered that the ordnance on the ridge

and at the Samee House were never able effectually to silence them. From

another quarter, the Selimgurh or old fort, a constant fire of shells

was kept up, so skilfully pointed as to drop with perilous accuracy upon

three of the breaching-batteries. During the actual progress of the

bombardment and assault, only one attempt was made by the enemy to annoy

the besiegers in the rear; a body of horse crossed the canal at Azadpore

(at the junction of the two roads leading from the city and the

cantonment), drove in a picket of irregular horse, and created some

confusion; but parties of Punjaub and Guide cavalry, quickly arriving at

the spot, checked, pursued, and dispersed the intruders.

Now commenced the fearful thunder of a cannonading. The engineers having

finished their work, handed it over to the artillerymen, who collected

around them vast stores of shot and shell. It was on the 11th of

September that the British siege-guns may be said to have opened their

systematic fire, although some had been already tested, and others were

not quite ready. The nine 24-pounders, in Major Campbell’s No. 2

Battery, ‘opened the ball,’ to use the language of one of the engineers,

and soon shewed their tremendous power in bringing down huge pieces of

the wall near the Cashmere Bastion. The enemy’s guns on that bastion

attempted to reply, but were soon knocked over, and the bastion itself

rendered untenable. The work was hot on the 11th, but much hotter on the

12th, when Battery No. 3 opened its fire, and upwards of forty ponderous

pieces of ordnance belched forth ruin and slaughter on the devoted city.

All that night, all the next day and night, until the morning of the

14th, did this cannonading continue, with scarcely an interval of

silence. Soldiers like to be met in soldierly fashion, even if they

suffer by it. The British did not fail to give a word of praise to the

enemy; who, though unable to work a gun from any of the three bastions

that were so fiercely assailed, stuck to their artillery in the open

ground which enfiladed the right attack; they got a gun to bear through

one of the holes breached in the wall; they sent rockets from one of

their martello towers; and they poured forth a torrent of musketry from

their advanced trench and from the city walls. Throughout the warlike

operations here and elsewhere, the enemy were more effective in

artillery than in infantry, and less in cavalry than in either of the

other two.

When the great day arrived—the day with which hopes and fears, anxieties

and responsibilities, had been so long associated—General Wilson made

arrangements for the final assault. The plan of operations was dependent

on the state to which the breaching-batteries had brought the

defence-works of the city during two or three days’ bombarding, by the

engineers under Colonel Baird Smith, and the artillery under Major

Gaitskell. It was known that the force of shot and shell poured against

the place had made breaches near the Cashmere and Water Bastions,

destroyed the defences of those bastions, and knocked down the parapets

which had afforded shelter to the enemy’s musketeers; but wishing to

ascertain the exact state of matters, the general, on the night of the

13th, sent down Lieutenants Medley and Lang on the dangerous duty of

examining the breach made in the city wall near the Cashmere Bastion;

while Lieutenants Greathed and Home made a similar examination of the

breach near the Water Bastion. These officers having announced that both

breaches were practicable for the entrance of storming-parties, the

general resolved that the next day, the 14th of September, should be

signalised by a storming of the great Mogul stronghold. He marshalled

his forces into columns,[88] the exact components of which it will be

interesting to record here; and to each column he prescribed a

particular line of duty. The 1st column, of 1000 men, was to assault the

main breach, and escalade the face of the Cashmere Bastion, after the

heavy siege-guns had finished their destructive work; it was to be

covered by a detachment of H.M. 60th Rifles. The 2d column, of 850 men,

similarly covered by a body of Rifles, was to advance on the Water

Bastion and carry the breach. The 3d column, of 950 men, was to be

directed against the Cashmere Gate, preceded by an explosion-party of

engineers under Lieutenants Home and Salkeld, and covered by a party of

Rifles. The 4th column (strength unrecorded) was to assail the enemy’s

strong position in the Kissengunje and Pahareepore suburbs, with a view

both of driving in the rebels, and of supporting the main attack by

forcing an entrance at the Cabool Gate; for this duty a miscellaneous

body of troops, almost wholly native, was told off. In addition to the

four columns, there was a reserve of 1300 men, covered by Rifles, which

was to await the result of the main attack, and take possession of

certain posts as soon as the columns entered the place. No more troops

were left at camp than were absolutely necessary for its protection; a

few convalescents of the infantry, and a few troopers and

horse-artillery, were all that could be spared for this duty. Nearly all

the pickets were handed over to the cavalry to guard. Arrangements were,

however, made to send back a force as speedily as possible to the camp

to guard the sick, wounded, stores, &c., which naturally became objects

of much solicitude to the general at such a time. Brigadier Grant, with

the bulk of the cavalry and some horse-artillery, moved down to the

vicinity of No. 1 Battery, to check any attempt that might be made by

the enemy, after a sortie from the Lahore or Ajmeer Gates, to attack the

storming columns in flank.

The night which closed in the 13th and opened the 14th of September was

not one to be soon forgotten by the soldiers of the siege-army. Few of

them, officers or men, slept much; their thoughts were too intensely

directed towards the stern realities of the morrow, which would end the

career of so many among their number. At four o’clock on the morning of

the 14th, the different columns set forth on their march from the camp

to their respective places. The first three columns were, according to

the programme just cited, to engage in the actual assault on the

northern side of the city; the heads of those columns were to be kept

concealed until the moment for assault had arrived; and the signal for

that crisis was to be, the advance of the Rifles to the front, to act as

skirmishers.

Brigadier Nicholson took the lead. He gave the signal; the Rifles rushed

to the front with a cheer, and skirmished along through the low jungle

which extended to within fifty yards of the ditch. The 1st and 2d

columns, under himself and Brigadier Jones, emerged from behind the

Koodseebagh, and advanced steadily towards the breached portions of the

wall. Up to this time the enemy’s guns had wrought little mischief on

the columns; but as soon as the latter emerged into the open ground, a

perfect storm of bullets met them from the front and both flanks;

officers and men were falling fast on the glacis; and for several

minutes it was impossible to get the ladders placed for a descent into

the ditch and an ascent of the escarp. After a fierce struggle, the

British bayonet, as usual, won the day; the troops dashed through and

over all obstacles, and entered the city through the breaches which the

guns had previously made in the walls. Now within the boundary of the

imperial city, the two brigadiers at once turned to the right, proceeded

along the ramparts, fought the sepoys inch by inch, overcame all

opposition, and captured in succession a small battery, a tower between

the Cashmere and Moree Bastions, the Moree itself, and the Cabool Gate;

but the vigorous attempts they made to take the Burn Bastion and the

Lahore Gate failed, so determined was the resistance opposed to them,

and so terrible the loss they suffered in officers and men. It was in

one of the many attacks on the Lahore Gate, when the troops had to

advance along a narrow lane swept by the enemy’s grape-shot and

musketry, that the bullet was fired which laid low the gallant

Nicholson—an officer in whom the whole army had reposed a full and deep

reliance. As far as the Cabool Gate, the two columns were enabled to

maintain their conquests; and they immediately made preparations for

opening fire from the bastions inwards upon the yet unconquered

buildings of the city—a sand-bag parapet being constructed across the

gorge or open rear of each bastion.

