CENTRAL REGIONS OF INDIA: JUNE.
In the political and territorial arrangements of the East India Company,
the name of Central India is somewhat vaguely employed to designate a
portion of the region lying between the Jumna and Bundelcund on the
northeast, and the Nizam’s territory and Gujerat on the southwest; a
designation convenient for general reading, without possessing any very
precise acceptation. In the present chapter, we shall change the
expression and enlarge the meaning so as to designate a belt of country
that really forms Central India in a geographical sense, extending from
Lower Bengal to Rajpootana, and separating Northern India from the
southern or peninsular portion of the empire. This will carry the
narrative into regions very little mentioned in former chapters—such as
Nagpoor, the Saugor and Nerbudda territories, Bundelcund and Rewah, the
Mahratta states and the Rajpoot states—regions that will be briefly
described, so far as to render the proceedings of the native troops
intelligible.
We begin with Nagpoor, a country now belonging to the British
government, and considerably larger than England and Wales.
This province was acquired, not so much by conquest, as by one of those
intricate arrangements concerning dynasty which have brought so many
native states under British rule. It is in general an elevated country,
containing many offshoots from the Vindhya range of mountains. Some
parts of it, towards the southeast, have never been explored by
Europeans, but are believed to be hilly, wooded, and full of jungles,
inhabited by the semi-barbarous tribe of Ghonds. The remainder is better
known and better cultivated; and being on the high road from Calcutta to
Bombay, possesses much political importance. The population exceeds four
millions and a half. Early in the last century, one of the Mahratta
chieftains conquered Nagpoor from the rajahs who had before governed it;
and he and his descendants, or other ambitious members of the Mahratta
family, continued to hold it as Rajahs of Nagpoor or Berar. Although
constantly fighting one with another, these Mahrattas were on fair terms
with the East India Company until 1803, when, unluckily for the
continuance of his rule, the native rajah joined Scindia in the war
against the British. As a consequence, when peace was restored in 1804,
he was forced to yield Cuttack and other provinces to the conquerors. In
1817, another Rajah of Nagpoor joined the Peishwa of the Mahrattas in
hostilities against the British—a course which led to his expulsion from
the raj, and to a further increase of British influence. Then followed a
period during which one rajah was imbecile, another under age, and many
unscrupulous chieftains sought to gain an ascendency one over another.
This was precisely the state of things which rendered the British
resident more and more powerful, setting up and putting down rajahs, and
allowing the competitors to weaken the whole native rule by weakening
each other. The history of British India may be almost told in such
words as these. At length, in 1853, the last rajah, Ragojee, died—not
only without heirs, but without any male relations who could support a
legitimate claim to the raj. Thereupon, the governor-general quietly
annexed this large country to the Company’s dominions. It will be
remembered (p. 4) that the Marquis of Dalhousie, in his minute,
despatched this subject in a very few lines; not asserting that the
British had actually any right to the country; but ‘wisely incorporated
it,’ as no one else could put in a legitimate claim for it, and as it
would have been imprudent ‘to bestow the territory in free gift upon a
stranger.’ The Nagpoor territory was placed under the management of a
commissioner, who was immediately subordinate to the governor-general in
council; seeing that the Bengal Presidency was already too large to have
this considerable country attached to it for governmental purposes.
At and soon after the time of the outbreak, there were the 1st regiment
irregular infantry, the Kamptee irregulars, an irregular horse-battery,
and a body of European gunners, stationed in the city of Nagpoor, or in
Kamptee, eleven miles distant; the 2d infantry and a detachment of the
1st were at Chandah; a detachment of the 1st at Bhandara; the chief
portion of the 3d at Rajpoor; and the remainder of the same regiment at
Bilaspoor. The arsenal, containing guns, arms, ammunition, and military
stores of every description; and the treasury of the province, with a
large amount of Company’s funds—were close to the city. Mr Plowden
filled the office of commissioner at that period. With a mere handful of
Europeans in the midst of a very extensive territory, he often trembled
in thought for the safety of his position, and of British interests
generally, in the region placed under his keeping. He had numerous
native troops with him, and a large city under his control; if anything
sinister should arise, he was far away from any extraneous aid—being
nearly six hundred miles distant from Madras, and still further from
Calcutta. But, whatever were his anxieties (and they were many), he put
on a calm bearing towards the natives of Nagpoor. This city, the capital
of the territory bearing the same name, is a dirty, irregular,
straggling place, nearly seven miles in circumference. Most of the
houses are mud-built; and even the palace of the late rajah is little
more than a clumsy pile of unfinished masonry. The city has become
rather famous for its banking business, and for its manufactures of
cottons, chintzes, turbans, silks, brocades, woollens, blankets,
tent-cloths, and other textile goods. The population exceeds a hundred
thousand. There is nothing of a military appearance about the city; but
whoever commands the Seetabuldee, commands Nagpoor itself. This
Seetabuldee is a hilly ridge close to the city on the west, having two
summits, the northern the higher, the southern the larger, but every
part overlooking the city, and fortified. Such being the topographical
position of his seat of government, Mr Plowden proceeded to disarm such
of his troops as excited disquietude in his mind, and to strengthen the
Seetabuldee. A corps of irregular cavalry shewed symptoms of disloyalty;
and indeed rumours were afloat that on a particular day the ascent of a
balloon was to be a signal for the revolt of the troops. Under these
circumstances, Mr Plowden arranged with Colonel Cumberlege, the
commandant, to disarm them on the morning of the 23d of June—the colonel
having the 4th regiment of Madras cavalry, on whom he fully relied, to
enforce the order for disbanding. The irregulars were paraded, mounted
and fully armed, to shew that the authorities were not afraid of them.
Mr Plowden having addressed them, they quietly gave up their arms and
their saddles, which were taken in carts to the arsenal; and thus six
hundred and fifty troopers were left with nothing but their bare horses,
and ropes to picket them. Some of the men and of the native officers
were arrested, and put on their trial for an attempt to excite mutiny.
The roll was called over every four hours, and every native soldier
absent, or found outside the lines without a pass, was treated as a
deserter. The 1st regiment irregular infantry assisted in the disarming
of the troopers. Following up the measures thus promptly taken, the
commissioner strengthened the defences on the Seetabuldee hill, as a
last refuge for the Europeans at Nagpoor in the event of any actual
mutiny at that place. The Residency became a barrack at night for all
the civil and military officers; and a watchful eye was kept on the
natives generally. At present, all was safe in Nagpoor.
Another province, and another commissioner in charge of it, now come for
notice. This province, bearing the rather lengthened name of the Saugor
and Nerbudda Territories, is about half the size of England, and is
bounded by the various provinces or regions of Nagpoor, Mirzapore,
Allahabad, Banda, Bundelcund, Gwalior, Bhopal, and the Nizam’s state of
Hyderabad. It corresponds more nearly with the exact centre of India
than any other portion of territory. One half of its name is derived
from the town of Saugor, the other half from the river Nerbudda. To
describe the scraps and patches of which it consists, and the means by
which they were acquired, would be neither easy nor necessary. Within
its limits is the small independent state of Rewah, the rajah of which
was bound to the British government by a treaty of alliance. Four other
petty states—Kotee, Myhir, Oocheyra, and Sohawul—were in the hands of
native chieftains, mere feudatories of the Company, under whose grants
they held their possessions; allowed to govern their small
sovereignties, but subject at any moment to the supervision and
interference of the paramount power. The larger portion, now entirely
British, is marked by the towns and districts of Saugor, Jubbulpoor,
Hosungabad, Seuni, Nursingpore, Baitool, Sohagpoor, and others of less
importance. There are still many aboriginal Ghonds in the province, as
in Nagpoor, lurking in the gloomiest recesses of dense forests, and
subsisting for the most part on wild roots and fruits. There are other
half-savage tribes of Koles, Palis, and Panwars; while the more
civilised population comprises a singular mixture of Brahmins, Bundelas,
Rajpoots, Mahrattas, and Patans. The Mahrattas at one time claimed this
region, on the same plea as those east and west of it—the right of
conquest; and the British obtained it from the Mahrattas, about forty
years ago, by cession after a course of hostilities.
Major Erskine was commissioner of the Saugor and Nerbudda territories
during the early weeks of the mutiny; responsible, not immediately to
the governor-general at Calcutta, but to the lieutenant-governor of the
Northwest Provinces at Agra. Like Mr Plowden at Nagpoor, he felt how
imperiled he and his fellow-Europeans would be if the native troops were
to rebel. At Jhansi and at Nuseerabad, as we shall presently see, revolt
and massacre marked the first week in June; and Major Erskine sought
earnestly for means to prevent his own Saugor troops from being tempted
to a similar course. He was with the 52d native infantry at Jubbulpoor.
