CHAPTER VI

THE NECESSITY OF CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS UPON THE POWERS OF THE

GOVERNMENT. BILLS OF RIGHTS

It should be evident that the division and distribution of

governmental powers among different depositaries will not alone

prevent encroachments by the governing power upon the liberty of the

subject. The executive department in performing only executive

functions can, in the absence of other checks, act oppressively. The

legislative department, especially, without exceeding the legislative

function, can in many ways and in excessive degrees oppress the

individual by unnecessary restrictions of personal liberty, by

unnecessary exactions, by arbitrary discriminations. The theory of

representative government is that the legislature will be a body of

men who will regard themselves as entrusted with important powers to

be exercised deliberately and wisely for the welfare of the whole

commonwealth and not for any one or more classes or interests,--who

will regard themselves not as mere delegates or proxies, but as

representatives, like the directors of a corporation, to form and act

upon their own judgment after investigation and reflection. Experience

has shown, however, that members of the legislature do not always nor

generally act upon that theory. They seem to be inoculated with the

bacillus of irrepressible activity, the desire continually to be

proposing new laws, new restrictions, new exactions. If the laws

enacted prove difficult of enforcement by reason of their interference

with what individuals feel to be their rights, then new and oppressive

methods of enforcement are devised, still further restricting liberty

and equality. I have seen it stated that in the first ten days of the

session of the Massachusetts legislature this present year over a

thousand laws were proposed. Further, the members of the legislature

are beset by constituents and others to favor legislative measures for

their own special benefit, or that of their association, or of their

locality. One result is that during every legislative session the

ordinary citizen is dreading oppressive legislation and feels relieved

when the session is over.

When we consider the wide, almost unlimited range of the legislative

function, and the power and tendency of legislatures to push that

function to the extreme, it would seem that some check should be put

upon the legislature to prevent its enacting discriminatory laws or

otherwise depriving the individual of some accustomed and cherished

freedom of action. If it be said that public opinion is sufficient

restraint, the answer is that in a democracy, or in a republic with

universal suffrage, the efficient public opinion is practically that

of the majority of the electorate, and it is an acknowledged truism

that the unrestrained majority is even more likely than the few to be

oppressive of the individual. The opinion of the many is more

variable than that of the few, more likely to be swayed by sympathy,

prejudice, and other emotions. Indeed, public opinion sometimes

induces legislatures to enact laws which they themselves feel to be

unwise and tyrannical.

If history and reason show that the happiness of the people as a whole

requires certain individual liberties and rights to be left

undisturbed and that the safety of the people as a whole does not

require the contrary, then in order to secure justice those possessing

the powers of government should be restrained from any acts infringing

those liberties and rights; for, as already stated, justice consists

in the equilibrium between restrictions necessary for the welfare of

the whole people without discrimination, and the freedom of the

individual to serve his own welfare.

I think there are such liberties and rights. The subjects of King John

in the 13th century thought so and compelled the king to guarantee by

the Magna Charta that certain specified rights and liberties should

not be infringed. Again, the subjects of Charles I in the 17th century

had a similar conviction and expressed it in the Petition of Right,

which named some liberties and rights not to be infringed. The king

assented to that much limitation of the royal power. In the same

century, upon the accession of William and Mary, a Bill of Rights was

framed and enacted into law by King and Parliament, naming liberties

and rights of the subject which ought not to be abridged. Succeeding

Kings and Parliaments seem to have respected the provisions of this

Bill of Rights in their legislation for British subjects. Had they

conceded the claim of the people of the American Colonies that they

also were protected by its provisions, the course of our political

history might have been different. As it was, however, the British

government practically held that neither Magna Charta, the Petition of

Right, nor the Bill of Rights restrained it in its dealings with the

Colonies, and this in despite of the protests of some of its most

eminent statesmen. The resolutions of the various Colonial

legislatures and the formal Declaration of Independence recite many

grievous instances of arbitrary action by the government in disregard

of the doctrines of those charters.

So bitter was their experience that, when the people of the various

Colonies came to frame constitutions for "a government of the people,

by the people, and for the people" independent of the British crown

and all other external authority, they very generally insisted that

even such a government should have its powers defined and limited,

that some rights of the individual should be specified which the

government should not infringe nor have the lawful power to infringe.

From their own experience the people were convinced that such

definitions and limitations were necessary for the security of the

individual even under a popular government.

The first step of the representatives of the people of Virginia toward

a declaration of independence of the British crown, and the setting up

an independent government, was the adoption of a declaration of rights

in the individual which no government should infringe. This was

adopted and promulgated sometime before the constitution proper was

framed. The statement was declared to be necessary in order that the

government might be "effectually secured against maladministration."

Similar limitations upon the powers of the government were imposed in

the early constitutions of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey,

Delaware, Pennsylvania, Maryland, North Carolina, and South Carolina;

also in the first constitution of Connecticut in 1818, and in the

first constitution of Rhode Island in 1842. The people of New Jersey

in 1844 made the limitations more definite, and the people of Maryland

imposed additional limitations in 1864. The people of New York did not

in their first constitution of 1777 expressly in terms guarantee

individual rights, but they impliedly did so by making the Declaration

of Independence the preamble, and in their constitution of 1821 they

incorporated an explicit statement of individual rights not to be

infringed. The example of the original states in this respect has been

followed by most of the subsequent states of the Union.

