Nor did the good intention of the Government and its regard for the

interests of seamen end even here. In the Merchant Shipping Code

Consolidation Bill,[249] first introduced on the 9th August, 1869, by

Mr. Lefevre, on behalf of Government, there is a provision (Clause 278)

enabling seamen, charged with desertion or other crimes, to demand and

obtain an official survey of the ship from which they have thought

it expedient to quit without leave!—a provision so very liberal in

their favour as to resemble, on the part of the Government, almost

encouragement of the offence of desertion. In this Bill we have also

a clause (334) which, for the first time in our legislation, requires

every shipmaster to make an official record of the draught of water

of the vessel under his charge when leaving port. And the Bill, when

again introduced in 1870, repeated, with modifications still further

in favour of seamen charged with desertion, their power to demand

“impartial survey;” while it enables the officers of the Board of Trade

to take and record the draught of water of any sea-going ship, and

makes it a misdemeanour on the part of any shipowner who sends his ship

to sea in an unseaworthy state, for which he may be _criminally_

punished.

[Sidenote: Mr. Samuel Plimsoll, M.P.]

[Sidenote: His first resolution, 1870.]

It was in the Session of 1870 that Mr. Plimsoll[250] first submitted

his views to Parliament respecting the loss of life and property at

sea, by moving a resolution calling in general terms for legislation on

this subject, as if no legislation had, up to that period, been even

attempted, still more carried out. I cannot but commend the laudable

objects he evidently had in view, but, on that occasion, they were,

so far as I can judge from the Reports of ‘Hansard,’ somewhat vaguely

expressed. Nor did he even then mention (as if ignoring or unaware of

the fact) that, in that very Session, Government had introduced the

stringent Bill to which I have just referred respecting unseaworthy

ships. His resolution, requiring a _compulsory_ load-line and the

survey of all ships, was withdrawn.

The Government, however, spared no exertion to perfect the Shipping

Code, which had twice been submitted to the consideration of

Parliament; and having, during the recess, forwarded copies of it for

approval and amendment to various Shipping and Seamen’s Associations

throughout the kingdom, they again introduced it on the opening of

the Session of 1871,[251] accompanied by a memorandum,[252] calling

attention to the alterations which had been made in the existing laws.

The Bill, as re-introduced in 1871, besides providing for the transfer

of the supervision of emigrant ships to the Board of Trade, which was

carried out in the following year, contained clauses for the compulsory

marking the draught of water on the stem and stern of every ship,

for recording the draught, for making it a crime to send unseaworthy

vessels to sea, and for enabling seamen, charged with desertion, to

obtain, with even greater facility than they had hitherto done, a

survey of the ships in which they had engaged to serve. Indeed, it

went still further, and, for the first time, gave the Board of Trade

alone the power of preventing any ship from proceeding to sea if, in

the opinion of its officers, there were defects in her hull liable to

render her unseaworthy: a further provision was very properly added to

prevent an owner changing the name of his ship without the consent of

the Board of Trade.

[Sidenote: Introduces a Bill, 1871.]

[Sidenote: Government measure of that year.]

But in that year, 1871, Mr. Plimsoll, not satisfied with the course

of legislation, introduced a Bill having the same objects in view

as his resolution of the previous Session, which, however, was also

withdrawn, Government agreeing to introduce a separate Bill, as they

had been unable to pass their Merchant Shipping Code Bill, containing

the clauses of the larger measure relating to draught of water and

surveys. Accordingly, before the close of the Session a short Bill was

introduced and passed[253] with these provisions, but with very little

discussion, on account of the lateness of the Session. In this Bill the

clause giving seamen charged with desertion a right to a survey, was

justly modified by confining the right to cases where the complaint

of unseaworthiness is made by one-fourth of the crew; or if they

exceed twenty by not less than five, and to cases where a complaint of

unseaworthiness had been made by them before quitting the ship. The

power of ordering a survey was also given to naval courts abroad.

[Sidenote: Mr. Plimsoll publishes a book, ‘Our Seamen,’ 1873.]

Although these amendments had, as I have shown, been for some years

contemplated by Government, and had been, in fact, submitted for the

consideration of Parliament before Mr. Plimsoll expressed any opinion

on the subject, they did not satisfy his demands; and in order that his

views might become more extensively known, he published in January,

1873, a curious book.[254] It is of that sensational class which

at present, either in the shape of novels or other works of a more

pretentious character, evidently commands a large circulation among

the light-reading public. But, besides its sensational character,

it contains a great deal of information new to the ordinary reader,

who, if he does not understand its technicalities, which Mr. Plimsoll

himself does not seem to have very well understood, will be struck by

its illustrations of decayed timbers, worm-eaten planks, and corroded

bolts. It begins with a facsimile of a policy of insurance with the

names and amount of risk attached, and the underwriters’ “slip” on

which the policy was based, with the signatures crossed out as they

were subscribed to the policy. His object in giving the numerous

names in detail, and the amount of the liability of each, was, as he

states, “in order to show how the responsibility is so divided and

spread as to leave no one individual a risk large enough to be worth

fighting to escape, even if there were adequate grounds for disputing

the subsequent claim,” and, from these premises, he arrives at the

conclusion that the interest of each underwriter is so small, that

where a claim is made, it is not sufficient “to induce any one to fight

a lawsuit in order to escape it,” even when there is “more than a

suspicion of its injustice.”

Unfortunately his statement, on this point, is at variance with fact;

for, though the risk of each individual may be small, their interest,

as a body, in resisting unjust claims, and resisting them frequently

in the most strenuous manner, is too great to allow such claims to

be settled unquestioned. Mr. Plimsoll might not, however, have been

aware that the Underwriters of Lloyd’s are thoroughly organised for

the purpose of grappling with such matters, having their agents at all

the principal seaports of the world, with every facility for readily

obtaining information respecting the cause of losses, and the nature

and character of the claims made upon them; nor of the important fact

that they not merely resist claims, as may be frequently seen in

our courts of law, but are occasionally prosecutors in the case of

fraudulent losses. So that it is altogether a mistake to describe the

Underwriters of Lloyd’s, much less of the marine insurance companies,

as a weak body of men, whom a shipowner can “bully” into an unjust

settlement.[255] The photographs he supplied were, however, so curious

in themselves, and so novel to the public, generally, and especially

to many members of the House of Commons, and his statements, though

sometimes hap-hazard, were given with such evidently honest intentions,

that his book attracted unusual notice.

But, however well-disposed the House of Commons may have been to

listen to him, and to the recommendations in his book, the Bill he

introduced for its consideration could not possibly be entertained with

any regard to the great maritime interests of this country, nor could

they be adopted without full inquiry; indeed, they were little short

of a transfer of the construction and management of the whole of the

shipping of Great Britain from the owners to some department of the

Government, which was to survey every ship built, and every ship sent

to sea.

From his own showing, no such extraordinary and sweeping measure was

necessary, for he admits, in a curious and very incidental manner,

that only a very small proportion of the shipowners of this country

require to be thus controlled; indeed he states,[256] “I have heard one

shipowner say that, if a small number of well-known shipowners were put

aboard one of their own vessels when she was ready for sea, we should,

in the event of bad weather, see that with them had disappeared from

our annals nine-tenths of the losses we all deplore!”

[Sidenote: An extension of the principle applied to testing of chain

cables strongly urged.]

But Mr. Plimsoll, in his general statements, only repeated, though in

a more sensational and striking manner, arguments which have for years

been used in the House of Commons. There has long been a constant cry

from a certain portion of the public for Government interference and

control; and in Parliament there are always to be found well-meaning

representatives of the people, who think that every evil in this wicked

world can be remedied by legislative enactments, or Crown supervision.

I may mention one instance out of many, viz.: the Act for testing chain

cables and anchors, to which I have already referred,[257] which was

forced upon the Board of Trade by the House of Commons. Returns, I am

aware, can be produced to show that since this Testing Act came into

operation, nine or ten years ago, there have been fewer disasters than

before, as the result of inferior ground tackle. But figures can be

arranged to prove almost anything; and I shall not stop to examine

those which have been produced to prove that the chain and anchor

manufacturers of this country required to be placed under the immediate

control of the Board of Trade. It will be a dark day for the mechanics

of Great Britain when this system prevails, and we may then abandon all

hope of ever becoming, what we have long aimed to be, the workshop of

the world. But what I cannot too strongly condemn is, the principle of

appointing Government officials—too frequently underpaid—to superintend

or inspect the work of the manufacturer and to regulate the standard

of merit. If a manufacturer can produce an article which, by some

means or other, is able to pass inspection, it is a matter, now, of

far less consequence than formerly to make it of the best description,

as, in the case of accident, he screens himself behind the official

certificate of its merit. Besides, the test Government, originally,

adopted too often destroyed in a great measure the elasticity of chain

cables[258]—a quality of the utmost importance to a ship riding at

anchor in a heavy sea-way. I quite admit that many vessels and too

many lives have been lost through inferior anchors and cables; but

a still larger number of vessels have been sacrificed by defective

construction, decayed timbers, inferior spars, ropes, and sails, or

insufficient stores; and, if the principle of Government interference

is correct in the one case, it ought to be extended to the others.

But this system of Government supervision would not end here. An

inspection of every chain and anchor manufactory falls far short of

the demands of thousands of well-meaning people, who wish to see some

potent Board of Trade testing-machines permanently established in

every dockyard in the kingdom, as if our shipbuilders knew nothing

whatever about the business, or had all arrived at the conclusion that

honesty was no longer the best policy, and that the only sure road to

riches was to cheat their customers. Nor would even that extension

of Government control satisfy them. An estimable friend of mine, a

Vice-Admiral in H.M.’s service and a man of learning and of great

practical knowledge, asks me in a note I received from him not long

since—

“Should there not be some more stringent provisions with respect

to the inspection of sailing vessels? It is an old proverb, ‘Who

ever saw a dead donkey?’ But who ever saw an old sailing-ship

broken up? I am inclined to think that it is more to the interest

of small owners to let an old tub go on shore than to bring her

safe into port. This works two evils:—1, the danger to human life;

2, the greater rate of insurance on honest owners to make up an

average for the dishonest. Should there not be a Board of Trade

inspection as to seaworthiness: 1, of every ship once a year; 2,

of every ship absent from Great Britain or Ireland over a year

continuously, on her return; 3, of every ship where it appears, on

her arrival in port, that she had been on shore or had suffered

from heavy weather?”

Now there is no doubt that the evils of which my friend complains do

exist, and the remedy he proposes has been advocated by many persons

besides himself. But would Government inspection, even if practicable,

remove or materially tend to mitigate the evil? A very large proportion

of the vessels owned in the United Kingdom are now classed either

at Lloyd’s or elsewhere, and are periodically inspected; and to the

possibility of extending this system, a much more feasible one than any

extension of the principle of Government supervision, I shall hereafter

refer. Unless a vessel is classed, an underwriter, as a rule, will

not take a risk on her, and, unless she is fully insured, it is not

the interest of the owner to lose her. In the case of clubs or mutual

associations, it would be impossible to have a better watch kept on the

vessels admitted, as each member and each person connected with these

associations adopts, for his own interest, if for no higher motive,

every possible precaution, as, in the event of loss, he becomes a

sufferer.

However great the evil, and however lamentable the losses annually

occurring on our shores, any very material extension of the legislation

now in force, can do little to remedy them. The remedy is in the

hands of those persons who are most deeply interested, in that they

are certain to become the heaviest sufferers from every loss. It is

true that no ship ought to be allowed to proceed to sea which is

unseaworthy, but it is the business of all insurance associations to

see that the vessels they insure are seaworthy; and no punishment

Government could inflict for neglect, would be heavier than that which

the owner of an uninsured ship sustains when she is lost, or than that

which falls on members of clubs, who admit worthless vessels to their

mutual-insurance associations. My experience (and it is not a short

one now) teaches me that nearly all legislation in this direction, is

unsound in principle; and, as a rule, pernicious in practice. I think,

for instance, that we have already erred in the attempt before noticed

to measure the standard of merit in the case of anchors and chains,

although we may have improved in the mode of testing them.

[Sidenote: Mr. Plimsoll moves an Address for a Commission of Inquiry,

which was unanimously granted.]

[Sidenote: Royal Commission on unseaworthy ships, 1873-4.]