We have now to see what was transpiring in another quarter, on this

morning of heroism and slaughter. While the 1st column was engaged in

forcing an entrance through the breach near the Cashmere Bastion, and

the 2d column a similar entrance through that near the Water Bastion,

the 3d directed its operations against the Cashmere Gate—through which,

it will be remembered, the troops of that column were to rush after an

explosion-party had blown in the gate itself. If there be any sublimity

in bloody warfare, it is manifested in the self-devotion with which a

soldier marches steadfastly to a position where he knows that death will

be almost certain and immediate. Such self-devotion was shewn by the

little band of heroes forming this explosion-party. They had to advance

in broad daylight to the gate, amid a storm of bullets from above, from

both flanks, and from a wicket in the gate itself; they had carefully to

lay down and adjust the bags of gunpowder close to the gate, to arrange

a train or fuse, to fire the bags, and to take their chance of being

themselves blown up by the explosion. The gallant men intrusted with

this dangerous duty were divided into two parties—an advanced and a

firing party. The first consisted of an engineer officer, Lieutenant

Home, two non-commissioned officers, Sergeants Smith and Carmichael, and

a few native sappers, who carried the powder-bags. The firing-party

consisted of Lieutenant Salkeld, Corporal Burgess, and a few native

sappers. Owing to some delay, the two parties did not set out for their

rendezvous at Ludlow Castle until broad daylight, and then they had to

encounter a heavy fire of musketry all the way. When the advanced party

reached the gate—a heavy wooden structure, flanked by massive walls—they

found that a part of the drawbridge over the ditch had been destroyed;

but, passing across the precarious footing afforded by the remaining

beams, they proceeded to lodge their powder-bags against the gate. The

wicket was open, and through it the enemy kept up a heavy fire. Sergeant

Carmichael, and a native sapper named Madhoo, were killed while laying

the bags; but Lieutenant Home only received a blow from a stone thrown

up by a bullet. The perilous duty of laying the bags being completed,

the advanced party slipped down into the ditch, to make room for the

firing-party, which then advanced. ‘Lieutenant Salkeld,’ said Colonel

Baird Smith, in his report of the engineering operations of the day,

‘while endeavouring to fire the charge, was shot through the arm and

leg, and handed over the slow match to Corporal Burgess, who fell

mortally wounded just as he had successfully accomplished the onerous

duty. Havildar Tilluh Singh, of the Sikhs, was wounded, and Ramloll

Sepoy of the same corps, was killed during this part of the operation.

The demolition being most successful, Lieutenant Home, happily not

wounded, caused the bugler (Hawthorne) to sound the regimental call of

the 52d, as the signal for the advancing columns. Fearing that amid the

noise of the assault the sounds might not be heard, he had the call

repeated three times, when the troops advanced and carried the gateway

with complete success.’ Sergeant Smith had a narrow escape from being

blown up. Seeing Burgess fall, and not knowing the exact result of the

gallant fellow’s efforts to fire the train, he ran forward; but seeing

the train alight, he had just time to throw himself into the ditch

before the explosion took place. The perilous nature of this kind of

duty gave rise to a correspondence in the public journals, from which a

few lines may not unsuitably be given in a note.[89]

Colonel Campbell, with the 3d column, after the heroic explosion-party

had forced an entry for him through the Cashmere Gate, marched boldly

through the city towards the Jumma Musjid—a perilous enterprise; for the

distance was upwards of a mile even in a straight line, and many

populous streets would need to be traversed. In this march he was aided

by Sir Theophilus Metcalfe, a member of the Company’s civil service,

whose house outside Delhi has been so often mentioned, and who had been

a valuable adviser to the siege-army during the whole period of its

operations on the ridge. He knew Delhi well, and was thus enabled to

render Campbell essential service. Conducting the column by a circuitous

route, he kept it nearly free from opposition until the fine street,

called the Chandnee Chowk, was reached, where they took possession of

the Kotwallee. At this point, however, the troops began to fall rapidly

under the muskets of the enemy, and it was found to be impracticable to

achieve the object fondly hoped—the capture of the Jumma Musjid itself.

After a gallant struggle, the column fell back to the neighbourhood of

the English church near the Cashmere Gate, where it had the support of

the reserve. The colonel at once placed the 52d regiment in the church,

the Kumaon battalion in Skinner’s house, and the Punjaub infantry in the

houses at the junction of two streets that led from the centre of the

city to the open space around the church. Guns, too, were posted at the

last-named place, to check the advance of insurgents who had begun to

treat Campbell as a fleeing and defeated officer. He was in one sense

defeated; for he had to retreat nearly a mile, and saw his fine troops

cut up terribly all around him; nevertheless, before nightfall he had

placed himself in a position from which the enemy could not dislodge

him, and which enabled him to take a prominent part in the subsequent

operations.

[Illustration:

CORPORAL BURGESS, blown up at Cashmere Gate.

]

Rather as a support to Colonel Campbell’s 3d column, than as a leading

corps, the reserve now comes for notice—its position being indeed

denoted by its name. This reserve column, under Brigadier Longfield,

had, it will be remembered, the duty of watching the result of the main

attack, and of taking possession of certain posts as soon as the other

columns had effected an entry into the city. The reserve followed the 3d

column through the Cashmere Gate, having previously spared the Belooch

battalion to render service near Hindoo Rao’s house. Longfield at once

cleared the college gardens of insurgents, and then told off his troops

so as to obtain efficient hold of the Water Bastion, the Cashmere Gate,

Skinner’s house, and a large commanding building called Ahmed Ali Khan’s

house. Skinner’s house, or in Indian form, Sikunder’s, had at one time

been the residence of Major Skinner, commander of a regiment of

irregular horse, which had acquired much celebrity; the house was large,

and presented many important advantages for a military force.

There is yet another portion of the siege-army, whose fortune on this

14th of September has to be noticed—namely, that which was placed under

the command of Major Reid, for a series of operations in the western

suburbs of the city. Everything here was under a cloud of

disappointment; the operations were not attended with that degree of

success which the officers and men had fondly hoped. Captain Dwyer, in

command of the Cashmere field-force, was intrusted with the management

of 400 men of that force, and four guns; and the object he was to

endeavour to attain was the safe occupation of the Eedghah Serai, in

dangerous proximity to the garrison within the city. Early in the

morning he set out from the camp. Finding the road very difficult for

artillery, he pulled down a portion of stone-wall to enable his guns to

get upon the Rohtuk high road; the noise unfortunately attracted the

enemy, who immediately sent down 2000 men to that point. Dwyer kept up a

fire of artillery for three quarters of an hour; but finding that the

enemy, instead of being discomfited, were about to outflank him, he

resolved on a bold advance on the Eedghah. This resolve he could not

carry out; his troops were widely spread in skirmishing order, and could

not be collected in column; the guns could not be properly moved, for

the grass-cutters had taken away the horses. In short, the attempt was a

total failure, and the captain was compelled to retire without his guns.

