[150] The first separate Act for regulating passenger ships was the 43
Geo. III. chap. 56. The substance of this Act and of all subsequent
Acts will be found in the Appendix, No. 7, p. 600.
[151] See ‘Fifteenth Report of Emigration Commissioners,’ 1855, p. 1,
and ‘Sixteenth Report,’ 1856, p. 329.
[152] 12 & 13 Vict. chap. lxxxi.
[153] See evidence taken in 1851, more particularly questions 4244,
3878, 3879, &c.
[154] See Captain Beechey’s report on _Annie Jane_, pp. 61, 62.
[155] The United States Passenger Act, passed in 1855, will be found in
Appendix to ‘Fifteenth Report of Emigration Commissioners,’ pp. 106,
107, &c.
[156] Great exertions were made by this country to bring about so
necessary an arrangement, and in 1870, ’71, and ’72, it was nearly
effected; but a question of jurisdiction has since then delayed its
further progress. The pending United States election, and a question
connected with consular jurisdiction, combined with a few other matters
of less importance, now delay the settlement which I trust may soon
be brought about, for nothing can tend so much to the advantage of
two such great nations speaking the same language as free and easy
intercourse.
[157] An excellent compendium of the Act; and the Act itself will be
found in Willmore and Bidell’s ‘Mercantile and Maritime Guide,’ 1856,
223, _et seq._ The rules and Orders in Council are at pp. 244, 245.
[158] But the great cause of improvement was the introduction of steam
ships especially adapted for the purposes of emigration, to which I
shall refer very fully hereafter.
[159] See their annual reports.
[160] As the law is more especially applicable for emigrant ships, the
“statutory damages therein named” are 30_l._ for each person.
[161] This power has only once been put in operation, viz., in the case
of the _John_. Its real importance is only in the cases where
the sufferers are very numerous, and too poor to bring actions for
themselves. In these cases the Board of Trade acts for them.
But, in ordinary cases, the passengers’ relations proceed for
themselves. The owner pays the whole amount for which he is liable into
the Court of Chancery, and that Court distributes it among all who have
claims—whether in respect of life or of property.
The real defects in the Act of 1854 are well pointed out by the
Committee of 1860: viz., first, that the law does not apply to foreign
ships on the high seas, whether plaintiffs or defendants; and,
secondly, that “value of ship and freight” is a premium on bad ships.
These defects, as I have already pointed out, were remedied by the Act
of 1862.
[162] As to the laws of foreign countries, see Evidence before
Committee of 1860; also correspondence in Appendix, No. 3, pp. 571-82,
and correspondence between Mr. Burns and the Board of Trade, Parl.
Paper, No. 236, 19th May, 1871.
[163] The shipowners suggested that every passenger should set a value
on himself before he embarked!!
[164] Report, 23 June, 1858.
[165] Sir William Jones.
[166]
_Steering and Sailing Rules._
Art. 11. If two sailing vessels are meeting end on, or nearly end on,
so as to involve risk of collision, the helms of both shall be put to
port, so that each may pass on the port side of the other.
Art. 12. When two sailing ships are crossing, so as to involve risk of
collision, then, if they have the wind on different sides, the ship
with the wind on the port side shall keep out of the way of the ship
with the wind on the starboard side; except in the case, in which the
ship with the wind on the port side is close-hauled and the other ship
free, in which case, the latter ship shall keep out of the way; but,
if they have the wind on the same side, or if one of them has the wind
aft, the ship which is to windward shall keep out of the way of the
ship which is to leeward.
Art. 13. If two ships under steam are meeting end on, so as to involve
risk of collision, the helms of both shall be put to port, so that each
may pass on the port side of the other.
Art. 14. If two ships under steam are crossing so as to involve risk of
collision, the ship which has the other on her own starboard side shall
keep out of the way of the other.
Art. 15. If two ships, one of which is a sailing ship and the other a
steam-ship, are proceeding in such directions as to involve risk of
collision, _the steam-ship shall keep out of the way_, and pass
astern of the sailing ship.
Art. 16. Every steam-ship, when approaching another ship, so as to
involve risk of collision, shall slacken her speed, or, if necessary,
stop and reverse; and every steam-ship shall, _when in a fog, go at a
moderate speed_.
Art. 17. Every vessel overtaking any other vessel shall keep out of the
way of the said last-mentioned vessel.
Art. 18. Where, by the above rules, one of two ships is to keep out of
the way, the other shall keep her course, subject to the qualifications
contained in the following Article.
Art. 19. In obeying and construing these rules, due regard must be had
to all dangers of navigation; and due regard must also be had to any
special circumstances which may exist in any particular case rendering
a departure from the above rules necessary, in order to avoid immediate
danger.
Art. 20. Nothing, in these rules, shall exonerate any ship, or the
owner or master or crew thereof, from the consequences of any neglect
to carry lights or signals, or of any neglect to keep a proper
look-out, or of the neglect of any precaution which may be required by
the ordinary practice of seamen or by the special circumstances of the
case.
Mr. Thomas Gray, one of the Assistant Secretaries to the Board of Trade
(Marine Department), feeling how important it would be to have these
rules impressed upon the minds of all navigators, and knowing what
effect rhyme has in bringing at once to recollection, for instance, the
number of days in each month, put with great tact and ingenuity these
rules into verse, thus:—
1. Two steam-ships meeting.
“When both side-lights you see ahead,
Port your helm, and show your _red_.”
2. Two steam-ships passing.
“_Green_ to _green_, or _red_ to _red_,
Perfect safety—go ahead.”
3. Two steam-ships crossing.
_Note._—This is the position of greatest danger; there is nothing
for it but _good look-out, caution, and judgment_.
“If to your starboard _red_ appear,
It is your duty to keep clear;
To act as judgment says is proper—
To port, or starboard, back, or stop her!
“But when upon your port is seen
A steamer’s starboard light of _green_,
There’s not so much for you to do,
For _green_ to port keeps clear of you.”
4. All ships must keep a good look-out, and steam-ships _must stop,
and go astern_, if necessary.
“Both in safety and in doubt
Always keep a good look-out;
In danger, with no room to turn,
Ease her—stop her—go astern!”
These appropriate but simple rhymes have been translated into various
languages, and, I doubt not, have been the means of preventing
numerous collisions and other accidents at sea. It may be amusing
and instructive to add that, when the question of lights for ships
and rules of the road at sea were under consideration, the French
Government wrote to our Government proposing a Maritime Congress to
settle them. We replied in substance, “No. A Maritime Congress of
sailors of different nations and languages will be a Babel. But we
will heartily co-operate with you; we will propose a draft of rules
and submit them to you. If France and England can agree on this,
other nations will probably join.” France adopted our proposal most
cordially, and we set to work. At that time we were fortunate enough
to have Mr. Milner Gibson at the Board of Trade, who united, as I
have explained in the text, what scarcely any other man would have
done, perfect knowledge of the subject, a clear, logical, and sensible
understanding, and a remarkable power of making other people agree. Not
without difficulty, a set of rules was, under his leadership, framed
by the Admiralty, the Trinity House and the Board of Trade acting
together. These rules were sent to the French Government. They approved
them, making some valuable criticisms, but, chiefly, criticisms of
detail. We then said, “Now let there be no question of national vanity;
no quarrel as to who originated these rules. Do you publish them in
your _Moniteur_ on a given day, and we will, on the same day,
publish them in our _Gazette_, merely stating that the rules
had been jointly settled by the two Governments.” This, as might have
been supposed, was agreed on. To the surprise, however, of every one
connected with the facts, the _Moniteur_ some time before the
day fixed, published a long story to the following effect:—“That the
French Minister of Marine had long been alive to the dangers to which
navigation was exposed for want of such rules; that he had communicated
his apprehensions to his colleague, the French Foreign Minister,
who sympathised with him; that he, the French Minister of Marine,
thereupon prepared a set of rules, which he sent to his colleague;
that the French Foreign Minister submitted these French rules to the
English Government; that that Government gave them its cordial and
grateful approval; and that both Governments then agreed to adopt them.
Therefore, they were to become law!”
[167] See evidence at great length on this subject before Merchant
Shipping Committee of 1860; and especially before Royal Commission on
unseaworthy ships of 1873-4.
[168] From having been myself trained in the forecastle of a ship, I
am familiar with the character and habits of sailors at sea. Though I
have found among them some worthless characters, as may be found in
all other branches of trade, and a few scheming and clever but bad
men, who were the leaders in all mischief, known frequently as “sea
lawyers,” the sailor at sea is usually an industrious, thrifty, and,
I may add, a sober man. You will find him in the “dog watches,” or
during the Saturday-afternoon holidays, making, mending, or washing
his clothes; his trousers, his chief garment, are cut out from a roll
of canvas stretched on deck, by means of his jack knife, and usually
consist of only two pieces ingeniously stitched together; being,
consequently, too flat behind, but having the highly-approved and
familiar straight legs. He takes a particular interest in his sea-chest
and its contents, and is often to be found arranging them and seeing
that they are all in good order. As he approaches home, after a long
voyage, you may see him figuring with a bit of chalk on the lid of his
chest the amount of wages he will have to receive, and frequently hear
him relating to his shipmates how he intends to dispose of them, and
his mental disposition of them is usually wise and generous. But, as
soon as he goes on shore, his character seems to change, and there he
too frequently throws his hard-earned wages away in drink, folly, and
vice. I had, when a youth, seen something of the sailor in his usual
rendezvous on shore as well as at sea, but nothing good or evil that
I remember worthy of note. Therefore, when changes relating to his
condition and welfare were contemplated, and when, as a member of the
House of Commons, it was likely that I should be expected to aid in
effecting those changes, I resolved to see more of Jack on shore than
I had ever done before. With that object, I frequently dressed in the
rough garb of a coasting skipper or mate. I might have saved myself the
trouble of changing my usual attire, for few knew me then in person,
and, at best, I never looked better than the character I assumed.
Thus attired, I made frequent nightly visits to the public-houses and
dancing saloons in Ratcliffe Highway, and in the vicinity of the London
and St. Katherine’s Docks, the usual haunts of sailors and of their
varied and very questionable “friends.” With my pipe and pint of beer,
I sat often for hours among them, and thoroughly made myself master of
“Jack on shore” and of his depraved companions. Poor fellow! he was,
so long as his money lasted, the victim of them all. Sometimes the
whole of his earnings were lost or stolen from him in the first night’s
debauch. As you entered these gaudy but wretched saloons, you could at
once distinguish in the throng the sailor who had just come on shore,
and the sailor out-of-elbows in search of another ship. I shall not
attempt to describe these places, of which there are still too many
in the East end of London; it is sufficient to state that vice in its
darkest forms, without one redeeming spark, held high revel there.
They were, indeed, loathsome “hells.” I gained from them, however, a
knowledge which I could not otherwise have obtained, and which I hope
proved of some service to the Board of Trade when they were framing
their excellent measures for the improvement of our mercantile marine.
[169] During the year ending 20th November, 1874, 50,182_l._ 15_s._
6_d._ was received at the Seaman’s Savings-banks, and 45,964_l._ 9_s._
10_d._ paid away, leaving to the credit of the seamen depositors, with
interest, 81,116_l._ 1_s_. Since the money-order offices were opened
in 1855, there has been received through these offices at ports in the
United Kingdom and ports abroad, up to the close of 1874, 4,827,093_l._
1_s._ 11_d._, and remitted to 804,208 persons the sum of 4,822,338_l._
14_s._ 8_d_. See Parl. Papers, Seaman’s Savings-banks and Money-orders,
161, 21st April, 1875. I most sincerely trust that Government will do
everything in its power to encourage and induce seamen to make more use
than they now do of these most valuable offices. These and education,
more than stringent legislative enactments, are the instruments whereby
the power of the crimp is to be crushed, and our seamen elevated to the
position of our mechanics.
CHAPTER XIII.
Scarcity of shipping at the commencement of the Crimean
War—Repeal of the manning clause—Government refuses to issue
letters of marque—Great increase of ship-building and high
freights—Reaction—Transport service (_notes_)—Depression
in the United States—The _Great Republic_—Disastrous
years of 1857 and 1858—Many banks stop payment—Shipowners’
Society still attribute their disasters to the repeal of
the Navigation Laws—Meeting of Shipowners, December 15th,
1858—Their proposal—Resolution moved by Mr. G. F. Young—Mr.