In 1778 a convention chosen to draft a constitution for Massachusetts

submitted a draft to the people, who rejected it by a large majority

mainly because it did not contain a "Bill of Rights." To quote from

Harry A. Cushing, a writer on the History of Commonwealth Government

in Massachusetts, "No demand was more general than that for a Bill of

Rights which should embody the best results of experience." In 1780 a

second convention submitted another draft of a constitution containing

the famous Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, and this the people

adopted by a majority of more than two to one. The only objection

urged against the Declaration of Rights was that it did not go far

enough.

In the convention that drafted the Federal Constitution it was

strongly urged that a Bill of Rights should be incorporated in the

draft, but it was deemed, by the majority at least, unnecessary and

even dangerous to make a specific declaration of individual rights,

inasmuch as the federal government contemplated was in its very nature

limited to such powers as were expressly, or by necessary implication,

conferred by the Constitution, and hence to specify certain things the

government should not do might be construed as permitting it to do

anything not so specified. This argument prevailed and the draft

submitted to the states contained no Bill of Rights. Immediately,

however, a storm of objections was raised against it because of the

omission. Despite the arguments of Hamilton and Madison that a Bill of

Rights was unnecessary, ratification was finally obtained only by a

general assurance and understanding that a sufficient Bill of Rights

should be added immediately upon the organization of the new

government. The necessary amendments, therefore, were submitted at the

first session of the new Congress and were unanimously adopted by the

states. Other limitations have since been imposed, notably those in

the XIVth amendment, assuring to every citizen equal consideration in

legislation by the states.

By the Federal Constitution as it now stands the citizen, in time of

peace at least, is guaranteed, among other matters, the protection of

the writ of habeas corpus; freedom from bills of attainder and ex post

facto legislation; freedom of religious belief and worship; freedom of

thought and its expression; freedom peacefully to assemble with others

and petition for redress of grievances; freedom from unreasonable

searches and seizure; the right not to be prosecuted for infamous

crimes except first accused by a grand jury; the right in all criminal

prosecutions to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury, to be

confronted with the witnesses against him and to have assistance of

counsel; that he shall not be deprived of life, liberty, or property

without due process of law; that his private property shall not be

taken from him even for public use without just compensation; that the

obligations accruing to him under lawful contracts shall not be

impaired; that he shall not be denied the equal protection of the

laws. The guarantees in the state constitutions are generally of the

same nature.

It is difficult to see how any of these guaranties, or such other

guaranties as may be contained in the federal and state constitutions,

prevent legislative or executive action necessary for the welfare of

the people generally. There is certainly an ample field for such

action without overstepping these boundaries. Nevertheless, it is

today urged by some impulsive persons, eager to impose their theories

on the people at once, that all or many of these limitations upon the

powers of government should be removed or disregarded and the majority

of the people allowed unrestricted sway in all matters of

governmental action. Others who do not go so far, yet urge that the

majority should be free to suspend these guaranties temporarily or in

some particular classes of cases. Against this opinion I submit that

after so many centuries of experience of the tendency of all

governments to enlarge their powers over the subject, and of struggles

to limit the powers of government over private rights and to protect

the individual from governmental oppression, the burden of evidence

and of argument is heavily on those who would now advocate unlimited

powers even for the most democratic government. A government directly

by the people is of course in practice a government by a shifting and

often narrow majority of the people. It is not yet demonstrated by

experience or reason that such a government, unlimited, would be as

regardful of individual rights or welfare as a republican form of

government with its checks and balances and constitutional

restrictions. The excesses of the unlimited democracies of ancient

Greece and of the unrestrained democracy of France during and after

the revolution of 1789 and the lynchings in this country do not

contribute to such demonstration.

It is not those who defend our present form of government with its

constitutional guaranties, who resist political action tending to

weaken them, that should be called unprogressive, undemocratic, or

wanting in love of country. Those of our ancestors, English and

American, who fought for these guaranties, who obtained them only

after years of strife, who incorporated them in our federal and state

constitutions and safeguarded them against the varying impulses of the

populace, were not unpatriotic nor unmindful of the welfare of the

people,--were not indifferent to human liberties or human rights.

Neither are they such who today strive to preserve those guaranties

won at such expense of blood and treasure. On the contrary, it is

those who would override these guaranties and revert to the old days

of unlimited governmental power, that are the reactionaries.

It may be admitted that some of these limitations if enforced do now

and then impede and even prevent some governmental action desired by

some group or section of the people, but while action in violation of

these limitations might benefit its sponsors it would necessarily be

at the expense of others. Those who seek such legislation against

others would quickly appeal to these limitations if legislation were

directed against themselves. The noisiest declaimers against these

guaranties fall back for protection upon the constitutional guaranty

of freedom of speech. So long as these barriers are maintained every

individual, no matter how poor and feeble, will be, theoretically at

least, secure in some rights against the attacks of the many. Without

such barriers every individual is at the mercy of an inconstant

majority. Without such barriers justice cannot be said to be secured.

Lord Treasurer Burleigh of Queen Elizabeth's time declared that

England could never be ruined by its kings, but only by its

Parliament. If the safeguards of the federal and state constitutions

are maintained, neither Congress nor the state legislatures can ruin

America. If the American people should ever consent to the removal of

these safeguards they would give evidence of their want of

self-restraint, of their unwillingness and even incapacity to govern

themselves, and would pave the way for the man on horseback as the

French Revolution paved the way for Napoleon. To deprive a single one

of his rightful liberty is to endanger the liberties of all.

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