The force appears to have been too small, and the Cashmerian troops

scarcely equal in soldierly discipline to the demands of the work

intrusted to them. This attack on the Eedghah was to have been part of a

larger enterprise intrusted to Major Reid, having in view the conquest

of the whole western suburb of Delhi, and the command of all outlets by

the western gates. The major advanced from the Subzee Mundee towards the

Kissengunje suburb; but he found the enemy so numerous and strongly

posted, and he met with such a strenuous opposition, that his progress

was soon checked. The gallant Reid himself being struck down wounded, as

well as many other officers, Captain Muter of the 60th Rifles, and

Captain R. C. Lawrence, political agent with the Cashmere Contingent,

felt it necessary promptly to decide on the course best to be pursued.

They found the different detachments, of which the column consisted, so

broken and disorganised by the heavy fire of the enemy, that it was

impossible to reform them on broken ground, and under a severe fire the

attack on the Kissengunje could not be renewed; all they attempted was

to keep the enemy in check for an hour, without losing ground. They

waited for a reinforcement of artillery, which Reid had sent for before

being wounded; but these guns, through some unexplained cause, failed to

arrive. Seeing the enemy increase in force, and fearing for the safety

of the batteries below Hindoo Rao’s house, the officers gave up the

attack and retired, strengthening the batteries and the Subzee Mundee

picket. The failure of Captain Dwyer’s attack greatly increased the

difficulty of the position; for the enemy was thereby enabled to advance

on the right flank of the main column, endanger its rear, and hotly

press the Subzee Mundee picket. Reid, Lawrence, Dwyer, Muter—all were

mortified at their failure in this suburban operation.

Thus ended the 14th of September, a day on which British authority was

partially restored in the ‘city of the Moguls,’ after an interregnum of

eighteen weeks. Partial, indeed, was the reconquest; for the portion of

the city held bore so small a ratio to the whole, that the troops

foresaw a terrible and sanguinary ordeal to be gone through before the

British flag would again wave undisputed over the conquered city. The

loss was very large, in relation to the strength of the army generally.

There fell on this one day, 8 British officers, 162 British troops, and

103 native troops, killed; while the list of wounded comprised 52

British officers, 512 British troops, and 310 native troops—a total of

1135. When night closed around the survivors, the 1st and 2d columns

held all the towers, bastions, and ramparts from the vicinity of the

Cashmere Gate to the Cabool Gate; the 3d column and the reserve held the

Cashmere Gate, the English church, Skinner’s house, the Water Bastion,

Ahmed Ali Khan’s house, the college gardens, and many buildings and open

spots in that part of Delhi; while the 4th column, defeated in the

western suburbs, had retreated to the camp or the ridge.

Snatching a little occasional repose during the night, the besiegers

found themselves at dawn on the 15th, as we have said, masters of a

_part_ only of Delhi; and they prepared for the stern work before them.

They dragged several mortars into position, at various points between

the Cashmere and Cabool Gates, to shell the heart of the city and the

imperial palace. A battery, commanding the Selimgurh and a part of the

palace, was also established in the college gardens; and several houses

were taken and armed in advance or further to the south. The enemy,

meanwhile, kept up a vigorous fire from the Selimgurh and the magazine

upon the positions occupied by the British, and skirmishing went on at

all the advanced posts. This, be it understood, was within the city

itself; the British being in command of a strip of ground and buildings

just within the northern wall; while all the rest was still in the hands

of the rebels. It was in every way a strange position for an army to

occupy; the city was filled with hostile soldiery, who had the command

of an immense array of guns and a vast store of ammunition, and whose

musketry told with fatal effect from loopholed walls and houses in all

the streets within reach; while the besiegers themselves were separated

by a lofty city wall from their own camp.

The 16th was marked by a greater progress than the 15th towards a

conquest of the city, because the newly established batteries began to

shew signs of work. The guns in the college garden having effected a

breach in the magazine defences, that important building was stormed and

taken, with a loss comparatively slight, by the 61st, the 4th Punjaub,

and the Beloochees.[90] Outside the city, the Kissengunje suburb was

this day evacuated by the enemy, leaving five guns, which were speedily

captured by a detachment sent down from Hindoo Rao’s house; it was then

found that the enemy’s position here had been one of immense strength,

and the failure of Major Reid’s attack received a ready explanation.

Another day dawned, and witnessed the commencement of operations which

placed a further portion of the city in the hands of the conquerors. The

magazine having been captured, it became important to secure the whole

line of rampart and forts from that point to the Cabool Gate, comprising

the northeast as well as the north sides of the city. This was begun on

the 17th, and completed on the 18th, giving to the British a firm hold

of everything behind a straight line extending from the magazine to the

Cabool Gate. A bold advance southward could now be made. Columns were

sent forth, which captured the Delhi bank, Major Abbott’s house, and the

house of Khan Mohammed Khan, and made a near approach to the palace and

the Chandnee Chowk. The pen can easily record this, but it must leave to

the imagination of the reader to conceive how great must have been the

peril of soldiers thus advancing inch by inch through a crowded city;

field-artillery was brought to bear against them from almost every

street, muskets from almost every house-top and window; and many a

gallant fellow was laid low. One great advantage the besiegers now had,

was in the command of mortars brought out from the magazine; these were

placed in selected positions, and employed to shell the palace and the

quarters of the town occupied by the enemy. It was now that the

insurgents were seen to be gradually escaping from the palace into the

southern parts of the city, and thence through the southern gates into

open country not yet attacked by the British. Over the bridge of boats

they could not go, for the guns of the conquerors commanded it. Or, it

may more correctly be said, the command of the bridge of boats enabled

the conquerors to check that passage if they chose; but General Wilson

did not make war on women and children, or on such males as appeared to

be peaceful citizens: he allowed them to depart from the city if they

wished—which nearly all did, for they feared terrible retribution at the

hands of the British soldiery.

After another night within the imperial city, the conquerors achieved

further successes on the 19th. The post called the Burn Bastion,

situated on the west side of the city, close to the Lahore Gate, was

surprised and captured by a detachment sent from the already conquered

Cabool Gate. This swept the enemy from another large extent of wall. On

the following morning a detachment of cavalry, going from the ridge by

way of the Kissengunje and the Eedghah, found that the enemy had

evacuated a large and strong camp long occupied by them outside the

Delhi Gate. Lieutenant Hodson at once took possession of it; and a mere

glance shewed, by the quantities of clothing, plunder, and ammunition

lying around, that the enemy must have made a very precipitate flight.

The cavalry, entering the city by the Delhi Gate—which, together with

the Gurstin Bastion, had just been attacked and taken by the infantry,

galloped on to the sumptuous Jumma Musjid, of which they took

possession, being speedily supported by infantry and guns. While all

this was going on, the imperial palace was the object of a distinct

attack. A column advanced along the Chandnee Chowk, placed powder-bags

against the gate, blew it in, and entered the palace. The enormous

building was found to be deserted by all but a few fanatics and numerous

wounded sepoys.

Thus at length was the great city of Delhi reconquered by its former

masters; thus again did the Feringhee become paramount over the Mogul.

