In two or three States the law provides that when an inhabitant goes

into some other State for the purpose of getting a divorce for a cause

arising within the State, or for a cause which the law of the State

would not authorize, a divorce granted to him shall have no effect

within the State.

-----

XVIII. STATISTICS OF DIVORCE IN AMERICA.

Under these lax laws, and the not less lax administration of them, the

number of divorces has in the United States risen with formidable

rapidity. In 1867 there were 9,937 granted, in 1886, 25,535, an increase

of nearly 157 per cent. in twenty years. The total number recorded to

have been granted in those twenty years (and the record is probably not

quite complete) is 328,716, a ghastly total, exceeding all the divorces

granted in the same years in all other Christian countries[218]. The

population of the Republic increased about 60 per cent. within the same

twenty years. Taking the two census years 1870 and 1880, the percentage

of increase was, for the population, 30·1, for divorce, 79·4, or more

than twice as great; and while in many States the percentage of divorce

increase is far larger than 79·4, there are only five in which divorce

has not grown faster than population.

-----

Footnote 218:

In Canada during the same twenty years only 135 divorces were granted

in a population which was, in 1881, 4,324,000. In some provinces of

the Dominion divorces could be obtained only by private Act of

Parliament.

-----

The increase is most rapid in the south-western States, in several New

England States, and especially in the States of the far West, less

marked in the north Atlantic States generally, and in those between the

Atlantic and the Mississippi. It is greater in cities than in rural

districts[219].

-----

Footnote 219:

In an interesting article in the _Political Science Quarterly_ for

March, 1893, Mr. W. F. Willcox (now (1900) of the U. S. Census Office)

argues that the divorce rate is influenced by depression of trade,

declining when the lower middle and working class, among whom it is

frequent, are less able to afford it.

Mr. Willcox quotes some remarkable figures from Japan showing an

extremely high divorce rate there. In 1886 there were in Japan 315,311

marriages and 117,964 divorces. This is four and a-half times the rate

in the U. S. of America, which comes next.

-----

It is, in the South, apparently somewhat greater among the coloured

people than among the whites[220]. It is greater among native-born

Americans than among immigrants from Europe. And it need hardly be said

that it is far larger among Protestants than among Roman Catholics.

These points deserve to be remembered, because they throw some light on

the causes which have produced the increase.

-----

Footnote 220:

The conditions prevailing among a coloured population which had, under

slavery, no legal marriage, go far to explain this phenomenon.

-----

Some other facts to be noted before we pass on to consider those causes

are the following.

The grounds on which divorces have been granted are often trivial, even

frivolous. I select a few from a long list given in the American

Official Report dealing with the subject[221].

-----

Footnote 221:

This Report, published in 1889 by the United States Labour Bureau at

Washington, contains many instructive data. The Annual Reports of the

voluntary Association, called the League for the Protection of the

Family, also deserve to be consulted. Its corresponding secretary is

the Rev. Dr. S. W. Dike of Auburndale, Mass., who has written a number

of thoughtful articles upon the subject, and to whom I am much

indebted for documents supplied to me and for the expression of his

own views.

-----

A wife alleges that her husband has accused her sister of stealing,

thereby sorely wounding her feelings.

Another says, ‘During our whole married life my husband has never

offered to take me out riding (= driving). This has been a source of

great mental suffering and injury.’

Another complains that her husband does not wash himself, ‘thereby

inflicting on plaintiff great mental anguish.’

Another says that her husband ‘quotes verses from the New Testament

about wives obeying their husbands. He has even threatened to mash the

plaintiff, and has drawn back his hand to do it.’ The decree which

awarded a divorce to this wife contains the following: ‘I find that when

plaintiff was sick and unable to work defendant told her the Lord

commanded her to work, and that he was in the habit of frequently

quoting Scriptural passages in order to show her she was to be obedient

to her husband.’