However, the House of Commons, ever ready to listen to the appeals of

humanity, and with the most laudable desire to do what it could to save

life and to mitigate the disasters incidental to seafaring pursuits,

was fairly disposed to legislate even further in this direction, should

it really appear that fresh legislation was necessary; hence, accepting

in Mr. Plimsoll an earnest, if not a wise counsellor, of measures

for the grandest of all objects—the saving of human life—the House,

stimulated by his recent work, unanimously approved of his address

to Her Majesty, who was graciously pleased not merely to grant the

Commission he had prayed for, but to place upon it “her most dear son

and counsellor Alfred Ernest Albert, Duke of Edinburgh,” who, himself

a sailor, was fully competent to understand the nature of the inquiry,

and had a fellow-feeling for the sailors of all classes, on whose

behalf the appeal was made.

[Sidenote: Its members.]

No Commission in our time has consisted of more able and impartial

members. Besides His Royal Highness, it had as chairman the Duke of

Somerset, a nobleman of shrewd sense and of very sound judgment,

who had been First Lord of the Admiralty; Mr. Liddell (now Lord

Eslington), who represented a large maritime constituency, and had

for years directed his attention with unwearied zeal to all seafaring

questions; Mr. Milner Gibson, who had filled the office of President of

the Board of Trade; Sir James Hope, an Admiral of great experience; Mr.

Rothery, the Registrar of the Admiralty Court; Mr. Cohen, a well-known

barrister-at-law; Mr. Denny, an eminent shipbuilder; Mr. George Duncan,

an experienced Shipowner, and a member of the Committee of Lloyd’s

Register; Mr. Edgell, of the Trinity House; and Mr. C. W. Merrifield,

F.R.S. and late Principal of the Royal School of Naval Architecture.

[Sidenote: Their order of reference]

By such a Commission the most searching inquiry was to be instituted

“with regard to the alleged unseaworthiness of British registered

ships, whether arising form overloading, deck-loading, defective

construction, form equipment, machinery, age, or improper stowage.”

The Commission was also instructed “to inquire into the present system

of marine insurance; the state of the law as to the liability of

shipowners for injury to those whom they employ, and also the alleged

practice of under-manning ships; they were likewise to suggest any

amendments of the law which might remedy or lessen such evils as may be

found to have arisen from the matters aforesaid.”

A careful analysis of Mr. Plimsoll’s statements showed that he

attributed the causes of shipwreck to unseaworthiness, owing to want

of repair; overloading, which includes the carriage of cargo on deck;

under-manning; bad stowage; inadequate engine power; over-insurance;

defective construction, and undue length; and, that a full half of the

losses arose from two of these causes, first, that “a great number

of ships are regularly sent to sea in such a rotten and otherwise

ill-provided state that they can only reach their destination through

fine weather;” and, secondly, that “a large number are so overloaded

that it is nearly impossible for them also to reach their destination

if the voyage is at all rough.”

As I have already endeavoured to show, the “Merchant Shipping

Consolidated Act” of 1854, with its 548 clauses, was passed expressly

for the purpose of remedying by law, as far as practicable, existing

evils, and the amended Acts of 1855, 1862, 1871, and 1873 had the

same object in view; so that there was in force, at the time when the

Commission commenced its inquiry, a mass of legislation, which, in

itself, ought to have been amply sufficient to prevent and punish the

offences alleged to be committed. Indeed, conscientious Shipowners have

been heard to say that they were appalled at the numerous instances

in which they had found themselves law breakers, from the simple

impossibility of bearing in mind, owing to the number of Acts in force,

their legal duties. Yet, if Mr. Plimsoll’s recommendations had been

carried into effect, the manifold legislation, then in force, would

have been very much increased.

[Sidenote: and mode of thorough investigation.]

Happily, however, the Commission saw, after thoroughly examining the

whole subject, that it was not by increase of legislation, that such

evils could be remedied, but by a more effectual application of the

law as it then stood. In their reports[259] they express an opinion,

that much misapprehension appears to exist about what is meant by

unseaworthiness, so, before offering any recommendation with the view

of preserving human life at sea, they prefaced their observations

with a few practical and sensible remarks on what constitutes

unseaworthiness.

The safety of a ship at sea, they remark, with great force, cannot be

secured by any one precaution or set of precautions, but requires the

unceasing application of skill, care, and vigilance, from her first

design to her unloading at the port of destination. To be seaworthy,

she must be well designed, well constructed, well equipped, well

stowed, and, above all, well manned and well navigated; otherwise, “all

precautions as to her construction and her stowage will be unavailing.”

While public opinion had been abundantly directed to these precautions,

they considered that other sources of danger had been altogether

unnoticed, and they showed, from a summary of official inquiries, that

from the year 1856 to 1872, inclusive, while only 60 ships were known

to have been lost from defects in the vessels or their stowage, no less

than 711 were lost from neglect and bad navigation.

[Sidenote: Their reports.]

As these returns[260] too clearly showed, that by far the largest

proportion of losses and other casualties were due to preventible

causes, other than faulty construction, insufficient repair, or

overloading, the Commissioners directed their attention to a rigid

examination of these causes and to the most effectual means of finding

a remedy for the evil. With regard to the vexed question of a fixed

load-line, which Mr. Plimsoll had recommended as a means of lessening,

if not of removing altogether, the losses occasioned by overloading,

they were unable to recommend any enactment for establishing a fixed

line, founded on the proportion of freeboard to the depth of the hold

of the vessel, remarking that the information they had obtained led

“to the conclusion that the settlement of a load-line should be mainly

guided by the consideration of the reserved buoyancy, that is to say,

of the proportion which the capacity of the water-tight and solidly

constructed part of the ship which is above water bears to the capacity

of the part immersed.”

[Sidenote: Load-line.]

Analysing various schemes prepared for their consideration, they

remarked that the rough rule of three inches of freeboard to every

foot of hold, hitherto considered as the measure of safety, while

practically convenient, was not adapted for regulating the loading of

all vessels, and, consequently, could not be recommended as a law to be

enforced. The model of the ship, the character of her cargo, the method

in which it is stowed, the nature and length of the proposed voyage,

and the season of the year when engaged, were all matters requiring

consideration, and which it would be quite impossible to embrace by any

fixed rule applicable to every ship, whatever might be her form or the

nature of her employment. Indeed, they remark with great force, “These

circumstances must continually vary, and, under a charter, this mode of

marking would have the dangerous tendency of inducing the charterer to

insist on the vessels being laden up to the line of deepest immersion,

and thus imperilling the safety of the ship; while the suggestion, from

various instances, that there should be an elasticity in the law to be

left to the discretion of the surveyor only shows the inexpediency of

legislating either to secure freeboard in proportion to the depth of

hold, or to provide some fixed percentage of spare buoyancy in every

description of vessel.”

Under all these circumstances, the Commission considered it desirable

to leave the discretion as to the proper loading of his ship to the

Shipowner himself, holding him responsible, as the law has ever done,

for sending his ship to sea in an unseaworthy condition, instead of

lessening his responsibility by transferring a duty, which properly

rests on himself, to any official surveyor. But to render the

responsibility of the Shipowner more complete, they recommended that

a vertical scale of feet should be marked on each side of the vessel,

and that, immediately before the time of her leaving or starting on

her voyage, this measure should be entered in her log-book and should,

wherever practicable, be left with the officer of Customs or with the

British Consul, by whom the draught of water should also be recorded.

[Sidenote: Deck-loads.]

Having offered a few suggestions with regard to deck loads and other

matters of minor importance, the Commissioners next investigated with

great care the practicability of instituting a survey of all British

merchant ships. In their opinion, the policy of having a Government

survey for the purpose of securing the seaworthiness of ships was

more than questionable. Any such measure, while tending to remove

responsibility from those on whom it ought to rest, would render

Government nominally responsible for the form, the materials, and the

whole construction of our merchant ships, and, consequently, could not

be seriously entertained.

[Sidenote: Government survey.]

As there is now an official survey of emigrant and passenger ships, a

few witnesses proposed that a similar survey should be extended to all

merchant vessels. Others went so far as to recommend that the Board

of Trade, already overburdened with work, should also superintend the

construction, the periodical inspection, the repair, and the loading of

the vessels. But the Commissioners very properly repudiated all such

recommendations.

There are great complaints, the Commissioners remark, against the

interference of Government, whose surveyors are now not unfrequently

accused of forcing on Shipowners and marine engineers special views

of their own which are not always in accordance with the best

judgment of the two professions, and that to extend the power of such

men would produce “mischievous consequences to the future progress

of shipbuilding, and would be actually calamitous.” “Ships,” they

add, “would be built and repaired so as to pass the examination of

the official surveyor, and any additional outlay beyond what was

indispensable to secure a certificate would be rejected as useless.

Under the present enactments, Shipowners justly complain that their

business is seriously inconvenienced, and that foreign ships are

already gaining the trade which the British Shipowners are being

compelled to relinquish.”[261]

[Sidenote: Its extension undesirable.]

By the Merchant Shipping Act of 1873 (36 & 37 Vict. cap. 85), the Board

of Trade are empowered, at their discretion, to detain any British

vessel “which they have reason to believe is by the defective condition

of her hull, equipment, or machinery, or by reason of overloading or

improper loading, unfit to proceed to sea without serious danger to

human life.” By this Act, power is also given to the Board of Trade to

detain any ship for the purpose of survey, to impose conditions as to

her repair, and to enforce alterations in loading. The Commissioners

do not consider it necessary or desirable to extend these already

stringent and arbitrary powers, in order to prevent unseaworthy vessels

from leaving any port in the United Kingdom. On the contrary, they

suggest certain modifications of those powers, so as to make _their

action more prompt than it is at present_, in which all differences

must be referred to the Board of Trade in the case of detention, the

owner having power of appeal in England to any court having Admiralty

jurisdiction, and in Scotland to the Sheriffs’ Court; they further

recommend that the master or owner of the vessel thus detained may be

permitted to appeal to the shipping master or collector of customs,

who should be vested with authority, when necessary, to appoint two or

more competent shipmasters, to constitute a court whose decision should

be final.[262] They at the same time express the hope, that, when

these modifications are adopted, “the detention of vessels notoriously

overladen or otherwise unseaworthy will gradually compel negligent

Shipowners to be more attentive or to abandon the trade; worthless

ships will be broken up, and the eventual weeding out of such ships

will not only add to the safety of a seafaring life, but will be a

benefit to the careful Shipowner, who will find his business increase,

while the premium to be paid for insurance will be reduced.”

[Sidenote: Shipowners already harassed by over-legislation.]

Parliament having, for many years, been engaged in attempting to

regulate minute details about shipping, it is not surprising that

Shipowners should have complained of being harassed in their business

by well-intended but ill-contrived legislation, and that they should,

when further legislation of this sort was injudiciously proposed,

have resisted it to the utmost of their power. Indeed, the Board of

Trade itself had, for some time, seen the absurdity as well as the

danger of a public department, imperfectly acquainted with the science

of shipbuilding and with the interests of the commercial marine,

attempting to dictate to shipbuilders and owners of vast experience the

best mode of conducting their business; and, in the evidence before the

Commission, Mr. Gray, Assistant-Secretary Marine Department, admitted

that many enactments designed to secure safety of life at sea had been

mischievous, and ought to be modified or repealed.

For instance, the obligation by the Merchant Shipping Act of 1844 to

carry a certain number of boats in proportion to a ship’s tonnage,

was found to be impracticable, and, consequently, the Board of Trade,

by the amended Act of 1873, took upon itself a discretionary power in

this matter. But discretionary powers in this case, as in many other

instances, did not work well in practice; surveyors differed in their

views as to the number of boats necessary, and the number of boats

sanctioned at one port was frequently disallowed at another. Similar

objections arose in the case of lights, and, as no coloured lamps

could be found on trial until very recently, equal to the requirements

of the Statute, Shipowners were subjected to similar capricious

decisions of surveyors.

[Sidenote: Mode of inquiry into losses at sea]

It would weary my readers were I to enter into all these details, such

as bulkheads, sea-cocks, hatchways, stoke-holes, compasses, safety

valves, and innumerable other matters which Government has attempted

to regulate by Act of Parliament, as I have, already, in more than one

instance, alluded to these matters during the course of this work. But

I must not omit directing attention to the large amount of evidence

received regarding the system of inquiring into losses and casualties

at sea, and to the powers given to the Board of Trade, by the Act of

1854, to institute such inquiries. It would appear from this evidence

that the officers of the Board of Trade and the solicitors who act

for it, as well as the Shipowners, have all a serious objection to

the present mode of conducting such inquiries, and that the tribunal

constituted by the Act does not command general confidence, while the

mode of procedure is dilatory and expensive (perhaps, necessarily so,

where much evidence has to be collected), and the power of the court is

so ill-defined that, in too many cases, it cannot be enforced.