Captain Norman, whose semi-official account of the siege has already

been adverted to, closed his narrative by saying: ‘It is impossible to

conclude without alluding to the trials and constancy of the troops

employed in this arduous siege. Called on at the hottest season of the

year to take the field, imperfectly equipped, and with the extent of

difficulties to be faced very imperfectly known, all felt that a crisis

had arrived, to meet which every man’s cheerful, willing, and heartfelt

energies must be put forth to the utmost; and how well this was done,

those who were with the army know and can never forget. For the first

five weeks every effort was required, not indeed to take Delhi, but even

to hold our own position; and day after day, for hours together, every

soldier was under arms under a burning sun, and constantly exposed to

fire. Notwithstanding the daily casualties in action, the numerous

deaths by cholera, the discouraging reports relative to the fidelity of

some of the native portions of our own force, the distressing accounts

from all parts of the country, the constant arrival of large

reinforcements of mutineers, and the apparent impossibility of aid ever

reaching in sufficient strength to enable us to take the place—the

courage and confidence of the army never flagged. And, besides enduring

a constant and often deadly cannonade, for more than three months, in

thirty different combats, our troops invariably were successful, always

against long odds, and often opposed to ten times their numbers, who had

all the advantages of ground and superior artillery.’

Taking the 30th of May as the date when the first conflict between the

besiegers and defenders of Delhi took place, at some distance from Delhi

itself, the interval of 113 days between that date and the final capture

on the 20th of September was marked by a very large death-list. It could

not be otherwise. Where men were exposed during so many days and nights

to shells, balls, bullets, swords, heat, swamps, fatigue, and disease,

the hand of the destroyer must indeed have been heavy. And, as in all

similar instances, the list of wounded was much larger than that of

killed. The official list comprised the names of 46 European officers

who had either been killed in battle, or died from wounds received; and

of 140 others whose wounds had not proved fatal. But the

adjutant-general is seldom accustomed to comprise in his lists those who

fall with disease without being wounded; and thus the Delhi enumeration

did not include the names of Generals Anson and Barnard, or of any of

the numerous officers, who, though not wounded before Delhi,

unquestionably met their death in connection with the preparations for,

or conduct of, the siege. Distributed under different headings, the

killed and wounded amounted altogether to 3807,[91] to which were added

30 missing. Of the horses there were 186 killed and 378 wounded. Of the

number of insurgents who fell during the struggle, no authentic

knowledge could be obtained.

The official dispatches were nearly silent concerning the proceedings,

except military, in the interval of six days between the first assault

of the city and the final subjugation, and during the remaining ten days

of September. General Wilson, shortly before the final attack was to be

made, issued an address to his soldiers, from which a few sentences are

here given in a note;[92] and in which, it will be seen, they were

instructed to give no quarter to the mutineers—that is, make no

prisoners, but put all armed rebels to death. This was attended to; but

something more was done, something darker and less justifiable. It is

not customary for soldiers to stab wounded and sick men in an enemy’s

army; but such was done at Delhi. The sense of hatred towards the

mutinous sepoys was so intense, the recollection of the atrocities at

Cawnpore was so vivid, that vengeance took place of every other feeling.

The troops did that which they would have scorned to do against the

Russians in the Crimean war—they bayoneted men no longer capable of

resistance. They refused to consider the rules of honourable warfare

applicable to black-hearted traitors; their officers joined them in this

refusal; and their general’s address justified them up to a certain

point. If the rule laid down by Wilson had been strictly adhered to,

there would have been military precedence to sanction it; but the common

soldiers did not discriminate in their passion; and many a dark-skinned

inhabitant of Delhi fell under the bayonet, against whom no charge of

complicity with the mutineers could be proved. The letters written home

to friends in England, soon after the battle, and made public,

abundantly prove this; the soldiers were thirsting for vengeance, and

they slaked their thirst. Many of the villagers of India, indeed, bore

cruel injustice during that extraordinary period. Instances frequently

came to light, such as the following: A revolted regiment or a predatory

band would enter a village, demand and obtain money, food, and other

supplies by threats of vengeance if the demand were not complied with,

and then depart; an English corps, entering soon afterwards, would fine

and punish the villagers for having aided the enemy. One thing, however,

the British soldiers did _not_ do; they did not murder women and

children. This humanity, heroism, justice, or whatever it may best be

called, was more than the natives generally expected: the leaders in the

revolt had sedulously disseminated a rumour that the British would abuse

all the women, and murder them and their children, in all towns and

stations where mutinies had taken place; and under the influence of this

belief, many of the natives put their wives to death rather than expose

them to the apprehended indignities. While, at one part of Delhi, the

conquerors (if the narrators are to be believed) found Christian women

_crucified_ against the walls in the streets; at another part, nearly

twenty native women were found lying side by side with their throats

cut, their husbands having put them to death to prevent them from

falling into the hands of the conquerors.

What other scenes of wild licence took place within Delhi during those

excited days, we may infer from collateral evidence. The mutineers,

quite as much in love with plunder as with nationality, had been wont to

carry about with them from place to place the _loot_ which they had

gathered during the sack of the stations and towns. As a consequence,

Delhi contained temporarily an enormous amount of miscellaneous wealth;

and such of this as the fugitives could not carry away with them, was

regarded as spoil by the conquerors. There are certain rules in the

English army concerning prizes and prize-money, which the soldiers more

or less closely obey; but the Punjaubee and Goorkha allies, more

accustomed to Asiatic notions of warfare, revelled in the unbridled

freedom of their new position, and were with difficulty maintained in

discipline. There was a large store of beverage, also, in the city,

which the conquerors soon got at; and as intemperance is one of the weak

points of English soldiers, many scenes of drunkenness ensued.

But all these are among the exigencies of war. The soldiers bore up

manfully against their varied trials, fought heroically, and conquered;

and it is not by the standards of conduct familiar to quiet persons at

home that they should be judged. When General Wilson reported the result

of his hard labours, he said in his dispatch: ‘Thus has the important

duty committed to this force been accomplished, and its object attained.

Delhi, the focus of rebellion and insurrection, and the scene of so much

horrible cruelty, taken and made desolate; the king a prisoner in our

hands; and the mutineers, notwithstanding their great numerical

superiority and their vast resources in ordnance, and all the munitions

and appliances of war, defeated on every occasion of engagement with our

troops, are now driven with slaughter in confusion and dismay from their

boasted stronghold.... Little remains for me to say, but to again

express my unqualified approbation of the conduct and spirit of the

whole of the troops, not only on this occasion, but during the entire

period they have been in the field.... For four months of the most

trying season of the year this force, originally very weak in number,

has been exposed to the repeated and determined attacks of an enemy far

outnumbering it, and supported by a numerous and powerful artillery. The

duties imposed upon all have been laborious, harassing, and incessant,

and notwithstanding heavy losses, both in action and from disease, have

been at all times zealously and cheerfully performed.’ And in similar

language, when the news was known at Calcutta, did Viscount Canning

acknowledge the heroism of those who had conquered Delhi.[93]

