BOOK XXIV

[Sidenote: Embassies at Rome from the Achaeans, the Spartan exiles,

Eumenes of Pergamus, Ariarathes, king of Cappadocia, and Pharnaces,

king of Pontus, B.C. 182.]

+1.+ The ambassadors from the Spartan exiles and from the Achaeans

arrived in Rome simultaneously with those of Eumenes, king Ariarathes,

and Pharnaces; and the Senate attended to these latter first. A short

time previously a report had been made to the Senate by Marcus,[134]

who had been despatched on a mission respecting the war that had broken

out between Eumenes and Pharnaces, speaking highly of the moderation

of Eumenes in every particular, and the grasping temper and insolence

of Pharnaces. The Senate accordingly did not require any lengthened

arguments; but, after listening to the ambassadors, answered that they

would once more send legates to examine more minutely into the points

in dispute between the kings. Then came in the ambassadors from the

Lacedaemonian exiles, and with them the ambassadors from the citizens

actually in the city; and after giving them a long hearing, the Senate

expressed no disapproval of what had been done, but promised the exiles

to write to the Achaeans on the subject of their restoration to their

country. Some days afterwards, Bippus of Argos and his colleagues,

sent by the Achaeans, entered the Senate with a statement as to the

restoration of order in Messene; and the Senate, without showing

displeasure at any part of the arrangement, gave the ambassadors a

cordial reception....

[Sidenote: Terms granted to the Messenians.]

[Sidenote: The request of the Spartan exiles refused.]

+2.+ When the ambassadors of the Spartan exiles arrived in the

Peloponnese from Rome with a letter from the Senate to the Achaeans,

desiring that measures should be taken for their recall and restoration

to their country, the Achaeans resolved to postpone the consideration

of the question until their own ambassadors should return. After

making this answer, they caused the agreement between themselves and

the Messenians to be engraved on a tablet: granting them, among other

favours, a three years’ remission of taxes, in order that the damage

done to their territory should fall upon the Achaeans equally with the

Messenians. But when Bippus and his colleagues arrived from Rome, and

reported that the letter in regard to the exiles was not due to any

strong feeling on the part of the Senate, but to the importunity of the

exiles themselves, the Achaeans voted to make no change....

[Sidenote: M. Haemus. Livy, 46, 21.]

+3.+ Mount Haemus is close to the Pontus, the most extensive and

loftiest of the ranges in Thrace, which it divides into two nearly

equal parts, from which a view of both seas may be obtained....[135]

[Sidenote: Crete in B.C. 182. See bk. 22, ch. 19.]

+4.+ In Crete there was the beginning of great troubles set in motion,

if one should speak of “a beginning of troubles” in Crete: for owing

to the persistency of civil wars and the acts of savagery practised

against each other, beginning and end are much the same in Crete; and

what appears to some people to be an incredible story is a spectacle of

everyday occurrence there....

[Sidenote: End of the war between Eumenes and Pharnaces, which the

former had undertaken to support his father-in-law Ariarathes. See

Livy, 38, 39, B.C. 182-181.]

+5.+ Having come to terms with each other, Pharnaces, Attalus, and the

rest returned home. While this was going on, Eumenes had recovered

from his illness, and was staying at Pergamus; and when his brother

arrived to announce the arrangements that had been made, he approved of

what had been done, and resolved to send his brothers to Rome: partly

because he hoped to put and end to the war with Pharnaces by means of

their mission, and partly because he wished to introduce his brothers

to his own private friends at Rome, and officially to the Senate.

Attalus and his brother were eager for this tour; and when they arrived

in Rome the young men met with a cordial reception from everybody in

private society, owing to the intimacies which they had formed during

the Roman wars in Asia, and a still more honourable welcome from the

Senate, which made liberal provision for their entertainment and

maintenance, and treated them with marked respect in such conferences

as it had with them. Thus, when the young men came formally before

the Senate, and, after speaking at considerable length of the renewal

of their ancient ties of friendship with Rome and inveighing against

Pharnaces, begged the Senate to adopt some active measures to inflict

on him the punishment he deserved, the Senate gave them a favourable

hearing, and promised in reply to send legates to use every possible

means of putting an end to the war....

[Sidenote: Ptolemy Epiphanes sends a present to the Achaeans. Lycortas,

Polybius, and Aratus sent to return thanks, B.C. 181.]