Lindsay moves for Committee of Inquiry—Well-drawn petition of
the Shipowners—Foreign governments and the amount of their
reciprocity—French trade—Spanish trade—Portuguese trade—Belgian
trade—British ships in French and Spanish ports—Coasting
trade—Non-reciprocating countries—Presumed advantage of
the Panama route—Question discussed—Was the depression due
to the withdrawal of Protection?—Board of Trade report and
returns—English and foreign tonnage—Sailing vessels and steamers
in home and foreign trades—Shipping accounts, 1858—Foreign and
Colonial trades—Probable causes of the depression in England and
America—American jealousy and competition—Inconclusive reasoning
of Board of Trade—Government proposes to remove burdens on British
shipping—Compulsory reciprocity no longer obtainable—Real value of
the Coasting trade of the United States—Magnanimity of England in
throwing open her Coasting trade unconditionally not appreciated
by the Americans.
[Sidenote: Scarcity of shipping at the commencement of the Crimean War.]
[Sidenote: Repeal of the manning clause.]
The spring of 1852 ushered in the dawn of brighter days for the
disconsolate and “ruined” British shipowner: he could then, at least,
obtain, with prudent management, a moderate remuneration on his
capital, but there was no actual scarcity of tonnage until 1854.
Freights, as we have seen, had no doubt materially risen in the
interval, because we had hesitated to increase the number of our ships,
while foreigners, with the exception of the Americans, had refrained
from rushing into the trade we had opened for them to the alarming
extent anticipated. Consequently, there was, hardly, tonnage enough
to meet the requirements of commerce created by the abolition of our
Navigation Laws, still less to satisfy the sudden demands which arose
when, in March 1854, England and France declared war against Russia.
Suitable vessels could not then be found in sufficient numbers to
send forth, with the requisite despatch, the allied armies and their
supplies to the scene of action; nor, I must add, could British seamen
be obtained to man with expedition our ships of war. Government,
therefore, threw open our Coasting trade, and repealed the once famous
manning clause, which, however, neither increased, on the average,
the number of foreigners we had hitherto been allowed to employ in
our ships, nor deteriorated the number and quality of British seamen,
though aiding, at the time, the more expeditious equipment of our
fleets.
[Sidenote: Government refuses to issue letters of marque.]
But a much more important step affecting the interests of maritime
commerce and the progress of mankind was taken in 1854. On the
declaration of that unfortunate war, her Majesty in Council, in order
to preserve the commerce of neutrals from unnecessary obstruction,
waived the belligerent rights appertaining to the Crown by the law of
nations, by declining to issue letters of marque or by confiscating
neutral property on board of Russian ships, or neutral ships with
Russian property on board, provided such goods were not contraband
of war. She, however, reserved the right of blockade; a reservation
by which I may remind my readers, her Majesty’s subjects were,
commercially, by far the greatest sufferers.[170]
[Sidenote: Great increase of ship-building and high freights.]
The extraordinary demands for shipping on the outbreak of war led
to their production with still more extraordinary rapidity, and
furnished, at the same time, the most convincing proofs that we had
within ourselves resources far beyond all other nations for meeting
the emergency of war, without the necessity of keeping up a large and
expensive standing navy, especially as such a navy must always be in
a state of transition. The high rates of freight then offered for
transports, ranging from 20_s._ to 30_s._ a register-ton
per month for sailing vessels, and from 35_s._ to 65_s._
per gross register-ton for steamers,[171] produced not merely all the
vessels required for our own transport service,[172] but, also, for
the wants of France, whose armies without our aid could not have been
conveyed to the Crimea.[173]
With such rapidity, indeed, were sailing ships produced, that the
supply not merely soon overtook, but greatly exceeded the demand;
the consequence, of course, being a great reaction in prices.
Steam-vessels, in the construction of which there had been a large
amount of speculation, likewise felt ere long the depression, and
before the close of 1855 the rates for these had fallen to 40_s._
and 35_s._ per ton per month: the surplus steamers, however, found
their way, in the end, to the advantage of all concerned, into trades
formerly carried on by sailing vessels.
[Sidenote: Reaction.]
Although the Russian war had created at first an unusual demand for
vessels of every description, and had given an extraordinary impulse to
ship-building, prudent shipowners soon foresaw that so sudden a rush
of prosperity could not long endure without as sudden a revulsion, and
“that it was fallacious to suppose that the same demand would continue
even while the war lasted.”[174]
[Sidenote: Transport service.]
Nor was it less apparent that the number of vessels engaged by
Government exceeded what was _actually_ required for the prosecution
of the war, and that, if hostilities continued, the number would be
materially reduced as soon as something like an organised system had
been established.[175] Such, indeed, proved to be the case; for,
when a temporary Transport Board was appointed, various vessels were
discharged, and the rates of freight for sailing ships, which had
averaged 1_l._ 7_s._ 7_d._ per ton, fell to 15_s._ 10_d._ per ton.
Indeed, there can be no doubt that, had there been a well-organised
board in operation when war was declared, the sea transport service,
which cost this country 15,000,000_l._ sterling during that brief
and unhappy war, would have been far more efficiently conducted for
two-thirds that amount.[176]
Great and unusual depression naturally followed the cessation of
hostilities. Although wars and famines, however unfortunate and
disastrous to the nation, afford rich sources of emolument to
shipowners, the adverse reaction is frequently sudden and severe.
Before the close of 1857, our markets had become so overstocked with
vessels of every kind, that it was hardly possible to obtain for them,
in any branch of trade, remunerative freights.
[Sidenote: Depression in the United States.]
Nor were the Shipowners of the United States in any better position.
They, too, had overbuilt themselves. Their exclusive Californian trade
had offered so many inducements, and, in fact, such large fortunes
had been realised out of it, that many more vessels than could be
profitably employed were built in the Northern States between 1849 and
1854. Some of these were placed on the trade with Europe. A very large
amount of capital had been invested in the famous ships thus employed;
but even these, before the close of 1854, were becoming unremunerative,
owing to the competition of British iron screw-steamers, which I shall
very fully describe hereafter, as they were the main weapon, whereby we
bade defiance to the competition of all other nations, in the general
ocean race then just commenced. As these splendid iron ships soon
commanded all the passenger traffic, and, at the same time, secured
the preference by shippers of high-classed and valuable goods, which
could afford to pay the heaviest rates of freight, many of the American
clippers were obliged to seek employment elsewhere. As the _Great
Republic_[177] was one of the finest, as well as the largest of
these famous vessels—indeed, she was the largest _sailing_ vessel
in the world, I furnish an illustration of her at page 360. But though
this vessel and a large number of the American liners found temporary
employment in the French transport service, they on the cessation of
hostilities were obliged to seek employment elsewhere; and, so great
was the depression, that American shipowners, in 1857, suffered quite
as much as did the generality of those persons who owned sailing
vessels in Great Britain. Indeed, on the 1st January of the following
year, there was not a single vessel building on the stocks of New
York for the mercantile marine, and, for many months previously, the
shipbuilders throughout the United States had been at a complete
standstill.
[Illustration: THE “GREAT REPUBLIC.”]
[Sidenote: Disastrous years of 1857 and 1858.]
But all branches of trade throughout the world were now suffering to
a greater or less extent, and 1857 and 1858 will long be remembered
as gloomy years. The outbreak of the mutiny in India, the consequent
suspension of remittances from the East, and the demand for specie,
together with an uninterrupted outflow of the precious metals to the
Continent, led to an alarming drain of the bullion in the Bank of
England.
[Sidenote: Many banks stop payment.]
After a long struggle to maintain cash payments without pressing unduly
on the mercantile classes, the rate of discount rose so high as to
render necessary, for the second time, the temporary suspension of the
Bank Charter Act of 1844. The effect of this twice-repeated measure
was disastrous to many merchants engaged in the trade of the United
States; not a few of whom were obliged to suspend payment. The stoppage
of the Northumberland and Durham district Bank, with liabilities
amounting to 3,000,000_l._ sterling; as well as those of the
Western Bank of Scotland, which had been engaged in wild speculations
in the United States and elsewhere, with liabilities to the extent
of 8,911,000_l._, and that also of the City of Glasgow Bank for
6,000,000_l._, tended materially to increase the depression.
The Liverpool Borough Bank, which had been previously drained by
the insolvency of various mushroom speculators in ships, failed
for 5,000,000_l._, and the Wolverhampton Bank followed for
1,000,000_l._ Many private mercantile firms, also, whose
liabilities alone were variously computed at a sum not far short of
20,000,000_l._, were, at the same period, obliged to suspend
payment.
[Sidenote: Shipowners’ Society still attribute their failures to the
repeal of the Navigation Laws.]
Through such overwhelming disasters, it was hardly to be expected that
the Shipowners of Great Britain would pass unscathed, especially after
the prosperity they had enjoyed during the Crimean War. Nevertheless,
the General Shipowners’ Society of London, in the report of the
annual meeting, held on the 25th June, 1858, does not appear to have
attributed the cause of the depression under which Shipowners were
suffering to the revulsion in commercial affairs. On the contrary, they
still held the strange delusion, that, so far as they were concerned,
the repeal of our Navigation Laws, together with the absence of
reciprocity on the part of foreign nations, were the main causes of
suffering: curiously enough, too, the report attributed some portion
of their misfortunes to the Merchant Shipping Act of 1854, and the
Passenger Act of the following year.
Having thus, as they conceived, ample grounds for an appeal to
Government, they, like the frogs before Jupiter, made an effort to
induce Lord Derby, their great friend and patron, and then Prime
Minister, to relieve their depressed fortunes.
Nor was this agitation for relief confined to the Shipowners’ Society
of London. Aberdeen, Dundee, Newcastle, Shields, and various other
ports on the north-east coast, where, perhaps, foreign competition was
most severely felt, sent in petitions to Parliament; while numerous
pamphlets appeared in which the ostensible cause of the Shipowners’
suffering was duly set forth. We had the old stories retold of the huge
Yankee ships eating up all their profits in the Indian trade, told,
too, at a time when American shipowners were suffering quite as much as
themselves. Nor did the authors of these pamphlets fail to remind us of
our old hobgoblins, the Swedes and Norwegians, who, faring sumptuously
on “black-bread,” were carrying all before them in the Northern Seas
and in the Mediterranean, to the irretrievable ruin of the hapless
British shipowners.
Such tales of sorrow from the outports, including Liverpool, Glasgow,
and those on the west coast of Scotland, where not a few of these
“ruined” men had realised handsome fortunes during the Crimean War,
made a deep impression on the bosom of the General Shipowners’ Society
of London, whose hearts had been softened by their own “losses.”[178]
They, too, as we have seen, entirely coincided with their brethren
of the outports as to the cause of the depression: and, while it was
resolved to continue pouring in the petitions to Parliament expressive
of their views and praying for relief, and, also, to stir up an
agitation through the medium of pamphlets and that portion of the
press which entertained similar opinions to their own, it was likewise
considered desirable to make a combined effort by the means of a public
meeting to be held in London, so that their sufferings and their wrongs
might become generally known among all classes of the community.
[Sidenote: Meeting of Shipowners, December 15th, 1858.]
[Sidenote: Their proposal.]
This meeting was consequently held at the London Tavern on the 15th
December, 1858. The chairman, however, Mr. Duncan Dunbar, then one
of the greatest individual shipowners in the kingdom, in opening the
proceedings, declared that no idea was entertained of asking for
a reversal of recent legislation, the delegates from the outports
having previously come to the resolution to limit their demands to the
consideration of the question of reciprocity, praying the Crown at the
same time to put in motion the clauses of the Navigation Repeal Act,
which authorize the Queen to retaliate on such foreign Powers as should
refuse reciprocity, and to place the ships of these countries on, as
nearly as possible, the same footing as that in which British ships are
placed in the ports of such country.
Volumes of statistics were brought forward by Mr. George Frederick
Young, who appeared as chief spokesman, and, as heretofore, the
undaunted champion of his party, to show that, though British shipping
had increased since the repeal of the Navigation Laws, foreign vessels
frequenting our ports had done so in a far greater proportion. Mr.