It will be seen above that the governor-general spoke of the ‘king a

prisoner.’ This must now be explained. When all hope of retaining Delhi

faded away, the aged king—who had in effect been more a puppet in the

hands of ambitious leaders than a king, during four months—fled from the

city, as did nearly all the members and retainers of the once imperial

family. It fell to the lot of Captain (afterwards Major) Hodson to

capture the king and other royal personages. This officer was assistant

quartermaster-general, and intelligence-officer on General Wilson’s

staff. His long acquaintance as a cavalry officer with Sikhs,

Punjaubees, and Afghans had given him much knowledge of the native

character, and enabled him to obtain remarkably minute information

concerning the movements and intentions of the enemy; to insure this, he

was invested with power to reward or punish in proportion to the deserts

of those who assisted him. It was known directly the Cashmere Gate was

conquered that the exodus of the less warlike inhabitants of Delhi was

beginning; but not then, nor until six days afterwards, could this be

stopped, for the southern gates were wholly beyond reach of the

conquerors. The imperial palace was captured, and was found nearly

empty, on the 20th; and on the following day Captain Hodson learned that

the king and his family had left the city with a large force by the

Ajmeer Gate, and had gone to the Kootub, a suburban palace about nine

miles from Delhi. Hodson urged that a detachment should be sent in

pursuit, but Wilson did not think he could spare troops for this

service. While this subject was under consideration, messengers were

coming from the king, and among others Zeenat Mahal, a favourite begum,

making ridiculous offers on his part, as if he were still the power

paramount—all of which were of course rejected. As these offers could

not be accepted; as Wilson could not or would not send a detachment at

once to defeat or capture the mutinous troops who had departed with the

king; and as it was, nevertheless, desirable to have the king’s person

in safe custody—Captain Hodson received permission to promise the aged

sovereign his life, and exemption from immediate personal indignity, if

he would surrender.

Thus armed, Hodson laid his plans. He started with fifty of his own

native irregular troopers to Humayoon’s Tomb, about three miles from the

Kootub. Concealing himself and his men among some old buildings close by

the gateway of the tomb, he sent his demand up to the palace. After two

hours of anxious suspense, he received a message from the king that he

would deliver himself up to Captain Hodson only, and on condition that

he repeated with his own lips the pledge of the government for his

safety. The captain then went out into the middle of the road in front

of the gateway, and said he was ready to receive his captives and renew

the promise. ‘You may picture to yourself,’ said one familiar with the

spot, ‘the scene before that magnificent gateway, with the milk-white

domes of the tomb towering up from within, one white man among a host of

natives, yet determined to secure his prisoners or perish in the

attempt.’ After a time, a procession began to arrive from the palace.

Threats and promises soon did their work; and the king, his begum Zeenat

Mahal, and her son Jumma Bukht, were escorted to Delhi. It was a

striking manifestation of moral power; for there were hundreds or even

thousands of retainers in the procession, any one of whom could by a

shot have put an end to Hodson’s life; but he rode at the side of the

imperial palanquins, cool and undaunted, and they touched him not. As

the city was approached, the followers and bystanders slunk away, being

unwilling to confront the British troops. The captain rode on a few

paces ahead, and ordered the Lahore Gate to be opened. ‘Who have you

there in the palanquin?’ asked the officer on duty. ‘Only the King of

Delhi,’ was the reply. The guard were all enraptured, and wanted to

greet Hodson with a cheer; but he said the king would probably take the

honour to himself, which was not desirable. On they went, through the

once magnificent but now deserted Chandnee Chowk; and the daring captor,

at the gate of the palace, handed up his royal prisoners to the civil

authorities.

[Illustration:

Scene of Capture of the Princes of Delhi—Tomb of Emperor Humayoon.

]

Captain Hodson’s work was not yet finished; there were other members of

the royal family towards whom his attention was directed. Early on the

following morning, he started to avail himself of information he

obtained concerning three of the princes, who were known to have been

guilty of monstrous deeds which rendered them worthy of instant death.

He went with a hundred of his troopers to the Tomb of Humayoon, where

the princes were concealed. After accepting ‘king’s evidence,’ bribing,

threatening, and manœuvring, Hudson secured his prisoners, and sent them

off with a small escort to the city. Entering the tomb, he found it

filled with an enormous number of palace scum and city rabble, mostly

armed; but so thoroughly cowed were they by his fearless demeanour, that

they quietly obeyed his order to lay down their arms and depart. The

captain and his men then moved warily off to the city; and at a short

distance from the gate, he found the vehicle containing the princes

surrounded by a mob, who seemed disposed to resist him. What followed

must be given in the words of an officer who was in a position to obtain

accurate information. ‘This was no time for hesitation or delay. Hodson

dashed at once into the midst—in few but energetic words explained “that

these were the men who had not only rebelled against the government, but

had ordered and witnessed the massacre and shameful exposure of innocent

women and children; and that thus therefore the government punished such

traitors, taken in open resistance”—shooting them down at the word. The

effect was instantaneous and wonderful. Not another hand was raised, not

another weapon levelled, and the Mohammedans of the troop and some

influential moulvies among the bystanders exclaimed, as if by

simultaneous impulse: “Well and rightly done! Their crime has met with

its just penalty. These were they who gave the signal for the death of

helpless women and children, and outraged decency by the exposure of

their persons, and now a righteous judgment has fallen on them. God is

great!” The remaining weapons were then laid down, and the crowd slowly

and quietly dispersed. The bodies were then carried into the city, and

thrown out on the very spot where the blood of their innocent victims

still stained the earth. They remained there till the 24th, when, for

sanitary reasons, they were removed from the Chibootra in front of the

Kotwallee. The effect of this just retribution was as miraculous on the

populace as it was deserved by the criminals.’ Thus were put to death

two of the old king’s sons, Mirza Mogul Beg, and another whose name is

doubtful, together with Mirza’s son.

What was done to restore order in Delhi after its recapture; who was

appointed to command it; what arrangements were made for bringing to

justice the wretched king who was now a prisoner; and what military plan

was formed for pursuing the mutinous regiments which had escaped from

the city—will more conveniently be noticed in subsequent pages.

The country did not fail to do honour to those who had been concerned in

the conquest of the imperial city. The commander of the siege-army was

of course the first to be noticed. Although he had no European

reputation, Archdale Wilson had served as an artillery officer nearly

forty years in India. He was employed at the siege of Bhurtpore in 1824,

and in many other active services; but his chief duties confined him to

the artillery depôts. It is a curious fact that most of the guns

employed by him at the siege of Delhi, as well as those used by the

enemy against him, had been cast by him as superintendent of the

gun-foundry at Calcutta many years before, and bore his name as part of

the device. He held in succession the offices of adjutant-general of

artillery and commandant of artillery. At the commencement of the

mutiny, his regimental rank was that of lieutenant-colonel of the Bengal

artillery; but he acted as brigadier at Meerut, and was afterwards

promoted to the rank of major-general. The Queen, in November, raised

him to the baronetcy, and made him a Knight Commander of the Order of

the Bath; and thus the artillery officer had risen to the rank of

‘Major-general Sir Archdale Wilson, K.C.B.’ The East India Company, too,

sought to bestow honour—or something more solid than honour—on the

victorious commander; the court of proprietors, on the suggestion of the

court of directors, voted a pension of £1000 per annum to Sir Archdale

Wilson, to commence from the day when his troops entered Delhi.

