In the meantime, negotiations had been going on with Siam, between
which state and Burma there was the bitterest enmity. It had been
thought that Siam would have willingly grasped the opportunity to
revenge itself for the many losses of territory that it had
suffered at the hands of Burma. This there was no doubt that it
would have been glad to do, but our occupation of several points on
the coast of Tenasserim roused the fears of Siam, and inclined it
to the belief that we might prove an even more dangerous neighbour
than Burma.
The court of Ava had, on its part, also sent urgent messages to the
King of Siam--when misfortunes had, to some extent, lowered its
pride--calling upon him to make common cause with Burma, and to
join it in repelling an enemy who would doubtless be as dangerous
to him as to Burma.
Siam, however, determined to steer a middle course. An army was
assembled, in readiness for any contingency; but Siam believed as
little as Burma, itself, that the British could possibly be
victorious over that power; and feared its vengeance, if she were
to ally herself with us while, upon the other hand, Siam had a long
sea coast, and feared the injury our fleet might inflict upon it,
were it to join Burma. The king, therefore, gave both powers an
assurance of his friendship; and marched his army down to the
frontier of the province of Martaban, which bordered on the great
Salween river on the Tenasserim coast, and lay some two hundred
miles from Rangoon, across the gulf of Martaban.
The intentions of the king being so doubtful, the advance of the
Siamese army in this direction could not be regarded with
indifference by the British. The town of Martaban was the centre of
the Burmese military power in Tenasserim, and the advance towards
it of the Siamese army would place it in direct communication with
that of Burma. On the 13th of October, therefore, a force,
consisting of a wing of the 41st Regiment and the 3rd Madras
Infantry, sailed from Rangoon against the town. The expedition was
delayed by light winds and, when it arrived at the mouth of the
river, found that every preparation had been made for an obstinate
defence. They learned, from a peasant, that strong works had been
erected on every eminence round the town; and that the road from
the coast had been cut, and stockaded.
Approach by this route was impossible, for there were twenty miles
of country to be traversed; and much of this was under water from
the inundations. It was, therefore, determined to go up the river,
although this was so shallow and full of shoals that the navigation
was extremely difficult. At last, after great labour--incurred by
the ships constantly getting ashore--they succeeded in making their
way up to Martaban, and anchored off the town.
A heavy cannonade was carried on, for some time, between the ships
and the enemy's works. Then the troops were embarked in boats,
which rowed for the shore under a very heavy fire from the enemy.
As soon as they landed, and advanced to attack the stockades, the
Burmese lost heart and hastily retreated; while the inhabitants
received the troops as they entered with the warmest welcome--for
they were, for the most part, natives of Pegu, and still
entertained a deep hatred for the Burmese, because of the long
oppression that they had suffered at their hands.
Throughout the rest of Tenasserim, however; and indeed, throughout
the whole country traversed by the troops later on, the inhabitants
appeared to have entirely forgotten their ancient nationality, and
the conquest of their country by the Burmans; and to have become
completely absorbed by them. Throughout the whole time that we
occupied Martaban, the people gave no trouble whatever and, indeed,
offered to raise a force for service with us, if we wished it.
At the end of October the rain ceased--to the intense delight of
the troops--and the cold season set in. November was, however, an
exceptionally deadly month--the occasional days of fine weather
drawing up the exhalations from the swamps--and the number of
deaths was greater than they had been at any previous time. There
was, too, no prospect of a forward movement, at present. The
expedition had come unprovided with boats or other means of
transport, making sure that an abundant supply would be obtained,
in a country where the whole trade was carried on by the rivers.
The promptness with which the native authorities had, on the first
appearance of the fleet, sent every boat away, had disappointed
this anticipation and, although the opening of some of the other
rivers had enabled the local fishermen to bring their boats to
Rangoon, where fish were eagerly purchased, the British troops were
still, up to the end of November, without the means of sending a
hundred men up the river, save in the boats of the fleet.
The Indian authorities--believing that, when the Burmese found
themselves impotent to turn us out of Rangoon, the court of Ava
would be glad to negotiate--had not, until the autumn was drawing
to a close, thought of making any preparations to supply the army
with water carriage. They now, however, began to bestir themselves.