The inquiry frequently assumes the shape of a criminal proceeding

against the captain, rather than of a careful investigation into the

cause of disaster, the chief point at issue being whether the captain

is to be acquitted, or punished by having his certificate cancelled or

suspended; and, inasmuch as he is on his trial, he may if he pleases

volunteer a statement, but cannot be examined. Nor has the court any

power over the Shipowner, who, however culpable, is altogether beyond

its jurisdiction.

[Sidenote: examined and condemned.]

The Commissioners recommended that these inquiries, made purely in the

public interest with a view to the preservation of human life, should

be conducted in such a manner as would best disclose the nature and

cause of the disaster, whether, for instance, this was owing to the

faulty construction of the vessel, to bad stowage, to circumstances

connected with the navigation, to the incompetency of officers, or to

the neglect and misconduct of the master or crew.

[Sidenote: Recommendations.]

With this object in view, they recommended that the preliminary

inquiry now made by the receiver of wrecks should be limited in the

first place to such a narrative statement as would enable the Board of

Trade, with the aid of their legal advisers, to decide on the propriety

of an official inquiry, and that, if such were found necessary,

there should be a complete severance between that inquiry and any

proceedings of a penal character, power being reserved to the Board

of Trade to prosecute the Shipowner or to proceed criminally against

the master, mate, or any member of the crew whose neglect of duty

may have occasioned the disaster. They further suggest that the 11th

Section of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1871, “should be amended and be

made expressly to extend to the master of the vessel; for it is very

important to avoid any doubt that the master who, without justifiable

excuse, leaves port with his vessel in an unseaworthy condition,

renders himself amenable to the criminal law.”[263]

The Commissioners very properly attached great importance to these

inquiries, as affording the best means of ascertaining on whom the

culpability rests; hence, they, incidentally, remark that, in comparing

the accidents occurring at sea with those taking place on land,

especially on railways, they were struck by the fact that, whereas,

in the latter case, it is usual to prosecute those servants whose

negligence has occasioned loss of life, there was scarcely a single

instance of the prosecution of a master or mate, or of a man on the

look-out or at the helm of a vessel, although cases have, undoubtedly,

been numerous in which vessels have been lost either by the negligence

of the master or of the crew.

They further recommend that the present system under which the

certificate of a master or other officer is suspended, very frequently

only for an error of judgment, should be entirely discontinued, and

that neither the Court of Inquiry nor the Board of Trade should have

the power of dealing with such certificates; but that, in cases to be

provided for by express enactment, the tribunal alone before which

the officer is tried should have the power of cancelling either all

his certificates, or, at its discretion, his higher certificates,

leaving him in these cases the chance of finding employment in a lower

grade.[264]

[Sidenote: Examination of masters and mates, shipping offices, &c.,

&c., approved.]

The examination of masters and mates, the regulation of space for

crews, the insertion of the scale of food in the articles, the

means of remitting wages, the allotment note, the establishment of

seamen’s savings-banks, and various other important measures, all

indicating as they do the earnest wish of the Legislature to secure

the welfare of the sailor, received the most careful consideration by

the Commissioners, with a view to their amendment where necessary.

But, though some Shipowners were of opinion that the system did not

work well, and that they should be allowed to engage seamen, as other

employers engage their workmen, without the presence of a shipping

master, the Commissioners were of opinion that the shipping offices

had been of great value and ought to be maintained, tersely remarking

that if the captain of a merchant ship would take trouble to seek out

eligible men he could arrange to meet them at the shipping offices,

indeed, could engage them on board or elsewhere under a special

application.

The anxiety of Parliament to protect the seaman and, more especially,

to treat him as incompetent to take care of himself, and as requiring

the special interference of the Legislature, had exercised a

prejudicial influence on his character, tending to destroy, as it

did, the confidence which should ever exist between the master and

his crew, and had frequently promoted insubordination at a time when

good discipline was most essential to the safety of the vessel and

all on board; moreover, the rule requiring misconduct on the part of a

seaman to be entered in the log and immediately read to the offender

was a contrivance so ill-calculated to promote good behaviour that

masters frequently left offences unnoticed rather than resort to such

a proceeding; the Commissioners recommended, therefore, that this plan

should be materially modified (they do not state how), and that, to

secure fair treatment for the seaman, without destroying discipline

or weakening the authority of the master, should be the object of the

Legislature.

Indeed, when it is considered that the safety of a merchant ship, as

well as of the lives of the passengers and crew, are entrusted to the

skill and judgment of the master, it is essential that his authority

should be upheld, as any interference tending to impair his authority

and to lower his position adds seriously to the dangers of navigation.

[Sidenote: Power of masters.]

As a ship at sea is in herself a little kingdom, the power of the

master should be paramount and all but unquestioned; hence, while held

strictly amenable to the law for any acts of tyranny and cruelty,

the Legislature was bound to take care not to deprive him of the

control necessary for the security of his vessel. Now, as the law

as it at present stands, gives him very little power of punishing

a sailor for anything but mutinous conduct, and as the sailor may

be guilty with virtual impunity of many gross derelictions of duty,

such as drunkenness, sleeping on the look-out, disobedience, and

insubordination, the Commissioners recommend that some remedies, less

cumbrous than those now existing, should be applied and more direct

penalties inflicted.

[Sidenote: Scheme for training boys for the sea.]

As most of my readers are aware, a system of compulsory apprenticeship

was established in the year 1844, but was abolished by the repeal of

the Navigation Laws in 1849, and, though some Shipowners, subsequently,

desired to restore this system, the Government could not, with any

regard to principle, meet their views. The object of training boys

for the sea service having been to secure a supply of seamen for the

Royal Navy as well as for the Merchant Service, it would have been

unjust to compel Shipowners to train boys for the public service

after they had been deprived of the special privileges, supposed

to be advantageous, conferred on them by the Navigation Laws. But,

as an impression prevailed that our seamen had deteriorated, both

in number and quality, since the Compulsory Apprenticeship Act was

abolished—though I think this is to be attributed to other and

different causes—the Commissioners suggested a scheme to meet the

existing evil. They proposed that every vessel above 100 tons register,

whether propelled by sail or steam, should be required to carry a

certain number of apprentices in proportion to her tonnage, or to pay a

small contribution annually (such as 6_d._ per ton), to be applied

towards the maintenance of training ships in all the principal ports in

the kingdom. They recommended that the apprentices should be indentured

at or about the age of fourteen to the master of the training ship for

five years; that, after serving in this ship for one or two years, the

indenture should be transferred to any Shipowner who would be willing

to take the apprentice, and with whom the apprentice might be willing

to serve, until the completion of his term, and that these school ships

should be inspected and receive grants from the State according to

their efficiency.

No doubt the system of apprenticeship affords the best means of

training boys for a service in which fitness can only be acquired

during early life. But the success of the system of training boys for

the Royal Navy, recommended by the Commission on Manning the Navy in

1859 (of which I had the honour to be a member) is so far questionable

that I think some other mode of obtaining the requisite supply of

seamen for the navy might have been adopted which would have been more

efficacious and much _less expensive_.

For instance, “a self-supporting pension fund for the benefit of

seamen, as suggested by the Manning Commission of 1859 might,” they

said, “prove of great value in creating a tie to bind the British

seaman to the Merchant Service of his own country,”[265] and would, I

venture to suggest, if properly organised have been a more effective

mode of training and maintaining the requisite number of seamen for

the Royal Navy as well as the Merchant Service. The Commissioners were

also of opinion that, though not strictly within the scope of their

inquiry, a self-supporting pension fund “well deserved the attention of

Government.”[266]

The desertion of seamen in foreign ports was a matter which, in the

opinion of the Commissioners, “deserved the serious attention of the

Government, inasmuch as British ships are now often obliged to sail

on their return voyage, when heavily laden, with insufficient or

incompetent crews,” and they recommended entering into arrangements

with foreign governments for some international conventions which

should have for their object the prevention of desertion and the

enforcement of better discipline in our ships when abroad.

[Sidenote: Marine Insurance.]

The question also of marine insurance was one which received most

careful consideration. The Commissioners felt that while the system

protects Shipowners against losses which would otherwise be ruinous, it

tends to render them less careful in the management of their ships, and

they were, evidently, alive to the fact that it relieved the Shipowner

from all loss, when his ship foundered at sea, and frequently enabled

him to derive a pecuniary profit from shipwreck. But to this difficult

and important question I shall fully refer hereafter, as also to the

system of advance notes inquired into by the Commission.

[Sidenote: Report, as a whole, most valuable.]

Considered as a whole the Report of the Commissioners is one of the

ablest documents I have ever examined, and, from the mass of valuable

evidence they have taken, and the care with which it has been analysed,

most of their recommendations are eminently qualified to effect the

great object in view—to reduce to the lowest possible extent the loss

of life and property at sea.

FOOTNOTES:

[239] In 1816, according to the official returns, the merchant navy of

the United Kingdom amounted to 2,783,933 tons; and in 1835 to 2,783,761

tons, or a fraction less; but we know that, at the former period, there

were a great many more vessels on the Register than there actually

existed, from the fact that no means were then taken to ascertain the

losses, or to erase from the records vessels which were lost.

[240] The entries and clearances of British vessels engaged in the

Foreign trade during the years 1816-18 averaged annually 21,735

vessels, of 3,180,472 tons; while for the three years previous to 1836

they averaged 27,390 vessels, of 4,628,450 tons, and, on the accuracy

of these returns at both periods, we can depend.

[241] “Imperfect charts” were often then made to cover, as I fear

may be the case to some extent now, incompetency, drunkenness, or

carelessness. Indeed, about that period, they frequently served as

excuses when other objects were in view. I remember a ludicrous

instance of this. When a boy at school in Ayr I used to accompany my

uncle to “the meeting of owners” of the brig _Eclipse_, in which

he held some eight or ten 64th-shares. Every spring, the owners met

on board to discuss matters relating to her affairs, and to dispose

of what I recollect best, a round of salt beef, sea-biscuits, and

rum-and-water. The _Eclipse_ had hitherto been invariably employed

during the summer season in the conveyance of timber from some one or

other of the ports of New Brunswick to Ayr. On one occasion, a tempting

freight had been offered for her to proceed to Quebec, and the owners,

in conclave assembled, had all but unanimously decided to send her to

that port. While, however, the discussion was going on, her skipper,

Garratt, or “old Garratty,” as he was called, seemed very uneasy, and

gulping down an extra tumbler of rum-and-water, he at last said,—“Weel,

gentlemen, should you send the _Eclipse_ to Quebec I’ll not be

answerable for her safety.” “How so?” asked one of the owners. “Ah,”

said Garratty, drawing his breath, “_the charts are a’ wrang in the

St. Lawrence_. Yee’l ne’er see the _Eclipse_ again gin ye send

her to Quebec.” The skipper carried the day.

It is much to be regretted that Shipowners, when they leave their

captains to provide their own charts (instead of supplying them), do

not stipulate that they are to be the best and the _latest_. I

remember a ship and cargo (numerous other instances could be produced),

valued at 70,000_l._, lost near Boulogne from the master mistaking

the two lights at Etaples for the South Foreland lights; and this,

as appeared by the Board of Trade inquiry, because his Channel

chart, which was thirty years old, had not the Etaples lights marked

on it. Indeed, it so far appears that the large passenger steamer

_Deutschland_, whose loss at the present moment (30th December,

1875) is now in course of investigation, was steered by an old chart.

[242] See Appendix to ‘Final Report of Unseaworthy Ships Commission,’

p. 600, and Summaries, p. 781, where this and other similar returns

will be found.

[243] See Appendix to ‘Final Report of Unseaworthy Ships Commission,’

p. 682, and Summary, p. 768.

[244] See _ante_, page 299.

[245] General Merchant Seaman’s Act, 7 & 8 Vict. cap. 112.

[246] 8 & 9 Vict. cap. 116.

[247] See _ante_, page 350, note.

[248] 30 & 31 Vict. cap. 124.

[249] This Bill consolidated all previous Acts; but from its

dimensions, or some other cause, it has not yet passed, though

frequently presented to the House of Commons for consideration.

[250] Mr. Samuel Plimsoll was first returned to Parliament in December,

1868, as one of the members for the town of Derby, which he had

unsuccessfully contested three years previously. In the ‘Parliamentary

Companion’ he is described as a “coal-merchant,” and author of various

pamphlets on the coal trade, and on the ‘Rights of Workmen,’ and of a

‘Plan to have Fatherless and Motherless Children cared for instead of

being consigned to the Workhouse.’

