FROM THE TROUBLES IN KORKYRA, IN THE FIFTH YEAR OF THE PELOPONNESIAN
WAR, DOWN TO THE END OF THE SIXTH YEAR.
About the same time as the troubles of Korkyra occurred, Nikias, the
Athenian general, conducted an armament against the rocky island
of Minôa, which lay at the mouth of the harbor of Megara, and was
occupied by a Megarian fort and garrison. The narrow channel, which
separated it from the Megarian port of Nisæa, and formed the entrance
of the harbor, was defended by two towers projecting out from Nisæa,
which Nikias attacked and destroyed by means of battering machines
from his ships. He thus cut off Minôa from communication on that
side with the Megarians, and fortified it on the other side, where
it communicated with the mainland by a lagoon bridged over with
a causeway. Minôa, thus becoming thoroughly insulated, was more
completely fortified and made an Athenian possession; since it was
eminently convenient to keep up an effective blockade against the
Megarian harbor, which the Athenians had hitherto done only from the
opposite shore of Salamis.[469]
[469] Thucyd. iii, 51. See the note of Dr. Arnold, and the plan
embodied in his work, for the topography of Minôa, which has now
ceased to be an island, and is a hill on the mainland near the
shore.
Though Nikias, son of Nikeratus, had been for some time conspicuous
in public life, and is said to have been more than once stratêgus
along with Periklês, this is the first occasion on which Thucydidês
introduces him to our notice. He was now one of the stratêgi, or
generals of the commonwealth, and appears to have enjoyed, on the
whole, a greater and more constant personal esteem than any citizen
of Athens, from the present time down to his death. In wealth
and in family he ranked among the first class of Athenians: in
political character, Aristotle placed him, together with Thucydidês
son of Melêsias and Theramenês, above all other names in Athenian
history,—seemingly even above Periklês.[470] Such a criticism, from
Aristotle, deserves respectful attention, though the facts before
us completely belie so lofty an estimate. It marks, however, the
position occupied by Nikias in Athenian politics, as the principal
person of what maybe called the oligarchical party, succeeding
Kimon and Thucydidês, and preceding Theramenês. In looking to the
conditions under which this party continued to subsist, we shall
see that, during the interval between Thucydidês (son of Melêsias)
and Nikias, the democratical forms had acquired such confirmed
ascendency, that it would not have suited the purpose of any
politician to betray evidence of positive hostility to them, prior to
the Sicilian expedition, and the great embarrassment in the foreign
relations of Athens which arose out of that disaster. After that
change, the Athenian oligarchs became emboldened and aggressive,
so that we shall find Theramenês among the chief conspirators in
the revolution of the Four Hundred: but Nikias represents the
oligarchical party in its previous state of quiescence and torpidity,
accommodating itself to a sovereign democracy, and existing in the
form of common sentiment rather than of common purposes. And it is a
remarkable illustration of the real temper of the Athenian people,
that a man of this character, known as an oligarch but not feared
as such, and doing his duty sincerely to the democracy, should have
remained until his death the most esteemed and influential man in
the city. He was a man of a sort of even mediocrity, in intellect,
in education, and in oratory: forward in his military duties, and
not only personally courageous in the field, but also competent as a
general under ordinary circumstances:[471] assiduous in the discharge
of all political duties at home, especially in the post of stratêgus,
or one of the ten generals of the state, to which he was frequently
chosen and rechosen. Of the many valuable qualities combined in his
predecessor Periklês, the recollection of whom was yet fresh in
the Athenian mind, Nikias possessed two, on which, most of all his
influence rested,—though, properly speaking, that influence belongs
to the sum total of his character, and not to any special attributes
in it: First, he was thoroughly incorruptible, as to pecuniary
gains,—a quality so rare in Grecian public men of all the cities,
that when a man once became notorious for possessing it, he acquired
a greater degree of trust than any superiority of intellect could
have bestowed upon him: next, he adopted the Periklêan view as to
the necessity of a conservative or stationary foreign policy for
Athens, and of avoiding new acquisitions at a distance, adventurous
risks, or provocation to fresh enemies. With this important point of
analogy, there were at the same time material differences between
them, even in regard to foreign policy. Periklês was a conservative,
resolute against submitting to loss or abstraction of empire,
as well as refraining from aggrandizement: Nikias was in policy
faint-hearted, averse to energetic effort for any purpose whatever,
and disposed, not only to maintain peace, but even to purchase it by
considerable sacrifices. Nevertheless, he was the leading champion
of the conservative party of his day, always powerful at Athens: and
as he was constantly familiar with the details and actual course
of public affairs, capable of giving full effect to the cautious
and prudential point of view, and enjoying unqualified credit for
honest purposes,—his value as a permanent counsellor was steadily
recognized, even though in particular cases his counsel might not be
followed.