Five hundred boatmen were sent from Chittagong, bringing many boats
down with them, and building others at Rangoon. Transports with
draft cattle sailed from Bengal, and a considerable reinforcement
of troops was on its way to join, at the end of December--for all
the natives agreed that no movement could be made, by land, until
the end of January.
In November, even Bandoola's army was obliged to make its approach
by water. Early in that month it was learned that the Burmese
general had given orders for the advance, and preparations were at
once begun to meet what none doubted would be a very serious
attack. The reinforcements had not yet arrived, and the greatly
diminished force was far too small for the length of the line that
had to be defended. Redoubts were therefore thrown up, pagodas and
other buildings were fortified; and two complete lines of works
constructed, from the great pagoda to the city, one facing east and
the other west.
The post at Kemmendine was strengthened, and was supported by H. M.
sloop Sophie, a company's cruiser, and a strong division of
gunboats. The retention of this post was of great importance, as it
barred the river approach to Rangoon, and prevented the enemy
sending down a huge fleet of war galleys and fire rafts to attack
the town, and set fire to the merchant shipping lying off it.
In the last week of November, smoke was seen to rise from many
points in the forest. Many fugitives came in from their villages,
and reported that Bandoola's army were all on their way down the
river; and by the end of the month some sixty thousand men, with a
large train of artillery and a body of cavalry, were assembled
round our position. Of this force, thirty thousand were armed with
muskets. They had with them, too, a great number of jingals. These
little guns carried ball of from six to twelve ounces, and were
mounted on a light carriage, which two men could wheel with ease.
The cannon were carried to the scene of action on elephants. The
cavalry were seven hundred strong, drawn from the borders of
Manipur.
The rest of the army were armed with swords and spears, and carried
implements for stockading and entrenching. The force was accompanied by
a number of astrologers; and by the Invulnerables--who had, doubtless,
satisfactorily explained their failure to capture the pagoda.
A great semicircle of light smoke, rising from the trees, showed
that the position taken up by Bandoola extended from the river
above Kemmendine to the neighbourhood of Rangoon. On the night of
the 31st, the troops at the pagoda heard a loud and continuous stir
in the forest. It gradually approached and, by morning, great
masses of troops had gathered at the edge of the jungle, within
musket shot of the post. The garrison there were drawn up in
readiness to repel a sudden rush but, just as the sun rose, a din
made by thousands of men engaged in cutting down the trees began,
and it was evident that the Burmese were going to adopt their usual
plan of entrenching themselves behind stockades.
During the time that had elapsed between the repulse of the
Invulnerables and the arrival of Bandoola's army, Stanley's work
was light, and the life dull and monotonous. An hour was spent,
every morning, in examining the fugitives who had, by the retreat
of the Burmese, been enabled to make their way back to the town;
and of women who had escaped from the vigilance of the Burmese
police, and had come in from the villages where they had been held
as hostages for their husbands. Once or twice a week, he went off
with the general to the hospital ship, to inquire into the state of
the sick and to pay a visit to the long line of cots along the main
and lower deck. Almost every day he rode, in spite of the weather,
to one or other of the regimental camps; and soon came to know most
of the officers of the force. His previous experience on the rivers
had done much to acclimatise him, and his health continued good.
On the evening of the 30th he had, at the general's order, ridden
up to the pagoda. It was considered likely that the attack would be
delivered there in the first place and, at three o'clock in the
morning, when it became evident that a large body of men were
approaching through the forest, he galloped back to Rangoon with
the news and, at five, rode out again with Sir A. Campbell.
Among the garrison there was much disappointment when the sound of
wood chopping announced that the Burmese did not intend to attack;
but the general, who had been watching the edge of the jungle
through his glasses, lowered them and put them into their case with
an expression of satisfaction.
"I don't want them to attack, Colonel," he said. "If they do, and
we beat them off, we are no nearer the end than before. That sort
of thing might be carried on for months; as long, in fact, as there
remains a man to bring up. What we want is to inflict such a heavy
blow upon them, that even the court at Ava may become convinced
that they cannot hope to drive us out of Rangoon; in which case
they may consent to negotiate, and we may bring the war to an end.
"Heaven knows that we have suffered enough loss, at present; and I
don't want to have to undertake such a difficult operation as an
advance against Ava. I am glad to see that they have begun to
construct stockades. I do not intend to interfere until they have
completely finished their work, and gained sufficient confidence to
make a general attack on us. Then we shall be able to give them a
heavy lesson.