Young repudiated the idea—the “delusion”—that consumers were benefited
by the reduction of freight to the full extent of the difference which
must exist between the sum paid to the English carrier and the rate of
freight paid to his foreign competitor; and concluded his remarks by a
resolution to the effect that the existing “most deplorable and ruinous
depression” had been partly caused, and was greatly aggravated by the
unequal competition to which British shipping was exposed by the repeal
of the Navigation Laws. Other speakers from Liverpool, Glasgow, Hull,
Shields, Montrose, Dundee, and Aberdeen described the state of affairs
in their several localities; and, finally, a petition to the Queen was
agreed on, recapitulating the progress of legislation on the Navigation
Laws, and alleging that the apprehensions entertained when that measure
passed were fully verified by the result.
Similar meetings were held in various other parts of the country,
including Tynemouth and North Shields, which I then represented, and
a wish was intimated to me from those places that I should bring the
state of the shipping interest under the notice of the House of Commons.
Although I entertained very different views to those expressed at
these meetings, I felt, nevertheless, that our Shipowners had many
just causes for complaint; and that, though it was now alike beyond
the power of the Legislature to control the rising destinies of other
and rival nations, or even confine their mercantile marine within the
narrow limits prescribed by our jealousy, so as to remove all dread
of foreign competition, there were yet many burdens from which they
ought to be relieved, and many restrictions, to which they would never
have been subjected by the State, had it not been considered that they
derived peculiar benefits from the laws so long enforced for their
supposed advantage.
[Sidenote: Mr. Lindsay moves for a Committee of Inquiry.]
Accordingly I moved for a committee “to inquire into the operation of
certain burdens specially affecting merchant shipping,” which after an
interesting debate the House was pleased to grant.
But the committee had scarcely assembled when Parliament was dissolved,
and it was not until a new Parliament had met, that the subject was
again brought under the notice of the House of Commons. In the meantime
the Shipowners’ Society of London had urged Government, in a letter
of the 22nd February, 1859, for a reply to their petition praying the
Queen to exercise the powers vested in her, and to put in force the
retaliatory clause of the Repeal Act of 1849.
[Sidenote: Well-drawn petition of the Shipowners.]
This petition, I must state, was short and exceedingly well drawn.
It gracefully avoided all matters of detail and controversy; the
petitioners approached her Majesty, “animated by the most profound
sentiments of loyalty,” for which, indeed, I must add the Shipowners of
the United Kingdom have ever been conspicuous; they represented “the
ruinous state of depression” into which their interest was “plunged,”
and they “implored” her Majesty “to be pleased to extend to that
important national interest such assistance and relief as her Majesty
was enabled to afford to it through the exercise of those powers which
were vested by law in the Crown.”[179]
The petition was signed by the chairman, Mr. Dunbar, as representative
of the meeting; by Mr. George Marshall, as chairman of the General
Shipowners’ Society; and by deputies from most of the leading seaports
of the kingdom. From the weight and high character of the persons who
had signed this petition, Government could not do otherwise than attach
considerable importance to it, however much they may have differed
from the mode of relief the memorialists prayed Her Majesty to adopt.
Indeed, the time had arrived when it was desirable for Government to
review the effects really produced by the repeal of the Navigation
Laws, and to inquire into the burdens and restrictions to which British
Shipowners were still subjected. Nor was it less necessary to direct
attention to the state of foreign legislation with regard to British
shipping, since the removal by us of all restrictions on the vessels
of foreign nations engaged in the trade of the United Kingdom and her
possessions. As the exposition of the bearing of these questions,
necessarily, furnishes a complete insight into the Merchant Shipping
of the country at that period, it is my duty to furnish the report of
Government, if not in detail, at least at greater length than I might
otherwise have done.
[Sidenote: Foreign Governments and the amount of their reciprocity.]
In this carefully considered document, it was, authoritatively,
announced that France, Spain, and Portugal, where partial restrictions
on the ships of other nations were still maintained, were the only
foreign Governments which had not extended complete reciprocity to
British ships so far as regards the foreign oversea carrying trade.
[Sidenote: French trade.]
In France, under the treaty of 1826, British and French ships were on a
footing of equality in the direct trade between the two countries; but,
in the indirect foreign trade, in the colonial, and in the coasting
trades of that country, British ships still laboured under serious
disabilities.
[Sidenote: Spanish trade.]
In Spain, British ships were placed on a footing of equality with
Spanish ships as regards all port and navigation dues, by a Royal
order of September, 1852, having been, previously, subjected to heavy
differential charges. But an excess of 20 per cent. was still levied
on goods imported in foreign ships in the indirect trade, and, to this
extent, British navigation was still unfairly treated there.
[Sidenote: Portuguese trade.]
[Sidenote: Belgian trade.]
Restrictions were also maintained in Portugal on foreign ships in the
indirect and colonial trades. In addition to the case of the above
three countries, it must be also mentioned that, in Belgium, there was
still charged a duty of 1_s._ 1¼_d._ per 100 kilogrammes on
salt, when imported in British vessels, while in Belgian and Sardinian
ships this article was free. But, in spite of this disability, the
total tonnage of the two countries, respectively, entered and cleared,
with cargoes or in ballast, in the direct trade, was, in 1857, only
143,341 tons, while the British shipping employed in it that year
amounted to upwards of 364,000 tons.
[Sidenote: British ships in French and Spanish ports.]
It was admitted that the pursuance of this restrictive policy would
fully justify retaliation, more especially in the case of France and
Spain; but the results exhibited in the appended Return[180] show
that the trade transferable, by any such measure, from foreign to
British ships was comparatively so small, as neither to operate as an
inducement to the countries in question to relax their present system,
nor to afford any material addition to British shipping. Another
Return,[181] also, showing the total amount of British tonnage which
entered and cleared in French and Spanish ports respectively in the
indirect trade in each year, from 1853 to 1857 inclusive, proves, to
how small an extent, the shipping of these countries engaged in the
indirect trade with the United Kingdom; the result being, that, in
spite of the unequal restrictions, there was a larger amount of British
tonnage employed in the indirect trade with those countries, than of
the tonnage of such countries, respectively, in the indirect trade
of the United Kingdom, to which they were admitted on equal terms
with British ships. Further, the accounts accessible in Portugal,
however imperfect, were sufficient to afford conclusive evidence that
the British flag in no respect suffered from the competition of that
country. Indeed, the total tonnage of Portuguese ships which entered
and cleared in the direct and indirect trades of the United Kingdom in
1857 was only 56,606 tons, whereas the British tonnage employed in the
direct trade alone with Portugal amounted in the same year to 234,423
tons.
If a comparison were made between the relative employment of British
and French tonnage in the whole trade of France and the United Kingdom,
respectively, direct as well as indirect, it would appear that, in
1857, the total amount of British tonnage in French ports was equal
to two-thirds of the French tonnage in its own ports; while, in the
same year, the total French tonnage in British ports was, of course,
in a very small proportion, indeed, to the amount of British tonnage
in British ports, and considerably less than one-half of the amount of
British tonnage at French ports. Similar results were shown in the
case of Spain.
[Sidenote: Coasting trade.]
Previously to the opening[182] of the coasting trade of the United
Kingdom, British ships were admitted on equal terms with the National
ships in the coasting trades of Hanover, Belgium, Oldenburg,
Mecklenburg, Holland, Turkey (except foreign steamers for the
Bosphorus), Monte Video, Paraguay, New Granada, and China. But, in
consequence of that measure, the coasting trades of Norway and Sweden,
Denmark, Prussia, Sardinia, and Tuscany were, likewise, opened to
British ships on the same footing as national vessels.
[Sidenote: Non-reciprocating countries.]
The coasting trade, however, of the following countries was still
withheld from British ships, and reserved for the national flag, viz.,
France, Papal States, Two Sicilies, Russia, Austria, Spain, Portugal,
Greece, United States of America (as regards goods), Mexico, Peru,
Chili, Brazil, La Plata, Venezuela, and Hayti.
As in the case of foreign trade, the Queen, in the exercise of the
powers vested in her, might, doubtless, with perfect justice, exclude
the shipping of these countries from the coasting trade of the United
Kingdom; but, in this branch of trade, even more than in that of
foreign trade, such a measure would have proved almost wholly valueless
to the shipping of the United Kingdom.
The tonnage of each foreign State, engaged in the coasting trade of the
United Kingdom in the year 1857 was absolutely insignificant, and, for
all practical purposes, is still virtually monopolised by
British shipping.[183] It will be observed that, both in the foreign
and in the coasting trades, the countries which have reciprocated
the liberal policy of the United Kingdom are those which have most
benefited by the repeal of our restrictions, while the countries which
continue to maintain unequal restrictions on British ships, and against
which, alone, any measure of retaliation could have been directed, are
those which have derived little or no advantage from the opening of
British trade.
There is one other case noticed in the Board of Trade Report to
which it is desirable again to advert, in considering the question
of reciprocity, as this case has been made the subject of frequent
complaint, viz., the exclusion of British ships from the trade between
the Atlantic and Pacific ports of the United States of America.
The Government of that country has reserved, as we have seen, this
trade to the national flag. In this report it is stated that they have
done so, on the ground of its being a Coasting trade; and that they
are supported, by analogy, in several other countries under similar
geographical conditions: for example, the trade between the Atlantic
and the Mediterranean coasts of France and Spain.[184] And, further,
that, with reference to the technical difficulty, it would not be
competent for the Queen, under the retaliatory clauses alluded to, to
exclude United States ships from any branch of British trade, except
the coasting trade of the United Kingdom; and it had been shown that
the share of this trade enjoyed by the United States was so small,
that such a measure could neither injure the United States nor benefit
British shipping.
[Sidenote: Presumed advantage of the Panama route.]
It was thought, moreover, that the value of this branch of trade on the
American coast had been greatly overrated. In the first place, it was
obvious that every year would diminish its importance if the surmise
was correct that the bulk of the trade between the two sea-boards
of the North American continent would shortly be carried across the
Isthmus of Panama, and would thus, be placed at the disposal of British
ships.[185]
[Sidenote: Question discussed.]
Whatever opinion may be formed concerning the validity of this
comparison, the Board of Trade assured the Shipowners that the Queen’s
Government had held on this question, that, although the inter-Oceanic
trade of the United States might, in a strictly technical sense, be
properly defined as a Coasting trade,[186] yet, on the broad ground of
international equity, it should rather be regarded as analogous to the
trade between the United Kingdom and her distant dependencies, and that
British ships were, therefore, fairly entitled to participate in the
former, in return for the complete assimilation of the United States to
the British flag in the latter field of profitable employment.
It should, however, be remarked that, with reference to this question,
the reservation of the coasting trade to national vessels does not
appear to apply to the carriage of passengers; so that, as far as
can be ascertained, foreign vessels lie under no disability in the
transport of passengers coastwise from port to port of the United
States of America.
[Sidenote: Was the depression due to the withdrawal of Protection?]
It remains now to inquire how far such depression can be, in truth,
attributed to the withdrawal of protection from British shipping, and
to the consequent unrestricted competition with the shipping of other
countries; for it is, only, by an examination into general results,
that any satisfactory conclusions upon this question can be arrived at.
Now it is inseparable from the nature of all great changes of system
that particular interests must, occasionally, suffer from causes which
contribute to the general good; it is, therefore, possible in this
instance, that particular trades may have been injuriously affected,
while the general interests of British shipping have been promoted.
The statistical accounts of British tonnage employed at any given
time afford a very imperfect test of the actual condition of the
shipping interest, the more so as shipping is often employed with very
inadequate remuneration; but this remark does not apply to periods
of time extending over several years; hence, the shipping returns of
the nine years since the repeal of the Navigation Laws may be fairly
held to supply sufficient evidence of the influence that measure has
exercised on the permanent interests of British shipping.
[Sidenote: Board of Trade report and returns.]
Consequently a table was prepared by the Board of Trade to show the
total aggregate tonnage of British and foreign vessels, respectively,
entered and cleared, with cargoes and in ballast, at ports of the
United Kingdom in each year from 1842 to 1857 inclusive, a period
comprehending eight years before and eight years after the repeal of
the Navigation Laws.[187]
[Sidenote: English and foreign tonnage.]