He wrote on the 9th of June to Brigadier Prior at Kamptee, praying
him—while keeping that station and Seuni intact—to prevent, if possible,
all news of the mutineers from passing to Jubbulpoor by that route; he
feared lest his 52d should yield to the influence of pernicious example.
Seuni was a small civil station, nearly midway between Jubbulpoor and
Nagpoor, and about eighty miles distant from each; while Kamptee was a
cantonment of Madras regulars, eleven miles north of Nagpoor. The four
places named, in fact, stand nearly in a line north and south, and
interpose between the Mahratta states and Lower Bengal. Mr Plowden at
Nagpoor, Major Erskine at Jubbulpoor, and Brigadier Prior at Kamptee,
thereupon concerted measures for preserving, so far as they could, that
region of India from disturbance; they all three agreed that
‘tranquillity will be most effectually secured by crushing disaffection
before it approaches too near to agitate men’s minds dangerously.’ One
consequence of this arrangement was, that a force was sent on the 13th
to Seuni, under Major Baker; consisting of the 32d native infantry, a
squadron of the 4th light cavalry, a squadron of irregular cavalry, and
three field-guns.
The Europeans at Jubbulpoor were not allowed to pass through the month
of June without many doubts and anxieties. The native troops, though not
actually in mutiny, were seized with a mingled feeling of fear and
exasperation when European troops were mentioned; they were in perpetual
apprehension, from the countless rumours at that time circulating
throughout India, that Europeans were about to approach and disarm them,
as degraded and distrusted men. Jubbulpoor is a large thriving town,
which at the time of the mutiny contained a small cantonment for native
troops, and a political agency subsidiary to that at Saugor. On one
occasion, this report of the approach of European troops seized so
forcibly on the minds of the sepoys, that the subadar-major, a trusted
and influential man, lost all control over them; and they were not
satisfied until their English colonel allowed two or three from each
company to go out and scour the country, to satisfy themselves and the
rest whether the rumour were true or false. On another occasion, one of
the sepoys rose with a shout of ‘Death to the Feringhees,’ and
endeavoured to bayonet the adjutant; but his companions did not aid him;
and the authorities deemed it prudent to treat him as a madman, to be
confined and not shot. When troops were marched from Kamptee to Seuni,
in accordance with the arrangements mentioned in the last paragraph, the
sepoys at Jubbulpoor were at once told of it, lest their excited minds
should be again aroused on the subject of Europeans. Some of the English
officers felt the humiliation involved in this kind of petting and
pampering; but danger was around them, and they were obliged to
temporise. A few ladies had been sent to Kamptee; all else remained with
their husbands, seldom taking off their clothes at night, and holding
themselves ready to flee at an hour’s warning. Such a state of affairs,
though less perilous, was almost as mentally distressing as actual
mutiny. As the month drew to a close, and the perpetual anxiety and
expectation were becoming wearisome to all, the Europeans resolved to
fortify the Residency. This they did, and moreover stored it with six
months’ provision for about sixty persons, including thirty ladies and
children; and for several civilians, who had also to be provided for.
Saugor was placed in some such predicament as Jubbulpoor; its European
officers had much to plan, much to execute, to enable them to pass
safely through the perils of the month of June. This town, the capital
of the province in political matters, possessed a military cantonment on
the borders of a lake on which the town stands; a large fort, which had
been converted into an ordnance depôt; and a population of fifty
thousand souls, chiefly Mahrattas. At the time of the outbreak,
Brigadier Sage commanded the Saugor district force, and had under him
the 31st and 42d native infantry regiments, a regiment of native
cavalry, and about seventy European gunners. The fort, the magazine, and
the battering-train were at one end of the cantonment; an eminence,
called the Artillery Hill, was at the other end, three miles off; and
the brigadier felt that if mutiny should occur, he would hardly be able
to hold both positions. During many minor transactions in the district,
requiring the presence of small detachments from Saugor, the temper of
the troops was made sufficiently manifest; sometimes the 31st shewed bad
symptoms, sometimes the 42d; two or three men were detected in plans for
murdering their officers; and petty rajahs in the district offered the
sepoys higher pay if they would change their allegiance. The European
inhabitants of Saugor becoming very uneasy, the brigadier cleared out
the fort, converted it into a place of refuge for women and children,
supplied it with useful furniture and other articles, and succeeded in
supplanting sepoys by Europeans in guard of the fort, the magazine, and
the treasury. The fort being provisioned for six months, and the guns
secured, Brigadier Sage felt himself in a position to adopt a resolute
tone towards the native troops, without compromising the safety of the
numerous persons congregated within it—comprising a hundred and thirty
officers and civilians, and a hundred and sixty women and children, all
the Europeans of the place. Thus ended June. It may simply be added
here, that during the early part of the following month, the 31st and
42d regiments had a desperate fight, the former willing to be faithful,
and the latter to mutiny. The brigadier, not feeling quite sure even of
the 31st, would not place either his officers or his guns at their
mercy, but he sent out of the fort a few men to aid them. The irregular
cavalry joined the 42d; but both corps were ultimately beaten off by the
31st—to carry wild disorder into other towns and districts.[26]
Without dwelling on minor mutinies at Dumoh and other places in the
Saugor province, we will transfer our attention northward to Bundelcund;
where Jhansi was the scene of a terrible catastrophe, and where riot and
plunder were in the ascendant throughout the month of June. Bundelcund,
the country of the Bundelas, affords a curious example of the mode in
which a region became in past times cut up into a number of petty
states, and then fell in great part into British hands. It is a strip of
country, about half the size of Scotland, lying south or southwest of
the Jumna, and separated by that river from the Doab. The country was in
the hands of the Rajpoots until the close of the fourteenth century;
when another tribe, the Bundelas, began a system of predatory incursions
which led to their ultimate possession of the whole tract. Early in the
last century there was a chief of Western Bundelcund tributary to the
Great Mogul, and another in Eastern Bundelcund supported by the
Mahrattas against that sovereign. How one chief rose against another,
and how each obtained a patch of territory for himself, need not be
told; it was only an exemplification of a process to which Asiatics have
been accustomed from the earliest ages. About the close of the century,
the East India Company began to obtain possession here, by conquest or
by treaty; and in 1817, after a war with the Mahrattas, a large increase
was made in this ownership. These are matters needful to be borne in
mind here; for, though the country is but small, it now contains five or
six districts belonging to the British, and nine native princedoms or
rajahships; besides numerous petty jaghires or domains that may in some
sense be compared to the smallest states of the Germanic confederation.
At the time of the mutiny, the British districts were managed under the
lieutenant-governor of the Northwest Provinces; while the ‘political
superintendence,’ as it was called, of the native states was in the
hands of an agent appointed by, and directly responsible to, the
governor-general. With the principal native states, of which Jhansi was
one, the British government had engagements, varying on minor points
according to circumstances, but all recognising its supremacy, and
binding the dependent state to the relinquishment of all political
relations except with the superior power. Some were tributary; some
exempt from that obligation. The chief towns in the portion of
Bundelcund belonging to the British are Jhansi, Banda, and Jaloun.
Bundelcund, we have said, was the scene of much outrage, especially at
Jhansi. This town, lying on the main route from Agra to Saugor, was much
frequented in the last century by caravans of merchants who traded
between the Doab and the Deccan; and it is still a prosperous commercial
place, rendered conspicuous by the castellated residence of the former
rajahs. The Jhansi mutiny was not followed by so many adventures and
wanderings as that at other places—for a very mournful reason; nearly
all the Europeans were at once put to death. A fort in the town had been
previously supplied with food and ammunition, and had been agreed on as
a place of refuge in time of danger. Major Skene and Captain Gordon,
civil officers of the Company, received information which tended to shew
that a petty chieftain near Jhansi was tampering with the troops; and
Captain Dunlop, in command there, made what defensive preparations he
could. Besides the fort in the town, there was one called the Star Fort
in the cantonment, containing the guns and the treasure. The native
troops—portions of the 12th infantry and of the 14th irregular cavalry,
and a few artillery—rose on the afternoon of the 4th of June, seized the
Star Fort, and shot at all the officers in the cantonment; many were
killed, and the rest ran to the Town Fort, which they barricaded as well
as they were able. The little garrison of Europeans then prepared for a
siege; but it could be only of short duration, as the place was too weak
to contend against the rebel besiegers. Musketry and sword-cuts (for the
garrison often met their assailants hand to hand at the gates) brought
down many; and some of the civilians, who tried to escape disguised as
natives, were caught by the insurgents and killed. At last, when
Captains Dunlop and Gordon, and many other officers had fallen, and when
the remaining Europeans had become disheartened, by the scarcity of
ammunition and of food, Major Skene accepted terms offered to him, on
oath—that the whole of the garrison should be spared if he opened the
gate and surrendered. The blood-thirsty villains soon shewed the value
of the oath they had taken. They seized all—men, women, and children—and
bound them in two rows to ropes, the men in one row and the women and
children in the other. The whole were then deliberately put to death;
the poor ladies stood with their infants in their arms, and their elder
children clinging to their gowns; and when the husbands and fathers had
been slaughtered, then came the other half of the tragedy. It is even
said that the innocent children were cut in halves before their mothers’
eyes. One relief, and one only, marked the scene; there was not, so far
as is known, torture and violation of women as precursors of death. The
death-list was a sad one. Skene, Dunlop, Gordon, Ryves, Taylor,
Campbell, Burgess, Turnbull—all were military officers in the Company’s
service, employed either on military or civil duties; and all were
killed. Twenty-four civil servants and non-commissioned officers
likewise met with their death; and most painful of all, nineteen ladies
and twenty-three children were butchered by the treacherous miscreants.