[470] Plutarch, Nikias, c. 2, 3.
[471] Καίτοι ἔγωγε καὶ τιμῶμαι ἐκ τοῦ τοιούτου (says Nikias, in
the Athenian assembly, Thucyd. vi, 9) ~καὶ ἧσσον ἑτέρων περὶ τῷ
ἐμαυτοῦ σώματι ὀῤῥωδῶ~· νομίζων ὁμοίως ἀγαθὸν πολίτην εἶναι, ὃς
ἂν καὶ τοῦ σώματός τι καὶ τῆς οὐσίας προνοῆται.
The whole conduct of Nikias before Syracuse, under the most
trying circumstances, more than bears out this boast.
Besides these two main points, which Nikias had in common with
Periklês, he was perfect in the use of those minor and collateral
modes of standing well with the people, which that great man had
taken little pains to practise. While Periklês attached himself
to Aspasia, whose splendid qualities did not redeem, in the eyes
of the public, either her foreign origin or her unchastity, the
domestic habits of Nikias appear to have been strictly conformable
to the rules of Athenian decorum. Periklês was surrounded by
philosophers, Nikias by prophets,—whose advice was necessary both as
a consolation to his temperament, and as a guide to his intelligence
under difficulties; one of them was constantly in his service and
confidence, and his conduct appears to have been sensibly affected by
the difference of character between one prophet and another,[472]
just as the government of Louis the Fourteenth, and other Catholic
princes, has been modified by the change of confessors. To a life
thus rigidly decorous and ultra-religious—both eminently acceptable
to the Athenians—Nikias added the judicious employment of a large
fortune with a view to popularity. Those liturgies—or expensive
public duties undertaken by rich men each in his turn, throughout
other cities of Greece as well as in Athens—which fell to his lot
were performed with such splendor, munificence, and good taste,
as to procure for him universal encomiums; and so much above his
predecessors as to be long remembered and extolled. Most of these
liturgies were connected with the religious service of the state,
so that Nikias, by his manner of performing them, displayed his
zeal for the honor of the gods at the same time that he laid up for
himself a store of popularity. Moreover, the remarkable caution
and timidity—not before an enemy, but in reference to his own
fellow-citizens—which marked his character, rendered him preëminently
scrupulous as to giving offence or making personal enemies. While
his demeanor towards the poorer citizens generally was equal and
conciliating, the presents which he made were numerous, both to gain
friends and to silence assailants. We are not surprised to hear that
various bullies, whom the comic writers turn to scorn, made their
profit out of this susceptibility,—but most assuredly Nikias as a
public man, though he might occasionally be cheated out of money, was
greatly assisted by the reputation which he thus acquired.
[472] Thucyd. vii. 50; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 4, 5, 23. Τῷ μέντοι
Νικίᾳ συνηνέχθη τότε μηδὲ μάντιν ἔχειν ἔμπειρον· ὁ γὰρ συνήθης
αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ πολὺ τῆς δεισιδαιμονίας ἀφαιρῶν Στιλβίδης ἐτεθνήκει
μικρὸν ἔμπροσθεν. This is suggested by Plutarch as an excuse for
mistakes on the part of Nikias.
The expenses unavoidable in such a career, combined with strict
personal honesty, could not have been defrayed except by another
quality, which ought not to count as discreditable to Nikias,
though in this too he stood distinguished from Periklês. He was
a careful and diligent money-getter; a speculator in the silver
mines of Laurium, and proprietor of one thousand slaves, whom he
let out for work in them, receiving a fixed sum per head for each:
the superintending slaves who managed the details of this business
were men of great ability and high pecuniary value.[473] Most of the
wealth of Nikias was held in this form, and not in landed property.