[251] This Bill contained 696 clauses, and replaced 90 Acts or parts of

Acts.

[252] See Parl. Paper, C. 287, 1871.

[253] Merchant Shipping Act, 34 & 35 Vict. cap. 110. “Unseaworthy

Ships.”

[254] It was entitled ‘Our Seamen: an Appeal by Samuel Plimsoll, M.P.,’

and was “dedicated to the Lady Gracious and Kind who seeing a labourer

working in the rain sent him her rug to wrap about his shoulders.”

Virtue and Co., Ivy Lane, London.

[255] See ‘Our Seamen,’ pp. 11, 12.

[256] ‘Our Seamen,’ p. 14.

[257] See _ante_, p. 318, _note_.

[258] It may not now be the case, but I have known a chain cable, made

of the best iron, and it would only be iron of the best description

which could stand such a strain, stretched from 150 fathoms, its length

when manufactured, to 155 fathoms after it had passed through the

testing-machine. Such an enormous strain must injure the fibre of the

iron, and, thereby, its elasticity, even though most of this stretch

would probably be due to the links fitting closer into each other,

and the actual stretch of the iron itself only a small portion of the

whole. But in either case the elasticity of the fibre would most likely

be injured, perhaps destroyed.

[259] There were two Reports: “Preliminary” and “Final.”

[260] See Parl. Paper, 349. Session 1873.

[261] I believe that there is much justice in these complaints. Indeed,

it cannot be otherwise if official surveyors are honest and vigilant.

For instance, some new danger or evil arises, and some new remedy is

invented. Consequently, the surveyor says:—“I must provide for this,”

and he makes the requirement; the trade call for uniformity, and the

specific thing required becomes a general _stereotyped_ Board of

Trade rule, checking further improvement, and making shipbuilders build

down to it.

On this point, my old friend, Mr. Alfred Holt, of Liverpool—and there

is no one more competent to offer an opinion on such a subject—in a

letter I had from him the other day, remarks with great force:—“The

real objection to Government survey is this: no Government can insist

on more than average standard of efficiency; but most of those ships of

which the nation is proud are built to _a much higher standard_.

Now, suppose two ships competing for freight, one of the high class

I describe, and one of low type just sufficient to pass survey.

Both have got certificates; these have blunted the discrimination

of underwriters, so that premiums are alike on both, and, naturally

enough, shippers send their goods by the one that asks least freight.

Is it in human nature that the conscience of the good Shipowner will

remain tender? He sees a vessel of much less strength, and not nigh so

efficiently manned, go to sea, perhaps a foot deeper than his, earning

the same rate of freight, and carrying a Government certificate of

competency. Is he likely to keep up to his old standard? and won’t he

be _compulsorily degraded_ to the other’s level? All these surveys

only help the bad, while they injure the good. I may say of ground

tackle that, although since the Act passed, it has become difficult to

get any very bad, it is equally difficult to get any really good. I

believe, in my own case, that the cables I have got since the Act came

into operation are worse than those I got before.”

[262] The recommendation might have been advantageously extended to any

other properly constituted tribunal, as it is most desirable that all

such disputes should be promptly settled, and especially in the port

where they arise, or its immediate locality. An appeal in all cases to

the central Board in London might inflict unnecessary hardship upon the

shipowner, and lead to other mischievous consequences.

[263] Although the present system, which originated with Lloyd’s,

stands much in need of reform, I think the recommendations of the

Commissioners on this subject require still further consideration

before they are adopted.

[264] The latter portion of this recommendation also requires further

consideration. While a second trial would be a double expense, it

would not facilitate getting evidence on the first inquest because the

captain would still be able to say,—“I shall not give evidence which

may be used against me.”

[265] There is no use hiding a fact which my experience on this

Commission and elsewhere has too clearly revealed. It is this, that the

officers of the Navy as a rule (there are exceptions) are much less

inclined to the amalgamation, under any circumstances, of the seamen

of the merchant service with those of the Royal Navy than the officers

of the Army are to coalesce with the Volunteers. They desire, and it

may be due to their patriotism, to have a large standing navy, as large

in peace as in war if they could get it; while they do not care to

be troubled with the drilling of relays of seamen from the merchant

service when they can obtain young men expressly trained, solely at the

expense of the State. They do not, or will not, understand the vast

natural resources this country has within itself—far greater than any

other countries,—or, indeed, than nearly all other countries combined,

available in the hour of need.

[266] See Report, ‘Manning the Navy.’

CHAPTER XVII.

Loose statements with regard to the loss of life at sea, and

other matters—“Coffin ships”—Great improvement of our ships

and officers in recent years—Duties of the Board of Trade

with regard to wrecks—Return of lives lost and saved between

1855 and 1873, _note_—Wreck chart; but the extent of

loss not sufficiently examined—Danger of too much Government

interference—Loss of life in proportion to vessels afloat—Causes

of loss—More details required—Improvement in lighthouses, buoys,

and beacons—Harbours of Refuge—Extraordinary scene in the House

of Commons on the withdrawal of the Merchant Shipping Bill,

1875—Another Bill introduced by Government—Its conditions—Unusual

_personal_ power granted to Surveyors—Propriety or not,

of further legislation considered—Compulsory load-line—Mr. J.

W. A. Harper’s evidence—Mr. W. J. Lamport and others—Opinion

of the Commissioners—Voluntary load-line—Its value

questionable—All ships should be certified as seaworthy—How

can this be accomplished?—Opinion of Mr. Charles McIver,

_note_—Registration Associations—Lloyd’s Register, its

great importance—Improvement of seamen by better education—Evil

effects of advance notes, confirmed by the opinion of the

Commissioners—Over-insurance—Views of Mr. T. H. Farrer—Evidence of

other witnesses—Opinion of the Commissioners—Too much legislation

already—The necessity of a Mercantile Marine Code, and more

prompt punishment in criminal cases—Concluding remarks on the

extraordinary progress of British shipping, and the dangers of

over-legislation.

[Sidenote: Loose statements with regard to the loss of life at sea, and

other matters.]

Although one or two of the more important questions with which the

Commissioners had to deal, cannot be materially advanced without an

arrangement with other nations, there are others entirely within our

own power. To retrace our steps, therefore, with regard to some of

these is as worthy of consideration as to devise any new enactments.

But these subjects can only be properly dealt with in a calm and

impartial spirit. So many exaggerated statements have been recently

made, in and out of Parliament, with reference to the extent of the

loss of life caused by men being sent to sea in “coffin ships,”[267] as

if such occurrences had no existence except in our own time, and were

the creation of a prevailing eagerness to be rich too soon, that it is,

above all things, necessary to adhere strictly to facts, in considering

further legislation, should such be necessary, and to regulate any

measures to be enforced on this subject by such facts alone. Nothing

can be more dangerous than legislation founded on sentimental or

sensational reports.

[Sidenote: “Coffin ships.”]

[Sidenote: Great improvement of our ships and officers in recent years.]

But if “coffin ships” still exist, and I fear they do, this cannot

arise from lack of legislative enactments. Indeed, the wisdom of

Parliament has, for the last quarter of a century, been seriously

directed every Session to the improvement of our ships and of their

crews.[268] Nor have individual efforts of the most effective and

laudable description been wanting to prevent the construction of

vessels of an unseaworthy character:[269] while it is _not_ the

case, as has been alleged, that, either our ships or the officers by

whom they are navigated have deteriorated. On the contrary, they

have, within the last quarter of a century, vastly improved in almost

every respect. If any of my readers have any doubts on this question,

let them refer to the answers to Mr. Murray’s circular of 1843,[270]

and to those sent by our consuls abroad to Mr. J. G. Shaw Lefevre’s

circular of 1872.[271] It may be that our seamen do not “hand, reef,

and steer,” with the same alacrity as they did in the days of our

forefathers, simply because such duties are less required now than they

were then; but our masters and mates are infinitely superior to what

they were a short time since, and in our regular lines of steamers and

packet-ships, there are to be found a class of seamen much more sober

and steady than could be found in any merchant service twenty-five

years ago. Men now exist, who are quite as competent for the duties

required of them, as any seamen of the days of Duncan or Nelson, and

far more to be depended on for the performance of their duties on board

of merchant ships than was the case in my own boyhood, although there

are, still, far too many who are inefficient, drunken, and worthless.

There are likewise still many ships lost which ought not to be lost,

but the assertions which have been made with regard to an increase in

the amount of loss during recent years have been greatly exaggerated,

as I shall now endeavour to show.

[Sidenote: Duties of the Board of Trade with regard to wrecks.]

Among the multifarious duties imposed on the Board of Trade, not

the least important is that connected with wrecks, casualties, and

collisions of ships at home and abroad. For many years, a sort of

record had been kept of those casualties, but it is not until 1855,

when the duty devolved on the Board of Trade, that we have any reliable

statistics.[272]

Of course the number of wrecks, casualties, and collisions reported for

any one year, increases or diminishes according to the prevalence or

absence of gales of remarkable violence and duration. These sometimes

tell in an appalling manner, in the greatly increased loss of life

which occurs in one year over another. A Table,[273] copied from the

wreck returns of the Board of Trade of 1874, classifies the reports so

far as regards the loss of life, showing how far one year has been more

disastrous than another; for instance, in 1859-60, the number of lives

lost was five times greater than in the previous year, and three times

more than in the year following, arising, in a great measure, from the

disastrous gale in October 1859 in which 343 lives were lost in the

_Royal Charter_, wrecked on the Anglesea Coast. Again, in 1867-68,

nearly double the number of lives were lost than during any year

either before or since: in fact, no less than 326 vessels were lost or

damaged, and 319 lives sacrificed by tempest, between the 1st and 3rd

December inclusive of the former year.

But, though between 1855 and 1873, 13,466 lives were lost on the coasts

of the United Kingdom, more than 71,000 lives were saved,[276] during

the same period, from the shipwrecked vessels; and, though the duty of

a seafaring man is proverbially a dangerous one, and the navigation

of our coasts is attended with greater perils than those in any other

parts of the world, it is astonishing how small is the percentage of

loss either of life or property, when compared with the amount of

shipping frequenting our shores.

[Sidenote: Wreck chart; but the extent of loss not sufficiently

examined.]

In the frontispiece to this volume will be found a wreck chart of the

British Islands, prepared from the last Board of Trade Returns for

the year 1873-4. A red dot signifies a case of total loss; a blue dot

signifies a case of partial damage. The first glance of this chart is

very appalling; but it becomes less so when we consider the enormous

number of vessels annually frequenting our coasts. Many hundreds of

vessels at times leave the northern coal ports, alone, in one day; and

I estimate that, in the year to which this chart refers, no less than

500,000 vessels of 90,000,000 tons! including their repeated voyages,

frequented the coasts of Great Britain and Ireland.[277]

But, however startling these figures as a measure of the immense number

of vessels frequenting our coasts, they affect the mind much less than

a glance at the actual facts, the fleets themselves. Until I made

a course from the Thames to the Tyne, and saw the sea covered with

ships, steamers, and fishing boats, of all kinds and sizes, and saw

what an industry even the fishing alone employed, I never had clearly

in my own mind a notion of what our mercantile marine really was.

Let anyone survey from the fort of Tynemouth and ancient churchyard

adjoining—a favourite walk of mine when I represented that borough in

Parliament—and see from 200 to 300 ships going out at one tide, or

watch the passing ships from Flamborough Head or from the cliffs of

Dover, or let him steam through the endless crowd of herring boats

off the Scotch coast, and he will have a stronger impression of the

magnitude of the mercantile marine of Great Britain than can be derived

from the most careful study of all our Blue Books on the subject.

In dealing with this question, it becomes our duty to consider

carefully such realities as these. We should not be led astray by a

mere glance at the wrecks and casualties which appear on the face of

the chart—a chart which has too frequently been used as a picture to

alarm the public mind, and induce people, _who will not take the

trouble to inquire for themselves_, to believe that the question

of the loss of life and property at sea has not received that

consideration from Government or Parliament which its great importance

demands.

[Sidenote: Danger of too much Government interference.]