Mr Thornton, the collector for a district between Jhansi and Cawnpore,
was afterwards in a position to inform the government that the mutinous
troops intended to have left Jhansi after they had captured the
treasure; that a Bundelcund chieftainess, the Ranee of Jhansi, wishing
to regain power in the district, bribed them with large presents to take
the fort and put all the Europeans to death before they finally departed
for Delhi; and that it was thus to a _woman_ that was due the inhuman
slaughtering of more than forty European ladies and children. One
account, that reached the ears of officers at other stations, was to the
effect that when Major Skene became aware of the miscreant treachery, he
kissed his wife, shot her, and then shot himself, to avert apprehended
atrocities worse than death; while another narrative or rumour
represented the murderers as having chopped off the heads of the
victims, instead of merely shooting them; but, in truth, the destruction
was so complete that scarcely one was left to tell the tale except
natives, who contradicted each other in some of the particulars.
Jhansi of course soon became a prey to lawless marauders; while the
mutineers marched off to Delhi or elsewhere. Lieutenant Osborne, at
Rewah, was placed in a difficult position at that time. Rewah is a small
Rajpoot state, ruled by a native rajah, who is bound by treaties with
the British government, and who has a British agent as resident at his
court. Rewah was nearly surrounded by mutinous districts, such as
Benares, Allahabad, Futtehpoor, Jhansi, Saugor, and Jubbulpoor; and it
became a difficult problem for Lieutenant Osborne, the British agent,
how to keep wild disorder away from that place. On the 8th of June, by
an energetic use of his influence, he was able to announce that the
Maharajah of Rewah had placed his troops at the disposal of the
government; that the offer had been accepted; and that eight hundred of
those troops, with two guns, had been sent off to Ummapatan, a place
which commanded the roads to Jubbulpoor, Nagode, and Saugor—ready to
oppose insurgents from any of those towns, and to intercept
communication with other mutinous towns on the Jumna. He also sent
eleven hundred of the Maharajah’s troops, with five guns, to Kuttra
Pass: a spot whence a rapid advance could be made to Benares, Chunar, or
Mirzapore, according as military exigencies might render desirable. A
week later, he obtained permission from the Maharajah to send seven
hundred troops to Banda; and at the same time to issue a proclamation,
promising rewards to any of his soldiers who should distinguish
themselves by their gallantry and fidelity. With no higher military rank
than that of lieutenant did this active officer thus lay plans, not only
for the peace of the Rewah territory itself, but also in aid of the
Company’s officers all around him. His position at a later date was very
perilous.
If the destruction of life was less at Nowgong than at Jhansi, the
proceedings of mutinous troops were followed by much more adventure and
varied interest. Nowgong or Nowgaon is situated about a hundred miles
southeast of the last-named town, but, like it, in the Bundelcund
territory. At the beginning of June there were stationed at that place
about four hundred men of the 12th native infantry, and rather over two
hundred of the 14th irregular cavalry—wings of the same two regiments as
at Jhansi; together with a company of the 9th battalion of artillery,
and a light field bullock-battery. Major Kirke, commanding the station,
had in earlier weeks often discussed the cartridge question with his
men, and believed he had removed from their minds all misgivings on that
unfortunate subject. Nevertheless, as June approached, the major deemed
the appearance of affairs so suspicious, that he made such precautionary
arrangements as were practicable to resist an outbreak. Bungalows were
now and then discovered to be in flames, without any means of detecting
the incendiaries. When the atrocities at Meerut and elsewhere became
known, the troops stationed at Nowgong made ardent demonstrations of
loyalty—so ardent, that Kirke almost upbraided himself for his momentary
distrust of them; the infantry embraced their colours, the artillery
embraced their guns, and all asserted their burning desire to chastise
the rebels who had proved faithless to the Company Bahadoor. So late as
the 6th of June, even while whisperings and ominous signs were passing
between them, these unreliable men sent in a grandiloquent petition, in
which they said: ‘As it is necessary to avenge the government on those
cowardly rascals who now, in Delhi and other places, are exciting
rebellion, and for which purpose many European regiments are being
despatched; we, hearing of this, are exceedingly desirous that we be
sent as volunteers to chastise these scoundrels. And that we may shew
from our hearts our faithfulness, we are ready to go wherever sent’—and
more to the same purpose. This petition or address was presented to
Major Kirke by the wing of the 12th regiment. On that same day news
arrived that the other wing of the same regiment had mutinied at Jhansi;
and the Neemuch men, either with childish indecision or with profound
duplicity, sent off a letter to them, reproving them for their
insubordination! On the 10th, a petition was presented by the commandant
of the artillery (4th company, 9th battalion), couched in similar
language; demanding that the artillery might be sent against the rebels;
‘in order,’ as the petition averred, ‘that we may fulfil the wish of our
hearts by shewing our bravery and loyalty.’
Never were words uttered more hollow and treacherous. By nightfall on
that same 10th of June, the native troops at Nowgong were nearly all
rebels, and the Europeans nearly all fugitives. A few hours sufficed to
shew the English officers that they were powerless to contend against
their opponents. Flight commenced. The officers and civilians, with
their families, and Europeans of humbler station, all took their
departure from Nowgong—some in buggies, some on horseback, and some on
foot; but all equally reft of their worldly property. Were it not that
this Chronicle has already contained examples, mournfully numerous, of
similar wanderings over the scorching roads and through the thick jungle
of India, the fate of the Nowgong party might afford materials for a
very exciting narrative; but with the reader’s experience on this
matter, a few lines of description will suffice. The party was a large
one. It comprised Major Kirke, Captain Scot, Lieutenants Townshend,
Jackson, Remington, Ewart, Franks, and Barber, about forty other
Europeans of both sexes and all ages, and about ninety sepoys of the
mutinous infantry, who had not joined their brethren. The fugitives
lessened in number every day; some or other of them sank under the heat
and fatigue; while the sepoys deserted when they approached towns where
insurgents were in the ascendant. Either collectively or separately the
wanderers found themselves on different days at Chutterpore, at
Logassee, at Churkaree, at Mahoba, at Callingurh, at Kabrai, at
Banda—places mostly belonging to petty rajahs of Bundelcund. The
principal survivors of the party were about ten or twelve days on the
roads and fields, before they reached friendly quarters at Banda. On one
occasion they were attacked by a band of marauders, and had to buy
security with rupees; on another, their sepoys were seized with a panic,
and ran off in large numbers; on a third, a body of matchlockmen
suddenly confronted them, and shot down Lieutenant Townshend. On one
part of the journey, Captain Scot found himself in the midst of a
distressing group of women and children: having poor Townshend’s horse
with him, he loaded both horses with as many as he could carry; but it
made him heart-sick to see the others fall away one by one, utterly
broken down by fatigue, and with insufficient men to help them along—for
the flight appears to have been wanting in every semblance of
organisation. A bandsman’s wife dropped dead through a sun-stroke; then
an artillery sergeant, worn out, went into a hut to die. Captain Scot
came up with a lady and her child, reeling along the road as if
delirious; he readjusted his horse-load, took up the fugitives, and the
lady very speedily died in his arms. Shortly after this a fine hale
sergeant-major sank, to rise no more; Major Kirke died through a
sun-stroke; and others dropped off in a similar way. Dr Mawe died from
illness and fatigue; and then his wife, while laving her blistered feet
in a pool, was set upon by ruffians and robbed of the little she had
about her. Captain Scot, after many changes in his horse-load, took up
Dr Mawe’s child; and ‘little Lotty,’ of two years’ old, seemed to him a
blessing rather than a burden; for on the few occasions when he met
friendly natives, their friendship was generally gained for him by the
sight of the little girl, whose head he endeavoured to shield from the
burning sun by a portion of his shirt—the only resource for one who had
lost both hat and coat, and whose own head was nearly driven wild by the
intense solar heat. It is pleasant to know that the captain and ‘little
Lotty’ were among the few who reached a place of safety.