What honours Brigadier Nicholson would have earned, had his valuable

life been spared, it would be useless to surmise. He was an especial

favourite among the soldiers in the Indian army—more so, perhaps, than

some whose names are better known to English readers; and his death

within the walls of Delhi was very generally deplored. He had not yet

attained his 35th year—a very early age at which to obtain brigade

command, either in the Company’s or the Queen’s armies. Nothing but the

unbounded confidence of Sir John Lawrence in the military genius of

Nicholson would have justified him in making so young a man, a simple

regimental captain (brevet-major), brigadier of a column destined to

fight the rebels all the way from the Punjaub to Delhi; yet even those

seniors who were superseded by this arrangement felt that the duty was

intrusted to one equal to its demands. He had seen hard service during

the Afghan and Punjaub campaigns, as captain in the 27th Bengal native

infantry; and had, instead of idling his time during a furlough visit to

England, studied the armies and military organisation of continental

Europe. An officer who served with him during the mutiny said: ‘He had a

constitution of iron. The day we marched to Murdan he was _twenty-six_

hours in the saddle, following up the mutineers.’ The Queen granted the

posthumous dignity of Knight Commander of the Bath upon

Brigadier-general John Nicholson; and as he was unmarried, the East

India Company departed from their general rule, by bestowing a special

grant of £500 per annum upon his widowed mother, who had in earlier

years lost another son in the Company’s service.

One among many civil servants of the Company who fell during the siege

was Hervey Harris Greathed, a member of a family well known in India.

After filling various official situations in the Punjaub, Rajpootana,

and Meerut, he became chief-commissioner of Delhi, after the foul murder

of Mr Simon Fraser on the 11th of May. Serve or remain in Delhi itself

he could not, for obvious reasons; but he was with Wilson’s army in the

expedition from Meerut to Delhi, and then remained with the siege-army

on the heights, where his intimate knowledge of India and the natives

was of essential value. He died of cholera just before the conclusion of

the siege. His brothers, Robert and George Herbert, had already died in

the services of the Company or the crown; but two others, Edward Harris

and William Wilberforce Harris, survived to achieve fame as gallant

officers.

Another of those who fell on the day of the assault was Lieutenant

Philip Salkeld, of the Bengal engineers. He was the son of a Dorsetshire

clergyman, and went to India in 1850, in his twentieth year, in the

corps of Sappers and Miners. He was employed for four years as an

engineer in connection with the new works of the grand trunk-road, in

Upper India; and was then transferred to the executive engineers’

department in the Delhi division. His first taste of war was in relation

to the mutinies; he was engaged in all the operations of the siege of

Delhi, and was struck down while gallantly exploding the Cashmere Gate.

He lingered in great pain, and died about the 10th of October. The Rev.

S. G. Osborne, in a letter written soon after the news of Salkeld’s

death reached England, said: ‘This young officer has not more

distinguished himself in his profession by his devotion to his country’s

service of his life, than he stands distinguished in the memory of those

who knew him for his virtues as a son and brother. His father, a

clergyman in Dorsetshire, by a reverse of fortune some years since, was

with a large family reduced, I may say, to utter poverty. This, his

soldier son, supported out of his own professional income one of his

brothers at school, helping a sister, obliged to earn her own bread as a

governess, to put another brother to school. Just before his death he

had saved a sum of £1000, which was in the bank at Delhi, and was

therefore lost to him, and, more than this, it was lost to the

honourable purpose to which, as a son and brother, he had devoted it. In

his native county it has been determined to erect a monument to his

memory by subscription. Cadetships having been given to two of his young

brothers, it is now wisely resolved that while the memorial which is to

hand down his name to posterity in connection with his glorious death

shall be all that is necessary for the purpose, every farthing collected

beyond the sum necessary for this shall be expended as he would have

desired, for the good of these his young brothers.’

Lieutenant Duncan Home, another hero of the Cashmere Gate, was not one

of the wounded on that perilous occasion; he lived to receive the

approval of his superior in the engineering department; but his death

occurred even sooner than that of his companion in arms, for he was

mortally wounded on the 1st of October while engaged with an

expeditionary force in pursuit of the fleeing rebels. It was on that

day, a few hours before he received the fatal bullet, that he wrote a

letter to his mother in England; in which, after describing the

operations at the Cashmere Gate, he said: ‘I was then continually on

duty until the king evacuated the palace. I had never more than four

hours’ sleep in the twenty-four, and then only by snatches. I had also

the pleasure of blowing in the gate of the palace; luckily no one fired

at me, there being so few men left in the palace.’

Salkeld and Home received the ‘Victoria Cross,’ a much-coveted honour

among the British troops engaged in the Indian war. As did likewise

Sergeant Smith, who so boldly risked, yet saved, his life; and also

Bugler Hawthorne of the 52d, who blew his signal-blast in spite of the

shots whistling around him. Poor Sergeant Carmichael and Corporal

Burgess did not live to share in this honour; they fell bullet-pierced.

[Illustration:

State Palanquin.

]

-----

Footnote 78:

Chap. xiv., pp. 230-246.

Footnote 79:

By comparing two wood-cuts—‘Bird’s-eye View of Delhi’ (p. 64), and

‘Delhi from Flagstaff Tower’ (p. 76)—the reader will be assisted in

forming an idea of the relative positions of the mutineers within the

city, and of the British on the ridge and in the camp behind it. The

‘Bird’s-eye View’ will be the most useful for this purpose, as

combining the characteristics of a _view_ and a _plan_, and shewing

very clearly the river, the bridge of boats, the camp, the ridge, the

broken ground in front of it, the Flagstaff Tower, Metcalfe House, the

Custom-house, Hindoo Rao’s house, the Samee House, the Selimgurh fort,

the city, the imperial palace, the Jumma Musjid, the walls and

bastions, the western suburbs, &c.

Footnote 80:

H.M. 75th foot, 100 men.

1st Bengal Europeans, 350 men.

Coke’s Punjaub Rifles, 250 men.

H.M. 8th foot, 100 men.

2d Bengal Europeans, 100 men.

Kumaon Goorkhas, 100 men.

4th Sikh infantry, 100 men.

H.M. 9th Lancers, one squadron.

Horse artillery, six guns.

Footnote 81:

H.M. 52d light infantry.

35th Bengal native infantry.

2d Punjaub infantry.

9th Bengal native cavalry, one wing.

Moultan horse.

Dawe’s troop of horse-artillery.

Smyth’s troop of native foot-artillery.

Bourchier’s light-infantry battery.

Footnote 82:

During that famous pursuit and defeat of the Sealkote mutineers, a

wing of H.M. 52d foot marched sixty-two miles in forty-eight hours of

an Indian summer, besides fighting with an enemy who resisted with

more than their usual determination. It was work worthy of a regiment

which had marched _three thousand miles in four years_.

Footnote 83:

‘What a sight our camp would be even to those who visited Sebastopol!