"Ah, there they are, at work!"
As he spoke, a roar of musketry and artillery broke out suddenly
from Kemmendine, and all eyes were turned in that direction. The
spot was two miles distant, but the forest shut out, alike, the
view of the river and of the works held by us. The exact position,
however, was indicated by the masts of the two war vessels, rising
above the trees.
Soon great wreaths of heavy white smoke rose above the forest, in
and around Kemmendine, shutting out all view. The fire continued
without abatement, and it was evident that the attack was a hot and
determined one. Confident as all felt that the little fort would be
able to defend itself successfully, the great smoke clouds were
watched with some feeling of anxiety; for the garrison was, after
all, but a handful. In momentary intervals of the firing, the yells
and shouts of the natives could be distinctly heard and, once or
twice, after a heavy broadside from the ships of war, the cheers of
the British sailors could be plainly recognized.
After two hours' fighting the din gradually ceased. The clouds of
smoke rolled away, and the masts of the ships became visible, and
the garrison of the pagoda raised three hearty cheers, to tell the
defenders that their successful defence had been watched and
welcomed.
Presently some heavy columns of the enemy issued from the forest,
on the other side of the river; and marched across the plain to
Dalla, which faced Rangoon. They moved with great regularity and
order, led by their chiefs on horseback, their gilded umbrellas
glittering in the rays of the sun. On reaching the bank of the
river opposite Rangoon, they began entrenching themselves and
throwing up stockades and batteries; with the evident intention of
opening fire on the shipping. Soon afterwards large bodies of men
issued from the forest facing the pagoda and, marching along a
slight ridge, that extended from that point to the creek below
Rangoon, took up their position there, and began entrenching
themselves all along the line. Thus the British position was now
completely surrounded; there was, however, no doubt that the main
body of the enemy was still facing the pagoda.
"We must see what they are doing," the general said. "This is too
important a point for us to allow them to erect a strongly
fortified position, close at hand."
Accordingly, Tollemache was sent down with an order to the 18th
Madras Infantry--supported by a detachment of the 13th Regiment,
under Major Sale--to advance against the enemy in the jungle. The
movements of this force were eagerly watched from the terrace of
the pagoda. At a rapid pace they crossed the intervening ground,
and a rattle of musketry broke out from the jungle as they
approached. The British made no response; but charged, with a
cheer, and were soon lost to sight in the trees. Their regular
volleys could be heard, at short intervals, above the scattered
rattle of the Burmese musketeers; and their cheers frequently rose,
loud and triumphant. In half an hour the red line emerged again
from the jungle, having destroyed the stockades the Burmese had
erected; captured several guns, a quantity of muskets, and
entrenching tools thrown away by the Burmese; and killed a large
number of the enemy.
During the day the enemy made repeated efforts to send fire rafts
down the river from above Kemmendine. These rafts were constructed
of bamboos, upon which were placed great numbers of earthenware
pots, filled with petroleum. These rafts were skilfully
constructed, and made in sections so that, when they drifted
against an anchor chain, they would divide--those on each side
swinging round, so as to envelop the ship on both sides with fire.
The sailors from the sloops and gunboats rowed up to meet the rafts
and, although a heavy fire was kept up by the enemy, from the
jungles lining the banks, they succeeded in towing most of them
safely to shore; while the rest grounded on a projecting spit, off
Kemmendine.
So diligently did the Burmese work at all points throughout the day
that, by the afternoon, their whole line of circumvallation was
covered with earthworks; behind which they lay, entirely hidden
from sight.
"If they could fight as well as they dig, and build stockades," Sir
A. Campbell remarked, "they would be one of the most formidable
enemies in the world. No European army ever accomplished the work
of entrenching themselves so speedily as they have done. Their
arrangements have been admirable. Everything has been done without
confusion, and each body has taken up the position allotted to it;
as is evident by the fact that there is no gap in their lines.
"As to Bandoola's tactics, I cannot say so much for them. In the
first place, he has divided his force into two parts, separated by
a river, and incapable of helping each other. In the next place,
great as are his numbers, his lines are far too extended.
"Well, we will let them go on for a time; and then show them the
mistake that they have committed."