[Sidenote: Bk. 22, ch. 12.]

[Sidenote: Ptolemy Epiphanes poisoned in B.C. 181.]

+6.+ About the same time king Ptolemy, wishing to make friends with the

Achaean league, sent an ambassador to them with an offer of a fleet of

ten penteconters fully equipped; and the Achaeans, thinking the present

worthy of their thanks, for the cost could not be much less than ten

talents, gladly accepted the offer. Having come to this resolution,

they selected Lycortas, Polybius, and Aratus, son of Aratus of Sicyon,

to go on a mission to the king, partly to thank him for the arms which

he had sent on a former occasion, and partly to receive the ships and

make arrangements for bringing them across. They appointed Lycortas,

because, as Strategus at the time that Ptolemy renewed the alliance, he

had worked energetically on the king’s side; and Polybius, though below

the legal age for acting as ambassador,[136] because his father has

been ambassador at the renewal of the alliance with Ptolemy, and had

brought the present of arms and of money to the Achaeans; and Aratus,

similarly, on account of his former intercourse with the king. However,

this mission never went after all as Ptolemy died just at this time....

[Sidenote: Chaeron’s malversations at Sparta.]

[Sidenote: Assassination of Apollonides.]

+7.+ There was at this time in Sparta a man named Chaeron, who in the

previous year had been on an embassy to Rome, a man of ready wit and

great ability in affairs, but still young, in a humble position of

life, and without the advantages of a liberal education. By flattering

the mob, and starting questions which no one else had the assurance to

move, he soon acquired a certain notoriety with the people. The first

use he made of his power was to confiscate the land granted by the

tyrants to the sisters, wives, mothers, and children of the exiles,

and to distribute it on his own authority among the poor without any

fixed rule or regard to equality. He next squandered the revenue, using

the public money as though it were his own, without the authority

of law, public decree, or magistrate. Annoyed at these proceedings,

certain men managed to get themselves appointed auditors of the

treasury in accordance with the laws. Seeing this, and conscious of his

maladministration of the government, Chaeron sent some men to attack

Apollonides, the most illustrious of the auditors, and the most able to

expose his embezzlements, who stabbed him to death in broad daylight as

he was coming from the bath. Upon this being reported to the Achaeans,

and the people expressing great indignation at what had been done,

the Strategus at once started for Sparta; and when he arrived there

he brought Chaeron to trial for the murder of Apollonides, and having

condemned him, threw him into prison. He then incited the remaining

auditors to make a real investigation into the public funds, and to see

that the relations of the exiles got back the property of which Chaeron

had shortly before deprived them....

[Sidenote: Winter of B.C. 181-180.]

[Sidenote: Spring of B.C. 180.]

[Sidenote: Eumenes enters Cappadocia.]

[Sidenote: Two Galatian chiefs.]

[Sidenote: Calpitus in Galatia (?). Parnassus, a town on the Halys.]

[Sidenote: Mocissus, N. of the Halys.]

+8.+ In Asia king Pharnaces, once more treating the reference to Rome

with contempt, sent Leocritus in the course of the winter with ten

thousand men to ravage Galatia, while he himself at the beginning of

spring collected his forces and invaded Cappadocia. When Eumenes heard

of it, he was much enraged at Pharnaces thus breaking through the

terms of the agreement to which he was pledged, but was compelled to

retaliate by acting in the same way. When he had already collected his

forces, Attalus and his brother landed from their voyage from Rome, and

the three brothers, after meeting and interchanging views, marched out

at once with the army. But on reaching Galatia they found Leocritus

no longer there; and when Carsignatus and Gaesotorius, who had before

embraced the cause of Pharnaces, sent them a message desiring that

their lives might be spared, and promising that they would do anything

that might be required of them, they refused the request on the ground

of the treachery of which they had been guilty, and advanced with

their full force against Pharnaces; and having performed the distance

from Calpitus to the river Halys in five days, they reached Parnassus

in six more, and being there joined by Ariarathes, the king of the

Cappadocians, with his own army, they entered the territory of the

Mocissians. Just as they had pitched their camp, news came that the

ambassadors from Rome had arrived to effect a pacification. When the

heard this, Eumenes sent his brother Attalus to receive them; while he

devoted himself to doubling the number of his troops, and improving

them to the utmost: partly with a view to prepare them for actual

service, and partly to impress the Romans with the belief that he was

able to defend himself against Pharnaces, and beat him in war.