Banda was another of the stations affected; but the details of its
troubles need not be traced here. Suffice it to say that, on the 14th of
June, there was a mutiny of a detachment of native infantry, and a few
troops belonging to the Nawab of Banda—a titular prince, possessing no
political power, but enjoying a pension from the Company, and having a
sort of honorary body-guard of native troops. The officers and their
families were at first in great peril; but the nawab aided them in
making a safe retreat to Nagode. On the 16th of June, Major Ellis had to
announce to the government that his station at Nagode was beginning to
be filled with anxious fugitives from Banda, Futtehpoor, Humeerpoor, and
Ameerpoor; comprising military officers, magistrates, salt-agents,
revenue servants, railway officials, and private persons. Twenty-eight
of these fugitives arrived on one day. He sent to many petty chieftains
of Bundelcund, who were pensioners under the Company or had treaties
with it, to exert themselves to the utmost in recovering all property
seized during the events of the preceding two or three days in the Banda
district. Major Ellis at Nagode, and Mr Mayne at Banda, applied
earnestly to Calcutta for military assistance; but they were told
plainly that none could be sent to them, every European soldier being
needed in the Ganges and Jumna regions.
It now becomes necessary, on removing the scene further to the west, to
know something concerning the Mahrattas, their relations to the two
great families of Scindia and Holkar, the conventions existing between
those two families and the British government, and the military
arrangements of the Mahratta territories at the time of the outbreak.
These matters can be rendered intelligible without any very lengthened
historical narrative.
After the death of the Emperor Aurungzebe, a century and a half ago,
India was distracted and impoverished by the contentions of his sons and
descendants; each of whom, in claiming the throne, secured the
partisanship of powerful nobles, and the military aid of fighting-men in
the pay of those nobles. A civil war of terrible kind was the natural
result; and equally natural was it that other chieftains, in nowise
related to the imperial family, should take advantage of the anarchy to
found dynasties for themselves. One such chieftain was Sevajee, a
Mahratta in the service of the King of Bejapore, in the southern part of
India. The Mahrattas were (and are) a peculiar tribe of Hindoos, more
fierce and predatory than most of their fellow-countrymen. Long before
Europeans settled in India, the Mahrattas were the chief tribe in the
region north, south, and east of the present city of Bombay. After many
struggles against the competitors for the throne of Delhi, the Mahrattas
were left in possession of a sovereign state, of which Satara and Poonah
were the chief cities. From 1707 till 1818, the nominal sovereign or
rajah of the Mahrattas had no real power; he was a sort of state or
honorary prisoner, confined in the hill-fortress of Satara; while the
government was administered by the Peishwa or prime minister, whose
office became hereditary in a particular family, and whose seat of
government was at Poonah. After many Peishwas had held this singular
kind of sovereignty at the one city—the nominal rajah being all the time
powerless at the other—circumstances occurred which led to an
intermeddling of the East India Company with Mahratta politics, followed
by the usual results. Narrain Rao Peishwa was murdered in 1773; many
relations of the murdered man competed for the succession; and as the
Company greatly desired to possess the island of Salsette and the town
of Bassein, at that time belonging to the Mahrattas, it was soon seen
that this wish might be gratified by aiding one competitor against
another. Battles and intrigues followed, ending in the possession of the
two coveted places by the British, and in the appointment of a British
resident at the Peishwa’s court at Poonah. Thus matters remained until
1817, when the Peishwa engaged in intrigues with other Mahratta chiefs
against the British; a course that led to his total overthrow after a
few fierce contests in the field. The Mahratta sovereignty at Poonah was
entirely put an end to, except a small principality assigned to the
Rajah of Satara, the almost forgotten representative of the founder of
the Mahratta rule. The British took all the remaining territory,
pensioning off the Peishwa; and as to Satara, after several rajahs had
reigned, under the close control of the British resident at that city,
the principality ‘lapsed’ in 1848, in default of legitimate male heirs—a
lapse that led to the preparation of many ponderous blue books
concerning the grievances and complaints of a certain adopted son of the
last rajah.
Thus much for the south Mahratta country, having Poonah and Satara for
its chief cities; but the British have had fully as much to do with the
northern portion of the Mahratta region, represented by the two cities
of Gwalior and Indore, and held by the two great Mahratta families of
Scindia and Holkar. As the Peishwas in past years cared little for the
nominal head of the Mahrattas at Satara, so did the Scindias and Holkars
care little for the Peishwas. Each chieftain endeavoured to become an
independent sovereign. The Scindia family is traceable up to the year
1720, when Ranojee Scindia was one of the dependents of the Peishwa.
From that year, by predatory expeditions and by intrigues, the
successive heads of the Scindia family became more and more
powerful—contending in turn against the Mogul, the Rajpoots, the
Peishwa, and the British; until at length, in 1784, Madhajee Scindia was
recognised as an independent sovereign prince, with the hill-fortress of
Gwalior as his stronghold and seat of government. In 1794, when Madhajee
died, the Scindia dominions extended from beyond Delhi on the north to
near Bombay on the south, and from the Ganges to Gujerat—a vast region,
held and acquired by means as atrocious as any recorded in the history
of India. Early in the present century, the power of the Scindia family
received a severe check. Hostilities having broken out with the British,
Sir Arthur Wellesley (afterwards Duke of Wellington) defeated Dowlut Rao
Scindia at Assaye in 1803, while Lord Lake drove the Mahrattas from the
whole of the Doab. Many desperate wars occurred in later years, ending,
in 1844, by a treaty which left Bajerut Rao Scindia king or rajah of a
state barely equalling England in area, with Gwalior as his capital. A
contingent or body of troops was to be supplied by him for the service
of the British, beyond which he was permitted to have an independent
army of nine thousand men; and there were numerous minor details which
gave much influence to the British resident at Gwalior.
Of the family of Holkar, almost the same account may be given as of that
of Scindia; inasmuch as it has sprung from a Mahratta leader who
acquired power a century and a half ago. The city of Indore has always
been the centre of dominion belonging to this family—a dominion
extending over a very wide region at some periods, but greatly
contracted in recent times. The ruler of the Indore territory at the
time of the mutiny was one Mulkerjee Holkar, who had been appointed by
the Calcutta government at a time of disputed succession, in such a way
as to imply that the territory might pass into British hands whenever
the Company chose. Holkar’s territory is now much smaller than
Scindia’s, scarcely exceeding Wales in area.
It will suffice, then, to bear in mind that the southern Mahratta power,
that of the courts of Poonah and Satara, had wholly fallen into British
hands before the time of the mutiny; and that the northern power, held
by the courts of Gwalior and Indore, extended over a country no larger
than England and Wales united. Nevertheless, considering that that
portion of central India is bounded by Bundelcund, the Doab, Rajpootana,
Gujerat, the Nizam’s dominions, and the Saugor and Nerbudda territories,
it was of much importance to the British that Scindia and Holkar should
remain faithful to their alliances at a critical period.
Although Nuseerabad is properly in Rajpootana, of which a few words of
description will be given shortly, the mutiny at that place may
conveniently be treated here; because it was a link in a chain which
successively affected Neemuch, Indore, Mhow, and Gwalior.
Nuseerabad is near Ajmeer, the chief town of a British district
surrounded by the dominions of independent or semi-independent rajahs.