A wife alleges that her husband does not come home till ten o’clock at

night, and when he does return he keeps plaintiff awake talking. He also

keeps a saloon, which sorely grieves mind of plaintiff. He replies,

saying, ‘Plaintiff should not be ashamed of him because temporarily in

the liquor business: that he may do better some day: his father was a

high State Officer in Germany.’ This wife gets a divorce on the ground

of ‘mental cruelty.’

In all these cases, and in many others enumerated in the Report where

the grounds are equally slight, the divorce is granted. And similar

cases are given in which the husband obtains divorce on the ground of

the wife’s cruelty.

‘Mental cruelty’ is of course a term hard to define, as may be seen by

examining the views that have been expressed by English judges on

cruelty, and it is not wonderful that the easy-going courts of most

American States should give a wide extension to such an elastic

conception.

Of the causes recorded as those for which marriages are dissolved, the

most frequent are Desertion, which represents 38·5 of the whole number

of divorces; then Infidelity; then Cruelty; then Intoxication. Of the

total number of divorces granted during the twenty years 1867-1886, 65·8

per cent., very nearly two-thirds, were granted to wives and 34·2 per

cent. to husbands. Of the total number granted for infidelity 56·4 per

cent. were granted to husbands and 43·6 to wives. But in the other chief

causes wives are more frequently the successful applicants. In cruelty

they obtain seven times as many decrees; in desertion one and a-half

times as many; in intoxication eight times as many. The Report, however,

shows that intemperance is either directly or indirectly responsible for

a larger proportion of the total cases than its place in the table

represents.

I take from a valuable paper by an Ohio lawyer (Mr. Newton D.

Baker)[222] some facts which illustrate the state of things in one of

the so-called ‘Western Reserve’ counties in that great State. In

Cuyahoga county the total yearly number of marriages is about 3,400, and

the number of divorce suits annually brought is about 500. In the year

1898-1899, the whole number of divorce suits brought in the Court of

Common Pleas was 562 out of a total number of 3,848 suits for all

causes, _i.e._ about 12 per cent. In the State of Ohio the annual number

of marriages is from 33,000 to 40,000; the total number of divorce suits

brought from 3,700 to 4,200; and the total number of divorces granted

annually about 3,000 in a population of about 4,000,000. Mr. Baker

observes that ‘five of the causes on which the law allows divorce, viz.

wilful absence of either party from the other for three years, extreme

cruelty, fraudulent contract, any gross neglect of duty, and habitual

drunkenness for three years, are all so vague and elastic as to amount

to unrestricted licence in the matter of divorce.’ Out of 366 divorces

granted in the year 1898-1899, wilful absence and gross neglect of duty

accounted for 150, extreme cruelty for 109, habitual drunkenness for 88,

and infidelity for 14 only (five being unaccounted for). He adds, ‘The

personal temper and disposition of individual judges (there are more

than eighty in the State entrusted with power to dissolve marriages)

have come to be so well recognized as the limits of the jurisdiction of

the Common Pleas Court in granting divorces, that now it is the practice

of many lawyers to continue and delay the hearing of divorce causes

until some judge, known to be lenient in this matter, rotates to the

bench of the Court in which such cases are set for hearing.... Many of

the judges appear to be oblivious to the fact that one of the most

important interests of society is at stake in every divorce proceeding,

and either out of unscientific ideas upon the subject, or out of mere

complaisancy towards attorneys and litigants, they have lent themselves

to a looseness of practice which is in some degree responsible for the

deplorable results.’

-----

Footnote 222:

_Western Reserve Law Journal_ for October, 1899.

-----

In the United States applications for divorce are mostly made after a

marriage of short duration. In one-half of the cases divorce was granted

within six years from the date of marriage. Oddly enough, the average

duration of a marriage terminated by divorce varies much between State

and State. It is shortest in the southern States, falling to 6·48 years

in Arkansas, and 6·91 in Tennessee, highest in the north-east, rising to

11·69 in New Jersey, and 12·12 in Massachusetts. This may be partly due

to the fact that the more conservative States require a longer period of

desertion to be proved. The duration of marriage is somewhat longer in

cases where the wife applies, which may indicate either that she is more

patient under her lot than the husband, or that her comparative

ignorance of the world makes her less able to resort to the Courts. The

fact that desertion is the cause most frequently assigned by wives may

also have its effect.