[Sidenote: The Roman legates arrive and undertake to negotiate.]

[Sidenote: The negotiation fails.]

[Sidenote: The Rhodians engaged in putting down a rising of the

Lycians. See Bk. 22, ch. 5.]

+9.+ When the Roman legates arrived and urged the putting an end to the

war, Eumenes and Ariarathes professed to be ready to obey; but begged

the Romans to bring them, if possible, to an interview with Pharnaces,

that they might see fully from what was said in their own presence how

faithless and cruel a man Pharnaces was; and, if this proved to be

impossible, to take a fair and impartial view of the controversy and

decide it themselves. The legates replied that they would do everything

that was in their power and was consistent with honour; but they

required the kings to remove their army from the country: for it was

inconsistent that, when they were there with proposals for a peace,

operations of war should be going on and mutual acts of hostility be

committed. Eumenes and his ally yielded to this representation, and

immediately marched off in the direction of Galatia. The Roman legates

then visited Pharnaces, and first demanded that he should meet Eumenes

and Ariarathes in a conference, as that would be the surest way of

settling the affair; but when he expressed repugnance to that measure,

and absolutely refused to do so, the Romans at once perceived that he

plainly thought himself in the wrong, and distrusted his own cause;

but, being anxious in any and every way to put an end to the war, they

continued to press him until he consented to send plenipotentiaries

to the coast, to conclude a peace on such terms as the legates might

command. When these plenipotentiaries, the Roman legates, and Eumenes

and Ariarathes met, the latter showed themselves ready to consent to

any proposal for the sake of concluding a peace. But the envoys of

Pharnaces disputed every point, and did not hold even to what they

had once accepted, but continually brought forward some fresh demand,

and altered their mind again and again. The Roman legates, therefore,

quickly came to the conclusion that they were wasting their labour,

as Pharnaces could not be induced to consent to the pacification. The

conference accordingly having come to nothing, and the Roman legates

having left Pergamum, and the envoys of Pharnaces having gone home, the

war went on, Eumenes and his allies proceeding in their preparations

for it. Meanwhile, however, the Rhodians earnestly requested Eumenes to

help them; and he accordingly set out in great haste to carry on a war

against the Lycians....

[Sidenote: B.C. 180. Debate in the Achaean assembly on the Roman

despatch.]

+10.+ This year the Achaean Strategus Hyperbatus brought before the

assembly the question of the letter from Rome as to the recall of the

Lacedaemonian exiles. Lycortas and his party recommended that no change

should be made, on the ground that “The Romans had only acted as they

were bound to do in listening to the petition of men who, on the face

of it, were deprived of their rights, so far as that petition seemed

reasonable; but when they were convinced that of a petition some points

were impossible, and others such as to inflict great disgrace and

damage upon their friends, it had never been their custom to insist

upon them peremptorily, or force their adoption. So in this case also,

if it were shown to them that the Achaeans by obeying their letter

would be breaking their oaths, their laws, and the provisions engraved

on the tablets, the very bonds of our league, they will retract their

orders, and will admit that we are right to hesitate and to ask to

be excused from carrying out its injunctions.” Such was the speech

of Lycortas. But Hyperbatus and Callicrates advised submission to

the letter, and that they should hold its authority superior to law

or tablet or anything else. Such being the division of opinion, the

Achaeans voted to send ambassadors to the Senate, to put before it the

points contained in the speech of Lycortas. Callicrates of Leontium,

Lydiades of Megalopolis, and Aratus of Sicyon were forthwith nominated

for this mission, and were despatched with instructions to this effect.

But on their arrival at Rome Callicrates went before the Senate, and,

so far from addressing it in accordance with his instructions, he on

the contrary entered upon an elaborate denunciation of his political

opponents; and, not contented with that, he undertook to rebuke the

Senate itself.

[Sidenote: Callicrates, instead of obeying his instructions, denounces

his opponents, and persuades the Senate that their interference is

necessary.]