The long lines of tents, the thatched hovels of the native servants,

the rows of horses, the parks of artillery, the English soldier in his

gray linen coat and trousers (he has fought as bravely as ever without

pipeclay), the Sikhs with their red and blue turbans, the Afghans with

their red and blue turbans, their wild air, and their gay head-dresses

and coloured saddle-cloths, and the little Goorkhas, dressed up to the

ugliness of demons in black worsted Kilmarnock hats and woollen

coats—the truest, bravest soldiers in our pay. There are scarcely any

Poorbeahs (Hindustanis) left in our ranks, but of native servants many

a score. In the rear are the booths of the native bazaars, and further

out on the plain the thousands of camels, bullocks, and horses that

carry our baggage. The soldiers are loitering through the lines or in

the bazaars. Suddenly the alarm is sounded. Every one rushes to his

tent. The infantry soldier seizes his musket and slings on his pouch,

the artilleryman gets his guns harnessed, the Afghan rides out to

explore; in a few minutes everybody is in his place.

‘If we go to the summit of the ridge of hill which separates us from

the city, we see the river winding along to the left, the bridge of

boats, the towers of the palace, and the high roof and minarets of the

great mosque, the roofs and gardens of the doomed city, and the

elegant-looking walls, with batteries here and there, the white smoke

of which rises slowly up among the green foliage that clusters round

the ramparts.’

Footnote 84:

‘The first day we marched to a place called Khurkowdeh, but such a

march! We had to go through water for miles up to the horses’ girths.

We took Khurkowdeh by surprise, and Hodson immediately placed men over

the gates, and we went in. Shot one scoundrel instanter, cut down

another, and took a ressaldar (native officer) and some sowars

(troopers) prisoners, and came to a house occupied by some more, who

would not let us in at all; at last, we rushed in and found the

rascals had taken to the upper story, and still kept us at bay. There

was only one door and a kirkee (window). I shoved in my head through

the door, with a pistol in my hand, and got a clip over my turban for

my pains; my pistol missed fire at the man’s breast (you must send me

a revolver), so I got out of that as fast as I could, and then tried

the kirkee with the other barrel, and very nearly got another cut. We

tried every means to get in, but could not, so we fired the house, and

out they rushed a muck among us. The first fellow went at ——, who

wounded him, but somehow or other he slipped and fell on his back. I

saw him fall, and, thinking he was hurt, rushed to the rescue. A Guide

got a chop at the fellow, and I gave him such a swinging back-hander

that he fell dead. I then went at another fellow rushing by my left,

and sent my sword through him, like butter, and bagged him. I then

looked round and saw a sword come crash on the shoulders of a poor

youth; oh, such a cut; and up went the sword again, and the next

moment the boy would have been in eternity, but I ran forward and

covered him with my sword and saved him. During this it was over with

seven men. —— had shot one with his revolver, and the other four were

cut down at once. Having polished off these fellows, we held an

impromptu court-martial on those we had taken, and shot them

all—murderers every one, who were justly rewarded for their deeds.’

Footnote 85:

H.M. 9th Lancers (Captain Sarrell), One squadron.

Guide cavalry (Captain Sandford), 120 men.

2d Punjaub cavalry, 80 men.

Moultan horse.

H.M. 61st foot (Colonel Renny), 420 men.

1st Bengal Europeans (Major Jacob), 380 men.

1st Punjaub infantry (Coke’s), 400 men.

2d Punjaub Infantry (Green’s), 400 men.

Sappers and Miners, 30 men.

Horse-artillery (Tombs’ and Olphert’s), Sixteen guns.

Captain (now Major) Olphert being ill, the command of his troop was

taken by Captain Remington.

Footnote 86:

‘Mrs ——, the wife of Mr ——, made her escape from Delhi on the morning

of the 19th. Poor creature, she was almost reduced to a skeleton; as

she had been kept in a sort of dungeon while in Delhi. Two

chuprassees, who, it appears, have all along been faithful to her,

aided her in making her attempt to escape. They passed through the

Ajmeer Gate, but not wholly unobserved by the mutineers’ sentries, as

one of the chuprassees was shot by them. It being dark at the time,

she lay hidden among the long web-grass until the dawn of day, when

she sent the chuprassee to reconnoitre, and as luck would have it, he

came across the European picket stationed at Subzee Mundee. So soon as

he could discover who they were, he went and brought the lady into the

picket-house amongst the soldiers, who did all they could to insure

her safety. As soon as she arrived inside the square, she fell down

upon her knees, and offered up a prayer to Heaven for her safe

deliverance. All she had round her body was a dirty piece of cloth,

and another piece folded round her head. She was in a terrible

condition; but I feel assured that there was not a single European but

felt greatly concerned in her behalf; and some even shed tears of pity

when they heard the tale of woe that she related. After being

interrogated by the officers for a short time, Captain Bailey provided

a doolie for her, and sent her under escort safe to camp, where she

has been provided with a staff-tent, and everything that she

requires.’

Footnote 87:

_Artillery, Engineers, &c._

European { Artillerymen of all kinds, 1350

and { Engineers, Sappers, Miners, &c., 722

Native. { Pioneers, unarmed and undisciplined, ?

————

2072

_Cavalry._

{ H.M. Carabiniers, 123

European. { H.M. 9th Lancers, 391

{ 4th irregular cavalry (disarmed and unhorsed), 78

{ 1st Punjaub cavalry, 147

Native. { 2d Punjaub cavalry, 114

{ 5th Punjaub cavalry, 107

{ Hodson’s Irregular Horse, 462

{ Guide corps, cavalry, 283

————

1705

_Infantry._

{ H.M. 8th foot, 322

{ H.M. 52d foot, 302

{ H.M. 60th Rifles, 390

European. { H.M. 61st foot, 402

{ H.M. 75th foot, 459

{ 1st Bengal European Fusiliers, 427

{ 2d Bengal European Fusiliers, 370

{ Sirmoor battalion, Goorkhas, 212

{ Kumaon battalion, Goorkhas, 312

{ Guide corps, infantry, 302

Native. { 4th Sikh infantry, 414

{ 1st Punjaub infantry, 664

{ 2d Punjaub infantry, 650

{ 4th Punjaub infantry, 541

{ Belooch battalion, 322

————

6089

Footnote 88:

_1st Column_, under Brigadier-general Nicholson—

Men.

H.M. 75th foot (Lieutenant-colonel Herbert), 300

1st Bengal Europeans (Major Jacob), 250

2d Punjaub infantry (Captain Green), 450

_2d Column_, under Brigadier Jones—

H.M. 8th foot (Lieutenant-colonel Greathed), 250

2d Bengal Europeans (Captain Boyd), 250

4th Sikh infantry (Captain Rothney), 350

_3d Column_, under Colonel Campbell—

H.M. 52d foot (Major Vigors), 200

Kumaon Goorkhas (Captain Ramsay), 250

1st Punjaub infantry (Lieutenant Nicholson), 500

_4th Column_, under Major Reid—

Sirmoor Goorkhas,}

Guide infantry, } Besides Cashmere Contingent,

European pickets,} of which strength unknown. 850

Native pickets, }

_Reserve_, under Brigadier Longfield—

H.M. 61st foot (Lieutenant-colonel Deacon), 250

4th Punjaub infantry (Captain Wilde), 450

Belooch battalion (Lieutenant-colonel Farquhar), 300

Jheend auxiliaries (Lieutenant-colonel Dunsford), 300

The engineer officers were attached to the several columns as follows:

To the 1st column, Lieuts. Medley, Lang, and Bingham.

To the 2d column, Lieuts. Greathed, Hovenden, and Pemberton.