Judging by what remains to us of the comic authors, this must have
been considered as a perfectly gentlemanlike way of making money:
for while they abound with derision of the leather-dresser Kleon,
the lamp-maker Hyperbolus, and the vegetable-selling mother to whom
Euripidês owes his birth, we hear nothing from them in disparagement
of the slave-letter Nikias. The degree to which the latter was thus
occupied with the care of his private fortune, together with the
general moderation of his temper, made him often wish to abstract
himself from public duty: but such unambitious reluctance, rare
among the public men of the day, rather made the Athenians more
anxious to put him forward and retain his services. In the eyes of
the Pentakosiomedimni and the Hippeis, the two richest classes in
Athens, he was one of themselves,—and on the whole, the best man, as
being so little open to reproach or calumny, whom they could oppose
to the leather-dressers and lamp-makers who often out-talked them in
the public assembly. The hoplites, who despised Kleon,—and did not
much regard even the brave, hardy, and soldierlike Lamachus, because
he happened to be poor,[474]—respected in Nikias the union of wealth
and family with honesty, courage, and carefulness in command. The
maritime and trading multitude esteemed him as a decorous, honest,
religious gentleman, who gave splendid choregies, treated the poorest
men with consideration, and never turned the public service into a
job for his own profit,—who, moreover, if he possessed no commanding
qualities, so as to give to his advice imperative and irresistible
authority, was yet always worthy of being consulted, and a steady
safeguard against public mischief. Before the fatal Sicilian
expedition, he had never commanded on any very serious or difficult
enterprise, but what he had done had been accomplished successfully;
so that he enjoyed the reputation of a fortunate as well as a
prudent commander.[475] He appears to have acted as proxenus to
the Lacedæmonians at Athens; probably by his own choice, and among
several others.
[473] Xenophon, Memorab. ii, 5, 2; Xenophon, De Vectigalibus, iv,
14.
[474] Thucyd. v, 7; Plutarch, Alkibiadês, c. 21. Ὁ γὰρ Λάμαχος ἦν
μὲν πολεμικὸς καὶ ἀνδρώδης, ἀξίωμα δ᾽ οὐ προσῆν οὐδ᾽ ὄγκος αὐτῷ
διὰ πενίαν; compare Plutarch, Nikias, c. 15.
[475] Thucyd. v, 16. Νικίας πλεῖστα τῶν τότε εὖ φερόμενος ἐν
στρατηγίαις,—Νικίας μὲν βουλόμενος, ἐν ᾧ ἀπαθὴς ἦν καὶ ἠξιοῦτο,
διασώσασθαι ~τὴν εὐτυχίαν~, etc.—vi, 17. ἕως ἐγώ τε (Alkibiadês)
ἔτι ἀκμάζω μετ᾽ αὐτῆς καὶ ὁ Νικίας ~εὐτυχὴς~ δοκεῖ εἶναι, etc.
The first half of the political life of Nikias,—after the time
when he rose to enjoy full consideration in Athens, being already
of mature age,—was spent in opposition to Kleon; the last half,
in opposition to Alkibiadês. To employ terms which are not fully
suitable to the Athenian democracy, but which yet bring to view
the difference intended to be noted better than any others, Nikias
was a minister or ministerial man, often actually exercising and
always likely to exercise official functions,—Kleon was a man of
the opposition, whose province it was to supervise and censure
official men for their public conduct. We must divest these words of
that sense which they are understood to carry in English political
life,—a standing parliamentary majority in favor of one party: Kleon
would often carry in the public assembly resolutions, which his
opponents Nikias and others of like rank and position,—who served
in the posts of stratêgus, ambassador, and other important offices
designated by the general vote, were obliged against their will
to execute. In attaining such offices they were assisted by the
political clubs, or established _conspiracies_ (to translate the
original literally), among the leading Athenians, to stand by each
other both for acquisition of office and for mutual insurance under
judicial trial. These clubs, or hetæries, must without doubt have
played a most important part in the practical working of Athenian
politics, and it is much to be regretted that we are possessed of no
details respecting them. We know that in Athens they were thoroughly
oligarchical in disposition,[476]—while equality, or something near
to it, in rank and position must have been essential to the social
harmony of the members: in some towns, it appears that such political
associations existed under the form of gymnasia,[477] for the mutual
exercise of the members, or of syssitia for joint banquets. At Athens
they were numerous, and doubtless not habitually in friendship with
each other, since the antipathies among different oligarchical men
were exceedingly strong, and the union brought about between them
at the time of the Four Hundred arose only out of common desire
to put down the democracy, and lasted but a little while. But the
designation of persons to serve in the capacity of stratêgus and
other principal offices greatly depended upon them,—as well as the
facility of passing through that trial of accountability to which
every man was liable after his year of office. Nikias, and men
generally of his rank and fortune, helped by these clubs, and lending
help in their turn, composed what may be called the ministers, or
executive individual functionaries of Athens: the men who acted,
gave orders to individual men as to specific acts, and saw to the
execution of that which the senate and the public assembly resolved.