It will be seen from this table that during the first period British
tonnage advanced from 6,699,995 tons in 1842 to 9,669,638 in 1849,
being an increase of 2,969,643 tons.
In the second period it advanced from 9,442,544 tons in 1850 to
13,694,107 tons in 1857, being an increase of 4,251,563 tons.
In the same period the progress in the employment of foreign tonnage
in the trade of the United Kingdom has been from 1842, 2,457,479 tons;
to 1849, 4,334,750 tons; increase 1,877,271 tons. From 1850, 5,062,520
tons; to 1857, 9,484,685 tons; increase 4,422,165 tons.
It must be borne in mind, that these tables only show the state of
the trades before the repeal was completely carried out for British
and, partially so, to foreign ships, and that, in order to estimate the
full effect of the measure on British shipping, it is necessary, also,
to show the number of British ships built and registered during the
respective periods.[188]
There are two features in these returns deserving special notice.
1st. According to the opinion of the Board of Trade this account shows
a larger relative increase than that of the previous returns relating
to the employment of tonnage, while it, at the same time, confirms
the hypothesis that many British ships now find an employment in the
indirect trade of foreign countries, which, of course, does not appear
in the accounts rendered in England. Indeed, during the period of
protection, there was an actual decrease in the amount of tonnage built
and registered, while a large increase took place in the second period
of open competition.
[Sidenote: Sailing vessels and steamers in home and foreign trades.]
The next account shows the number and tonnage of registered sailing and
steam vessels of the United Kingdom employed in the home and foreign
trades respectively (_excluding repeated voyages_).[189]
On this return it is to be observed that there has been a greater
progress in the tonnage engaged in the foreign trade, where competition
exists, than in the home trade, where, although that competition is
also allowed by law, it is only carried out to a trifling extent in
practice, the latter having only advanced from 719,815 to 860,406 tons,
while the former has advanced from 2,089,037 to 3,168,105.
It now remains to consider the shipping accounts for 1858.[190] These
exhibited a decline as compared with those of the preceding years, and
to this extent gave indications of the depression of which Shipowners
so much complained.
The accounts of December 1858 and January 1859,[191] if taken
separately, showed that a favourable reaction had already commenced,
and that British shipping was, in the spring of 1859, recovering from
the depression it had suffered; and this fact was, naturally, much
dwelt on by the champions of repeal, confirming, as it was supposed to
do, the opinion expressed on the temporary and accidental character
of this depression. This account, also, illustrates the state of the
merchant shipping of England at a period preceding a continental war.
[Sidenote: Foreign and Colonial trades.]
It was pointed out with a certain degree of triumph, that these
three accounts, when taken together, afforded satisfactory evidence
that, down to the close of 1857, the progress of British shipping
had suffered no check nor reverse, and that the great development
of the foreign tonnage, employed in the trade of the United Kingdom
during recent years, was only partly attributable to the repeal of the
Navigation Laws in 1849, the progress of foreign shipping in British
trade having been nearly as rapid in the period of eight years prior to
1850 in consequence of the increasing requirements of British commerce.
The reason of the decline exhibited in the accounts for 1858 must,
therefore, be sought from other causes; and, probably, the commercial
history of the previous few years is amply sufficient to afford
the required explanation; moreover, any loss we might, thereby,
have sustained was more than counterbalanced by the extraordinary
development of the foreign and colonial trades of the United Kingdom
during the ten years preceding 1859.[192]
[Sidenote: Probable causes of the depression in England and America.]
The commercial crisis, however, which occurred on both sides of the
Atlantic, at the close of 1857, necessarily operated injuriously
upon the progress of English trade, and consequently on English
shipping. It must be also remembered that the Russian war, and,
subsequently, the disturbances in British India, created a large and
_abnormal_ demand for tonnage, which ceased with the termination
of those temporary causes; and, as tonnage employed exclusively in the
Government transport service, does not appear in the preceding account,
it is probable that, during 1858, there was a still greater check to
the demand for tonnage than is therein expressed.
The temporary depression was, however, by no means confined to the
shipping of the United Kingdom, as we have shown; similar symptoms had
manifested themselves in other maritime countries.[193]
[Sidenote: American jealousy and competition.]
Although the competition of British shipping in steam navigation had
been the subject of loud complaint in America, it will be found that
the decline in the building and employment of British shipping in 1858
was not so great in proportion as that which was indicated by the
annual accounts of the imports and exports of the United Kingdom for
that year.[194]
[Sidenote: Inconclusive reasoning of Board of Trade.]
The Board of Trade argued, but very inconclusively, with reference to
the free supply of foreign tonnage for the requirements of British
trade, that if, during the exceptional circumstances of recent years,
British commerce had been obliged to depend on British shipping alone
to the extent which was necessary before 1850, an artificial stimulus
would have been given to the demand for British ships, which could
not have been sustained, and that, therefore, the whole weight of the
reaction would have fallen upon British shipping, instead of being
diffused, as was the case, among the whole tonnage employed in British
trade.
Upon this preposterous conclusion no argument can be raised: as
well might it be said that a man ought not to be individually
prosperous, lest the revulsion of adversity should be too great for
him, especially if not diffused among his rivals in trade. At last,
Government arrived at this conclusion about the condition of merchant
shipping, that they could not attribute the actual depression of
British shipping to the effects of increased competition with foreign
shipping consequent on the repeal of the Navigation Laws; but that,
considering the importance of the shipping interest in a national point
of view, it was desirable that all partial and unequal burdens to which
the shipping interest was still subject should be removed as soon as
practicable. In this spirit, the repeal of the differential duty on
foreign timber as the raw material of shipbuilding, and the abolition
of passing tolls and other local burdens, which were still maintained
without any equivalent in the shape of services rendered to shipping,
were questions which deserved immediate consideration.
[Sidenote: Compulsory reciprocity no longer obtainable.]
[Sidenote: Government proposes to remove burdens on British shipping.]
It cannot be denied that this very elaborate exposition of the state
of merchant shipping completely cut the ground from under those
Shipowners who still advocated Protection. They, however, went on
cavilling “for a principle,” and contended that the Spanish and French
trades for instance might become valuable to the British Shipowner if
the Governments of France and Spain would adopt the liberal policy
pursued by England towards them in this respect; whereas, under the
existing restrictions, British Shipowners lost many valuable charters,
and were prevented from completing voyages otherwise profitable. The
Shipowners refused to allow the validity of the argument, that the
British Shipowner carried on a greater business in the indirect trade
with France and Spain than the French and Spanish Shipowners in the
indirect trade with England, and that, therefore, retaliation would
neither operate as an inducement to those countries to relax their
system, nor afford material addition to the field of employment of
British shipping. They contended that the commercial navy of this
country was larger than that of France and Spain combined; that,
therefore, the Shipowners of these countries had not the means of
engaging in an oversea trade to the same extent as the Shipowners of
England, and that, consequently, the superior energy of the British
Shipowner ought not be pleaded as a barrier to an act of justice.
Nor did it, in their opinion, follow that, because the engagement of
the Spaniard and Frenchman in the indirect trade with England was
not larger and more active than that of the British Shipowners in
the indirect trade with France and Spain, there was no inducement to
the Governments of those countries to relax the present restrictive
system, and no prospect, in the event of such relaxation, of increased
employment of British shipping in the direction indicated. In fact, the
London Shipowners thought the argument was entirely the other way, and
would not be convinced to the contrary, whatever relative prosperity
they might enjoy.
[Sidenote: Real value of the Coasting trade of the United States.]
With regard to the Coasting trade, all parties were agreed that the
Americans acted selfishly in denying to England the same reciprocity
for the coasting trade, which she had unrestrictedly conceded to them.
The Shipowners, however, by no means acquiesced in the opinion given
by the Board of Trade, that “the value of the American Coasting trade
had been greatly overestimated.” They said, and with reason, that it
was an error to imagine that because San Francisco formed the limit
of the United States’ coasting trade, the entrances and clearances at
that port exhibited the entire amount of the trade along the American
seaboard.
[Sidenote: Magnanimity of England in throwing open her Coasting trade
unconditionally not appreciated by the Americans.]
It was, indeed, an evasion to say that the American coasting trade,
meaning the western coast only, never afforded employment to more than
200,000 tons of American ships. The records of these pages afford
proofs to the contrary. All mention of the trade between the ports
of the Northern States and those of the Gulf of Mexico is, for some
reason or other, suppressed. All the vast and lucrative carrying trade
between New York and Boston, New Orleans and Mobile and Charleston, is
studiously kept out of view; trades far more valuable than that of San
Francisco and of the whole western coast, collectively. The argument,
therefore, set up by the Board of Trade, “that the participation
of the Californian trade, however desirable, cannot be regarded as
a circumstance which could exercise any important influence on the
shipping interests of Great Britain,” was altogether unsatisfactory.
Magnanimous as it was of the English Legislature to throw open the
foreign, as well as the colonial commerce and navigation of the Empire,
and the coasting trade afterwards, without imposing any previous
conditions, such a liberal policy has, evidently, been unappreciated by
the Americans, who seem resolved to monopolise all advantages resulting
from their geographical position.
FOOTNOTES:
[170] See _ante_, vol. ii. _note_, page 312.
[171] Timber freights from Quebec rose from 30_s._ per load, the
ordinary rate, to 55_s._ Coal freights to Constantinople advanced
from 20_l._ to 70_l._ per keel of twenty-one tons four cwt.;
and freights from India, which had previously ranged from 50_s._
to 80_s._, ran up as high as 180_s._ per ton.
[172] The new law of admeasurement, which came into operation on the
1st of January, 1855, while it produced great improvement in the
models of our ships, had the important advantage of creating very
little difference in the gross tonnage of the Empire, on which so
many dues are levied, and thus rendered unnecessary any change in the
long-established scale of charges, which in many cases would have been
altogether impracticable. For instance, 1100 vessels, large and small,
which were taken promiscuously, measuring under the old law 248,842
tons, were found under the new law to measure 231,277 tons, showing a
difference of only 7 per cent.
[173] My own firm had somewhere about 100,000 tons of shipping (a large
proportion of which consisted of steam-vessels) under our management
engaged as transports for the Government of France. It was then that I
for the first time met the Emperor. I had occasion to visit Marseilles
with regard to the fitting of some of these ships, and, on my return to
Paris, I had an interview with Marshal Vaillant, the then Minister of
War, which led to an audience with his Majesty. I daresay the Emperor
had sent for me to confirm, or otherwise, certain calculations of
his own which he had been making as to the number of ships requisite
to transport a given number of men, and so forth; for, after a long
audience, I remarked at parting, “Sire, you had no need to send for
me, as you know more about ships and their capacity than I do.” The
fact is, he was thoroughly master of the subject, and could tell me
to a man the number of troops to be placed on a given ship, and to an
animal the number of horses a ship of 1000 tons could or should carry
from Marseilles to Kaemish; the space required for each, and for their
fodder and water, the height of deck requisite to allow for the _toss
of the head_; and the important, but not generally known fact, that
though a horse must feel its own weight on its own legs at sea, it must
also be slung, for if it lie down the chances are that it will not be
able to get up again. At least, if the Emperor did not know all about
these things when I entered the Tuileries, he was the most apt scholar
I ever met, for he knew all about them before I left. I mention this
circumstance because this audience, subsequently, enabled me to render
some assistance in a matter of far greater importance to both France
and England and to mankind, to which I shall hereafter refer, viz.:
the change in the French navigation laws, which is more to the purpose
of this work, than the transport of troops and horses to a field of
slaughter.
[174] Annual circular of W. S. Lindsay & Co. for 1854, quoted in
Tooke’s ‘History of Prices.’