To the 3d column, Lieuts. Home, Salkeld, and Tandy.

To the 4th column, Lieuts. Maunsell and Tennant.

To the Reserve, Lieuts. Ward and Thackeray.

Footnote 89:

One of the writers remarked: ‘The stout rope-mat which forms an

efficient screen to the Russian artillerymen while serving their gun,

impervious to the Minié ball, which lodges harmlessly in its rough and

rugged surface, may surely suggest to our engineers the expediency of

some effort to shield the valuable lives of our men when exposed to

the enemy’s fire. In ancient warfare, all nations appear to have

defended themselves from the deadly arrow by shields, and why the

principle of the testudo should be ignored in modern times is not

obvious. Take the instance before us—Lieutenant Salkeld and a few

others undertake the important, but most perilous duty of blowing in

the Cashmere Gate, by bags of gunpowder, in broad daylight, and in the

face of numerous foes, whose concentrated fire threatens the whole

party with certain death. It is accomplished, but at what a loss!

Marvellous indeed was it that one escaped. Now, as a plain man,

without any scientific pretensions, I ask, could not, and might not,

some kind of defensive screen have been furnished for the protection

of these few devoted men? Suppose a light cart or truck on three

wheels, having a semicircular framework in front, against which might

be lashed a rope-matting, and inside a sufficient number of sacks of

wool or hay, propelled by means of a central cross-bar pushed against

by four men within the semicircle, the engineers could advance, and on

reaching the gate, perform their work through a central orifice in the

outer matting, made to open like a flap. The party would then retire

in a similar manner, merely reversing the mode of propulsion, until

the danger was past.’ Another, Mr Rock of Hastings, said: ‘In July

1848, I sent a plan for a movable shield for attacking barricades, to

General Cavaignac, at Paris; and on the 13th or 14th of July your own

columns (the _Times_) contained descriptions of my machine, and a

statement by your Paris correspondent that it had been constructed at

the Ecole Militaire in that city. Fortunately, it was never used

there, but there seems to me no valid reason why such a contrivance

should not be used on occasions like that which recently occurred at

Delhi. The truck proposed, with a shield in front, would serve to

carry the powder-bags, without incurring the chance of their being

dropped owing to the fall of one or two of the men employed on the

service, while the chances of premature ignition would be diminished.

These, I think, are advantages tending to insure success which should

induce military engineers to use movable cover for their men when

possible, even if they despise it as a personal protection.’

Footnote 90:

When the magazine was so heroically fired by Lieutenant Willoughby,

four months earlier, the destruction caused was very much smaller than

had been reported and believed. The stores in the magazine had been

available to the rebels during the greater part of the siege.

Footnote 91:

_Europeans_— Killed. Wounded.

Officers, 46 140

Non-commissioned officers, 50 113

Rank and file, 476 1313

_Natives_—

Officers, 14 49

Non-commissioned officers, 37 104

Rank and file, 389 1076

Footnote 92:

‘The force assembled before Delhi has had much hardship and fatigue to

undergo since its arrival in this camp, all of which has been most

cheerfully borne by officers and men. The time is now drawing near

when the major-general commanding the force trusts that their labours

will be over, and that they will be rewarded by the capture of a city

for all their past exertions and for a cheerful endurance of still

greater fatigue and exposure.... The artillery will have even harder

work than they yet have had, and which they have so well and

cheerfully performed hitherto; this, however, will be for a short

period only, and when ordered to the assault, the major-general feels

assured British pluck and determination will carry everything before

them, and that the blood-thirsty and murderous mutineers against whom

they are fighting will be driven headlong out of their stronghold or

be exterminated.

‘Major-general Wilson need hardly remind the troops of the cruel

murders committed on their officers and comrades, as well as their

wives and children, to move them in the deadly struggle. _No quarter

should be given to the mutineers_; at the same time, for the sake of

humanity, and the honour of the country they belong to, he calls upon

them to spare all women and children that may come in their way.... It

is to be explained to every regiment that indiscriminate plunder will

not be allowed; that prize-agents have been appointed, by whom all

captured property will be collected and sold, to be divided, according

to the rules and regulations on this head fairly among all men

engaged; and that any man found guilty of having concealed captured

property will be made to restore it, and will forfeit all claims to

the general prize; he will also be likely to be made over to the

provost-marshal, to be summarily dealt with.’

Footnote 93:

‘The reports and returns which accompany this dispatch establish the

arduous nature of a contest carried on against an enemy vastly

superior in numbers, holding a strong position, furnished with

unlimited appliances, and aided by the most exhausting and sickly

season of the year.

‘They set forth the indomitable courage and perseverance, the heroic

self-devotion and fortitude, the steady discipline, and stern resolve

of English soldiers.

‘There is no mistaking the earnestness of purpose with which the

struggle has been maintained by Major-general Wilson’s army. Every

heart was in the cause; and while their numbers were, according to all

ordinary rule, fearfully unequal to the task, every man has given his

aid, wherever and in whatever manner it could most avail, to hasten

retribution upon a treacherous and murderous foe.

‘In the name of outraged humanity, in memory of innocent blood

ruthlessly shed, and in acknowledgment of the first signal vengeance

inflicted upon the foulest treason, the governor-general in council

records his gratitude to Major-general Wilson and the brave army of

Delhi. He does so in the sure conviction that a like tribute awaits

them, not in England only, but wherever within the limits of

civilisation the news of their well-earned triumph shall reach.’

Some days afterwards, Lord Canning issued a more formal and complete

proclamation, of which a few paragraphs may here be given: ‘Delhi, the

focus of the treason and revolt which for four months have harassed

Hindostan, and the stronghold in which the mutinous army of Bengal has

sought to concentrate its power, has been wrested from the rebels. The

king is a prisoner in the palace. The head-quarters of Major-general

Wilson are established in the Dewani Khas [the “Elysium” of the Mogul

palace-builders, and of Moore’s _Lalla Rookh_]. A strong column is in

pursuit of the fugitives.

‘Whatever may be the motives and passions by which the mutinous

soldiery, and those who are leagued with them, have been instigated to

faithlessness, rebellion, and crimes at which the heart sickens, it is

certain that they have found encouragement in the delusive belief that

India was weakly guarded by England, and that before the government

could gather together its strength against them, their ends would be

gained.

‘They are now undeceived.

‘Before a single soldier of the many thousands who are hastening from

England to uphold the supremacy of the British power has set foot on

these shores, the rebel force, where it was strongest and most united,

and where it had the command of unbounded military appliances, has

been destroyed or scattered by an army collected within the limits of

the Northwestern Provinces and the Punjaub alone.

‘The work has been done before the support of those battalions which

have been collected in Bengal from the forces of the Queen in China

and in her Majesty’s eastern colonies could reach Major-general

Wilson’s army; and it is by the courage and endurance of that gallant

army alone, by the skill, sound judgment, and steady resolution of its

brave commander, and by the aid of some native chiefs true to their

allegiance, that, under the blessing of God, the head of the rebellion

has been crushed, and the cause of loyalty, humanity, and rightful

authority vindicated.’

[Illustration:

SIR J. E. W. INGLIS, defender of Lucknow.

]