Ajmeer, though far smaller than most of the principal cities in India,
is an ancient and important place, about two hundred and sixty miles
southwest of Delhi; at the time of the mutiny, it was the seat of a
British political agency; and in a ruined palace of the Emperor Akbar,
converted into an arsenal, was a powder-magazine. Nuseerabad, fifteen
miles from Ajmeer, may be regarded as the military station for that
city, and for the neighbouring British districts; it had an extensive
and well-laid-out cantonment, and was the head-quarters of the corps
known as the Rajpootana Field-force. Nuseerabad had been nearly drained
of troops early in the year, on account of the Persian expedition; but
this gap was afterwards partially filled up. In the month of May there
were at the station the 1st regiment Bombay lancers, the 15th and 30th
Bengal native infantry, and the 2d company of the 7th battalion of
Bengal native artillery. An instructive fact was made manifest; the
Bombay troops remained faithful, while those of the Bengal army became
first restless, then mutinous, then murderous. Unfortunately, the good
were not strong enough to coerce the bad; the Bombay lancers numbered
only two hundred and fifty sabres. The month of May had not closed when
the disturbances at Nuseerabad began. The officers had been nightly in
the habit of sleeping with revolvers and swords near at hand; while the
Bombay lancers patrolled the cantonment—so suspicious were the symptoms
observed. On the evening of the 28th a servant rushed into the bungalow
of one of the lieutenants of the 15th infantry, announcing that the
regiment had risen. The officers hastened to the lines, and there found
the regiment drawn up in companies—the martial array being maintained in
mutiny as it had been in regular drill. The men looked sternly at their
officers; and soon worse news arrived. The native artillerymen who
worked the six guns joined the revolters—not actually firing on the
officers, but ready to do so. The Englishmen connected with the two
regiments were a mere handful; they were powerless, for none of the
sepoys would aid them against the rest. Colonel Penny, in command of the
Bombay lancers, instantly hastened down, armed and mounted his troopers,
and drew them up into position. Galloping to the artillery lines, and
finding the guns pointed against him, he immediately ordered a charge
for capturing them, each troop charging in succession. Captain
Spottiswoode began, and soon fell mortally wounded; other officers led
subsequent charges, but the guns could not be taken. Penny then felt
obliged to relinquish this attempt, and to hold himself in readiness to
check the mutineers in other ways; but as the two regiments of native
infantry refused to listen to their officers, nothing was left but
flight. Cornet Newberry, as well as Captain Spottiswoode, fell while
charging; Colonel Penny became suddenly ill and died in a few hours;
while two or three other officers were wounded. How perilous were those
cavalry-charges against the six guns may be judged from a letter written
by one of the officers: ‘I galloped towards the guns, and must have been
eighty or a hundred yards from them when I began to experience the
unpleasant sensation of bullets whizzing past my head, and saw a lot of
sepoys taking shots at me as I came along. I immediately turned my
pony’s head, and endeavoured to retreat under cover of a wall which ran
in front of the artillery lines. Here I saw more men running up with the
kind intention of having a crack at me; so I had to keep along the
parade-ground right in the line of fire, and had one or two men popping
at me from over the wall on my right. My tât (pony) went as fast as ever
he could go, and, thanks be to God, carried me back in perfect
safety.... Off we started towards the cavalry lines amid showers of
bullets. I dodged round the first bell of arms; and as I passed the
bells, saw three or four men behind each, who deliberately shot at us as
we passed.’ The ladies had been sent off from the station just in time.
The surviving officers joined them beyond the cantonment about
nightfall, and then all hastened away. They rode forty miles during the
night, on roads and fields and rocky hills, and reached a place of
safety, Beaur or Beawur, towards noon—hungry, tired, and reft of
everything but the clothes on their backs.
As this small body of Bombay native cavalry remained stanch when the
Bengal troops were faithless all around them, it was deemed right to
make some public acknowledgment of the fact. Lord Elphinstone, as
president or governor of Bombay, issued a general order on the subject,
thanking the troopers, and passing lightly over the fact that a few of
them afterwards disgraced themselves.[27] The commander-in-chief
afterwards ordered the report of the transaction by Captain Hardy, who
took the control of the lancers when Colonel Penny died, to be
translated into the Hindustani and Mahratta languages, and read to all
the regiments of the Bombay native army, as an encouragement to them in
the path of duty. After the English officers and their families had
escaped to Beaur, the mutinous troops made off towards Delhi. Nuseerabad
being considered an important station in regard to the control of the
surrounding districts, a force was sent to reoccupy it towards the end
of June; comprising a detachment of H.M. 83d foot, another of the 20th
Bombay native infantry, another of the Jhodpore legion, and a squadron
of the 2d Bombay cavalry—Nuseerabad being sufficiently near Bombay to
derive advantages not possessed by stations further east.
The usual consequences of the revolt of native regiments followed.
Nuseerabad furnished a bad example to Neemuch. As a village, Neemuch is
of small consequence; as a military station, its importance is
considerable. During some of the negotiations with Scindia in past
years, it was agreed that the British should have a cantonment at this
spot, which is on the confines of Malwah and Mewar, about three hundred
miles southwest of Agra; a force in British pay was to be stationed
there, by virtue of certain terms in a treaty, and a small district,
with the village in the centre, was made over to the Company for this
purpose. The cantonment thereupon built was two or three miles long by a
mile in width, and comprised the usual native infantry lines, cavalry
lines, artillery lines, head-quarters, offices, bungalows, bazaar,
parade-ground, &c. There was also a small fort or fortified square
built, as a place of refuge for the families of the military when called
to a distance on duty.
In the early part of June, the troops stationed at Neemuch comprised the
72d Bengal N. I., the 7th regiment of Gwalior infantry, two troops of
the 1st Bengal light cavalry, and a troop of horse-artillery. Every
effort had been made in the early weeks of the mutiny to insure the
confidence of these troops, and prevent them from joining the standard
of rebellion. Colonel Abbott, and most of the officers of the 72d, as
well even as some of their families, slept within the sepoy lines, to
win the good-will of the men by a generous confidence. One wing (three
companies) of the Gwalior troops held the fortified square and treasury;
while the other wing (five companies), now quartered in a vacant
hospital, about a quarter of a mile distant, was encamped just outside
the walls; Captain Macdonald, the chief officer, residing with the
first-named wing. Colonel Abbott, who commanded the station generally,
as well as the 72d regiment in particular, became convinced, on the
morning of the 2d of June, that all the hopeful expectations of himself
and brother-officers were likely to be dashed; for the troops at Neemuch
had heard of the mutiny at Nuseerabad, and could be restrained no
longer. While the superintendent, Captain Lloyd, hastened to secure some
of the Company’s records and accounts, and to open a line of retreat for
fugitives along the Odeypore road, Colonel Abbott made such military
arrangements as were practicable on the spur of the moment. The colonel
brought his native officers together, and talked to them so earnestly,
that he induced them to swear, ‘on the Koran and on Ganges water,’ that
they would be true to their salt; while he, at their request, swore to
his confidence in their faithful intentions. This singular compact, in
which Mohammedans, Hindoos, and a Christian swore according to the
things most solemn to them respectively, remained unbroken for
twenty-four hours; who broke it, after that interval, will at once be
guessed. During many preceding days, a panic had prevailed in the Sudder
Bazaar; incendiary fires occurred at night; great numbers of persons had
removed with their property; the wildest reports were set afloat by
designing knaves to increase the distrust; and the commonest occurrences
were distorted into phantoms of evil intended against the troops. At
last, on the night of the 3d, the troops threw off their oath and their
allegiance at once. The artillery, disregarding Lieutenant Walker’s
entreaties and expostulations, fired off two guns; the cavalry, on
hearing this signal, rushed out to join them; and the 72d broke from
their lines immediately afterwards. Captain Macdonald instantly ordered
into the fort the one wing of the Gwalior regiment which had been
encamped outside, under Lieutenants Rose and Gurdon; and then prepared
for defence. A bold and singular expedient had just before been adopted
by the civil superintendent; he authorised Macdonald to promise to the
Gwalior troops, if they faithfully defended the fort during any mutiny
outside, a reward of a hundred rupees to each sepoy or private, three
hundred to each naik or corporal, five hundred to each havildar or
sergeant, higher sums to the jemadars and subadars, and five thousand
rupees to the senior native officer, or to the one who should most
distinguish himself in preserving the loyalty of the regiment. These are
large sums to the natives of India; and the superintendent must have
considered long and fully before he promised the Company’s money in such
a manner. All was, however, in vain. The Gwalior troops remained
faithful under the temptation of this promise for a short time; but at
length, headed by a subadar named Heera Singh, they demanded that the
gates of the fort should be opened, and requested that the officers
would make arrangements for their own safety. Macdonald, Rose, Gurdon,
and other officers of the Gwalior regiment, expostulated with their men;
but entreaty was now of no avail; the troops forcibly opened the gates,
and the officers took their departure when the last vestige of hope had
been destroyed.
Of the flight, little need be said; it was such a flight as almost every
province in Northern India exhibited in those sad days. Some of the
ladies and children had been sent off a few hours earlier, hurried away
with no preparations for their comfort or even their sustenance; while
others waited to accompany their husbands or fathers. Very few had
either horses or vehicles; they laboured on footsore to Baree, to Chota
Sadree, to Burra Sadree, to Doogla—straggling parties meeting and
separating according as their strength remained or failed, and all
dependent on the villagers for food. At Doogla, where they arrived on
the third night, the officers strengthened a sort of mud-fort about
forty yards square, within which forty persons were huddled. After being
much straitened, they were relieved by Brigadier Showers on the 9th. The
fugitive party now broke up; some returned to Neemuch, which the
mutineers had abandoned; but the greater number went to Odeypore, the
rana of which place gave them a hospitable reception; some of them
afterwards went further west to Mount Aboo or Aboo Gurh—a celebrated
place of Hindoo pilgrimage to a sacred temple, and a sanatarium for the
Europeans stationed at the cantonment of Deesa, about forty miles
distant. Those of the party who returned to Neemuch, found everything
devastated, the bungalows and offices burnt, and the villagers stripped
of their stores by the mutineers, who had afterwards started off for
Agra. The officers and their families were literally beggars; they had
lost their all. No Europeans were killed save the wife and three
children of a sergeant, who could not leave Neemuch in time.