Major Sale's reports of the entrenchments were that they consisted
of a long line of holes, each capable of containing two men. The
earth was dug out on one side so as to form a sort of cave. In this
was a bed of straw or brushwood, on which one man could sleep,
while the other watched. Each hole contained a sufficient supply of
rice, water, and even fuel for its inmates. One line of these holes
had been completed, and another was being dug a short distance in
advance.
The Burmese do not relieve their men in the trenches. Those who
occupy the line first made remain there. Fresh men dig and occupy
the next line, and so the advance is continued, until close to the
work to be attacked. The system has the great advantage that a
shell falling into one of these holes only kills its two occupants;
instead of destroying many, as it might do if it fell in a
continuous trench.
In the afternoon the general returned to Rangoon, leaving Stanley
at the pagoda, with orders to ride down should there be any change
of importance. In the evening a considerable force of Burmese
issued from the jungle, and prepared to entrench themselves near
the northeast angle of the pagoda hill. Major Piper therefore took
two companies of the 38th and, descending the hill, drove the
Burmese, in confusion, back to the jungle.
In the morning it was found that the enemy had entrenched
themselves upon some high and open ground, within musket shot of
the north gate of the pagoda. It was separated from the gate by a
large tank; but as their jingals and musketry were able, from the
point they occupied, to sweep the plateau and the huts occupied by
the troops, a party of the 38th and the 28th Madras Infantry went
out, and drove them off. As soon, however, as our troops fell back
the Burmese reoccupied the position and, for the next few days, a
constant skirmishing went on at this point; while an artillery fire
was maintained, by the assailants and defenders, along the whole
line down to Rangoon, and the enemy's batteries at Dalla kept up an
incessant fire on the shipping. Kemmendine was attacked time after
time, and many attempts made to launch fire rafts down the river.
The work was very harassing for the troops. Night and day they were
expecting an attack in force; and there was a general feeling of
delight when, on the evening of the 4th, orders were issued for a
general movement against the enemy.
The latter had, by this time, brought the greater portion of their
guns up from the jungle, and placed them in their entrenchments;
and it was therefore in the power of the British to strike a heavy
blow. A division of the flotilla of gunboats was ordered up the
creek by the town. These opened a heavy fire upon the enemy's
flank, thus attracting their attention to that point and, after the
cannonade had continued for some little time, the two columns of
attack--the one eight hundred strong, under Major Sale; the other
five hundred, under Major Walker of the Madras army--issued out.
The latter was to attack the enemy facing the town, the former to
force his way through the centre of their position. He had with him
a troop of horse, that had landed only the previous day.
Major Walker's force was the first to encounter the enemy. Their
resistance was, for a time, obstinate. Major Walker and several
other officers fell, in the attack on the first line of
entrenchments; but the soldiers carried it at the point of the
bayonet and, as the enemy broke and retreated, followed them so
hotly that the works in the rear fell into their hands with but
slight opposition.
Major Sale's column now began its attack on the enemy's centre.
Here the resistance was more feeble and, bursting through the
enemy's lines, the British drove them before them in headlong
flight. Then, turning, they swept along the line of entrenchments;
carrying all before them until they effected a junction with the
other column, which was advancing to meet them. They then drove the
Burmese from every part of their works into the jungle, leaving the
ground behind them covered with dead and wounded.
Except at the point first attacked by Major Walker, the resistance
of the Burmese was very feeble, and the British loss inconsiderable;
and a large number of guns, entrenching tools, and muskets fell into
the hands of the victors. The next day Bandoola rallied the troops
that had been driven from the plain, and gathered the greatest part
of his force in the forest round the pagoda, where they continued to
push forward their works with unabated energy.
The British had a day of rest given them and, on the 7th, prepared
to attack the enemy at this point. Four columns of attack were
formed, composed of detachments drawn from all the corps of the
army. In the morning a heavy cannonade was opened upon the jungle;
the artillery being assisted by several heavy guns which had, with
great labour, been brought up by the sailors from the ships to the
pagoda. The enemy returned it with a steady fire of light
artillery, jingals, and musketry.