Especially in regard to the military and naval force of the city, so
large and so actively employed at this time, the powers of detail
possessed by the stratêgi must have been very great and essential to
the safety of the state.
[476] Thucyd. viii, 54. Καὶ ὁ μὲν Πείσανδρος τάς τε ξυνωμοσίας,
αἵπερ ἐτύγχανον πρότερον ἐν τῇ πόλει οὖσαι ἐπὶ δίκαις καὶ ἀρχαῖς,
ἁπάσας ἐπελθὼν, καὶ παρακελευσάμενος ὅπως ξυστραφέντες καὶ κοινῇ
βουλευσάμενοι καταλύσουσι τὸν δῆμον, καὶ τἆλλα παρασκευάσας, etc.
After having thus organized the hetæries, and brought them
into coöperation for his revolutionary objects against the
democracy, Peisander departed from Athens to Samos: on his
return, he finds that these hetæries have been very actively
employed, and had made great progress towards the subversion of
the democracy: they had assassinated the demagogue Androklês and
various other political enemies,—οἱ δὲ ἀμφὶ τὸν Πείσανδρον—ἦλθον
ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας,—καὶ καταλαμβάνουσι τὰ πλεῖστα τοῖς ἑταίροις
προειργασμένα, etc. (viii, 65.)
The political ἑταίρεια to which Alkibiadês belonged is mentioned
in Isokratês, De Bigis, Or. xvi, p. 348, sect. 6. λέγοντες ὡς ὁ
πατὴρ ~συνάγοι τὴν ἑταίρειαν ἐπὶ νεωτέροις πράγμασι~. Allusions
to these ἑταιρεῖαι and to their well-known political and judicial
purposes (unfortunately they are only allusions), are found in
Plato, Theætet. c. 79, p. 173, σπουδαὶ δὲ ἑταιρειῶν ἐπ᾽ ἀρχὰς,
etc.: also Plato, Legg. ix, c. 3, p. 856; Plato, Republic, ii,
c. 8, p. 365, where they are mentioned in conjunction with
συνωμοσίαι—ἐπὶ γὰρ τὸ λανθάνειν ξυνωμοσίας τε καὶ ἑταιρείας
συνάξομεν—also in Pseudo-Andokidês cont. Alkibiad. c. 2, p.
112. Compare the general remarks of Thucydidês, iii, 82, and
Demosthenês cont. Stephan. ii, p. 1157.
Two Dissertations, by Messrs. Vischer and Büttner, collect the
scanty indications respecting these hetæries, together with some
attempts to enlarge and speculate upon them, which are more
ingenious than trustworthy (Die Oligarchische Partei und die
Hetairien in Athen, von W. Vischer, Basel, 1836; Geschichte der
politischen Hetairien zu Athen, von Hermann Büttner, Leipsic,
1840).
[477] About the political workings of the Syssitia and Gymnasia,
see Plato Legg. i, p. 636; Polybius, xx, 6.
While Nikias was thus in what may be called ministerial function,
Kleon was not of sufficient importance to attain the same, but
was confined to the inferior function of opposition: we shall see
in the coming chapter how he became as it were promoted, partly
by his own superior penetration, partly by the dishonest artifice
and misjudgment of Nikias and other opponents, in the affair of
Sphakteria. But his vocation was now to find fault, to censure, to
denounce; his theatre of action was the senate, the public assembly,
the dikasteries; his principal talent was that of speech, in which he
must unquestionably have surpassed all his contemporaries. The two
gifts which had been united in Periklês—superior capacity for speech
as well as for action—were now severed, and had fallen, though both
in greatly inferior degree, the one to Nikias, the other to Kleon. As
an opposition-man, fierce and violent in temper, Kleon was extremely
formidable to all acting functionaries; and from his influence in
the public assembly, he was doubtless the author of many important
positive measures, thus going beyond the functions belonging to what
is called opposition. But though the most effective speaker in the
public assembly, he was not for that reason the most influential
person in the democracy: his powers of speech in fact, stood out the
more prominently, because they were found apart from that station,
and those qualities which were considered, even at Athens, all but
essential to make a man a leader in political life. To understand the
political condition of Athens at this time, it has been necessary to
take this comparison between Nikias and Kleon, and to remark, that
though the latter might be a more victorious speaker, the former was
the more guiding and influential leader; the points gained by Kleon
were all noisy and palpable, sometimes however, without doubt, of
considerable moment,—but the course of affairs was much more under
the direction of Nikias.