[Illustration:
Fort of Mhow.
]
Thus were lost to the British about fourteen hundred men and six guns at
Nuseerabad, and sixteen hundred men and six guns at Neemuch, all of
which went to swell the insurgent forces inside Delhi or outside Agra.
The stations of Indore and Mhow must now engage a little of our
attention—situated nearly south of Neemuch, and about four hundred miles
from Agra. Indore, as has already been stated, is the capital of
Holkar’s Mahratta dominions. It is an ill-built place, standing on the
small river Kutki, and is less than a century old: the original Indore,
or Jemnah, being on the opposite side of the river. Holkar’s palace is a
building possessing few attractions; and the like may be said of the
other native structures. The relation existing at that time between
Indore and Mhow was this—that Indore was the residence of the British
political agent at the court of Holkar; whereas Mhow, thirteen miles
distant, was the military station or cantonment. The house of the
British agent, and those of the other Europeans, were on the eastern
side of the town. The agent, at the time of the mutiny, had an escort of
cavalry and infantry at his disposal; but it was simply an escort, not a
regular military force. The agent, in addition to his duties connected
with Holkar’s court, was the immediate representative of the British
government in relation to various petty states under its protection, but
in other points differing greatly in their circumstances.
The Indore agent in May and June was Colonel Durand. All was peaceful at
that place, although much agitation was visible, until the 1st of July;
on which day mutiny occurred. Holkar’s troops rose against the English,
without, as it afterwards appeared, the privity or the wish of the
Maharajah himself. Two companies, set apart for the protection of the
Residency in the bazaar square, brought two guns to bear upon the
building; and the Europeans were horror-stricken at finding themselves
suddenly exposed to cannon and musketry. Fortunately a few men of the
Bhopal Contingent under Colonel Travers, were on duty at the Residency;
and a few of these remained faithful long enough to allow the colonel
and the other European officers, with their families, to escape. Not so
the civilians, however; many of the civil servants, and of the clerks in
the telegraph department, with their wives and children, were butchered
in cold blood. As soon as Holkar heard of the outbreak, he ordered some
of his own Mahratta troops to hasten to the Residency and aid Colonel
Durand; but they told him it was a matter of _deen_ (religion), and that
they could not act against their brethren. During the next three days
Holkar was almost a prisoner in his own palace; his troops rose in
revolt, and were speedily joined by those from Mhow, presently to be
mentioned; they plundered the treasury, the Residency, and many parts of
the town; but as he would not countenance their proceedings, they at
length marched off towards Gwalior. This affair at Indore led to the
flight of many European families, amid great misery. They collected
hastily a few ammunition-wagons, two or three bullock-carts, an
elephant, and some horses, and started off towards Sehore and
Hosungabad; escorted by a portion of the Bhopal Contingent from several
small stations in that part of India.
An important question arose—how was Mhow affected by the mutinous
proceedings? As the news of the Nuseerabad mutiny had thrown the troops
at Neemuch into agitation, so did the subsequent events at Neemuch
immediately affect the sowars and sepoys at Mhow.[28] Mhow contained a
squadron of the same cavalry regiment, the 1st B. N. C., two troops of
which had mutinied at Neemuch; and in addition to these was the 23d
regiment native infantry, and a company of European artillery. Mhow
presented much the appearance of an English town; having a steepled
church on an eminence, a spacious lecture-room, a well-furnished
library, and a theatre; the cantonment was large and well appointed; and
a force was maintained there in virtue of one of the treaties made with
Holkar. This relates to the station or British part of the town; the
small native town of Mhow is a mile and a half distant. The excitement
caused at this station by the news from Neemuch was visible in the
conduct of the troops throughout the whole of the month of June. Colonel
Platt and the other officers, however, kept a vigilant watch on them,
and by combined firmness and kindness hoped to surmount the difficulty.
Captain Hungerford afterwards stated that such had been the excessive
confidence of some of the officers in their respective regiments, that
he could not induce them to strengthen the fort or fortified square, by
occupying it with their artillery, until almost the last hour before the
Revolt. The fortified square had for some time, however, been a
rendezvous for all the ladies and children, who slept within it; the
officers remaining in the lines. Thus matters passed until the 1st of
July, when Colonel Platt received a pencil-note from Colonel Durand,
announcing that the Residency at Indore had been attacked by Holkar’s
soldiers, and that aid was urgently needed. A troop of cavalry and a few
guns were immediately despatched from Mhow; but when they had reached
within four miles of Indore, news arrived that the Europeans yet living
at that station were about to effect a retreat; upon which the small
force returned to Mhow. This duty the troops performed, but it was the
last they rendered. The colonel, fearing the arrival of mutinous sepoys
from Indore, but not suspecting his own men, made such arrangements as
seemed to him befitting, bringing a European battery of artillery into
the fort. Soon did the crisis arrive. At eleven o’clock on that same
night the plans and hopes were cruelly disappointed; that terrible yell
was heard which so often struck dismay into the hearts of the Europeans
at the various military stations: the yell of native troops rising in
mutiny. Lieutenant Martin, adjutant of the cavalry, while quietly
conversing with one of the troopers, became the victim of that dastardly
fellow; the war-cry arose, and the trooper turned round and shot the
unfortunate officer without a moment’s warning. The other officers,
hearing the report, but not suspecting the real truth, thought that
Holkar’s Mahrattas had arrived; they rushed forward to head their
respective companies and troops, but sepoys and sowars alike opened fire
on them. The officers, now rendered painfully aware of their critical
position, ran swiftly across the parade towards the fort, having no time
to mount their horses; and it is a marvel that only one of the number,
Major Harris, commandant of the cavalry, was shot by the heavy fire
poured on them during this run. Colonel Platt, who was in the fort, was
almost incredulous when the breathless officers rushed in; he could with
difficulty believe the truth now presented to his notice—so fully had he
relied on the fidelity of the men. Colonel Platt and Captain Fagan rode
down to the lines of the 23d, to which regiment they both belonged, to
ascertain the real facts and to exhort the men; but they were never seen
alive again by their brethren in arms; they fell, riddled with bullets
and gashed with sword-cuts. Captain Hungerford, of the artillery,
brought two guns to bear on the mutineers, which gradually drove them
from the lines, but not before they had fired the regimental mess-house
and several bungalows; and during the darkness of night, plunderers
carried off everything that was valuable. Hungerford would have followed
the mutineers with his guns; but the roads were too dark for the
pursuit, and the Europeans too unprotected to be left. The remaining
English officers, having now no troops to command, acted as a cavalry
guard in support of the European battery in the fortified square, under
Captain Hungerford. As all the civilians, women, and children were in
this place; as the square itself was quite unfitted for a long defence;
and as only five native soldiers out of the whole number remained with
the officers—the prospect was precarious enough: nevertheless all did
their best; Hungerford collected in a few days a large store of
provisions, and routed many of the insurgents in neighbouring villages.
The impulses that guided the actions of the sepoys were strangely
inconsistent; for two of the men saved the life of Lieutenant Simpson,
who had been on outpost-duty on the fatal night, and brought him safely
into the fort; and yet, though offered promotion for their fidelity,
they absconded on the following morning to join their mutinous
companions. The Europeans, about eighty in number, maintained their
position at Mhow, until a force from Bombay arrived to reoccupy all that
region. The ladies, there as everywhere, strove to lessen rather than
increase the anxieties of their male companions. One of the officers
thus shut up in the extemporised stronghold said in a letter:
‘Throughout all this I cannot express the admiration I feel at the way
the ladies have behaved—cheerful, and assisting in every way in their
power. Poor things, without servants or quarters, huddled together; they
have had to do everything for themselves, and employ all their time in
sewing bags for powder for the guns, well knowing the awful fate that
awaits them if the place is taken. There has not been a sign of fear;
they bring us tea or any little thing they can, and would even like to
keep watch on the bastions if we would let them.... You should see the
state we are in—men making up canister, ladies sewing powder-bags,
people bringing plunder recovered, artillery mounting guns; all of us
dirty and tired with night-watching; we mount sentry-duty to take the
weight of it off the artillerymen, and snatch sleep and food as we can.’
Many other stations in that part of India were disturbed in June and
July by the mutinies of wings and detachments of regiments too small in
amount to need notice here. At one place, Asseerghur, Colonel Le
Mesurier warded off mutiny by a prompt and dexterous manœuvre, for which
he received the marked thanks of the government.
