_To the Senate and House of Representatives_:
Our coast defences as they existed in 1860 were not surpassed
in efficiency by those of any country, but within a few years
the introduction of rifled cannon and armor in the navies of the
world, against which the smoothbore guns were practically useless,
rendered them obsolete. For many years no attempt was made to remedy
the deficiencies of these seacoast fortifications. There was no
establishment in the country equipped for the manufacture of high-power
rifled guns; there was no definite adopted policy of coast defence, and
Congress was reluctant to undertake a work the cost of which could not
be stated even approximately and the details of which had not advanced,
so far as could be ascertained, beyond the experimental stages.
The Act of March 3, 1883, was the first decisive step taken to secure
suitable and adequate ordnance for military purposes. Under the
provisions of this act a joint board of officers of the Army and
Navy was appointed “for the purpose of examining and reporting to
Congress which of the navy-yards or arsenals owned by the Government
has the best location and is best adapted for the establishment of a
Government foundry, or what other method, if any, should be adopted for
the manufacture of heavy ordnance adapted to modern warfare for the
use of the Army and Navy of the United States.” This board, known as
the “Gun Foundry Board,” made its report in 1884 and directed public
attention not only to the defenceless condition of our coasts, but to
the importance and necessity of formulating a comprehensive scheme for
the protection of our harbors and coast cities.
As a result, the Act of Congress approved March 3, 1885, provided that
“the President of the United States shall appoint a board ... which
board shall examine and report at what ports fortifications or other
defences are most urgently required, the character and kind of defences
best adapted to each with reference to armament, the utilization of
torpedoes, mines, and other defensive appliances.”
The board, organized under the foregoing provision of law, popularly
known as the “Endicott Board,” in its report of January 23, 1886, cited
the principles on which any system of coast defence should be based,
and clearly stated the necessity of having our important strategic and
commercial centres made secure against naval attack. In determining
the ports that were in urgent need of defence, since a fleet did not
exist for the protection of the merchant marine, fortifications were
provided at every harbor of importance along the coast and at several
of the lake ports. For any particular harbor or locality the report
specifies the armament considered necessary for proper protection, the
character of emplacements to be used, the number of submarine mines and
torpedo boats, with detailed estimates of cost for these various items.
The proposed guns, mounts, and emplacements were of types that seemed
at that time best suited to accomplish the desired results, based on
the only data available, namely, experiments and information of similar
work from abroad.
After the report was made part of the public records, the development
and adoption of a suitable disappearing gun carriage caused the
substitution of open emplacements for the expensive turrets and armored
casements, materially reducing the cost of installing the armament.
The great advances in ordnance, increasing the power and range of
the later guns, caused a diminution in the number and calibre of the
pieces to be mounted, and this fact, combined with advances in the
science of engineering, rendered unnecessary the construction of the
expensive “floating batteries” designed by the Endicott Board for
mounting guns to give sufficient fire for the defence of wide channels
or for harbors where suitable foundations could not be secured on land.
Furthermore, keeping pace with the gradual development and improvement
in the engines and implements of war, fortified harbors are equipped
with rapid-fire guns, and, to a certain extent, with power plants,
searchlights, and a system of fire control and direction, now essential
adjuncts of a complete system of defence, though not so considered by
that board.
While the details of the scheme of defence recommended by the
Endicott Board have been departed from, in making provision for later
developments of war material, the great value of its report lies in
the fact that it sets forth a definite and intelligible plan or policy
upon which the very important work of coast defence should proceed, and
which is as applicable to-day as when formulated.
The greater effective ranges possible with the later rifled cannon, the
necessity of thoroughly covering with gun fire all available waters of
approach, and the growth of seacoast towns beyond the limits of some
of the military reservations, have combined to move defensive works
more to the front, and many of the gun positions now occupied have been
obtained from private ownership. The cost of such sites has been a
large item in the present cost of fortifications, and this purchase of
land was not included in its estimates by the Endicott Board.