It was during the summer of this year, the fifth of the war,—B.C.
427, that the Athenians began operations on a small scale in Sicily;
probably contrary to the advice both of Nikias and Kleon, neither of
them seemingly favorable to these distant undertakings. I reserve,
however, the series of Athenian measures in Sicily—which afterwards
became the turning-point of the fortunes of the state—for a
department by themselves. I shall take them up separately, and bring
them down to the Athenian expedition against Syracuse, when I reach
the date of that important event.
During the autumn of the same year, the epidemic disorder, after
having intermitted for some time, resumed its ravages at Athens,
and continued for one whole year longer, to the sad ruin both of
the strength and the comfort of the city. And it seems that this
autumn, as well as the ensuing summer, were distinguished by violent
atmospheric and terrestrial disturbance. Numerous earthquakes
were experienced at Athens, in Eubœa, in Bœotia, especially near
Orchomenus. Sudden waves of the sea and unexampled tides were also
felt on the coast of Eubœa and Lokris, and the islands of Atalantê
and Peparêthus; the Athenian fort and one of the two guard-ships
at Atalantê were partially destroyed. The earthquakes produced one
effect favorable to Athens; they deterred the Lacedæmonians from
invading Attica. Agis, king of Sparta, had already reached the
isthmus for that purpose; but the repeated earthquakes were looked
upon as an unfavorable portent, and the scheme was abandoned.[478]
[478] Thucyd. iii, 87, 89, 90.
These earthquakes, however, were not considered as calculated to
deter the Lacedæmonians from the foundation of Herakleia, a new
colony near the strait of Thermopylæ. On this occasion, we hear of
a branch of the Greek population not before mentioned during the
war. The coast immediately north of the strait of Thermopylæ was
occupied by the three subdivisions of the Malians,—Paralii, Hierês,
and Trachinians. These latter, immediately adjoining Mount Œta on
its north side,—as well as the Dorians, the little tribe properly
so called, which was accounted the primitive hearth of the Dorians
generally, who joined the same mountain-range on the south,—were
both of them harassed and plundered by the predatory mountaineers,
probably Ætolians, on the high lands between them. At first, the
Trachinians were disposed to throw themselves on the protection
of Athens; but not feeling sufficiently assured as to the way in
which she would deal with them, they joined with the Dorians in
claiming aid from Sparta: in fact, it does not appear that Athens,
possessing naval superiority only, and being inferior on land, could
have given them effective aid. The Lacedæmonians eagerly embraced
the opportunity, and determined to plant a strong colony in this
tempting situation: there was wood in the neighboring regions for
ship-building,[479] so that they might hope to acquire a naval
position for attacking the neighboring island of Eubœa, while the
passage of troops against the subject-allies of Athens in Thrace,
would also be facilitated; the impracticability of such passage had
forced them, three years before, to leave Potidæa to its fate. A
considerable body of colonists, Spartans and Lacedæmonian Periœki,
was assembled under the conduct of three Spartan œkists,—Leon,
Damagon, and Alkidas; the latter we are to presume, though Thucydidês
does not say so, was the same admiral who had met with such little
success in Ionia and at Korkyra. Proclamation was farther made to
invite the junction of all other Greeks as colonists, excepting by
name Ionians, Achæans, and some other tribes not here specified.
Probably the distinct exclusion of the Achæans must have been rather
the continuance of ancient sentiment than dictated by any present
reasons; since the Achæans were not now pronounced enemies of Sparta.