+11.+ For he said that “The Romans were themselves responsible for the

Greeks neglecting their letters and orders instead of obeying them. For

in all the democratic states of the day there were two parties,—one

recommending obedience to the Roman rescripts, and holding neither law

nor tablet nor anything else to be superior to the will of Rome; the

other always quoting oaths and tablets, and exhorting the people to

be careful about breaking them. Now the latter policy was by far the

most popular in Achaia, and the most influential with the multitude;

consequently the Romanisers were discredited and denounced among the

populace—their opponents glorified. If then the Senate would give some

sign of their interest in the matter, the leaders, in the first place,

would quickly change to the Romanising party, and, in the next place,

would be followed by the populace from fear. But if this were neglected

by the Senate, the tendency towards the latter of the two parties would

be universal, as the more creditable and honourable in the eyes of the

populace. Thus it came about that at that very time certain statesmen,

without any other claims whatever, had obtained the highest offices

in their own cities, merely from coming forward to speak against the

rescripts of the Senate, with the view of maintaining the validity

of the laws and decrees made in the country. If then the Senate was

indifferent about having their rescripts obeyed by the Greeks, by all

means let it go on as it is now doing. But if the Senate wished that

its orders should be carried out, and its rescripts be despised by no

one, it must give serious attention to that subject. If it did not

do so, he knew only too well that the exact opposite of the Senate’s

wishes would come about, as in fact had already been the case. For but

lately, in the Messenian disturbance, though Quintus Marcius had taken

many precautions to prevent the Achaeans adopting any measures with

regard to the Messenians without the consent of the Romans, they had

disobeyed that order; had voted the war on their own authority; had not

only wasted the whole country in defiance of justice, but had in some

cases driven its noblest citizens into exile, and in others put them

to death with every extremity of torture, though they had surrendered,

and were guilty of no crime but that of appealing to Rome on the points

in dispute. Again, too, though the Senate had repeatedly written to

order the restoration of the Lacedaemonian exiles, the Achaeans were

so far from obeying, that they had actually set up an engraved tablet,

and made a sworn agreement with the men actually in possession of the

city that these exiles should never return. With these instances before

their eyes, the Romans should take measures of precaution for the

future.”

[Sidenote: The Romans adopt the policy of raising a party in Greece

against the Achaean league.]

+12.+ After delivering a speech in these words, or to this effect,

Callicrates left the Senate-house. He was followed by the envoys of

the exiles, who retired after delivering a short address, stating

their case, and containing some of the ordinary appeals to pity. The

Senate was persuaded that much of what Callicrates had said touched

the interests of Rome, and that it was incumbent upon it to exalt

those who supported its own decrees, and to humble those who resisted

them. It was with this conviction, therefore, and at this time that

it first adopted the policy of depressing those who in their several

states took the patriotic and honourable side, and promoting those

who were for appealing to its authority on every occasion, right or

wrong. The result of which was that gradually, as time went on,the

Senate had abundance of flatterers, but a great scarcity of genuine

friends. However, on this occasion the Senate did not write about

the restoration of the exiles to the Achaeans only, but also to the

Aetolians, Epirotes, Athenians, Boeotians, and Acarnanians, calling

them all as it were to witness, in order to break down the power of the

Achaeans. Moreover, they added to their answer, without saying a word

to his colleagues, a remark confined entirely to Callicrates himself,

that “everybody in the various states should be as Callicrates.” This

man accordingly arrived in Greece with his answer, in a great state of

exultation, little thinking that he had become the initiator of great

miseries to all the Greeks, but especially to the Achaeans. This nation

had still at that time the privilege of dealing on something like equal

terms with Rome, because it had kept faith with her from the time that

it had elected to maintain the Roman cause, in the hour of her greatest

danger—I mean during the wars with Philip and Antiochus.... The league,

too, had made progress in material strength and in every direction

from the period from which my history commences; but the audacious

proceeding of Callicrates proved the beginning of a change for the

worse....

[Sidenote: B.C. 180-179.]

The Romans having the feelings of men, with a noble spirit and generous

principles, commiserate all who have met with misfortunes, and show

favour to all who fly to them for protection; but directly any one

claims anything as of right, on the ground of having been faithful to

their alliance, they at once draw in and correct their error to the

best of their ability. Thus then Calibrates, who had been sent to Rome

to plead for the rights of the Achaeans, acted in exactly the opposite

spirit; and dragging in the subject of the Messenian war, on which

the Romans themselves had made no complaint, returned to Achaia to

overawe the people with the threat of the hostility of Rome. Having

therefore by his official report frightened and dismayed the spirits of

the populace, who were of course ignorant of what he had really said

in the Senate, he was first of all elected Strategus, and, to make

matters worse, proved to be open to bribery; and then, having got the

office, carried out the restoration of the Lacedaemonian and Messenian

exiles.[137]...