I have frequently remarked, in the course of this work, that, however

great our exertions have been to save human life, more might still be

done, but, without all the facts, further legislation, based on general

impressions, and still more so on popular clamour (valuable in itself,

though but too often deplorable in its results), will prove of the most

mischievous character. We must, also, remember that every act fettering

free navigation, renders our Shipowners less able to compete with

those of other countries, and, if it does not forward the main object

in view—the safety of life—must be a clear national loss, because it

renders us less able to make our ships a source of profit, a result

which, if not carefully watched, might easily be carried to such an

extent as to discourage investments in British shipping.[278]

Now if we take the total disasters on our coasts, including trivial

accidents, it does not amount to anything like one-half per cent.

per annum, and to not three out of every thousand of the vessels

frequenting these shores; indeed, when we consider the dangerous

character of these shores, the rocks and shoals with which they are

surrounded, the storms with which we are visited, the frequency and

uncertainty of these storms, and the dense fogs which often prevail,

we may, so far from being startled by the sight of the wreck chart, be

surprised that the casualties are not far greater. But, to arrive at

the true bearing of the case, it is desirable to analyse the disasters.

Besides the red and blue dots on the chart, indicative of total loss

or partial damage to vessels, I have indicated by similar dots, with a

cross above, the number of disasters in the course of the year, which

were attended with _loss of life_. When my readers examine these,

they will be still more agreeably surprised. From the Frith of Forth

to Spurnhead, a distance of somewhere about 150 miles of the most

rugged, unprotected, and dangerous coast in the world, where numerous

fleets of vessels are constantly wending their way, and in every

description of weather, there were only seven vessels wrecked with loss

of life during 1873-4, and two of these were partial losses. In calling

attention to this fact, I must remind my readers that, on the part of

our coast in question, the most inferior description of vessels, and

the most deeply laden, carry on their hazardous trade. If we next cast

our eye over the line of coast extending from London to the Lizard

Point, and embracing the whole coast of the English Channel, a distance

of somewhere about 400 miles, we will see that during the whole of the

same year there were only fifteen wrecks with loss of life, and seven

of these were partial. Nor is the proportion greater on any other

portion of the coasts of Great Britain and Ireland.

[Sidenote: Loss of life in proportion to vessels afloat.]

[Sidenote: Causes of loss.]

But we should do well to inquire still further, and not merely compare

the present number of disasters with those of former years, but

likewise their extent and character; and, as far as is practicable,

the different causes of loss, so as to endeavour to apply, to the

best advantage, any further remedies that may be necessary. I have

shown[279] that the average loss of life during the three years ending

1835 was 894 per annum, when we owned 2,780,000 tons of shipping; but

the loss of life for the year 1873-4, when our Merchant Shipping had

increased to 7,294,230 tons, of which no less than 1,825,738 tons

consisted of steamers, in which the risk of navigating our coasts

is greatly increased, amounted only to 506, of whom 103 were lost in

foreign vessels. Many of the remaining 403 were lost on fishing boats,

and other vessels not registered under the Merchant Shipping Act.[280]

Very material progress towards the saving of life on our coasts has,

therefore, been made during the last forty years—a progress which will

appear the more striking when I direct attention to the fact, that,

while the entrances and clearances of British ships engaged in the

foreign trade were, in 1835, not much more than 4,000,000 tons, they

had increased to more than 26,000,000 tons in 1873-4.[281] Of the

506 lives lost, 61 were lost in vessels that foundered; 76 through

vessels in collision; 200 in vessels that stranded or were cast ashore

derelict; and 101 in missing vessels. The remaining 68 lives were lost

from various causes, such as by being washed overboard and by other

accidents on board. The whole of the above lives were lost in 130

vessels, 87 of which were laden, and 40 in ballast. It is not known

whether the remaining three were laden or light.

If we take the last five years from 1869 to 1873-4 inclusive, we

find the total number of wrecks and casualties of vessels of every

kind, arising from all causes and including collisions, amounted to

8952, giving an annual average of 1791; the average loss of life

in these vessels during the five and a half years, including the

disastrous half-year 1873, being 755 per annum. Although no return is

kept in minute detail of the approximate cause of these disasters,

we learn from the wreck register, that in the year 1873-4, 381 were

from collisions, and 1422 from wrecks and casualties other than

collisions; 346 were wrecks, &c., resulting in total loss; and 1076

partial damage more or less serious. Of the total losses, 128 happened

when the wind was at “force 9 or upwards” (a strong gale), and they

are classed as having been caused by stress of weather; 93 from

inattention, carelessness, or neglect; 30 from defects in the ship

or equipments (and of these thirty, 19 appear to have foundered from

unseaworthiness); the remainder seem to have arisen from various other

causes. Of the 1070 casualties, 525 arose from stress of weather; 180

from carelessness; and 91 from defects in equipments; and the remainder

from various other causes. In 1873-4, there were, on or near the coasts

of the United Kingdom, 165 wrecks and casualties to smacks and other

fishing vessels, which are included in the above returns, and in these,

76 lives were lost, while 195 lives were lost in vessels of the collier

class.

[Sidenote: More details required.]

These returns are, no doubt, very valuable as far as they go, and have

become more so since they were extended to the loss of _all_

British ships, and, where practicable, to the cause of the loss. But

the class of the vessel, whether built of wood or iron, and the draught

of water when she left her last port, might be added to advantage. Nor

should we omit the familiar S.S. to distinguish steam from sailing

ships. However, they amply show that no charge can be justly made

against either the Government or the Legislature of any dereliction of

duty in their endeavours to save the life of all persons who “go down

to the sea in ships.” Nor can we charge the people of this country with

any callousness or want of sympathy for the seafaring portion of the

population. The number of Acts of Parliament passed in recent years,

and the grants of public money voted for the purpose of saving life,

are an answer to all such charges; while noble private institutions,

like the Shipwrecked Mariners’ Society, the Lifeboat Establishments,

the Royal Alfred Asylum, besides various other charitable associations

for the benefit of seamen, testify in this respect to the liberality of

the public.[282]

[Sidenote: Improvement in lighthouses, buoys, and beacons.]

[Sidenote: Harbours of Refuge.]

Nor have the lights, beacons, and buoys on our coast, all tending

materially, as they do, to save life, been neglected. On the contrary,

while we have greatly reduced the charges, we have increased the number

and highly improved the quality of our lights. By the Act passed in

1836,[283] a number of lighthouses, which formed part of the hereditary

estate of the Crown and had been allowed to get into the hands of

private persons, were transferred to the Trinity House, provision being

made for reducing the exorbitant tolls previously levied. By an Act

of 1853,[284] the expenditure of the Trinity House on lighthouses,

and that of the Scotch and Irish lighthouse boards, was subjected to

the control of the Board of Trade, and, since then, the reduction on

the charges for lights, buoys, beacons, &c., has been fully 75 per

cent. Nor has the question of Harbours of Refuge been overlooked; for,

besides the construction of various national harbours, large sums of

public money have been advanced at a low rate of interest for the

improvement of local harbours, expressly for the benefit of merchant

ships and seamen, and these, while facilitating commerce, have, in no

small degree, tended to the safety of life and property.

Indeed, so anxious has Government been to rectify any shortcomings

in legislation, which might tend to the loss of life, or inflict

a hardship on seamen, that the Bill of Mr. Fortescue (now Lord

Carlingford), passed in 1873,[285] contained not merely clauses about

“load-lines” and “clear sides,” but a provision giving seamen a claim

for compensation when, having been detained on a charge of desertion,

the ship, upon survey, was shown to be unseaworthy. This Act further

contains a provision, strengthening the power of the Board of Trade

to detain unseaworthy ships, whereby that “Board are enabled to act

of their own accord, and without complaint from without,” the result

of which has been that, up to the last return,[286] out of the 474

vessels detained and surveyed by the Board of Trade under this Act,

435 have been on the report of their own officers, and 39 only on

complaints made _ab extra_.[287] To these facts I may add, as

having a very important bearing on the opinions I have hitherto

ventured to express, that only 24 out of the 474 vessels were detained

_because_ they were overladen; and that, out of these, not a

single vessel detained was alleged to be overladen on information given

by the crews, notwithstanding the encouragement they had to become

informers against their employers. This power to detain is extended to

cases of overloading and improper stowage or imperfect loading, and the

conditional orders of release are of a very elaborate character, while

the provisions concerning payment of expenses, and the mode of appeal,

are made far more full and explicit.

This Act further gives power to vary the requirements contained in the

Merchant Shipping Act of 1854 with regard to boats—requirements, I may

add, which it had been found practically impossible to comply with.

It likewise contains a clause, which ought to have been the law long

since, making it criminal (though the dictates of humanity, it had been

thought, were in themselves sufficient), in a master, after collision

with another vessel, not to stand by and render assistance. In the

same statute, a code of signals of distress has been adopted and very

properly enforced, as well as a general code of pilot signals.

Many losses having occurred from spontaneous combustion of coal on

board ship, Government, in 1874, appointed, on the recommendation of

Lloyd’s Committee, a Royal Commission, under the chairmanship of Mr.

Childers, to inquire into this subject, but this Commission has not yet

concluded its labours.

[Sidenote: Extraordinary scene in the House of Commons on the

withdrawal of the Merchant Shipping Bill, 1875.]

Early in the Session of 1875, the Government introduced another

Merchant Shipping Bill, containing various amendments of the then

existing law, and among them a special clause which had for its

object the abolition of all advance notes. This Bill met with very

considerable opposition (partly of a frivolous character), rendering

its progress through the House so slow, that Government found it

desirable to withdraw it, more especially as the Bill had been

materially altered and curtailed in the course of various divisions,

especially in the clauses referring to the advance notes and other

matters of importance.

When Government intimated its intention of withdrawing the Bill of

which they could no longer approve, and which they had not time to

pass, a scene arose[289] happily of rare occurrence in the debates of

the British Parliament. It was closed, however, with great dignity by

the Prime Minister and leader of the Commons. He had introduced such

a measure as he no doubt, after grave consultation with his Cabinet,

considered necessary and sufficient. The House, and more especially

those members of it who were more immediately interested in maritime

affairs, and who either approved or opposed the views of Mr. Plimsoll

had so mutilated the Government measure, that Mr. Disraeli would no

longer be responsible for it. To use his own words, he “declined to

deal with the subject in that fragmentary manner,” and no man of

prudence or common sense can blame him for the course he adopted under

these circumstances.[290]

[Sidenote: Another Bill introduced by Government.]

Unfortunately, however, the popular outcry was so great against the

course he had adopted, aroused as this had been for the moment by the

well-meaning but rhapsodical protests of Mr. Plimsoll, backed, as they

no doubt were, by many really benevolent men, that Mr. Disraeli, in

the end, considered it expedient to introduce another Bill, embodying

a portion of his own views together with those of the philanthropists.

Although this Act contains some necessary and useful provisions, it

is not a wise measure, nor can the Government have considered it

perfect, as it was hurriedly passed so late in the Session as the 6th

of September, and is only to remain in force until the 1st of October

1876.[291]

[Sidenote: Its conditions.]

[Sidenote: Unusual personal power granted to Surveyors.]

This Act confirms the powers previously given to persons, specially

appointed by the Board of Trade, to detain what they consider

unseaworthy ships, _without previous orders from the Board_, an

addition which, however necessary, ought not to have been conceded to

any individuals without much further consideration and discussion than

it received. This addition opens the door to corruption in its most

pernicious and dangerous forms, by giving, as it does, to each one of

a great number of subordinate officers, _personal_ authority to

detain “unseaworthy vessels,” thus transferring to a single person

a power the Board of Trade alone possessed under the Act of 1873,

and laying down a principle contrary to all good government, while

relieving that Board of its administrative responsibility. Otherwise

the Bill contains some useful provisions, and none more so than where

it prohibits the carriage of a cargo of which more than one-third

consists of grain, &c., unless the grain is secured from shifting by

suitable boards or otherwise. But, while this clause may be necessary

or right in itself, its meaning may be misconstrued, and it may lead

to further and more detailed legislation, making its vague language

specific, and calling on Government officers in _Foreign_ ports to

enforce its provisions.[292]

The Act also amends the clause in the Act of 1871, which makes the

sending an unseaworthy ship to sea a misdemeanour, by providing—

(_a._) That criminal liability shall attach to any one who

attempts, or is party to an attempt, to send such a ship to sea, and to

a master who knowingly takes such a ship to sea.

(_b._) That every ship shall have a registered managing owner, and

that if she is sent to sea from any port in the United Kingdom in an

unseaworthy state he shall be liable, unless he proves that he has done

all he can to prevent it.

The Act further provides that every British ship shall be marked

permanently with lines on her sides showing the position of her decks.

It also provides that the owner of every foreign-going British ship

shall, before clearance outwards from any port in the United Kingdom,

mark upon her sides a maximum load-line, and shall insert the distance

between this and the deck marks in the entry outwards at the Custom

House and in the agreement with the crew.