While the firing was still going on, the four columns were already
in motion. One had entered the jungle on the enemy's left, and
another on the right. One of the central columns advanced from the
foot of the pagoda hill, while the 38th Regiment descended the
stairs from the north gate and advanced, one wing on each side of
the tank, against the enemy's entrenchments on the high ground. As
the four columns approached the enemy, our artillery fire ceased.
The Burmese appeared, for a moment, bewildered at the sight of
their foes advancing against them from so many directions, but they
soon opened a very heavy fire upon the assailants; and kept it up
with undiminished steadiness until our troops, advancing at the
charge, dashed into their entrenchments and drove them headlong
before them into the thick forest behind--where pursuit, which
would at any time have been difficult, was now impossible; the
troops, exhausted by their seven days' and nights' watching, being
wholly incapable of following their active and lightly-armed
enemies.
There now remained but the force at Dalla to cope with and, in the
evening, a force composed of the 89th and 43rd Madras Infantry,
under Colonel Parlby, embarked in boats. The night was dark, and
the troops crossed unobserved. The alarm was not given until the
British actually entered the entrenchments, and opened fire upon
the enemy; who were sitting, unsuspicious of danger, round their
fires. Scarcely any opposition was encountered, and the whole of
the works, with the guns and the stores, were soon in our hands;
while the enemy were flying towards the forest.
In the actions during these three days, the Burmese lost some 5000
men, 240 pieces of artillery of every kind, and a great number of
muskets and vast supplies of ammunition; while the British had but
50 killed and 300 wounded. Great numbers of Bandoola's men never
rejoined the army, and the whole force was dispersed through the
country.
Bandoola himself was retiring towards Donabew, with but a remnant
of his army, when he met considerable reinforcements on their way
to join him. During his operations he had left a reserve corps at
the village of Kokein, four miles from the pagoda; and these had
been busily entrenching the position, which commanded the road
leading from Rangoon to Donabew. The ground was elevated and, on
his arrival there, Bandoola set his troops--now some 25,000 in
number--to aid in the work. In a marvellously short time the
heights were completely stockaded with trunks of trees; and with a
broad, deep ditch in front. Beyond this were lines of felled trees,
their heads pointing outwards and each branch sharpened--forming a
very formidable abattis--and, believing this to be impregnable,
Bandoola awaited the attack of the British.
As soon as his army had been dispersed, great numbers of deserters,
and of the inhabitants of the villages, poured into Rangoon. With
the deserters were mingled a good many of the troops sent in by
Bandoola, himself, with instructions to fire the town. In order to
lull the suspicions of the British, he caused a report to be spread
that an imperial commissioner from the court of Ava would arrive,
in the course of a few days, to treat for terms of peace.
The general, however, determined to attack Bandoola before the
commissioner could arrive; as it was evident that better terms
could be obtained, after the total dispersion of the Burmese, than
if their famous general remained, with 25,000 men, in a formidable
position close at hand. He was uneasy at the presence of so large a
number of natives in the town, and the precautions that had been
taken against fire, some time before, were now redoubled. Were one
to break out, not only might the whole of the stores collected for
the advance of the army be destroyed but, if Bandoola had his force
gathered in readiness at the edge of the jungle, he might take
advantage of the confusion that would be caused by the fire, and
rush forward to the attack of the town.
Numbers of troops, and of sailors from the fleet, patrolled the
streets in every direction at night but, in spite of their efforts,
a week after the retreat of Bandoola the dreaded cry of fire was
raised. At a dozen points, on the windward side of the town, fires
had been lighted by incendiaries and, as there was a brisk wind
blowing, the danger was extreme. The drums beat to arms along the
whole of the British lines. Orders had already been issued as to
what was to be done in such an emergency and, while a portion of
the troops lined the trenches, the rest were marched at once to the
town, and formed up between it and the jungle, to repel any attack
that might be made there; leaving the troops quartered in the town,
and the sailors of the fleet to battle with the flames.
For a time it seemed as if the whole place would be swept away but,
by levelling lines of huts, and beating out the flames at the
barrier so formed, their progress was at length checked; but not
until more than half the town had been destroyed. Fortunately this
was the half farthest from the river and--with the exception of the
commissariat stores for the supply of the troops of the Madras
Presidency--the buildings containing the food, ammunition, and
necessaries for the army escaped unharmed.