It would be important to know what proportion the desire to marry some

one else bears to the other causes which induce persons to seek to

escape from their existing wedlock. Unfortunately American statistics of

marriage, which are in many States loosely kept, do not enable us to

answer this question[223]. Practising lawyers say that nothing is

commoner. It would appear, however, from some European[224] figures that

there is in reality no greater tendency for divorced men, and scarcely

any greater tendency for divorced women, to remarry within a few years

of the dissolution of their marriage than there is for widowers and

widows to do so after the death of a consort; and it has often been

observed that persons who have been most happily married are among those

most likely to marry again.

-----

Footnote 223:

The Report for 1891 of the League for the Protection of the Family

says: ‘Connecticut for two years reports the number of divorced

persons married each year. In 1889 there were 286 such—135 men and 151

women, which is a little above one-third the number divorced in the

year. In 1890 there were 477 divorces granted, or 954 individuals

divorced; and there were 350 divorced persons—this year 207 women and

143 men—who married again during the year. An extended induction along

this line should be possible. Guesses based on mere observation are

untrustworthy guides in legislation or social reform.’

-----

The rapid growth of divorce under the hasty legislation which marked the

first half of the present century began about thirty years ago to create

some alarm in the United States. The subject was much discussed, an

association was formed to grapple with the evil, and in several States

laws were passed restricting a little the causes entitling persons to be

divorced[225]. In those States there has accordingly been some slight

diminution in the number of divorces granted, but elsewhere the rate has

gone on increasing, though apparently (for there are no very recent

statistics) a little more slowly than it was doing down to 1886. In some

States it seems, after increasing, to have now reached a stable average

to the population. This would appear to be the case in Switzerland also.

-----

Footnote 224:

This point has been worked out by M. Bertillon, a well-known French

statistician. I owe my knowledge of it to an acute and suggestive

paper (some of whose conclusions however seem to me questionable) by

Mr. W. F. Willcox, of Cornell University, New York. ‘The Divorce

Problem’: New York, 1891.

Footnote 225:

Efforts have recently been made to induce States to adopt identical

legislation on this among other topics; and there seems to be a

prospect that a certain number will do so.

-----

XIX. DIVORCE IN MODERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES.

It is not only in America that the evil grows. In all modern countries

where divorce is permitted, that is to say in all Protestant and some

Roman Catholic States, the same tendency is perceptible. Among the

Protestant nations the impulse of the Reformation caused sooner or later

a rejection of the old canonical doctrine of indissolubility; so we may

say, speaking broadly, that in Germany, Switzerland, Holland, Denmark,

Sweden and Norway, a marriage may be dissolved not only for the

infidelity of either party (since in all these countries husband and

wife are treated alike), but also for desertion and imprisonment for

crime. Some laws go even further, allowing mutual consent to be a cause.

Among Roman Catholic countries, France retained the canonical rule till

the Revolution. The legislation of 1792 granted extreme freedom, which

was so largely used that we are told that in 1797 there were more

divorces than marriages. In 1816 the principles of Catholicism regained

control, and held it till 1884, when a law was passed permitting

marriages to be dissolved for the infidelity of either party, or for the

condemnation of either to an infamous punishment, and authorizing the

transmutation into an absolute divorce of a judicial separation which

has lasted for three years. The law of Belgium is similar, but goes a

little further in allowing mutual consent to be a ground, though one

surrounded by many restrictions. Austria and Hungary allow divorce

(under rules similar to those of Protestant countries, _i.e._ on the

grounds of infidelity, grave crime, desertion, cruelty, &c.) to

non-Catholic citizens, while Italy, Portugal, and Spain adhere to the

Tridentine system which recognizes only a judicial separation (_a mensa

et thoro_) and not a dissolution of the tie. Russia still leaves

matrimonial causes to the ecclesiastical courts, but allows them to

dissolve marriages on the ground of infidelity, a heavy criminal

sentence, or disappearance of one consort for five years[226].