The Act further stipulates that every contract with a seaman shall

imply an obligation on the part of the owner and his agents to use all

reasonable efforts to make and _keep_[293] the ship seaworthy.

The effect of this clause is to give the seaman or his family a remedy

against the owner. But it does not extend to damage or loss of life

caused by the act of a fellow seaman other than the master.

Happily it is not necessary, in reviewing the recent changes in our

Mercantile Marine Laws, to notice those personal matters which have

unfortunately been raised in the course of their discussion, except

to express regret that Mr. Plimsoll in dealing with a subject of such

great public importance should have made grave assertions and charges

alike against Government and private individuals, too many of which he

has not merely entirely failed to prove, but has neglected to withdraw.

Had Government been persistently neglectful of its duty in its

endeavours to mitigate the loss of life and property at sea, there

might have been an excuse for some of these charges, especially if

it had neglected necessary legislative enactments.[294] But such has

not been the case. On the contrary, Parliament of late years, while

producing some excellent measures, has interfered far too much with

the details of the affairs of individuals connected with Merchant

Shipping: and, though yielding for the moment to a popular cry,

Mr. Disraeli may well have had reasonable doubts whether further

legislation might not, so far from lessening, tend to increase those

dangers and disasters which must ever attend the navigation of the

ocean.

[Sidenote: Propriety or not, of further legislation considered.]

Having, however, officially announced his intention to review the whole

subject, and to consider it in all its bearings, I venture to invite

the attention of my readers to the more important points now pending.

They are: a compulsory load-line, and the production of an official

certificate of seaworthiness by all ships before they are cleared at

the Custom House.

[Sidenote: Compulsory load-line.]

[Sidenote: Mr. J. W. A. Harper’s evidence.]

So far as regards the proposed compulsory load-line, a very competent

and intelligent witness who gave his evidence before the Royal

Commission on unseaworthy ships, says,[296] “I think nothing could be

more serviceable and nothing more excellent than to obtain and, if it

were possible, enforce a load-line; but I also think there is nothing

more impossible. A load-line, do what you may, is the opinion of an

expert. How can you, by authority, enforce the opinion of an expert?

I have had before me,” he continues, “a great many proposals for

ascertaining load-lines for ships. Some of them are very ingenious. By

the best of them you may get, with considerable accuracy, the cubical

displacement of the empty ship, the displacement of the cargo, and so

you may arrive at the cubical space left in the ship available for

floating. And getting that you get a valuable and useful fact for some

objects. _But the supreme difficulty remains untouched, viz., What

ought the floating capacity to be?_ I cannot imagine it possible to

enforce by any Government intervention a rule _which must depend in

every individual case upon the opinion of an expert_.”

[Sidenote: Mr. W. J. Lamport and others.]

[Sidenote: Opinion of the Commissioners.]

Such, also, was the purport of the evidence of the great majority, if

not of all the witnesses examined before the Commission; but I quote

that of Mr. Harper, because he is not merely thoroughly competent to

offer an opinion on the subject, but is altogether disinterested.

Indeed, from the appointment he holds, it would be to his interest to

recommend a compulsory load-line, and he would no doubt have done so,

had he not thought that any such legislative measure would be likely

to aggravate the evils sought to be remedied. In fact, the whole tenor

of the evidence is that a fixed load-line would do more harm than

good.[297] And such was the opinion of the Commissioners, who state,

“that any rule of freeboard founded on surplus buoyancy gives to a

vessel of light scantling an advantage over a stronger vessel. Thus the

inferior ship would by law be allowed to carry the heavier cargo. Such

an enactment would not contribute to the safety of life at sea. From

all the evidence we have collected on this subject, we are of opinion

that an Act of Parliament enforcing any scale of freeboard would be

_mischievous_.”... “A law presenting such a rule would therefore

_enhance the perils of a seafaring life_.”

Nor can impartial persons who have studied this question arrive at

any other conclusion, for as the Commissioners justly add, “There is

no general agreement as to a rule by which the requisite amount of

_reserve_ buoyancy could be determined, and it appears that,

except under definite circumstances, it is not a determinable problem.

The proper load-line in each particular case depends not only upon the

principal dimensions of the ship, but also upon her form and structural

strength, the nature of her cargo, the voyage, and the season of the

year.”

[Sidenote: Voluntary load-line.]

The Commissioners, consequently, limited their recommendation so far

as regards freeboard to the extent that “every merchant ship should

have marked upon each of her sides amidships, a vertical scale of feet

downwards from the edge of her main-deck,” and that a note of her

draught of water “should be entered in the log after the vessel has

received her full load, immediately before the time of her starting

on her voyage, which should, wherever practicable, be left with the

officer of Customs or with the British Consul, by whom it should be

recorded.”

[Sidenote: Its value questionable.]

This recommendation was proposed to be carried out in the Government

Bill which was withdrawn, but, in the Act now temporarily in force, the

provisions are somewhat different. The advantages of either system are

problematical. Shipowners will continue, as they have hitherto done,

to load their vessels to such draught as they consider prudent, and if

one of their vessels is lost, and other persons remark that she was

too heavily laden, the answer will either be that the draught was as

usual, or that safety in proportion to depth is a matter of opinion

depending on many varying circumstances. The mere fact of publicly

recording the draught of water would, it is to be feared, have little

effect on unprincipled or avaricious Shipowners, against whom alone

the law is aimed. Practically, I think the system of marking now in

force will be of little or no avail, and that the result will not be

as the framers of the law intended. A Shipowner being now required by

law to mark upon the sides of the vessel amidships a circular disc 12

inches in diameter, to be so placed that “the centre of the disc shall

indicate the _maximum_ load-line in salt water to which the owner

intends to load the ship for that voyage,” will perceive that to place

the disc only slightly above the usual line of load draught would, on

the one hand, fetter him to some extent; while, on the other hand, he

would incur no disadvantage by placing it so much higher as to ensure

its being well clear of the water under any circumstances of loading.

A maximum load-line will, therefore, in practice mean the line down

to which the ship will certainly _not_ be loaded. Indeed, from

the information I have gained on the subject, the practice with some

Shipowners seems already to be that the discs are placed one, two,

and in some cases, three and even four feet above the water-line. The

mere marking it would, therefore, appear in a great measure worthless,

as surveyors will still require to wait until a ship has her cargo on

board and is ready for sea, before they can form any opinion as to

her safety. Whether it is wise, on the part of Shipowners, to place

the disc so far above the vessel’s ordinary water-line as to make it

meaningless has been doubted by many, but the fact remains that it is

so placed in very many instances. It would, certainly, have been better

to have omitted from the clause of the Act I have just quoted the word

“maximum,” as few Shipowners would have placed their discs too high

if, by doing so, this indicated an intention on their part to overload

their vessels.

However, if it can be shown that this new mode of marking the sides

of a ship tends in any degree towards the greater safety of life

and property at sea, the shipping community, generally, will not

complain of the expense and trouble. In all good governments there is

a pervading principle to which all classes submit, that the interests

of the few must be made subservient to the good of the many, and

that, especially where life is at stake, no reasonable trouble or

expense should be spared to preserve it. But if, on the other hand,

it is found that this system of marking or registering the draught of

water is useless, or even injurious, Shipowners will have great cause

of complaint against Government for an unnecessary interference with

their business, provided they can show that they have made an earnest

endeavour to apply the provisions of the Act fairly and in the spirit

in which they were framed.[298]

The other important point on which Mr. Plimsoll insisted is of a

different character. But to carry it out in the way suggested, or as

it was argued in the House of Commons and before the Royal Commission,

would be impracticable, and even if practicable, it would be most

mischievous: the Commissioners in their Report state the question as

follows:—“With the view of providing for the greater safety of life at

sea, it has been suggested that the Board of Trade shall superintend

the construction, the periodical inspection, the repair, and the

loading of all British Merchant Ships.” Considering the extent of our

mercantile marine and the mode in which business must, necessarily,

be conducted if we desire to maintain our present high position as a

maritime nation, any such suggestion is simply absurd and, if carried

into effect, would be most ruinous. That we have already too much

legislation in matters of detail the Commissioners themselves admit.

Referring to the pernicious effects of inquiry into such matters by

Government surveyors on Emigrant ships, they say, and from the evidence

before them they would have been justified in expressing their opinion

in still stronger terms, “We consider it to be a question worthy of

serious consideration, whether, in the case of passenger ships, the

certificate of the Board of Trade, so far as regards specific approval,

should not be expressly confined to the number of passengers to be

allowed, and to the accommodation for their health, comfort, and

general security; all questions of unseaworthiness of hull, machinery,

and equipment being left to the owners, subject only to a general power

of interference in case of danger, sufficiently apparent to justify

special intervention.”

[Sidenote: How this can be accomplished.]

I have been unable to ascertain who made the extraordinary proposal,

that every ship from the time her keel was laid until she was loaded

and ready for sea should be under the superintendence of officers

appointed by the Board of Trade. In justice to Mr. Plimsoll I must

state that, though I have read his book, and nearly all his speeches,

I cannot trace any recommendation that the merchant ships of this

country should be placed, either as regards construction, inspection,

or repair, altogether, under the control of the Board of Trade or of

any other Government department.[299] What Mr. Plimsoll mentions seems

to me, to be a matter to which I have often referred in the course of

this work, that we do not utilise to anything like the extent we might

the vast private resources within ourselves, and that we might do so to

advantage, so far as regards _the survey of our merchant ships_,

not one of which he suggests should be allowed to go to sea unless she

is _seaworthy_. Now this is a suggestion which few men would be

bold enough to decline to consider, and Mr. Plimsoll points out how

this may be secured by means already at our disposal. Perhaps in the

way he puts it, the difficulties with which it is surrounded could

not be overcome; but the maxim cannot be ignored, as it is sound in

principle.

To leave the survey of our ships to any one private institution,

not on a sufficiently broad basis, such as Lloyd’s Register, might

create as many evils as a general Government survey, and, besides

creating jealousy on the part of other somewhat similar institutions

or associations, might be considered contrary to the rules of sound

government. But these institutions could be enrolled and licensed, as

various other associations now are, and empowered to grant certificates

of seaworthiness, which every ship above a certain tonnage would

require to produce before she was cleared at the Custom House. Or they

might be welded into one great national institution directly controlled

by all the various branches of the shipping community in harmony with

their sentiments, and alive to the wants and necessities always arising

through the growth and development of trade and commerce.

Individuals may do wrong, and, though it may be for their interests

to have a good sound ship, there is no denying the fact that ships

are sent to sea which are not seaworthy; but corporations and

associations cannot do wrong with the same impunity. If they did, they

would be deprived of their licence, and there would be a check, one

against the other, which is not the case with individuals. Or, on the

other hand, a great representative institution would be efficiently

checked and influenced by public opinion, and the voice of those

immediately concerned. Were Government to require these associations to

_classify_ ships, then I agree with the Commissioners, that it is

not its province “to ascertain whether a ship is fit for the conveyance

of dry and perishable goods,” but, from the debates in Parliament, and

numerous articles in the public press, it is clear that many persons

are of opinion, that it is the duty of Government to be reasonably

satisfied that a ship is _seaworthy_ before she proceeds to sea.

We exercise this duty in the case of railways, mines, and manufactures

of various kinds, and events have shown, however much we may have

already done to save life and property at sea, that the exercise of a

similar duty, if practicable, is at least worthy of consideration in

the case of ships.

As the great bulk of the vessels belonging to the United Kingdom are

already classed, the certificate of classification they now hold would

suffice as a certificate of seaworthiness. Those which are not now

classed in Lloyd’s Register, or in any other association, but which

belong to the great steam companies, or to very large shipowners,

are so well known for their good qualities as not to require

classification, and for this reason classification, or, at least,

survey for seaworthiness, even if compulsory, could not be a serious

hardship to them.

Practically the number of vessels now unclassed is confined to the

very good or to the very bad ships. With the owners of the former

I should think there would be no difficulty in dealing; they do

not class their ships either because they do not care to incur the

expense (underwriters being ready to insure them at the lowest current

premiums), or because they think they can construct ships, in their own

way, superior to those which are built to rules for classification.