An examination of the report also discloses the fact that no estimates
were submitted covering a supply of ammunition to be kept in reserve
for the services of the guns that were recommended, due, perhaps, to
the fact that a satisfactory powder to give the energy desired and a
suitable projectile to accomplish the desired destruction of armor were
still in experimental stages. These questions, however, are no longer
in doubt, and Congress already has made provision for some of the
ammunition needed.
The omissions in the estimates of the Endicott Board and the changes in
the details of its plans have caused doubts in the minds of many as to
the money that will be needed to defend completely our coasts by guns,
mines, and their adjuncts. New localities are pressing their claims for
defence. The insular possessions can not be held unless the principal
ports, naval bases, and coaling stations are fortified before the
outbreak of war. These considerations have led me to appoint a joint
board of officers of the Army and Navy “to recommend the armament,
fixed and floating, mobile torpedoes, submarine mines, and all other
defensive appliances that may be necessary to complete the harbor
defence with the most economical and advantageous expenditures of
money.” The board was further instructed “to extend its examinations so
as to include estimates and recommendations relative to defences of the
insular possessions,” and to “recommend the order in which the proposed
defence shall be completed, so that all the elements of harbor defence
may be properly and effectively co-ordinated.”
The board has completed its labors, and its report, together with a
letter of transmittal by the Secretary of War, is herewith transmitted
for the information of the Congress. It is to be noted that the
entrance to Chesapeake Bay, not heretofore recommended or authorized
by Congress, is added to the list of ports in the United States to be
defended, with the important reasons therefor clearly stated; that the
gun defence proper is well advanced toward completion, and that the
greater part of the estimate is for new work of gun defence, for the
accessories now so necessary for efficiency, and for an allowance of
ammunition which, added to that already on hand, will give the minimum
supply that should be kept in reserve to successfully meet any sudden
attack. The letter of the Secretary of War contains a comparison of the
estimates of the Endicott Board, with the amounts already appropriated
for the present defence and the estimates of the new board, from
which it appears that a completed defence of our coast, omitting
cost of ammunition and sites, can be accomplished for less than the
amount estimated by the Endicott Board, even including the additional
localities not recommended by it.
In the insular possessions, the great naval bases at Guantanamo,
Subig Bay, and Pearl Harbor, the coaling stations at Guam and San
Juan, require protection, and, in addition, defences are recommended
for Manila Bay and Honolulu, because of the strategic importance of
these localities. In the letter of the Secretary of War will be found
the sums already appropriated for defences at some of these ports
or harbors, and the estimates are for the completion of an adequate
defence at each locality.
Defences are recommended for the entrances to the Panama Canal as
contemplated by the Act of June 28, 1902 (Spooner Act), and under the
terms of this act the cost of such fortifications would probably be
paid from appropriations for the construction and defence of the canal.
The necessity for a complete and adequate system of coast defence is
greater to-day than twenty years ago, for the increased wealth of the
country offers more tempting inducements to attack and a hostile fleet
can reach our coast in a much shorter period of time. The fact that
we now have a navy does not in any wise diminish the importance of
coast defences; on the contrary, that fact emphasizes their value and
the necessity for their construction. It is an accepted naval maxim
that a navy can be used to strategic advantage only when acting on
the offensive, and it can be free to so operate only after our coast
defence is reasonably secure and so recognized by the country. It was
due to the securely defended condition of the Japanese ports that the
Japanese fleet was free to seek out and watch its proper objective—the
Russian fleet—without fear of interruption or recall to guard its home
ports against raids by the Vladivostok squadron. This one of the most
valuable lessons of the late war in the East is worthy of serious
consideration by our country, with its extensive coast line, its many
important harbors, and its many wealthy manufacturing coast cities.
The security and protection of our interests require the completion of
the defences of our coast, and the accompanying plan merits and should
receive the generous support of the Congress.