[175] When war was declared, the greater portion of the work of
engaging transports devolved upon the Civil Lord of the Admiralty;
and though, perhaps, few men could have been found more competent
for the duty than Captain (now Admiral Sir Alexander) Milne, who
then filled that office, it was impossible for any one man to get
through the work he was expected to do, especially with the system,
or rather want of all system, which then prevailed. From my knowledge
of what took place, I have no hesitation in saying that everything
relating to the engagement of the requisite number of ships, and to
the transport of troops and stores to the Crimea, was a huge chaos;
and I fear some serious disaster would have ensued had the pluck and
genius of the nation not come to the rescue in the mode of conducting
affairs at home, as well as, so far as I could ascertain, in the
field of action abroad. At home, there was certainly no organisation,
so far as regards the transport service, or, at best, it was of the
most imperfect description. Stores were shipped without bills of
parcels, and, frequently, without bills of lading; and the current
stories, at the time, of the shipload of boots and shoes which lay
at anchor in Balaclava harbour unknown to our authorities, while the
troops were bootless and shoeless; of the tops of mess tables sent
to the Crimea without the legs, and of the guns without carriages,
were no exaggerations. The Admiralty, it is true, were responsible
for the transport of the troops; but the Civil Lord, by whom it was
represented, had no control over shipments by either the Ordnance or
by the Medical Departments. A case came under my own knowledge which
would be ludicrous were it not melancholy. One day, when I had occasion
to visit a transport which lay at Woolwich, two gentlemen, when I
stepped on board, were wrangling over the main hatchway. One was from
the Ordnance, the other was evidently in charge of certain medical
stores which, with piles of shot and shell, lay on the wharf ready for
shipment. The shot and shell representative insisted on having his
goods in the centre compartment of the vessel because they were heavy;
the other gentleman was as determined to have his physic stored in
the same division of the ship because it was perishable. Each would
have his own way; and, as neither would give way, after an hour’s
altercation, they, to the amazement and horror of the mate of the
ship, came to a compromise by ordering the stores of both departments
to be stowed in this one favourite position! It is needless to state
the result; I may just, however, say that when the ship arrived at the
Crimea it was found that the shot and shell had played sad havoc with
the medicine cases, and that the floor of her centre compartment was
strewed with fragments of fragile cases, demolished physic bottles, and
countless numbers of squashed pill-boxes.
[176] When the war ceased, the Transport Board was abolished, and the
mode of conducting this important branch of the public service reverted
pretty much to what it had been previously. The Admiralty found ships
for the transport of troops at home and to our colonies abroad, but a
board at the India Office engaged vessels for all the troops and stores
to and from our possessions in the East, while other departments had
their own separate shipping offices; all of which, when vessels were
in demand, were _bidding against each other_, and also against
another department of the government, the Emigration Office. The rates
of freight were, of course, materially enhanced by this unnecessary
competition; and there would have been the same sad story to tell as in
the case of the Crimea, had we been unfortunately involved in another
war. Unable to obtain the necessary reform by any other means, I, on
the 5th of January, 1860, brought the existing state of affairs under
the notice of the House of Commons (see ‘Hansard,’ vol. clviii. pp.
2051-2061), when a committee was unanimously appointed on my motion,
“To inquire into the organisation and management of those branches of
the Admiralty, War Office, India Office, and Emigration Board, by which
the business of transporting, by means of shipping, troops, convicts,
emigrants, materials of war, stores, and any other similar services,
is now performed.” After a diligent inquiry which lasted the whole
session, the Committee did me the honour to almost as unanimously
adopt my report. But some time elapsed before a permanent Transport
Board was established, so numerous were the obstacles, or rather
prejudices, which had to be overcome. That board is now, or ought to
be, responsible for the conveyance of all troops and Government stores
from their embarkation until landed at their port of destination.
[177] The _Great Republic_ belonged to the well-known mercantile
firm of Messrs. A. A. Law & Co., of New York. When launched she
registered 4000 tons; but, having unfortunately been partially
destroyed by fire shortly after she was built, her upper deck was
removed, thus reducing her size to 3400 tons. Her dimensions were 305
feet in length, fifty-three feet extreme breadth, and thirty feet depth
of hold. She was fitted with double topsails, an American invention
then rare in this country, but now very common; she had on board a
steam-engine of eight horse-power for working ship, or loading and
discharging cargo. She brought 3000 tons of guano as “ballast” from New
York to London, and made the passage to the Scilly Islands in thirteen
days, beating up the English Channel thence against an easterly gale
in three days to the Downs. But, on her arrival in London, where she
was consigned to the care of my firm, I found she was much too large to
be employed, profitably, in any of the ordinary channels of commerce;
and, had not the French Government, then in want of transports for the
Crimean War, been induced, by the large space she afforded for the
conveyance of their troops, to engage her for this purpose, she must
have remained long after her arrival unemployed.
[178] When I was a member of the House of Commons, there was a great
brewer, a most excellent man, who sat close to me on the cross benches,
who frequently complained of the heavy “losses” he sustained in his
trade. I was under the impression that the brewing trade was a very
lucrative one, especially to persons like himself, who conducted it
on a gigantic scale, and I was puzzled to understand how, in the face
of such “losses,” he could continue adding _vat_ to _vat_,
and rearing fresh mountains of beer-barrels every year to his brewery
yard. Turning one night to a mutual friend who knew him more intimately
than I did, I asked, in the simplicity of my heart, if it _really_
was the case that the great establishment of which our friend was the
senior was a losing concern. “It is so,” he answered, “according to our
friend’s way of calculating; for every pound less than 75,000_l._
per annum, which is estimated as his share of the net profits, is
booked as _loss_!” Such must also have been the way in which some
of our large shipowners calculated their “losses” after the repeal of
the Navigation Laws.
[179] See ‘Copies of Address to the Queen from owners of British ships
and others interested in the prosperity of British navigation, and of
the subsequent correspondence relating thereto.’ Presented to both
Houses of Parliament, by command, 1859.
[180] Table showing the total amount of French and Spanish tonnage
which entered and cleared in the United Kingdom in the indirect trade,
viz., trade with other countries than France and Spain respectively in
each year, from 1853 to 1857 inclusive:—
---------------+----------+----------+--------
| Entered. | Cleared. | Total.
---------------+----------+----------+--------
France 1853 | 23,554 | 85,052 | 108,606
” 1854 | 23,284 | 122,763 | 146,047
” 1855 | 24,094 | 55,164 | 79,258
” 1856 | 21,618 | 79,288 | 100,906
” 1857 | 36,401 | 125,775 | 162,176
| | |
Spain 1853 | 11,606 | 20,085 | 31,691
” 1854 | 18,681 | 14,068 | 32,749
” 1855 | 6,180 | 8,883 | 15,063
” 1856 | 8,200 | 4,810 | 13,010
” 1857 | 12,720 | 10,373 | 23,093
---------------+----------+----------+--------
[181]
---------------+----------+----------+--------
| Entered. | Cleared. | Total.
---------------+----------+----------+--------
France 1853 | 35,160 | 23,367 | 58,527
” 1854 | 33,955 | 47,709 | 81,664
” 1855 | 104,147 | 127,630 | 231,777
” 1856 | 198,842 | 152,919 | 351,761
” 1857 | 66,845 | 46,383 | 113,228
| | |
Spain 1853 | 24,967 | 109,591 | 134,558
” 1854 | 67,051 | 123,373 | 190,424
” 1855 | 91,416 | 105,166 | 196,582
” 1856 | 52,030 | 102,663 | 154,693
” 1857 | | |
---------------+----------+----------+--------
[182] Act 18 and 19 Vict., chap. vii.
[183]
COASTING TRADE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, 1857.
-------------------------+----------------------------------+------------------------------------
| ENTERED. | CLEARED.
+-----------------+----------------+-----------------+------------------
Nationality of |Sailing Vessels. | Steam Vessels. | Sailing Vessels.| Steam Vessels.
Vessels. | | | |
+--------+--------+---------+------+---------+-------+---------+--------
|Vessels.| Tons. | Vessels.| Tons.| Vessels.| Tons. | Vessels.| Tons.
+--------+--------+---------+------+---------+-------+---------+--------
Russian | 4 | 1,603 | | | 5 | 1,729 | |
Swedish | 22 | 3,755 | | | 22 | 3,630 | |
Norwegian | 27 | 5,580 | | | 26 | 5,426 | |
Danish | 85 | 9,633 | | | 85 | 9,692 | |
Prussian | 50 | 9,953 | | | 44 | 9,043 | |
Mecklenburg-Schwerin | 17 | 3,600 | | | 19 | 4,400 | |
Hanoverian | 30 | 2,176 | | | 36 | 2,448 | |
Oldenburg and Knyphausen | 4 | 330 | | | 4 | 451 | |
Hamburg | 6 | 694 | | | 5 | 689 | 1 | 250
Bremen | | | | | | | |
Lubeck | | | | | | | |
Dutch | 47| 4,535 | 2| 336 | 40 | 4,143 | |
Belgian | 4| 593 | | | 3 | 337 | 5 | 840
French | 4| 507 | | | 9 | 854 | |
Spanish | 3| 572 | | | 2 | 401 | |
Portuguese | | | | | 1 | 95 | |
Sardinian | | | | | | | |
Tuscan | | | | | | | |
Papal | 2| 381 | | | | | |
Two Sicilies | 3| 615 | | | 5 | 1,080 | |
Austrian | 1| 387 | | | 4 | 1,002 | |
Greek | 1| 312 | | | 2 | 532 | |
America, U.S. | 7| 4,797 | | | 12 | 5,883 | |
+--------+--------+---------+------+---------+-------+---------+--------
| 317 |50,023 | 2| 336 | 324| 51,835| 6 | 1090
| |
| Vessels, 319. | Vessels, 330.
| Tons, 50,359. | Tons, 52,925.
-------------------------+----------------------------------+------------------------------------
The Entrances and Clearances of British ships in the same year amounted
to upwards of 80,000,000 tons!!
[184] I have great doubt whether the Board of Trade was justified
in making this statement. The Royal Decree of 10th December, 1852,
refers to a Law 9th July, 1841, which I have before me; but, when
the differential tonnage duty was abolished, the Gibraltar merchants
presented addresses thanking the authorities for the _restoration_
of the flag. The ports between the Garonne and the Bidassoa are,
surely, not under similar geographical conditions as either the ports
or voyage between the Hudson and the Columbia.
[185] I really do not see it in that light. British ships would,
indeed, have a shorter voyage from England to California, but they
would still be precluded from going from New York to California
_viâ_ the Canal or passage at the Isthmus. The restriction would
continue and would prove even more vexatious, as might be shown in a
variety of ways.
[186] I deny this altogether. I cannot admit that a ship taking a cargo
from Cronstadt to Odessa, thus making almost the circumnavigation of
Europe, could be justly deemed to be making a _Coasting_ voyage,
however much Russian municipal law might declare it to be so.
[187] Table showing the total amount of tonnage of British and Foreign
Vessels respectively, with cargoes and in ballast, entered and cleared
in the United Kingdom in each year, from 1842 to 1857 inclusive.
---------+-------------+-------------+-------------
Years. | British. | Foreign. | Total.
---------+-------------+-------------+-------------
| Tons. | Tons. | Tons.
1842 | 6,669,995 | 2,457,479 | 9,127,474
1843 | 7,181,179 | 2,643,383 | 9,824,562
1844 | 7,500,285 | 2,846,484 | 10,346,769
1845 | 8,546,090 | 3,531,215 | 12,077,305
1846 | 8,688,148 | 3,727,438 | 12,415,586
1847 | 9,712,464 | 4,566,732 | 14,279,196
1848 | 9,289,560 | 4,017,066 | 13,306,626
1849 | 9,669,638 | 4,334,750 | 14,004,388
1850 | 9,442,544 | 5,062,520 | 14,505,064
1851 | 9,820,876 | 6,159,322 | 15,980,198
1852 | 9,985,969 | 6,144,180 | 16,130,149
1853 | 10,268,323 | 8,121,887 | 18,390,210
1854 | 10,744,849 | 7,924,238 | 18,669,087
1855 | 10,919,732 | 7,569,738 | 18,489,470
1856 | 12,945,771 | 8,643,278 | 21,589,049
1857 | 13,694,107 | 9,484,685 | 23,178,792
---------+-------------+-------------+--------------
[188] Table showing the total number and tonnage of Sailing and Steam
Vessels built and registered in the United Kingdom in each year, from
1842 to 1857 inclusive.
-------+----------+---------+--------+----------+---------
Years. | Vessels. | Tons. | Years. | Vessels. | Tons.