Gwalior now comes under notice, in relation to a mutiny of troops at
that place, and to the conduct of Scindia, the most important of the
Mahratta chieftains. Considered as a city or town (about sixty-five
miles south of Agra), Gwalior is not very important or interesting,
being irregularly built and deplorably dirty, and possessing few public
buildings of any note. It is for its hill-fortress that Gwalior is so
famed. The rock on which the fortress stands is an elongated mass, a
mile and a half long by a quarter of a mile in width, and reaching in
some places to a height of about three hundred and fifty feet. It is
entirely isolated from other hills; and—partly from the natural
stratification of the sandstone, partly from artificial construction—is
in many parts quite perpendicular. A rampart runs round the upper edge,
conforming to the outline of the summit. The entrance to the enclosure
within the rampart is near the north end of the east side; in the lower
part by a steep road, and in the upper part by steps cut in the rock,
wide enough to permit elephants to make the ascent. A high and massive
stone-wall protects the outer side of this huge staircase; seven
gateways are placed at intervals along its ascent; and guns at the top
command the whole of it. Within the enclosure of the rampart is a
citadel of striking appearance, an antique palace surmounted by kiosks,
six lofty round towers or bastions, curtains or walls of great thickness
to connect those towers, and several spacious tanks. It is considered
that fifteen thousand men would be required to garrison this fortress
completely. So striking is this rock, so tempting to a chieftain who
desires a stronghold, that Gwalior is believed to have been a fortress
during more than a thousand years. It has been captured and recaptured
nearly a dozen times, by contending Hindoos and Mohammedans, in the
course of centuries. The last celebrated contest there was in 1779, when
the Company’s forces captured it through a clever and unexpected use of
ladders and ropes during a dark night. In the next sixty-five years it
was possessed successively by the British, the Jâts, the Mahrattas, the
British again, the Mahrattas again, and finally by the British,
according to the intricacies of treaties and exchanges. Since 1844,
Gwalior has been the head-quarters of a corps called the Gwalior
Contingent, commanded by British officers; and thus the hill-fortress
has virtually been placed within the power of the British government.
Besides this famous stronghold, there is at Gwalior a place called the
Lashkar. This, in former times, was the stationary camp of the Maharajah
Scindia—a dirty collection of rude buildings, extending to a great
distance from the southwest foot of the rock; but the great reduction in
the number of troops allowed to be held independently by Scindia has
materially lessened the importance of the Lashkar.
The loyalty of Scindia became a question of very anxious importance at
the time of the mutinies. Holkar was possessor of a much smaller
territory than Scindia; and yet, when a rumour spread that the rising at
Indore on the 1st of July had the sanction of the first-named sovereign,
numerous petty chieftains in that part of India rose against the
British, and prepared to cut off all retreat for Europeans. It was not
until Holkar had given undoubted evidence of his hostility to the
mutineers, that these movements were checked. Much more was this
rendered manifest in Scindia’s dominions. If Scindia had failed us, the
mutineers from Neemuch, Nuseerabad, and Jhansi, by concentrating at
Gwalior, might have rendered that hill-fortress a second Delhi to the
British. Scindia and Holkar both remained steady; it was the Contingents
that failed. These contingents were bodies of native troops, paid by the
native princes of the states or countries whose name they bore, but
organised and officered by the British, in the same way as the ordinary
battalions of the sepoy army. If the native princes, for whose defence
ostensibly, and at whose expense really, these contingents were
maintained, wished and were permitted to have any independent military
force of their own, that could only be done additionally to the
contingent which they were bound to furnish. As a consequence of this
curious system, a distinction must be drawn between the contingent
troops and the prince’s troops. At Indore, Holkar’s little army as well
as Holkar’s contingent proved hostile to the British. Scindia was in
like manner paymaster for a double force; and the British often
anxiously pondered whether one or both of these might prove faithless at
Gwalior, with or without the consent of Scindia himself. The Gwalior
Contingent, though connected with a Mahratta state, consisted chiefly of
Hindustanis, like the sepoys of the Bengal army; the Mahrattas formed
quite a minority of the number. The contingent consisted of all three
arms of the service—infantry, cavalry, and artillery—and formed a
compact army.
The disasters at Gwalior began on Sunday the 14th of June—as usual, on
Sunday. It will be remembered (p. 112) that Scindia, three or four weeks
earlier, had offered the aid of his own body-guard, which had been
accepted by Mr Colvin at Agra; that a portion of the Gwalior Contingent
(cavalry) was also sent; that this contingent, under Lieutenant
Cockburn, was actively engaged against the insurgents in the region
between Agra and Allygurh; and that about one-half of the troopers
composing it revolted on the 28th of May, placing that gallant officer
in a very embarrassing position. They were portions of the same
contingent that mutinied at Neemuch and one or two other places; and on
this account the European inhabitants at Gwalior were subject to much
anxiety—knowing that that station was the head-quarters; and that,
although the contingent was paid for by the Maharajah, the troops had
been raised mostly in Oude, and, being disciplined and officered by the
British, were likely to share the same sentiments as the Oudians and
other Hindustanis of the Bengal army elsewhere. The Maharajah had little
or no influence over them; for neither were they his countrymen, nor had
he any control over their discipline or movements. During fourteen
years, as boy, youth, and man, he had been in great measure a pupil
under the British resident at Gwalior; and if he remained an obedient
pupil, this was nearly all that could be expected from him—shorn, as the
Mahratta court was, of so much of its former influence. Dr Winlow Kirk,
superintending surgeon of the contingent, placed upon record, ten days
before the bloody deed which deprived him of life, a few facts relating
to the position of the Europeans at Gwalior in the latter part of May
and the beginning of June. The resident received information which led
him to believe that the contingent—seven regiments of infantry, two of
cavalry, and four batteries of artillery—was thoroughly disaffected,
both the main body at Gwalior and the detachments elsewhere. The
brigadier commandant shared this opinion with the resident; and, as a
precautionary measure, all the ladies were sent from the station to the
Residency, a distance of six miles, on the 28th of May. Dr Kirk, and
most of the military officers, dissented from this opinion; they thought
the troops were behaving in a respectful manner, and they offered to
sleep among the men’s lines to shew their confidence in them. On the
29th and 30th, the ladies returned to cantonment, much to the apparent
delight of the sepoys at the generous reliance thus placed in them.
Bitter was the disappointment and grief in store for those who had
trusted these miscreants.
It was on the 14th of June, we have said, that the uprising at Gwalior
began. The Europeans had long wished for the presence of a few English
troops; but as none were to be had, they watched each day’s proceedings
rather anxiously. At nine o’clock in the evening of the disastrous
Sunday, the alarm was given at the cantonment; all rushed out of their
respective bungalows, and each family found others in a similar state of
alarm. Shots were heard; officers were galloping or running past; horses
were wildly rushing with empty saddles; and no one could give a precise
account of the details of the outbreak. Then occurred the sudden and
mournful disruption of family ties; husbands became separated from their
wives; ladies and children sought to hide in gardens and grass, on
house-tops and in huts. Then arose flames from the burning bungalows;
and then came bands of reckless sepoys, hunting out the poor homeless
English who were in hiding. On the morning of that day, Dr Kirk,
although he had not shared the resident’s alarm seventeen days before,
nevertheless thought with some anxiety of the ladies and children, and
asked what arrangements had been made for their safety in the event of
an outbreak; but the officers of the regiments, most of whom relied
fully on their men, would not admit that there was any serious need for
precautionary measures. Two of these unfortunate officers, Major Blake
and Major Hawkins, were especially trustful; and these were two among
the number who fell by the hands of their own men that very night.
Captain Stewart, with his wife and child, were killed, as also Major
Sheriff. Brigadier Ramsey, and several others, whose bungalows were on
the banks of a small river, escaped by fording. Dr Kirk was one of those
who, less fortunate, were furthest from the river. With Mrs Kirk and his
child, he hid in the garden all night; in the morning they were
discovered; Mrs Kirk was robbed without being otherwise ill treated; but
her husband was shot dead before her eyes. Thus fell an amiable and
skilful man, who for nearly twenty years had been a medical officer of
the Company—first with the Bundelcund legion in Sinde; then as a medical
adviser to Sir Charles Napier on matters connected with the health of
troops in that sandy region; then with the Bengal troops at Bareilly;
then with the European artillery at Ferozpore; and lastly, as
superintending surgeon to the troops of the Gwalior Contingent, who
shewed their gratitude for his medical aid by putting him to death.
After this miserable sight, Mrs Kirk begged the murderers to put an end
to her also; but they replied: ‘No, we have killed you already’—pointing
to the dead body of her husband.