But such men, while they might protest, and justly so, against being

interfered with in a business they more thoroughly understand than any

government or private surveyor, and in which they take a laudable pride

(for such men are the pillars of our maritime greatness), would, I

doubt not, have no objection to an authorised surveyor inspecting their

ships, and would readily pay the moderate fee required to cover the

cost of a certificate of _seaworthiness_.[300]

For the information of the general public I may state that there is a

very great difference between the highest grades of vessels and those

which any surveyor who knew anything about his business would pronounce

to be _unseaworthy_. In the case of classed ships, the certificate

of classification would suffice; but, from the owners of ships who do

not class, many intelligent persons are of opinion that a certificate

of _seaworthiness_ should be required. They argue, and with great

force, that those persons who do not class their ships, because they

will not bear inspection, have no right to imperil the lives of others

for their own gain. Life is not a thing of price; if it were, the rich

would live, and the poor would die. And when a Shipowner declines to

bear the expense of making his vessel seaworthy, he places in jeopardy

the life of the sailor to benefit himself.

[Sidenote: Registration Associations.]

[Sidenote: Lloyd’s Register, its great importance.]

There are very easy means of ascertaining the seaworthiness of a ship,

_when first sent afloat_, already at our disposal, as those of

my readers, who are not conversant with this subject, will find by

referring to the Appendix,[301] where a history of Lloyd’s Register

of British and Foreign Shipping will be found. That association has

a well-organised and extensive staff of surveyors, through whom, at

a very small cost, this fact could be ascertained. My readers will

also there see the immense advantage that association has afforded in

the improvement of our ships and the power it possesses of rendering

still greater public service. But while rivalry amongst associations

for classification is unquestionably injurious,[302] it may not

be considered advisable that Lloyd’s Register alone should issue

certificates of seaworthiness. There are other similar associations

whose certificates would answer the object in view equally well, and it

is for Government to decide (should an attempt be made to carry this

principle into practice) what associations shall be empowered to issue

the requisite certificates.

But while I cannot ignore the principle that no unseaworthy vessel

should be allowed to leave our ports, I cannot hide from myself

the fact that there would be numerous difficulties (but far from

insurmountable) in the way of carrying it fully into practice. It

might be argued that if the Board of Trade enrolled the associations

named, and, more especially, if it took them under its _immediate_

control, they would in a few years, instead of being private

Institutions, be mere servants of the Board, and, through the Board,

of a sensational House of Commons. But that argument may be met by

the Shipowners saying to the Board of Trade, “We do not wish to be

under your immediate control at all. Why should we not be allowed to

manage our own affairs, as all other branches of the community now

do,—subject, in our case, as in that of all others, to such enactments

only as may be necessary for the public safety? We ought to know our

own business a great deal better than any of your surveyors can teach

us; and, if we think proper to form ourselves into an association,

or associations, to manage our own affairs, and if we do what the

country requires, why should we be interfered with by the Government

as to the manner in which we think proper to build, equip, and

navigate our ships, any more than other traders in the management of

their affairs? Enrol us, if we think proper to associate, as you do

joint-stock concerns or other associations; let us form a board with

members elected by the persons interested, such, for instance, as the

Metropolitan Board of Works, to manage our own concerns, with specific

rules for the protection of the public, which, if we violate, you will

punish us as you would do any other class of the community.”

Now, arguments such as these are really unanswerable. Statesmen and

others, who have to encounter the harassing difficulties of official

life, and who know that all executive power _must_ be exercised

by a minister, or by individuals responsible to him, and, through him,

to the public, might say, “How are we, unless all ships are under our

immediate control, to meet questions put to us in the House of Commons,

such as, ‘Whether such and such a society licensed by Government had

the folly and audacity to allow of spring safety-valves, or of boats

not fitted with Clifford’s Patent?’ or how could we justify a licence

granted to an association which showed such flagrant disregard of

modern inventions and of seamen’s lives?” But the reply to all this

is that it is _not the province of Government to legislate on such

details as these_, any more than it would be to dictate by Act of

Parliament, how the details of any other branch of trade or manufacture

are to be carried out. The duties of Government have long since been

defined, and it is because Government, of recent years, has gone far

beyond its duties in the case of Shipowners, that Shipowners complain,

and justly complain, against Government for a “meddling and muddling”

in matters alike beyond its province and its knowledge.

Reverting to the principle which so many persons now say should

be enforced by legislative enactment, the seaworthiness of every

ship, there would be great difficulty in carrying that out _by

Government_, as seaworthiness is not definable. That is to say,

though a vessel may be seaworthy, when launched, (even then it would

depend upon the trade in which she was to be employed), she might not

be so at the end of her first voyage, or she might be so for one trade

in summer, but not in winter, or with one description of cargo, but not

with another; or, in fact, with the same cargo if properly stowed,[303]

but not otherwise, and so forth. The details are so numerous that it

would be impossible to enter upon them within my limits, and for the

same reasons, if the principle is to be carried out, it can only be by

the association of competent individuals with the necessary staff under

their control, possessing that knowledge which long experience alone

can give. I mention these points in case the Legislature consider it

necessary to enforce this principle; for, if it is to be carried out,

it should be in such a manner as will satisfy the public with the least

possible interference with the duties of the Shipowner.[304]

[Sidenote: Improvement of seamen by better education.]

In the meantime I must direct the attention of my readers to the

unseaworthiness of too many of our seamen, which is of really greater

national importance than the unseaworthiness of our ships. However

desirable it may be to make certain, if we can, that no unseaworthy

ships shall leave our ports, the incompetency, carelessness, and

drunkenness of seamen demand much more seriously our attention; and, as

all legislative enactments have hitherto failed to raise them to the

requisite standard, we ought to direct our attention more earnestly

than we have yet done to their _education_. If education is

necessary on shore, it is still more so with seamen, and yet we have

done, practically, nothing, as a Nation, to assist them in gaining

knowledge, and, especially, that description of knowledge required

in their calling. Indeed, we have not seriously attempted any great

practical scheme for their education or for the amalgamation of the

services of the Royal Navy and those of the mercantile marine, which,

while invaluable to us as a nation, would tend so much to elevate the

social position of that neglected portion of their class, who, not

having the good fortune to be enrolled in the Navy or on the lists of

the large Shipowners, must seek their daily bread at sea in any ship

where employment can be found.

[Sidenote: Evil effects of advance notes]

On the contrary, we have, in some respects, pandered to their

pernicious habits. For instance, when a clause in the first Government

Bill of last Session (1875) was introduced to render advance notes

illegal, the House of Commons rejected it. From my own experience I

can have no hesitation in stating that the system of advance notes

(I do not include the _allotment notes_, which are most useful)

tends to lower the character of seamen, promotes intemperance and

insubordination, and has been the indirect means of far more disasters

at sea than either overladen or otherwise unseaworthy vessels.

Besides, any such system is unknown to any other class of the

community. What should we think of a mechanic or house servant who

could not enter our service unless we paid him a month’s wages in

advance? We should have nothing to say to him—1st, because we should

not care to trust our money to a person who, on some frivolous

excuse, might decline to repay us by his faithful service; and

(2ndly) because we should, naturally, consider anyone requiring such

an advance an improvident if not a worthless person. These advances

must, necessarily, discourage frugality and prudence; while, in the

case of seamen, they most assuredly lead, directly, to intemperance

and vice. Nor is there any real occasion for making advances in their

case. The mechanic or the house servant may have been for some time

out of employment, and, as his wages are paid weekly or monthly, he

may not have laid by anything; but, in the case of seamen, their

wages are paid at the end of the voyage, often in large sums, and by

means of savings-banks and money-order offices, specially established

for their use, they have every facility afforded them for retaining

their earnings. But they do not. Why? Because the Legislature has

encouraged their natural and _proverbially_ improvident habits,

by acknowledging a system of advance of wages unknown to any other

class of workmen, on which advance they depend for an outfit, after too

frequently squandering the wages they had earned on a previous voyage.

But I should prefer my readers considering carefully the Report of the

Commissioners on this subject instead of my own views, and therefore I

do not hesitate to give these conclusions at length,[305] as a large

mass of evidence was brought before them. They, as statesmen and

philanthropists, had no object in view beyond the national good, and,

more especially, the welfare of the seafaring population.

[Sidenote: confirmed by the opinion of the Commissioners.]

“The evidence before us leads to the conclusion that the system

of advance notes is one great obstacle to the amelioration of the

condition of merchant seamen. All the witnesses whom we have examined

admit that the system is most pernicious, but it is defended on the

ground that, without this advance, the sailor could not pay for his

lodging on shore, or procure the clothes requisite for him when he

joins a ship.

“In practice it seems that the advance note is handed over to the

lodging-house keeper, not usually in exchange for cash, but in

discharge of debts which the sailor has been induced to incur. The

lodging-house keeper charges a heavy discount, and the sailor is

frequently brought on board half-clad and intoxicated.

“Shipowners and captains of merchant ships concur in stating that a

large portion of the ship’s crew is very often brought or even lifted

on board in a condition of helpless drunkenness, that the vessel must

often be detained for twenty-four hours in order that the men may be so

far recovered as to be able to get her under weigh, and that there is

great risk of life and property at the commencement of the voyage from

the consequent inefficiency of the seamen.

“The advance note is not payable until some days after the sailing of

the ship; but if the ship then puts back or touches at another port,

the seaman often takes the opportunity of making some complaint, in

order to get free from his engagement, and will even incur a month’s

imprisonment with this object, whilst the Shipowner or the person who

has cashed the note loses the money which has been paid in advance.

“It is said that if there were no advance note, the crimp in a foreign

or colonial port would not have the same inducement to entice the

sailor to desert.

“After careful consideration of the numerous evils attending this mode

of prepayment, we recommend that advance notes should be declared

illegal, that no payment or order for payment made in advance for wages

shall be a discharge for the payment of any portion of a seaman’s

wages when due, and that no money paid by a Shipowner to or for a

seaman shall be debited to the seaman, except wages already earned,

the allotment notes, and the cost of such supplies as the seamen may

receive after joining the ship.

“There will be some inconvenience felt at first from the abolition

of the existing system of advance notes, and there will be perhaps

considerable opposition to the change in the ports, and amongst the

lodging-house keepers, who profit by these notes. We feel, however,

convinced that unless this mischievous mode of payment be discontinued,

the seamen will never be raised from their servile dependence on

crimps, and taught to rely on their own industry and intelligence.”[306]

[Sidenote: Over-insurance.]

But there is a question of quite as great importance to which I shall

again have occasion to refer when I review the history of our steam

companies, and show the remarkably small amount of loss that some of

them have sustained through the system and order prevailing on board

their vessels. _There we shall see how losses are prevented._ In

the meantime, we should do well to inquire how losses are encouraged by

allowing policies of insurance to be effected for a greater amount than

the value of the ship or the cargo she contains.

[Sidenote: Views of Mr. T. H. Farrer.]

A contract of marine insurance is in its essence a contract of

indemnity, and the spirit of the contract is violated if the assured

can make the occurrence of a loss the means of gain. But the law has

allowed a very considerable deviation from this fundamental principle.

Mr. T. H. Farrer, in his evidence, happily illustrates this in the case

of a ship with a chartered freight, bound from London to Calcutta and

back.[307] He supposes her to be lost on her outward passage in the

Bay of Biscay. Presuming that the owner only insured her prudently and

not exorbitantly, he would recover in this case not merely the value

of the ship at the commencement of the voyage, but also the freight

of the outward and homeward voyages, while he would be exempted from

paying the seamen’s wages from the date of the disaster, the expenses

necessary to carry his ship to Calcutta, to remain there, and to

return on her homeward passage, so that he would be, actually, a very

considerable gainer by the loss.[308] Nor is the matter less flagrant

in the case of valued policies, when the value of the property is fixed

by agreement beforehand between the assured and the underwriter. The

effect of this, as the Commissioners justly remark,[309] is, “that

unless the policy is altogether void, on account of fraud, or the

concealment of a material fact, the assured can, in the case of a total

loss, receive the value which has been stated in the policy, however

much it may exceed the actual worth of his property.” In confirmation

of their opinion, they add “that, in certain decided cases, the

Shipowner has been allowed to recover 50 and even 100 per cent. more

than the actual value of his vessel.”

[Sidenote: Evidence of other witnesses.]

Various witnesses recommended that, in case of a total loss, the

underwriter should be allowed to question a valued policy, when he

considered that the value had been overstated; but many Shipowners

and underwriters objected to this proposal, contending that, where

a value had been agreed on between the Shipowners and underwriter,

subsequent interference would be mischievous or futile, as it might

induce Shipowners to insure abroad. It was contended that the value

of a ship might depend on a variety of circumstances; for instance,

the loss of a steamer to a Shipowner, about to start a new line of

steam communication, would be inadequately replaced by the cost of the

vessel, though estimated values of this sort are very problematical.