-------+----------+---------+--------+----------+---------
1842 | 914 | 129,929 | 1850 | 689 | 133,695
1843 | 698 | 83,097 | 1851 | 672 | 149,637
1844 | 689 | 94,995 | 1852 | 712 | 167,491
1845 | 853 | 23,230 | 1853 | 798 | 203,171
1846 | 809 | 125,350 | 1854 | 802 | 196,942
1847 | 936 | 145,834 | 1855 | 1098 | 323,200
1848 | 847 | 122,552 | 1856 | 1150 | 244,578
1849 | 730 | 117,953 | 1857 | 1278 | 250,472
-------+----------+---------+--------+----------+---------
From this it will be seen that the total of such tonnage was in--
1842 129,929
1849 117,953
-------
Decrease 11,976
1850 133,695
1857 250,172
-------
Increase 116,777
[189] Table showing the number and tonnage of registered SAILING and
STEAM VESSELS (exclusive of river steamers) of the United Kingdom
employed in the Home and Foreign Trade respectively in each year, from
1849 to 1857 inclusive.
----------------------------------++----------------------------------
EMPLOYED IN THE HOME TRADE. || EMPLOYED IN THE FOREIGN TRADE.
----------+-----------+-----------++----------+-----------+-----------
Years. | Vessels. | Tons. || Years. | Vessels. | Tons.
----------+-----------+-----------++----------+-----------+-----------
1849 | 9,610 | 719,815 || 1849 | 6,694 | 2,089,037
1850 | 9,150 | 721,153 || 1850 | 7,235 | 2,188,420
1851 | 9,266 | 764,461 || 1851 | 7,411 | 2,348,892
1852 | 9,134 | 768,409 || 1852 | 7,580 | 2,449,364
1853 | 8,851 | 774,813 || 1853 | 8,357 | 2,791,224
1854 | 8,778 | 748,714 || 1854 | 7,418 | 2,759,120
1855 | 8,590 | 748,543 || 1855 | 7,957 | 3,018,951
1856 | 9,707 | 787,476 || 1856 | 8,551 | 3,190,011
1857 | 10,064 | 860,406 || 1857 | 8,100 | 3,168,105
----------+-----------+-----------++----------+-----------+-----------
EMPLOYED PARTLY IN THE HOME AND || TOTAL NUMBER EMPLOYED.
PARTLY IN THE FOREIGN TRADE. ||
----------+-----------+-----------++----------+-----------+-----------
1849 | 1,917 | 287,490 || 1849 | 18,221 | 3,096,342
1850 | 1,507 | 227,639 || 1850 | 17,892 | 3,137,212
1851 | 1,507 | 247,582 || 1851 | 18,184 | 3,360,935
1852 | 1,105 | 163,111 || 1852 | 17,819 | 3,380,884
1853 | 998 | 164,050 || 1853 | 18,206 | 3,730,087
1854 | 1,211 | 221,259 || 1854 | 17,407 | 3,729,093
1855 | 1,281 | 222,676 || 1855 | 17,828 | 3,990,170
1856 | 1,012 | 178,590 || 1856 | 19,270 | 4,156,077
1857 | 1,164 | 182,971 || 1857 | 19,328 | 4,211,482
----------+-----------+-----------++----------+-----------+-----------
[190] Tonnage entered and cleared with cargoes and in ballast at ports
of the UNITED KINGDOM, in 1857 and 1858 respectively.
-------+------------+-----------+------------
| British. | Foreign. | Total.
-------+------------+-----------+------------
1857 | 13,691,107 | 9,484,685 | 23,178,792
1858 | 12,891,405 | 9,418,576 | 22,309,981
-------+------------+-----------+------------
Number and tonnage of SAILING and STEAM VESSELS built and registered in
the United Kingdom, in 1857 and 1858.
+------+----------+----------+
| | Vessels. | Tonnage. |
+------+----------+----------+
| 1857 | 1278 | 250,472 |
| 1858 | 1000 | 208,080 |
+------+----------+----------+
[191] Total tonnage of BRITISH VESSELS entered and cleared
with cargoes (_including repeated voyages_) in the months of
December 1858, and January 1859, as compared with corresponding months
of 1856-7-8.
---------+---------+---------+---------+---------
| 1856. | 1857. | 1858. | 1859.
---------+---------+---------+---------+---------
December | 848,762 | 853,619 | 970,174 |
January | | 678,705 | 603,393 | 700,445
---------+---------+---------+---------+---------
[192] As an indication of this progress, it is enough to show how
vastly the exports of British produce had advanced in value in that
period. Thus the Foreign Trade rose from 39,163,407_l._ in
1847, to 85,039,991_l._ in 1857, and the Colonial Trade from
13,686,038_l._ in 1847, to 37,115,257_l._ in 1857.
[193] The shipping accounts of the United States of America for the
year ended 30th June, 1858, showed a corresponding decline in the
employment of United States tonnage.
The total tonnage entered and cleared of United States ships in the two
years 1856-7, and 1857-8, having been
1856-7, 9,302,021 tons.
1857-8, 8,885,675 tons; Decrease 416,346 tons.
[194]
-------------------------------+-------------+--------------
| 1857. | 1858.
-------------------------------+-------------+--------------
| £ | £
Imports | 135,051,444 | 115,218,811
Exports | 122,066,107 | 116,614,331
+-------------+--------------
| 257,117,551 | 231,833,142
| 231,833,012 |
+-------------+ Decrease per
| | cent. 9 4-5
Decrease, 1858 | 25,284,409 |
-------------------------------+-------------+--------------
Shipping (total entered and cleared in Cargo and Ballast).
----------+------------+------------
Years. | Total. | British.
----------+------------+------------
| Tons. | Tons.
1857 | 23,178,792 | 13,694,107
1858 | 22,309,981 | 12,891,405
----------+------------+------------
CHAPTER XIV.
Further returns of the Board of Trade, and address of the
Shipowners’ Society to the electors, 13th April, 1859—Shipowners’
meeting in London—Character of the speeches at it—Mr. Lindsay
proposes an amendment—Effect of the war between France and
Austria—Mr. Lindsay moves for an inquiry into the burdens
on the Shipping Interest, 31st January, 1860—Report of the
Committee thereon—Views with regard to foreign countries—The
Netherlands—The United States—Generally unsatisfactory state
of the intercourse with foreign nations—The present depression
beyond the influence of Government—General results of Steamers
_versus_ Sailing Vessels—The Committee resists the plan
of re-imposing restrictions on the Colonial Trade—Difficulty
of _enforcing_ reciprocity—Want of energy on the part of
the English Foreign Office—Rights of belligerents—Privateering
abolished in Europe; America, however, declining to accept this
proposal—Views of the Committee thereon, and on the liability
of Merchant Shipping—Burden of light dues—Pilotage Charges made
by local authorities now, generally, abolished, as well as
those of the Stade dues—The report of 1860, generally, accepted
by the Mercantile Marine—Magnificent English Merchant Sailing
vessels, 1859-1872—The _Thermopylæ_—_Sir Lancelot_
and others—Americans completely outstripped—Equal increase in the
number as well as the excellence of English shipping—Results of
the Free-trade policy.
Besides the statistical returns supplied by the Board of Trade on
their report on the memorial of the Shipowners to her Majesty, this
Board, on the 25th February, 1859, published further returns which were
seized upon by the Shipowners’ Association, and made the basis for an
energetic manifesto addressed to the constituencies of the United
Kingdom at the general election in the spring of 1859.[195]
[Sidenote: Further returns of the Board of Trade,]
[Sidenote: and address of the Shipowners’ Society to the electors,
April 13, 1859.]
The returns in question consisted of five statements, including the
period from 1834 to 1858. They are too voluminous to be given here,
but it was clear from them that, if the increase of the entrances and
clearances of British ships at the ports of the United Kingdom, since
the repeal of the Navigation Laws, had been 3,221,767, the increase of
foreign ships on the other hand amounted to 5,083,826 tons. To these
leading facts, the Shipowners’ Association, triumphantly, referred the
different constituencies, and, although British ships in the eight
years over which these returns extended, had increased to a far greater
extent than they had in any similar previous period, the Association
pointed to the still greater increase of foreign shipping, and implored
the electors of the leading maritime ports to send such representatives
to the new Parliament, who would be exponents of the opinions they
sought to perpetuate; and who would save British Shipowners from
the certain ruin in their opinion awaiting them, as was so clearly
demonstrated by the “appalling” number of foreign ships frequenting our
ports. Pertinaciously adhering in this celebrated manifesto to their
extreme Protectionist principles, they now reasserted with confidence,
and with a brazen front the more astonishing, after what they had
previously admitted, every doctrine that had proved to be fallacious,
every “fact” which had long since been shown to have had its origin in
the regions of fancy or fiction, every appeal to be saved from ruin
as baseless as the shepherd’s wolf cry, and every theory as visionary
as their own fears; by such means, hoping to revive a system, which
the Legislature and every class of the community, except themselves,
had pronounced to be neither wise, just, nor beneficial. But, with
these principles patent to the whole world, fully confirmed, too, as
they were, by the extraordinary success resulting from the repeal of
the Navigation Laws, they kept harping on the one string, that foreign
shipping entering and clearing from our ports had, since that period,
increased in a greater ratio than our own, and this one fact produced
to a large extent the desired effect on the maritime portions of the
constituencies.
It was vain to tell them that, under the new policy, we had increased
our shipping to an extent far beyond what had been hitherto
accomplished; or that the nation at large, by obtaining all it required
from foreign nations at materially reduced rates, was greatly and
proportionately benefited by the change. Nor was it of any use to show
that our exports and imports, and, consequently, the general wealth
of the country, had already increased far beyond the most sanguine
hopes of even the Free-traders. To attempt to prove to a maritime
constituency that the more intercourse we had with other countries
the better it would be for us, and that the impoverishment of our
neighbours by restrictive laws was not the best means of enriching
ourselves, was then a mere waste of time, and all such arguments
were, at too many of our seaports, only received with scorn and
ridicule. At all such places, the one fact I have named carried the
day. Among various other seaport representatives who held Free-trade
principles, I lost my seat for the Tynemouth boroughs; at least, I
found such a phalanx of Shipowners arrayed against me, that I should
have had a great struggle to retain it.[196] However, within a week,
I found another seat at Sunderland, and, though the bulk of the
Shipowners there, too, were opposed to my views, I was returned over
my Conservative opponent (the late George Hudson) by a very large
majority.[197] But it fared, otherwise, with many better men who lost
their seats and did not find others.
The one fact in the Shipowners’ manifesto, apparently, strengthened
their cause in Parliament. I say apparently, because though the new
men were pledged to vote for the removal of all “grievances” in the
shape of peculiar and special burdens and for “reciprocity,” whatever
that might mean, I question if any one of them would have voted for a
reversion of our policy. It was idle to talk about it. “Protection to
native industry” was gone, and gone for ever! England had adopted a
policy which can never be reversed. But the General Shipowners’ Society
of London, elated with success, resolved to make one more determined
effort to, at least, restore the Colonial trade to the vessels of Great
Britain, and to induce Parliament to recommend her Majesty in Council
to exclude from our carrying trade the vessels of those nations which
did not reciprocate.
[Sidenote: Shipowners’ meeting in London.]
With these objects in view, they invited to their aid delegates from
all the seaports in the kingdom, and every person of influence in and
out of Parliament likely to aid their cause. Another public meeting
was held in the London Tavern, at which Mr. R. W. Crawford, one of the
members for the City, took the chair. I had, unexpectedly, received
an invitation to attend, which I accepted, as the question to be
discussed, apart from my duty to my constituents, was one in which I
had a large personal interest. Knowing, however, that few persons in
the vast assembly which had been got together agreed with the view I
entertained, I took my seat, almost out of sight, in the rear of the
platform. The meeting was, indeed, one of a most influential character.
Many men were there whose cheque for 10,000_l._ would have passed
as freely as a 5_l._ note, and whose hale and ruddy countenances
did not at all betoken that they were on “the road to ruin.” Perhaps it
was malicious on the part of the ‘Times’ to describe the meeting “as
the largest collection of political and commercial fossils which could
be got together in these adverse days for political antiquarianism;”
but it is quite true that their views, generally, so far as they could
be comprehended, were certainly of an antiquarian character.