The rest of this story need not be told in detail. Agra was the place of
refuge sought by those who had now to flee; and it is some small
alleviation of the crimes of the mutineers that they allowed the ladies
and children to depart—with their lives, but with little else. How the
poor things suffered during five days of weary journeying, they could
themselves hardly have told; hunger, thirst, heat, illness, fatigue, and
anxiety of mind accumulated on them. Many arrived at Agra without shoes
or stockings; and all were beggared of their worldly possessions when
they reached that city. When, shortly afterwards, Lieutenant Cockburn
wrote to private friends of this event, he had to tell, not only of his
own mortification as the officer of a disloyal corps, but of the wreck
suffered by the British station at Gwalior. ‘I fear there is no chance
of my ever recovering any of your portraits; for the ruffians invariably
destroy all they cannot convert into silver or gold. All our beautiful
garden at Gwalior, on which I spent a good deal of money and care, has
been dug up; our houses have been turned into cattle-sheds; there is not
a pane of glass in the station; our beautiful church has been gutted,
the monuments destroyed, the organ broken up, the stained-glass windows
smashed, and the lovely floor of encaustic tiles torn up. The
desecration of the tombs is still more horrible; in many places the
remains of our countrymen have been torn from the earth, and consigned
to the flames!’
The position of Scindia was sufficiently embarrassing at that time. As
soon as the troops of the contingent had murdered or driven away their
officers, they went to him, placed their services at his disposal, and
demanded that he would lead them against the British at Agra. There were
eight or ten thousand men in the contingent altogether, and his own
Mahratta army was little less numerous; it was therefore a matter of
critical importance to the English that he remained steady and faithful.
He not only refused to sanction the proceedings of the mutineers, but
endeavoured to prevent them from marching towards Agra. In this he
succeeded until an advanced period of the autumn; for the troops that
troubled Agra at the end of June and the beginning of July were those
from Mhow and Neemuch, not the larger body from Gwalior. These mutineers
proceeded towards Agra by way of Futtehpore or Futhepore Sikri—a town
famed for the vast expanse of ruined buildings, erected by Akbar and
destroyed by the Mahrattas; for the great mosque, with its noble gateway
and flight of steps; and for the sumptuous white marble tomb,
constructed by Akbar in memory of a renowned Mussulman ascetic, Sheik
Selim Cheestee.[29] The battle that ensued, and the considerations that
induced Mr Colvin to shut up himself and all the British in the fort at
Agra, will be better treated in a later page.
Many of the events treated in this chapter occurred in, or on the
frontiers of, the region known as Rajpootana or Rajasthan—concerning
which a few words may be desirable. The name denotes the land of the
Rajpoots. These Hindoos are a widely spread sept of the Kshetrigas or
military caste; but when or where they obtained a separate name and
character is not now known. Some of the legends point to Mount Aboo as
the original home of the Rajpoots. They were in their greatest power
seven hundred years ago, when Rajpoot princes ruled in Delhi, in Ajmeer,
in Gujerat, and in other provinces; but the Mohammedan conquerors drove
them out of those places; and during many centuries the region mainly
belonging to the Rajpoots has been nearly identical with that exhibited
at the present time. This region, situated between Central India and
Sinde, is about twice as large as England and Wales. Warlike as the
Rajpoots have ever been, and possessing many strongholds and numerous
forces, they were no match for the Mahrattas in the last century; indeed
it was this inequality that led to the interference of the British, who
began to be the ‘protector’ of the Rajpoot princes early in the present
century. This protection, insured by various treaties, seems to have
been beneficial to the Rajpoots, whose country has advanced in industry
and prosperity during a long continuance of peace. The chief Rajpoot
states at present are Odeypore or Mewar, Jeypoor, Jhodpore or Joudpore,
Jhallawar, Kotah, Boondee, Alwur, Bikaneer, Jeysulmeer, Kishengurh,
Banswarra, Pertabghur, Dongurpore, Kerowlee, and Sirohi. The treaties
with these several states, at the time of the mutiny, were curiously
complicated and diverse: Odeypore paid tribute, and shared with the
Company the expense of maintaining a Bheel corps; Jeypoor, though under
a rajah, was virtually governed by a British resident; Jhodpore, under a
sort of feudal rule, paid tribute, and maintained a Jhodpore legion
besides a force belonging to the feudatories; Kotah bore the expense of
a corps called the Kotah Contingent, organised and officered by the
British; Jeysulmeer gave allegiance in return for protection, and so did
Kishengurh and many other of the states included in the above list. Most
of the Rajpoot states had a feudal organisation for internal affairs;
and most of them maintained small native corps, in addition to the
contingents furnished by three or four under arrangements with the
British. For the whole of the Rajpoot states collectively an agent was
appointed by the governor-general to represent British interests, under
whom were the civil officers at various towns and stations; while the
military formed a Rajpootana Field-force, with head-quarters at
Nuseerabad.
At the extreme north of Rajpootana is a small British district named
Hurrianah, of which the chief towns are Hansi and Hissar. A military
corps, called the Hurrianah Light Infantry Battalion, mutinied a few
weeks after the Meerut outbreak, killing Lieutenant Barwell and other
Europeans; the men acted in conjunction with a part of the 4th regiment
irregular cavalry, and, after a scene of murder and pillage, marched off
towards Delhi. At Bhurtpore, on the northeast frontier of Rajpootana, a
similar scene was exhibited on a smaller scale; a corps called the
Bhurtpore Levies revolted against Captain Nixon and other officers,
compelling them to flee for their lives: the mutineers, as in so many
other instances, marching off at once towards Delhi. There were other
mutinies of small detachments of native troops, at minor stations in the
Mahratta and Rajpoot countries, which need not be traced in detail.
* * * * *
The vast region in the centre of India has thus passed rapidly under
review. We have seen Hindustanis, Bundelas, Jâts, Mahrattas, Bheels,
Rajpoots, and other tribes of India revolting against English authority;
we have seen native princes and chiefs perplexed how to act between the
suzerain power on the one hand, and the turbulent soldiery on the other;
we have seen that soldiery, and the attendant rabble of marauders,
influenced quite as much by love of plunder as by hate of the Company’s
raj; we have seen British officers sorely wounded at heart by finding
those men to be traitors whom they had trusted almost to the last hour;
we have seen ladies and children driven from their bungalows, and hunted
like wild beasts from road to river, from jungle to forest; and lastly,
in this vast region, we have tracked over considerably more than a
thousand miles of country in length without meeting with a single
regiment of British troops. The centre of India was defended from
natives by natives; and the result shewed itself in deplorable colours.
[Illustration:
Girls at the Ganges.
]
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Footnote 26:
A curious example was afforded, in relation to the affairs of Saugor,
of the circuitous manner in which public affairs were conducted in
India, when different officials were residing in different parts of
that vast empire. The brigadier commanding the Saugor district adopted
a certain course, in a time of peril, concerning the management of the
troops under his command. He sent information of these proceedings to
Neill at Allahabad (300 miles). Neill forwarded the information to
Calcutta (500 miles). The military secretary to the government at
Calcutta sent a dispatch to the adjutant-general of the army outside
Delhi (900 miles), requesting him to ‘move’ the commander-in-chief to
send a military message to Saugor (400 miles), calling upon the
officer of that station to explain the motives for his conduct in the
matter at issue. The explanation, so given, was to be sent 400 miles
to Delhi, and then 900 miles to Calcutta; and lastly, if the conduct
were not approved, a message to that effect would be sent, by any
route that happened to be open for dâk, from Calcutta to Saugor.
Footnote 27:
‘To mark the approbation with which he has received this report, the
Right Honourable the Governor in Council will direct the immediate
promotion to higher grades of such of the native officers and men as
his Excellency the Commander-in-chief may be pleased to name as having
most distinguished themselves on this occasion, and thereby earned
this special reward; and the Governor will take care that liberal
compensation is awarded for the loss of property abandoned in the
cantonment and subsequently destroyed, when the Lancers, in obedience
to orders, marched out to protect the families of the European
officers, leaving their own unguarded in cantonment.
‘By a later report the Governor in Council has learned with regret
that eleven men of the Lancers basely deserted their comrades and
their standards, and joined the mutineers; but the Governor in Council
will not suffer the disgrace of these unworthy members of the corps to
sully the display of loyalty, discipline, and gallantry which the
conduct of this fine regiment has eminently exhibited.’
Footnote 28:
It is well to observe, for the aid of those consulting maps, that
there are five or six towns and villages of this name in India. The
Mhow here indicated is nearly in lat. 22½°, long. 76°.
Footnote 29:
See page 175.
[Illustration:
Akali of the Sikhs.
]