A number of colonists, stated as not less than ten thousand, flocked
to the place, having confidence in the stability of the colony under
the powerful protection of Sparta; and a new town, of large circuit,
was built and fortified under the name of Herakleia;[480] not far
from the site of Trachis, about two miles and a quarter from the
nearest point of the Maliac gulf, but about double that distance
from the strait of Thermopylæ. Near to the latter, and for the
purpose of keeping effective possession of it, a port, with dock and
accommodation for shipping, was constructed.
[479] Respecting this abundance of wood, as well as the site of
Herakleia generally, consult Livy, xxxvi, 22.
[480] Diodor. xii, 59. Not merely was Hêraklês the mythical
progenitor of the Spartan kings, but the whole region near Œta
and Trachis was adorned by legends and heroic incidents connected
with him: see the drama of the Trachiniæ by Sophoklês.
A populous city, established under Lacedæmonian protection in this
important post, alarmed the Athenians, and created much expectation
in every part of Greece: but the Lacedæmonian œkists were harsh and
unskilful in their management, and the Thessalians, to whom the
Trachinian territory was tributary, considered the colony as an
encroachment upon their soil. Anxious to prevent its increase, they
harassed it with hostilities from the first moment, while the Œtæan
assailants were not idle: and Herakleia, thus pressed from without,
and misgoverned within, dwindled down from its original numbers and
promise, barely maintaining its existence.[481] We shall find it in
later times, however, revived, and becoming a place of considerable
importance.
[481] Thucyd. iii, 92, 93; Diodor xi, 49; xii, 59.
The main Athenian armament of this summer, consisting of sixty
triremes, under Nikias, undertook an expedition against the island
of Melos. Melos and Thera, both inhabited by ancient colonists from
Lacedæmon, had never been from the beginning, and still refused to
be, members of the Athenian alliance, or subjects of the Athenian
empire. They thus stood out as exceptions to all the other islands in
the Ægean, and the Athenians thought themselves authorized to resort
to constraint and conquest; believing themselves entitled to command
over all the islands. They might indeed urge, and with considerable
plausibility, that the Melians now enjoyed their share of the
protection of the Ægean from piracy, without contributing at all to
the cost of it: but considering the obstinate reluctance and strong
Lacedæmonian prepossessions of the Melians, who had taken no part in
the war, and given no ground of offence to Athens, the attempt to
conquer them by force could hardly be justified even as a calculation
of gain and loss, and was a mere gratification to the pride of power
in carrying out what, in modern days, we should call the principle
of maritime empire. Melos and Thera formed awkward corners, which
defaced the symmetry of a great proprietor’s field;[482] and the
former ultimately entailed upon Athens the heaviest of all losses,—a
deed of blood which deeply dishonored her annals. On this occasion,
Nikias visited the island with his fleet, and after vainly summoning
the inhabitants, ravaged the lands, but retired without undertaking
a siege. He then sailed away, and came to Orôpus, on the northeast
frontier of Attica, bordering on Bœotia: the hoplites on board his
ships landed in the night, and marched into the interior of Bœotia,
to the vicinity of Tanagra. They were here met, according to signal
raised, by a military force from Athens, which marched thither by
land; and the joint Athenian army ravaged the Tanagræan territory,
gaining an insignificant advantage over its defenders. On retiring,
Nikias reassembled his armament, sailed northward along the coast of
Lokris with the usual ravages, and returned home without effecting
anything farther.[483]
[482] Horat. Sat. ii, 6, 8:—
O! si angulus iste
Proximus accedat, qui nunc denormat agellum!
[483] Thucyd. iii, 91.
About the same time that he started, thirty other Athenian triremes,
under Demosthenês and Proklês, had been sent round Peloponnesus
to act upon the coast of Akarnania. In conjunction with the whole
Akarnanian force, except the men of Œniade,—with fifteen triremes
from Korkyra, and some troops from Kephallênia and Zakynthus,—they
ravaged the whole territory of Leukas, both within and without the
isthmus, and confined the inhabitants to their town, which was
too strong to be taken by anything but a wall of circumvallation
and a tedious blockade. And the Akarnanians, to whom the city was
especially hostile, were urgent with Demosthenês to undertake this
measure forthwith, since the opportunity might not again recur, and
success was nearly certain.
But this enterprising officer committed the grave imprudence of
offending them on a matter of great importance, in order to attack a
country of all others the most impracticable,—the interior of Ætolia.