[Sidenote: Character of the speeches at it.]
Mr. Frederick Somes, the member for Hull, who moved the first
resolution, declared “that nothing but ruin could result to the
shipping interest,” if the existing policy was pursued; and Mr.
Bramley-Moore, who seconded it, stated that “the coasting trade was
gradually drifting into the hands of foreigners” (a very extraordinary
statement in the face of the official returns), while he argued that,
“we should have the right of selling to, as well as purchasing from,
the foreigner,” as if any person or any law prevented him from doing
so if he pleased. Mr. George Marshall, one of our largest and most
intelligent shipowners, spoke, from experience, of the depressed
state of British shipping, owing to the “inability to compete with
foreigners;” and Mr. Duncan Dunbar told the meeting, but not in a
doleful tone, for he was the jolliest of men, with the happiest of
countenances, “that the very property he had made by his industry and
hard labour was melting away like snow before the sun.”[198]
It was hopeless to expect that the Legislature would attempt to do
anything, even if they could, for a body of men who, representing
a great national interest, delivered such sentiments as these, and
had, evidently, assembled for the purpose of obliging other people to
make good any losses they might have sustained, if any there were,
during the two previous years, while pocketing in silence, for their
own special benefit, the large profits they had secured during the
Crimean war. What had Government to do with the profits and losses of
Shipowners any more than it had to do with those of any other branch
of trade? Invited, as I had been, to take part in these deliberations,
I felt that I should do wrong were I not, regardless of any insults to
myself, to step forward and attempt to expose the fallacy of the course
pursued by the meeting, especially, as the Shipowners had grievances
which really ought to be redressed, and to which the Legislature, I
felt sure, would readily listen, if properly appealed to. Shipowners
were then, unquestionably, subjected to various burdens which would
never have been imposed upon them had they not been a _protected
class_, and, as such, supposed to derive advantages from which other
classes of the community were excluded; burdens, too, I am bound and
willing to add, from which they ought to have been relieved when the
Navigation Laws were repealed.
[Sidenote: Mr. Lindsay proposes an amendment.]
Feeling, therefore, that the time of this large and important meeting
would be wasted in vain and useless resolutions, I stepped forward
to the front of the platform, resolved, at all hazards, to endure
every contumely, and, if I could not carry an amendment, which I saw
was altogether hopeless, to at least enter my protest as a British
Shipowner against such subservient and worthless appeals to the
Legislature of our country. My appearance on the front row was the
signal for a yell of derision; and my amendment, which I had hastily
written in pencil, “that a petition be presented to both Houses of
Parliament, praying for an inquiry into the actual condition of British
navigation, and for relief from all peculiar burdens and restrictions
that still fetter maritime enterprise,” was received with hisses and
the loudest and rudest demonstrations of dissatisfaction.
Although these events are matters for history, they are of too personal
a character to be pursued at length; however, that my readers may
form some idea of the feelings of a very large number of the most
influential Shipowners of the period, I furnish in a foot-note[199]
extracts from the report which appeared in the ‘Times’ and of other
journals of the proceedings of this great meeting.
[Sidenote: Effect of the war between France and Austria.]
But, even if the Legislature had been disposed to consider the wailings
of the Shipowners, or to listen to their unreasonable demands, an
event supervened which for a time changed the aspect of their affairs.
Critical questions arose in Europe. Political relations between France
and Austria had become most unsatisfactory. The Emperor of the French,
having recently, by a member of his family, contracted an alliance
with a Princess of the House of Savoy, welded another political link
with the King of Sardinia, and, on the 1st January, 1860, announced
an approaching rupture with Austria. “A cry of anguish” arose from
the provinces of Lombardy; and all the miseries the Italians, during
many years, had suffered from Austrian domination were suddenly and
ostentatiously paraded before the world. Free Europe witnessed with
astonishment the scene in which the despotic Emperor of the French
complained of the tyranny exercised by another despot in Austria, over
a portion of Austrian subjects, whilst the Emperor of Russia, more
despotic than either, joined in the strange and mysterious confederacy,
and affected sympathy for the down-trodden and oppressed Italians.
It was impossible for Great Britain to remain indifferent while events
so momentous were happening in rapid succession on the continent of
Europe; hence, when Austria summoned Sardinia to disarm, and the
French troops were put in motion to cross the Alps, the English
people, carried away by their sympathies for the oppressed Italians,
and forgetting to inquire “Can grapes come from thorns, or figs from
thistles?” were almost willing to join France and aid her in her real
object, the advancement of the eastern portion of the Empire towards
the Rhine. But, whatever the results of the short but great war then
publicly proclaimed by France and Sardinia against Austria, its effect,
by increasing the demand for shipping, combined with other causes,
proved very salutary to the fortunes of British Shipowners.
[Sidenote: Mr. Lindsay moves for an inquiry into the burdens on the
Shipping Interest, January 31, 1860.]
Though England had been startled by the proceedings on the Continent,
and had made preparations for any emergency, she happily kept clear of
“entanglement,” so that Parliament had time to direct its attention to
other less exciting, but to her more important subjects. Under these
circumstances, I consequently, on the 31st January, 1860, renewed my
motion,[200] for an inquiry into the state of our merchant shipping,
and the operations of the burdens and restrictions especially affecting
that interest. After a long and interesting discussion, the House was
pleased to adopt my motion, extending the inquiry into various Acts of
Parliament then in force;[201] and, on the 16th February of that year,
the Committee was appointed:[202] the whole of that session was devoted
to the inquiry, and to the complaints and suggestions of the Shipowners
and other persons interested, who were heard in detail: no less than
6813 questions were asked, and as many answers given in reply, and
voluminous appendices swelled the Report.
[Sidenote: Report of the Committee thereon.]
No Committee ever commenced its duty with a more fixed determination
to grant impartial justice and remedy any existing evils. I shall
not venture to offer an opinion on the Report, as it was drawn up by
myself, at the request of my colleagues. But I ought to state that the
Committee examined most carefully and anxiously, in all its bearings,
the great question with which it had to deal, and enabled me to prepare
a report which was strictly just and thoroughly exhaustive, and which
I hope has rendered unnecessary any further appeals, at least, on
similar grounds, for relief to the Legislature. In prosecution of their
inquiries the Committee examined numerous persons residing in London
and the outports connected with the shipping interests, many of whom
were extensively engaged in the home, colonial, and foreign trades.
They also examined several officers in various departments of her
Majesty’s Government, and others representing two of the corporations,
which exercise trading powers affecting shipping, so as to more fully
elucidate the subjects with which they were respectively acquainted.
They then reviewed in detail the various measures which had been
introduced during the previous quarter of a century affecting maritime
commerce, directing attention to that part of the evidence which stated
that the reason, why the Coasting trade was not thrown open until 1854,
was the assertion on the part of the officers of Customs that there
would be a difficulty in enforcing effectual regulations to guard the
revenue.
[Sidenote: Views with reference to foreign countries.]
[Sidenote: The Netherlands.]
Referring to existing treaties, the Committee remarked that, though the
Government of the Netherlands placed the ships of England, ostensibly,
on the same footing as Dutch vessels, English vessels, however, in
consequence of the regulations of the Dutch East India Company, were
practically prevented from trading with the valuable settlements of the
Dutch in the Eastern seas.
[Sidenote: The United States.]
When directing attention to the different nations who still withheld
from British ships the advantages of their coasting trade, they could
not fail to notice the often repeated fact, that the United States
of North America not only shut out British vessels from the carrying
of goods in the vast coasting trade of their Atlantic and Pacific
sea-boards, but that British vessels running between New York and
Aspinwall, and between Panama and San Francisco, were denied the
ordinary privileges enjoyed by the American national flag; and that,
thus, the indirect carrying trade between the eastern and western coast
of the United States was, practically, confined to American shipping,
as well as the coasting trade proper.
With regard to British colonial possessions the Committee stated that,
while the coasting trade had been thrown open to foreign vessels in the
British East Indies, Ceylon, the Cape of Good Hope, and Victoria, the
coasting trade of our North American colonies was still confined to
British vessels; foreign ships being, however, permitted to carry on
the inter-colonial trade with our various possessions.
[Sidenote: Generally unsatisfactory]
[Sidenote: state of the intercourse with foreign nations.]
The Committee, especially, noticed the entire unanimity of the
witnesses whom they had examined with regard to the unsatisfactory
state of the laws then regulating international intercourse, not merely
with the United States of America, but also with France, Spain, and
Portugal; nor could they fail to perceive that every witness viewed
with the greatest jealousy the restrictions still imposed by those
nations on our shipping, and further, that we had not been met by them
in that spirit of fairness and reciprocity we had a right to expect.
So far as regards the great question—the repeal of the Navigation
Laws—into which the Committee inquired minutely and impartially, I may
say that they were, unanimously, of opinion that it would be impossible
to reverse the established policy of Free-trade, and that, in fact, it
would not be to the interests of our Shipowners, if they had been able
to do so. Indeed, the representatives of the then most conservative
ports in the kingdom (Mr. Horsfall for Liverpool, and Mr. Liddell,
now Lord Eslington, one of the members for Northumberland) were
decidedly of opinion that any reversal of our policy would not merely
be prejudicial to the great trading interests of this country, but,
specially so, to those engaged in its maritime commerce; and, in fact,
though they felt the advantages derivable by reciprocal advantages from
foreign nations, they were not prepared to support an Order in Council
against the admission to our ports of the ships of those nations which
did not reciprocate.
[Sidenote: The present depression beyond the influence of Government.]
While admitting the depressed state of the shipping interest during
the previous two or three years, the Committee pointed out that this
depression had arisen in great measure from causes beyond the reach or
province of legislation. They remarked, for instance, with great force,
that as one-fourth part of the whole coasting trade was then carried
on by means of steam-vessels, while one steamer could accomplish as
much work as five sailing vessels, it must follow that the owners of
the latter would suffer; the result clearly showing that the depression
arose in the north of England ports to a great extent from causes no
government could control. Instancing Sunderland, they remarked that
while in 1852 there were no steamers whatever engaged in trade at that
port, the number of such vessels built there since that period (between
1852 and 1860) had displaced the enormous number of 4000 sailing ships,
each of 250 tons capacity. Hence, while the Committee could not but
regret the heavy loss thus entailed on one industrious class of men,
many of whom were, no doubt, totally ruined, it was impossible for
them to remedy a state of things brought about mainly by the progress
of science, and one, moreover, with which the change in our policy had
nothing whatever to do. Indeed, not one of the witnesses examined,
although many of them had been sufferers in this way, proposed to recur
to the absolutely restrictive system in vogue previously to 1850.
[Sidenote: General results of Steamers _versus_ Sailing vessels.]
When the figures brought forward by the opponents of repeal were
closely examined, it appeared that, while the increase of all the
sailing ships in the United Kingdom had for nine years previously to
the change in our Navigation Laws been only 23½ per cent., the increase
of steamers, during the same period, had been as much as 81 per cent.;
but that since then to the end of 1859, while the increase of sailing
ships had been 26½ per cent., steamers had increased no less than 184
per cent. These were transient evils against which no legislation could
provide; and it was, therefore, obvious that, instead of attempting
to render remunerative a class of vessels, now obsolete owing to the
improvements of the age, Shipowners would have done better to direct
their attention to the development of the new power, for which they
possessed in vast abundance the requisite materials of iron and coal:
in this way, there could be no doubt that they would be able to compete
successfully with all other nations. In how remarkable a manner these
words have been fulfilled I shall be able to show when I come to treat
of the progress of steam navigation in the Transatlantic trades. Nor
has our success been less remarkable in our competition with the Swedes
and Norwegians, with whom it was repeatedly alleged we were unable to
compete; for they, in 1859, had already become large buyers of ships
in our markets, and, I may add, are still frequently to be found
purchasers of British-built vessels.
[Sidenote: The Committee resists the plan of re-imposing restrictions
on the Colonial Trade.]
The question having now been narrowed to that of re-imposing the
monopoly of the carrying trade to and from our Colonial possessions,
the Committee soon arrived at the conclusion that the extent,
diversified interests, and increasing power of our possessions abroad,
offered insuperable obstacles to the re-imposition of restrictions on
that trade, while the daily increase of feelings of independence in
our Colonies naturally tended to resist a system which would place the
grower of British plantation sugar and coffee in the West Indies at
a greater disadvantage than then existed, especially when compared
with the producer of slave-grown sugar and coffee in Brazil and Cuba.