-----

Footnote 226:

According to a high Russian authority, divorce was freely practised by

the Russian peasantry under their ancient customs.

-----

In nearly all these countries such statistics as are available show an

increase in the number of divorces during recent years. For instance in

Belgium, a predominantly Roman Catholic country, divorces rose between

1884 and 1893 from 221 to 497. In France the suits for divorce rose from

1773 in 1884 to 7445 in 1891. The number of divorces compared with the

number of marriages almost doubled in those seven years. In the German

Empire there were 5342 divorces granted in 1882 and 6178 in 1891. In

Holland they were, in 1883, 189, in 1892, 354. A like period saw them

rise in Sweden from 218 to 316, in Norway from 7 to 82(!), in Greece

from 251 to 788. The rise is slighter in Austria. Switzerland alone,

though its law is comparatively lax, shows no increase[227]. In England

divorces rose from 127 in 1860 to 390 in 1887, an increase much more

rapid than that of population or of marriages[228]. Judicial separations

rose between the same years from 11 to 50. In Scotland divorces which in

1867 numbered 32 had, in 1886, grown to 96, a still more rapid rise, as

it covers only twenty instead of twenty-seven years. It is worth noting

that in England it is usually the husband who petitions for a divorce,

and almost always the wife who seeks a judicial separation.

-----

Footnote 227:

I take the above figures from _Parliamentary Paper_ [C-7639] of 1895.

No figures are given for Russia or Denmark.

Footnote 228:

Parliamentary Return of March 9, 1889.

-----

The growth in so many otherwise dissimilar countries of this disposition

to shake off the marriage tie is a remarkable phenomenon, which deserves

more attention than it seems to have yet received in England. Though

strongest in Protestant countries, it is not confined to them, as

appears from the instances of Belgium, Bavaria and Greece. Though there

is no divorce _a vinculo_ in Italy or Spain, the same causes which make

it frequent elsewhere may be at work, though less conspicuously, in

countries where the State aids the Church in checking their outward

manifestation. Divorce is an obtrusive symptom of the disease, not the

disease itself.

What is the disease? or, lest we should seem to prejudge the merits of

the matter, what is the source of this disposition to look upon the

marriage tie with eyes different from those of a century ago, and to

yield more easily to the temptation to dissolve it? The cause, whatever

it is, must lie deep, for it manifests itself under many different

conditions; and it may possibly be not any single cause, but a

combination of several concurrent social or moral changes, independent

springs whose confluence swells the stream of tendency.

A similar phenomenon happened once before in history. At Rome also, as

we have already seen, a very strict theory of marriage and a

corresponding strictness in practice gave way to great laxity of the law

and, after a short interval, to unbounded licence in practice. Let us

see whether we can, by examining the phenomena which brought about this

change in the greatest of ancient States, hit upon any clue that may

serve to explain the facts of our own time.

XX. COMPARISON OF THE PROCESS OF CHANGE AT ROME AND IN THE MODERN WORLD.

The Romans began with a doctrine of marriage which had four salient

characteristics[229]:

A formal legal act almost invariably accompanying marriage.

A religious element in the oldest form of this act.

A subjection of the wife to the husband’s power.

A complete absorption of the wife’s property rights into the legal

personality of the husband.

-----

Footnote 229:

See above, p. 388 sqq. Although no formal legal act and no religious

rites were absolutely required for marriage at the time when we first

discover the Roman Law as a working system, the practice of using

either such an act or such rites was all but universal.

-----

These characteristics all vanished; and under the newer law and custom

of the city, and ultimately of the Empire—

The act of marriage required no formalities, and was entirely a

private affair.

It was also a purely civil, not a religious, affair.