What had happened once might, however, happen again, in spite of
all precautions. The general therefore determined to attack
Bandoola at once as, were his force once scattered, the motive for
these incendiary fires would cease to operate.
The difficulties were formidable. One or two light field pieces
could, at the most, be taken with the column. They would have to
march by a narrow and winding footpath, through a thick forest,
exposed at any moment to a desperate attack by the enemy. Moreover,
it would be necessary to leave a strong force for the defence of
Rangoon, as Bandoola would be sure to learn, from his spies, of the
intended movement and, having with him men intimately acquainted
with every forest track, could make a rush down upon the town
during the absence of so many of its defenders.
The general felt it imperative, however, to attack without delay
and, early on the morning of the 15th, he moved out with a force of
1500 men against Kokein. They marched without molestation through
the forest and, on reaching its confines, could see the truly
formidable nature of the works that they were to attack. The moment
they issued from the forest, a dropping fire was opened upon them
by parties of the enemy, in flank and rear; and no time was lost in
preparing for the assault.
The 13th Light Infantry and the 18th Madras, with 60 cavalry, under
Brigadier General Cotton, were ordered to move round the stockade
and assault it on the left rear; while the rest of the troops, some
800 strong, with 100 cavalry under the general himself, were to
attack in front. The enemy's works consisted of a central
entrenchment, connected with two large entrenched stockades on its
flank, but somewhat advanced in front of it.
As soon as the force under General Cotton had gained its position
in the rear of the enemy, a gun was fired, and the whole force
moved forward to the assault.. The Burmans regarded the attack by
so insignificant a force upon their works with such contempt that
they did not, for some time, fire a shot; but continued chanting a
war song, swaying themselves to its cadence, stamping and beating
time with their hands on their breasts.
This delay proved fatal to them. When they opened fire, their
assailants were already close to the ditch and, leaping down into
this, were sheltered from the fire of the defenders. Scaling
ladders were speedily placed and the troops, running up them,
leaped down into the entrenchment. Astounded at this sudden entry
into the works they had deemed impregnable, the Burmese hesitated;
and the assailants, being joined by their comrades from behind,
rushed impetuously upon the enemy.
The column in the rear had greater difficulty--for they had several
strong stockades to carry before they reached the central work--and
lost four officers and eight men killed, and forty-nine officers
and men wounded, in the 13th Regiment alone. Fifteen minutes after
the first shot was fired, the whole of the works were in our
possession and the Burmese, who gathered in a confused mass, had
been decimated by our volleys. They were now in full flight, many
being cut down by the cavalry before they reached the shelter of
the woods. The British troops marched back to Rangoon; while the
Burmese retreated to Donabew, leaving strong posts on the two
rivers leading in that direction.
Their retirement left it free to the country people to return to
Rangoon, and very large numbers came in, including very many of the
villagers who had been forced to fight against us. All had alike
suffered from famine and hardship. Even the women had been
compelled to labour in the work of stockading, and the sufferings
of all had been terrible. The work of rebuilding the town began at
once, and the wooden huts sprang up with great rapidity; markets
were opened and, in a short time, supplies of fish, fruit, game,
and vegetables poured in; sufficient not only for the native
population, but to effect a most welcome change in the diet of the
troops.
As most of the natives were accustomed to the construction and
management of boats, the work of preparing the flotilla by which
the troops were to proceed up the rivers went on rapidly; and
numbers of men were hired as servants and drivers for the
commissariat--with which the force was very insufficiently
supplied, as the natives of India of that class for the most part
refused, on account of their caste prejudices, to engage themselves
for service across the sea. Reinforcements arrived; and Rangoon,
which but six weeks before presented a miserable and deserted
appearance was, towards the beginning of January, a cheerful and
bustling town.
Preparations were being made in other quarters to assume the
offensive. Some 3000 men were driving the Burmese out of Assam; and
a force 7000 strong was marching from Sylhet, to expel them from
Cachar and capture Manipur; while 11,000 men were assembled at
Chittagong, and were advancing into Aracan with the intention of
driving the Burmese from that province--and they meant, if
possible, to cross the mountains and effect a junction with Sir
Archibald Campbell's force. The first part of the operations were
conducted with complete success, and Aracan wrested from Burma; but
it was found impossible to perform the terrible journey across
mountain and swamp, or to afford any aid to the main expedition.