As regards insurance of freight, it was further suggested that the

Shipowner should not, in case of total loss, be entitled to recover

his freight, without deducting the expense saved to him by reason

of the loss of the vessel. On the other hand, it was alleged that

the necessity of estimating these uninsured expenses would give rise

to doubt, difficulty, and litigation, and that, if the suggestion

were adopted, the Shipowner would be to a great extent deprived of

the legitimate advantage he now enjoys of being able to obtain with

facility an advance on his freight.

[Sidenote: Opinion of the Commissioners.]

After carefully considering all these matters, the Commissioners

arrived at the conclusion that they ought not to recommend any

alteration of the law with regard to valued policies in cases of total

loss, as there were weighty reasons against any interference on the

part of the Legislature with contracts made by persons capable of

taking care of their own interests, without carefully ascertaining the

effect this interference was likely to produce on the entire system

of law relating to such contracts. But they were of opinion that the

“whole system of insurance law requires complete revision, for not only

does it allow the assured, in some cases, to recover more than the

amount of the loss actually sustained by him, but it also, on the other

hand, deprives him of an indemnity in cases in which he ought to be

protected by his insurance.”

The Commissioners, however, with great force, remark, that “a complete

and thorough revision of our laws relating to marine insurance is a

task of equal importance, difficulty, and delicacy, requiring evidence

of an extensive character, and necessitating a very lengthy and careful

investigation, and it touches directly on so many subjects unconnected

with the security of life at sea, on which it has only an indirect

and somewhat remote bearing, that we do not think it properly falls

within the scope of our commission. We should also have been reluctant

to undertake the complete revision of our system of marine insurance

law, because, for many reasons, it appears to us to be important that,

before such a task is undertaken, an attempt should be made to induce

foreign nations to concur with us in framing and adopting a general

code of insurance law. To alter the English law of marine insurance

to any considerable extent, might have the effect of throwing the

business of insurance into the hands of foreigners, and there is so

much insurance of foreign property in England, as well as of English

property abroad, that it is most desirable that the law of insurance

should, as far as possible, be the same among all commercial nations.

An examination of the foreign codes leads us to hope that there would

be found no insuperable difficulty in the way of attaining this

important object.”

Although the Commissioners do not at present recommend any alteration

to be made in the law relating to valued policies, they think that the

Shipowner should not be able to recover his insurance, whether under

a time or voyage policy, in cases where it is shown that he or his

agent had not done everything reasonably within their power to make and

maintain the ship in a seaworthy condition, where that unseaworthiness

occasioned the loss. They further consider that the Shipowner’s

liability for damage to property or person should be unlimited in cases

involving the death of the seaman or the damage to person or property.

They are also of opinion that the present system by which insurance

cases are tried before a judge and jury is altogether unsatisfactory,

as a single judge and two assessors would constitute a far better

tribunal. In conclusion, they recommend that the Marine Department of

the Board should be revised and strengthened by having a legal adviser

exclusively attached to it (a recommendation which has been since

carried out). “It will,” they remark, “be the duty of the Board of

Trade to check the negligent and to punish the culpable shipowner,

but it is desirable that these functions should be performed without

harassing the great body of Shipowners, who, by their ability and

indefatigable energy, have contributed to the prosperity of the empire.”

I have now endeavoured to give as succinct an account of the whole

course of the maritime legislation of the British Empire and its

effects upon ships, seamen, and commerce as my space will permit, from

the earliest period up to the close of the year 1875. Although it is

not the province of an historian to enter upon controversial questions,

much less to dive into the future, yet history is of little value

unless we can gain knowledge from the past which can be made useful

hereafter. I may therefore be permitted to close this volume with a few

remarks on the subject of further maritime legislation, especially as

the subject is one to which an unusual amount of public attention has

been devoted during the last two or three years, and as it has been,

officially, announced that it will be again dealt with by Government in

the ensuing Session of Parliament.

[Sidenote: Too much legislation already.]

Shipowners say that there is far too much legislation already, and I

certainly agree with them; but when they charge the Government as they

do, and especially the Board of Trade, or rather Mr. T. H. Farrer,

as its permanent Secretary, with forcing all this over-legislation

upon them, I must remind them of the facts. What Government did, and

did wisely and well, as I have endeavoured to show, was to frame such

mercantile marine laws as had become essential after the repeal of the

Navigation Laws. The laws then passed have, unquestionably, been of

great service, not merely to the nation, but to Shipowners themselves.

Having completed all that was considered necessary, Government directed

its attention to the amendment, as cases for its necessity arose, and

to the consolidation of existing laws; and I can, of my own knowledge,

state that Mr. Farrer has, since then, opposed all further legislation

which had for its object the interference with the details of a

Shipowner’s duty. But the House of Commons would not allow Government

to rest with its good work. “Independent members” of that House,

actuated by various motives, some of them not very clearly defined,

commenced to “amend” (?) in their own way, these laws (see Hansard’s

‘Reports of Parliamentary Proceedings’), by proposing numerous fresh

clauses and fresh Bills which, if Government had not resisted, would

most likely have doubled the existing number of the mercantile marine

statutes. They next commenced to introduce Bills of their own, to teach

Shipowners how to construct and equip their vessels. Among the first

of these measures was the Act to test chains and anchors, introduced

by Sir J. D. H. Elphinstone and the late Mr. John Laird. So far from

that Bill receiving the approval of Government, when I moved its

rejection,[310] was strongly supported by Mr. Milner Gibson, the then

President of the Board of Trade. We were, however, defeated, and the

Bill passed and became law.

Encouraged by this success, other independent members followed,

and, since then, most of the measures connected with the mercantile

marine of this country have been forced upon Government either by

Bills introduced by individual members, or by questions asked, or by

deputations from interested constituencies, or “philanthropists,” who,

however good in their intentions, are, too frequently, mischievously

ignorant of the subjects they force upon the attention of Parliament.

No one of my readers conversant with these matters can say that the

Bills of the last three or four years, except so far as necessary

amendments, were Government measures. They were nearly all forced upon

the executive, while the only real and valuable measure of Government,

the consolidation and codification of existing laws, has been, Session

after Session, rejected, or, at least, “shunted” aside by the House of

Commons.

For more than two centuries we attempted to regulate our maritime

commerce by means of the Navigation Laws and their innumerable

additions and amendments, the fallacy of which I have endeavoured in

these volumes to expose; yet we are now following the same course our

forefathers adopted by attempting, by means of a library of Mercantile

Marine Laws, to regulate the details of the business of our Shipowners.

Commerce, in all its branches, flourishes most when left alone. Leave

our Shipowners alone, except when they do wrong. Leave them to manage

their own affairs in such a manner as they consider most conducive to

their own interests, and we may rest assured that, if they have a fair

and free field and no special favours, they will maintain, against all

nations, the maritime supremacy of England.

[Sidenote: Necessity of a Mercantile Marine Code,]

My advice, therefore, to the House of Commons, if an old member may

venture to give it, would be to do nothing next Session in the way

of fresh legislation, but to confine itself to necessary amendments,

and to the codification of existing laws, so that Shipowners may have

one law for their guidance; at present they are bewildered by the

numerous fragmentary laws now in force. But, in addition to whatever

reorganisation and changes may be found necessary, increased facilities

would still seem requisite for the immediate payment of seamen’s wages

on their discharge; and, though the mode of inquiry into the causes of

the loss of life and property at sea has already been altered, greater

rigour is still demanded for such inquiries, and more prompt means of

detecting and punishing persons who ignorantly or negligently lose the

vessels in which they serve. In cases of wilful loss, which I hope

and believe are of rare occurrence, the law cannot be too prompt, too

stringent, nor too severe. A man who _wilfully_ loses his ship, I

rank without hesitation with the “villain and the murderer.”

[Sidenote: and of more prompt punishment in criminal cases.]

Nor should I have much more mercy on the Shipowner who recklessly

loses his ship, or who is accessory to her loss; and I should subject

to punishment, though in a different and more modified form, any

Shipowner who, either ignorantly or negligently, sends his ship to sea

in an unseaworthy state. In these matters, the law is still open to

improvement, both as regards greater facilities for the discovery of

crime and its prompt punishment, arising, as this does, in no small

degree, from its too complex character.

Although the Shipowner is now made liable for criminal neglect, and

cannot, by contract, relieve himself from this liability, such neglect

is difficult of proof, and a jury deciding against a Shipowner on

a question of damages, may, often, hesitate to make him criminally

responsible. If it were possible to enforce this liability in all cases

where guilty; if every Shipowner were made to feel that the proper

construction, equipment, loading, manning, and navigation of his ship

were matters to which it was his duty to attend, and if these duties

were enforced, it would produce much more salutary effects in the way

of saving life and property at sea than any Government surveys with

a legion of inspectors at their back: each one of these relieves the

Shipowner from a duty which belongs to him alone, and relieves, or, at

the least, might relieve, him from a part of his responsibility; for

if, as in the case of compulsory pilotage, a Shipowner is relieved from

responsibility in case of accident, he cannot, in common justice, be

held criminally liable when he has acted in conformity with such laws

as have been passed for his guidance and control.

Whether it would be possible, as has been recommended, to establish

by positive enactment an absolute and indefeasible obligation on the

part of every Shipowner to his shippers, passengers, and underwriters,

that he and the agents to whom he trusts his ships, shall do all in

their power to make and _keep_ his ship seaworthy, is a problem

I am not, at present, prepared to solve; moreover, it raises numerous

questions of great difficulty and delicacy.

Some amendments may be, also, required in the tonnage and measurement

law, which, though, as I have already explained, now a vast

improvement on any previous law, still presents features of hardship

alike on Shipowners and seamen, as, in the case of the latter, frequent

instances occur where the law is evaded by the stowage of cargo or

stores in spaces appointed by the present Act for the accommodation of

the crew.

Such are the leading measures which may still require the attention of

the Legislature; but, before closing my remarks, I desire my readers to

recollect the existence of a Merchant Shipping Code, which has not yet

become law. It embraces all the laws relating to Merchant Shipping, and

if the First Minister would take up this Bill and amend it in detail,

he would not merely confer a boon on the largest shipping community the

world has ever seen, but one by which his name would be long remembered.

If the Legislature did nothing else during the ensuing Session, it

would be a Session well spent: ten clear sittings[311] would, however,

suffice, if there was a determination on both sides of the House to

allow no party spirit to interfere. Nor should any such feeling be

displayed, for the questions now to be considered are almost wholly of

an executive and not of a political character; while all the materials

are now ready, the lengthened inquiries and discussions to which almost

every point except insurance (and on this there must be further inquiry

before there is any legislation) has been already subjected, render

further discussion, in a great measure, unnecessary.

[Sidenote: Concluding remarks on the extraordinary progress of British

shipping.]

I have endeavoured to show how much progress has been made during the

last quarter of a century—a progress eminently due to the repeal of our

Navigation Laws and to many of the earlier measures of the Board of

Trade, in confirmation of which I may point to the magnificent ships

now produced, to the enormous extent of our mercantile fleets,[312] as

compared with those of all other nations, and to the superiority of our

officers to what they were before the repeal of the Navigation Laws.

There is, nevertheless, a wide and noble field in which the statesman

might employ his power and genius to great advantage, and earn for

himself an imperishable name. The means are now in a great measure

at his disposal. But he must decide between two principles. He must

not, on the one hand, give way to the question of sentiment or to

the popular cry that merchant ships and their cargoes shall be under

Government survey, and, at the same time, hold Shipowners responsible

for acts which legislation has placed beyond their control. If he

adopts the former course, he must double or treble the existing staff

of officials; but I venture to warn him that, in so doing, he will

place a canker-worm at the root of our maritime greatness, which

will as surely destroy the mighty fabric we have raised by individual

genius, energy, and skill, as ever did the “dry rot” in our wooden

ships of war and commerce.

Seeing what our Shipowners have already accomplished, he might to

advantage afford them facilities for _self-government_. The

means, as I have shown, are already at his disposal. We have Lloyd’s

Register, with its large staff of competent surveyors ready to aid,

at our disposal, as also a similar association in Liverpool. We have

mercantile marine boards, elected by popular constituencies, at all the

leading seaports in the kingdom, under whose supervision the shipping

officers are now placed, as well as the examination of all masters and

mates. Leave them as they are; but, as I understand that these boards

are not overburdened by the duties now devolving on them, could not

their duties in relation to the crews be extended and some arrangement

be made whereby these different institutions, formed into one, two, or

more central and district boards, might perform all the work of detail

now required by Parliament? By some such amalgamation everything the

country requires could be done more economically and efficiently than

at present.