[Sidenote: Comparison between the characters of Philopoemen and

Aristaenus.]

+13.+ Philopoemen and Aristaenus, the Achaeans, were unlike both in

character and policy. Philopoemen was formed by nature in body and mind

for the life of a soldier, Aristaenus for a statesman and debater. In

politics they differed in this, that whereas during the periods of the

wars with Philip and Antiochus, Roman influence had become supreme in

Greece, Aristaenus directed his policy with the idea of carrying out

with alacrity every order from Rome, and sometimes even of anticipating

it. Still he endeavoured to keep up the appearance of abiding by the

laws, and did, in fact, maintain the reputation of doing so, only

giving way when any one of them proved to plainly militate against the

rescripts from Rome. But Philopoemen accepted, and loyally performed,

all Roman orders which were in harmony with the laws and the terms of

their alliance; but when such orders exceeded these limits, he could

not make up his mind to yield a willing obedience, but was wont first

to demand an arbitration, and to repeat the demand a second time; and

if this proved unavailing, to give in at length under protest, and so

finally carry out the order....

[Sidenote: The view of Aristaenus on the right attitude towards Rome.]

+14.+ Aristaenus used to defend his policy before the Achaeans by some

such arguments as these: “It was impossible to maintain the Roman

friendship by holding out the spear and the herald’s staff together.

If we have the resolution to withstand them face to face, and can do

so, well and good. But if Philopoemen himself does not venture to

assert this,[138]... why should we lose what is possible in striving

for the impossible? There are but two marks that every policy must aim

at—honour and expediency. Those to whom honour is a possible attainment

should stick to that, if they have political wisdom; those to whom

it is not must take refuge in expediency. To miss both is the surest

proof of unwisdom: and the men to do that are clearly those who, while

ostensibly consenting to obey orders, carry them out with reluctance

and hesitation. Therefore we must either show that we are strong enough

to refuse obedience, or, if we dare not venture even to suggest that,

we must give a ready submission to orders.”

[Sidenote: Philopoemen’s answer in defence of his policy.]

+15.+ Philopoemen, however, said that “People should not suppose him

so stupid as not to be able to estimate the difference between the

Achaean and Roman states, or the superiority of the power of the

latter. But as it is the inevitable tendency of the stronger to oppress

the weaker, can it be expedient to assist the designs of the superior

power, and to put no obstacle in their way, so as to experience as soon

as possible the utmost of their tyranny? Is it not, on the contrary,

better to resist and struggle to the utmost of our power?... And

if they persist in forcing their injunctions upon us,[138]... and

if, by reminding them of the facts we do something to soften their

resolution, we shall at any rate mitigate the harshness of their rule

to a certain extent; especially as up to this time the Romans, as you

yourself say, Aristaenus, have always made a great point of fidelity

to oaths, treaties, and promises to allies. But if we at once condemn

the justice of our own cause, and, like captives of the spear, offer an

unquestioning submission to every order, what will be the difference

between the Achaeans and the Sicilians or Capuans, who have been

notoriously slaves this long time past? Therefore it must either be

admitted that the justice of a cause has no weight with the Romans, or,

if we do not venture to say that, we must stand by our rights, and not

abandon our own cause, especially as our position in regard to Rome is

exceedingly strong and honourable. That the time will come when the

Greeks will be forced to give unlimited obedience, I know full well.

But would one wish to see this time as soon or as late as possible?

Surely as late as possible! In this, then, my policy differs from that

of Aristaenus. He wishes to see the inevitable arrive as quickly as

possible, and even to help it to come: I wish to the best of my power

to resist and ward it off.”

From these speeches it was made clear that while the policy of the

one was honourable, of the other undignified, both were founded on

considerations of safety. Wherefore while both Romans and Greeks were

at that time threatened with serious dangers from Philip and Antiochus,

yet both these statesmen maintained the rights of the Achaeans in

regard to the Romans undiminished; though a report found its way about

that Aristaenus was better affected to the Romans than Philopoemen....

The Histories of Polybius, Vol. 2 (of 2) · 第 14 / 31 章