The wife became absolutely independent of her husband, remaining

(unless she had been emancipated) in the legal family of her

father.

The wife’s property remained her own, though it was usual for the

consorts to have some joint property.

Concurrently with and following on these changes there had come about in

Rome a general decline of faith in the old deities, a faith partially,

but not beneficially, replaced by Oriental superstitions. There had also

come habits of luxury, a thirst for material enjoyment, a passion for

amusements, a general relaxation of the moral restraints which public

opinion had formerly imposed. Marriage had begun to be regarded mainly

from the point of view of pecuniary interest or social advancement.

There was comparatively little sentiment attaching to it, and not much

sense of duty. Men grew less and less willing to marry; women as well as

men less and less faithful. Fewer children were born. As neither

religious nor moral associations sanctified the relation, and as it

could be terminated at pleasure, it was lightly entered on, and this

very heedlessness, making it frequently a failure, caused it to be no

less lightly dissolved. Thus social habits and a standard of opinion

were formed, against which the reforming efforts of Augustus and his

successors could do little, and which resisted even the far more

powerful efforts of Christianity, until Roman society itself went to

pieces in the West, and passed into new forms in the East.

This decadence of the matrimonial relation was doubtless facilitated by

three peculiarities of the law, viz. the absence of all prescribed forms

for marriage and divorce, which set caprice free from legal restraints

or delays, the extinction of any necessary connexion as regards property

between the two spouses[230], and the fact that the legal family did not

coincide with the natural family, for legally the wife remained in her

father’s family and did not enter her husband’s. Nevertheless the

underlying causes of that decadence were social and moral rather than

legal causes.

-----

Footnote 230:

The _Dos_ supplied a connexion, but the wife’s right to claim it at

the end of the marriage was not greatly affected by her conduct (see

pp. 397 and 406 _supra_).

-----

In the modern world the change from the old state of things to the new

has been slower and less complete. Still it offers a kind of parallel to

the phenomena we have been considering.

Before the Reformation what were the features of the marriage relation

in Europe?

It had a strongly religious character. Its formation was blessed by the

Church. It was deemed a Sacrament. It was treated, for doctrinal

reasons, as indissoluble. There were, to be sure, plenty of marriages

essentially unhallowed, plenty of marriages contracted for the most

sordid reasons, plenty of marriages with little affection; and there

were also marriages tainted by sin. The standard of conjugal fidelity

was in the fifteenth century a low one. Nevertheless the tie was deemed

to be one which religion sanctified, and religious sentiment must have

had a restraining effect upon tender consciences, and particularly upon

the wife, women being usually more susceptible to religious emotion than

men are.

It gave the husband, in most countries, and notably in England, an

almost complete control over the property rights of the two spouses, and

in this way held them together.

It gave the husband, and notably in England, almost complete control

over the person and conduct of the wife, impressing upon her mind her

dependence on him, and her duty to obey him. No doubt where the wife’s

intellect or will was the stronger of the two her intellect guided or

her will prevailed. Nevertheless her normal attitude was that of a

submissive identification of her wishes and interests with his.

Whether these things made for affection, and for happiness, the outcome

of affection, is another question. What we have to remark is that at any

rate they drew the bond very tight, and formed a solid basis for family

life. Bride and bridegroom took one another for richer for poorer, for

better for worse, in sickness and in health, till death should them

part.

What has been the course of things since the Reformation?

In Protestant countries the religious character of marriage has been

sensibly weakened. Although the ceremony, in most of such countries, and

notably in England, still usually receives ecclesiastical benediction,

the tie is not to men’s or even to women’s minds primarily a religious

tie. To most Protestants, the wedding service in church, or before a

minister of religion, is rather an ornamental ceremony than essentially

a sacred vow. The duties of the spouses are conceived of by them in a

more or less worthy way, according to their respective religious and

moral standards, but not generally, or at least seldom vividly, as a

part of their duties towards God.

Studies in history and jurisprudence, volume 2 (of 2) · 第 32 / 40 段