The Committee, therefore, looking to our relations with Canada, our
possessions in the East and West Indies, and, above all, in Australia,
considered it their duty, unhesitatingly, to declare that any proposal
having for its object the re-establishing an exclusive monopoly
of the carrying trade to and from our colonial possessions must,
both on political and commercial grounds, be rejected as altogether
impracticable. Moreover, that, while such a step would be unjust to our
fellow-subjects in the colonies, it would very likely embroil us with
those foreign Powers to whom we were bound by existing treaties.
[Sidenote: Difficulty of _enforcing_ reciprocity.]
The question, however, of the expediency of requiring foreign
Powers, having colonial possessions, to reciprocate every advantage
to us, which Great Britain had accorded unconditionally to them,
though, commercially, when compared with other branches of commerce,
unimportant, was one which demanded peculiar attention, as it was, and
still is, a source of great annoyance, in that it creates a feeling
that we have been very illiberally, if not unjustly, dealt with by
these Powers. British Shipowners who, carried on the restricted and
scarcely tolerated intercourse with the colonies of France, Spain,
and Portugal, found their ships placed at an immense disadvantage,
in the unequal competition they had to encounter, while they had the
mortification to see foreign ships resort to our own colonies and
secure much higher freights than our own ships when chartered to a port
in Europe.[203]
For instance, it was given in evidence that Spanish vessels were
chartered in English ports to Manilla at 3_l._ or 4_l._ per ton, while
the British vessel could not obtain 30_s._ per ton. From the Mauritius
to Europe a French ship, enjoying the option of both the British and
French markets, obtained a freight for sugar of 3_l._ 10_s._ per ton at
a time when English ships were obliged to accept 10_s._ per ton. Thus,
in all our colonies and possessions, French, Spanish, and Portuguese
vessels[204] could generally procure a freight greatly in excess of
that obtained by British ships, as the foreign national flag secured
for them, on arrival at a port of call in England, the advantage of
our markets, with the option of sending on the cargo to the respective
countries of Europe to which the national flag belonged, but from which
markets such produce was excluded by heavy differential duties, if
conveyed thither in British ships.
[Sidenote: Want of energy on the part of the English Foreign Office.]
The Committee naturally felt that a sense of justice demanded that
our Shipowners should, as far as practicable and consistent with the
interests of the community, be placed on equal terms in the race of
competition, and that, whatever difficulties might stand in the way of
having recourse to retaliatory measures, there had been, they regretted
to state, an apparent apathy on the part of the executive government,
in remonstrating with those nations which then excluded our vessels
from their trade; in other words, that the Foreign Office had not
employed the influence it might have exercised to secure, by diplomatic
negotiation, the advantages of reciprocity.
[Sidenote: Rights of belligerents.]
As the question of belligerent rights at sea was one which deeply
affected alike the British Shipowner in the prosecution of his business
and the general interests of Great Britain, the Committee devoted their
especial attention to the evidence advanced on this important question.
[Sidenote: Privateering abolished in Europe;]
In the recent war with Russia, England, as we have already incidentally
noticed, when she formed an alliance with France, agreed with that
country to waive her right to confiscate an enemy’s goods on board
neutral ships as also neutral goods found on board an enemy’s, so
long as they were not, in either case, contraband of war. This mutual
but provisional waiver of belligerent rights placed the allies in
harmonious action, and, practically, countenanced the principle that
“free ships make free goods.” Upon the return of peace, as I have
explained in a previous portion of this work, the declaration of Paris
of April, 1856, signed by Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia,
Russia, Sardinia, and Turkey gave a formal sanction to this principle.
Privateering was also abolished.
[Sidenote: America, however, declining to accept this proposal.]
[Sidenote: Views of the Committee thereon,]
America was invited to be a party to this general international
agreement, but demurred, and coupled at first her assent to the
abolition of privateering, with the condition that private property at
sea should no longer be subject to capture. Finally, she refused to be
a party to a convention, whereby she would be precluded from resorting
to her merchant marine for privateering purposes, in case she became
a belligerent. But this, in the opinion of the Committee, was not
surprising, as the United States had obtained the recognition of the
rights of neutrals, for which she contended throughout a long period of
hostilities, and Great Britain had surrendered those rights without any
equivalent from her. The Committee were therefore of opinion that our
Shipowners would thereby be placed at an immense disadvantage in the
event of a war breaking out with any important European Power. Indeed,
they went so far as to give it as their deliberate conviction that “the
whole of our carrying trade in the event of a great European war would
be inevitably transferred to American and other neutral bottoms.”
“We must therefore,” they continued, “either secure the general consent
of all nations to establish the immunity of merchant ships and their
cargoes from the depredations of both privateers and armed national
cruisers during hostilities, or we must revert to the maintenance of
our ancient rights, whereby, relying upon our maritime superiority, we
may not merely hope to guard unmolested our merchant shipping in the
prosecution of their business, but may capture enemy’s goods in neutral
ships, and thus prevent other nations from seizing the carrying trade
of this kingdom during a state of hostility.”
Looking at this important question in all its bearings, and considering
that we have at all times a much larger amount of property afloat than
any other nation, the Committee were of opinion, that, though grave
objections had been urged by high authorities against any further step
in advance, they could not close their remarks without expressing an
earnest hope, and, at the same time, giving it as a deliberate opinion,
that “in the progress of civilisation, and in the cause of humanity,
the time had arrived when all private property (not contraband of war)
should be exempt from capture at sea.”
[Sidenote: and on the liability of Merchant Shipping.]
Having reviewed the question of liability, of which many Shipowners had
complained, the Committee were of opinion that it was not advisable
to reduce that liability to any extent below the value of the ship
and freight, taking the value of the former at 15_l._ per ton.
For to confine it simply to the actual value of the ship “would,”
they urged, “be an encouragement to unprincipled persons to employ
inadequate and worn-out vessels in the conveyance of passengers, and
that, on the other hand, to subject shipowners to unlimited liability
might induce men of property and character to withdraw their fortunes
from so great a hazard.” The Committee could not, however, overlook
the additional liability to which Shipowners were exposed by the
operation of the municipal laws of foreign states, for, as the law
now stands, the liability of the foreign shipowner is not limited to
our courts, and the liability of the English shipowner by the same
rule, if it were applied in the United States, would not be limited
in their courts.[205] Therefore, although the English law may have
contemplated the limitation of the British shipowners’ liability, any
damage sustained by collision on the high seas between a British ship
and a foreign vessel, would not fall within the statutory limit, and,
practically, the liability of the British shipowner, in the event of
loss of life, would be unlimited, or at least co-extensive with the
loss, which a jury might assess according to the rank of life and the
injuries sustained by the relatives and families of the deceased. It
was further recommended that the practicability and desirability of an
international arrangement with maritime countries,[206] so as to arrive
at some uniform reciprocal principles, should be seriously considered
by Government.
[Sidenote: Burden of light dues.]
The incidence of the light dues paid by the Shipowners of the Empire,
necessarily received consideration from the Committee, more especially
as it was a serious burden on all merchant vessels. So far back as
1845, a Committee appointed specially to inquire into those dues,
recommended, “That all expenses for the erection of lighthouses,
floating-lights, buoys, and beacons, on the coast of the United
Kingdom, be henceforth defrayed out of the public revenue.”
Entirely agreeing with this resolution, the Committee of 1860, while
recommending Government to adopt that resolution, added: “That the
lighting of our shores is a high imperial duty which we owe, not merely
to ourselves, but to strangers, whom we invite to trade with us.”
They felt that the justice as well as the policy of such a course was
strengthened by the fact that the large debt of 1,250,000_l._,
the result of improvident grants, incurred under the authority of
Parliament for buying up the lighthouses held by private individuals,
had, since that period (1845), been paid out of light dues, raised out
of a tax upon shipping, and they had less hesitation in recommending
the adoption of this enlightened policy from the fact that the Congress
of the United States of America appropriates an annual vote for
lights throughout their whole territory, which is borne by the entire
federation, and that no charge for light dues is levied on foreign
vessels frequenting the ports of that country.
[Sidenote: Pilotage.]
The question of pilotage was also one which received every
consideration, the evidence showing that when a voluntary system
prevailed, even where the navigation was difficult and, at times,
dangerous, no inconvenience arose from the absence of legal compulsion
for the employment of a pilot. Many of the members of the committee
were of opinion that the whole pilotage of the kingdom should be
thrown open; but no decided recommendation was offered, as it had been
pretty clearly demonstrated in evidence that the compulsory system
of pilotage still exercised at London, Liverpool, and Bristol, had
worked in a manner satisfactory to those persons who were most directly
interested in this matter.
[Sidenote: Charges made by local authorities, now generally abolished;]
The charges levied by local authorities on ships and goods entering
or clearing from their ports, had so frequently been under the
consideration of Parliament, that the Committee could do little more
than refer to the various reports on this subject, and especially to
that of the Royal Commissions of 1854, with the expression of their
regret that not one of the recommendations of that commission had been
carried into effect.[207]
[Sidenote: as well as those of the Stade dues.]
The Committee, after inquiring into the management of the Trinity
Houses of Newcastle and Hull, and the nature of the charges levied by
the Russian Company and by the King of Hanover on shipping, under
the name of Stade dues, both of which have since then been happily
abolished, reviewed our mercantile marine legislation since 1835, and
were of opinion that, though, in many respects the measures adopted
had been judicious and beneficial, a few had been carried to excess
in matters of detail (an opinion very different to that which at
present prevails in the House of Commons); nor, indeed, could they have
arrived at any other conclusion, as various witnesses clearly showed
that, in some instances, a zealous wish to accomplish improvements,
and to protect the interests of the public, had led to the adoption
of legislative measures of a too minute and restrictive character,
and, above all, that any unnecessary interference as to how a ship
should be built, fitted, manned, and navigated, was frequently attended
with prejudicial consequences, while it had as frequently retarded
beneficial advance.
[Sidenote: The Report of 1860 generally accepted by the mercantile
marine.]
Such were the leading points of the report of the Merchant Shipping
Committee of 1860. It seems to have satisfied all parties as far
as anything could satisfy men whose policy had been ignored; at
least no further inquiry into the state of British shipping, or for
relief from oppressive and unjust burdens has since been considered
either expedient or necessary. Indeed, the great majority of the
recommendations have since been carried out by successive Governments.
The Local Charges Bill, which had been referred to a Select Committee
in 1856, was dealt with by separate inquiries; the important case
of Liverpool occupying the whole of the Session of 1857, ultimately
resulting in a reform of the Dock management, and in the transfer of
the Liverpool town dues to the Dock estate.
In 1861, Mr. Milner Gibson, then President of the Board of Trade,
introduced a Bill[208] by which most of the other grievances were
removed. All taxes on shipping, raised for the purpose of granting
pensions and other, so-called, charitable objects, were abolished;
local differential charges on foreign shipping were, to a large extent,
prohibited;[209] the passing tolls levied for the support of such
harbours as Ramsgate, Dover, and Bridlington were swept away, and power
(on the recommendation originally of the Harbours of Refuge Commission
of 1854) was given to the Public Works Loan Commissioners to lend money
for the improvement of trading harbours at a low rate of interest.[210]
France, to whose shipping laws I shall hereafter refer, abolished her
local charges and differential dues; Italy, in 1863, admitted British
ships to national treatment; and Austria also, by treaty, in 1868, has
followed her example.
Unfortunately, Shipowners are still taxed for the maintenance of
the National lights; but, although the recommendations of various
Committees have not in this respect been adopted, reductions in the
charges levied have been made to no less an extent than 75 per cent,
since 1853.[211] Great improvements have also been made since Mr.
(now Lord) Cardwell put in motion this scale of reduction, which has
proved so valuable in its results; since then no less than fifty-seven
new lighthouses have been built, and fifteen new light ships moored
on the coast, whilst thirty-seven old lighthouses have been rebuilt
and re-organised at an aggregate cost of more than one million pounds
sterling.