The Messenians of Naupaktus, who suffered from the depredations
of the neighboring Ætolian tribes, inflamed his imagination by
suggesting to him a grand scheme of operations,[484] more worthy of
the large force which he commanded than the mere reduction of Leukas.
The various tribes of Ætolians,—rude, brave, active, predatory, and
unrivalled in the use of the javelin, which they rarely laid out of
their hands,—stretched across the country from between Parnassus
and Œta to the eastern bank of the Achelôus. The scheme suggested
by the Messenians was, that Demosthenês should attack the great
central Ætolian tribes,—the Apodôti, Ophioneis, and Eurytânes: if
they were conquered, all the remaining continental tribes between the
Ambrakian gulf and Mount Parnassus might be invited or forced into
the alliance of Athens,—the Akarnanians being already included in
it. Having thus got the command of a large continental force,[485]
Demosthenês contemplated the ulterior scheme of marching at the head
of it on the west of Parnassus, through the territory of the Ozolian
Lokrians,—inhabiting the north of the Corinthian gulf, friendly to
Athens, and enemies to the Ætolians, whom they resembled both in
their habits and in their fighting,—until he arrived at Kytinium,
in Doris, in the upper portion of the valley of the river Kephisus.
He would then easily descend that valley into the territory of the
Phocians, who were likely to join the Athenians if a favorable
opportunity occurred, but who might at any rate be constrained to
do so. From Phocis, the scheme was to invade from the northward the
conterminous territory of Bœotia, the great enemy of Athens: which
might thus perhaps be completely subdued, if assailed at the same
time from Attica. Any Athenian general, who could have executed
this comprehensive scheme, would have acquired at home a high and
well-merited celebrity. But Demosthenês had been ill-informed, both
of the invincible barbarians and the pathless country comprehended
under the name of Ætolia: some of the tribes spoke a language
scarcely intelligible to Greeks, and even eat their meat raw, while
the country has even down to the present time remained not only
unconquered, but untraversed, by an enemy in arms.
[484] Thucyd. iii, 95. Δημοσθένης δ᾽ ἀναπείθεται κατὰ τὸν
χρόνον τοῦτον ὑπὸ Μεσσηνίων ὡς καλὸν αὐτῷ στρατιᾶς τοσαύτης
ξυνειλεγμένης, etc.
[485] Thucyd. iii, 95. τὸ ἄλλο ἠπειρωτικὸν τὸ ταύτῃ. None of
the tribes properly called Epirots, would be comprised in this
expression: the name ἠπειρῶται is here a general name, not
a proper name, as Poppo and Dr. Arnold remark. Demosthenês
would calculate on getting under his orders the Akarnanians
and Ætolians, and some other tribes besides; but _what_ other
tribes, it is not easy to specify: perhaps the Agræi, east of
Amphilochia, among them.
Demosthenês accordingly retired from Leukas, in spite of the
remonstrance of the Akarnanians, who not only could not be induced to
accompany him, but went home in visible disgust, He then sailed with
his other forces—Messenians, Kephallenians, and Zakynthians—to Œneon,
in the territory of the Ozolian Lokrians, a maritime township on the
Corinthian gulf, not far eastward of Naupaktus,—where his army was
disembarked, together with three hundred epibatæ (or marines) from
the triremes,—including on this occasion, what was not commonly the
case on shipboard,[486] some of the choice hoplites, selected all
from young men of the same age, on the Athenian muster-roll. Having
passed the night in the sacred precinct of Zeus Nemeus at Œneon,
memorable as the spot where the poet Hesiod was said to have been
slain, he marched early in the morning, under the guidance of the
Messenian Chromon, into Ætolia; on the first day he took Potidania,
on the second Krokyleium, on the third Teichium,—all of them
villages unfortified and undefended, for the inhabitants abandoned
them and fled to the mountains above. He was here inclined to halt
and wait the junction of the Ozolian Lokrians, who had engaged to
invade Ætolia at the same time, and were almost indispensable to his
success, from their familiarity with Ætolian warfare and similarity
of weapons. But the Messenians again persuaded him to advance
without delay into the interior, in order that the villages might be
separately attacked and taken before any collective force could be
gathered together: and Demosthenês was so encouraged by having as yet
encountered no resistance, that he advanced to Ægitium, which he also
found deserted, and captured without opposition.
[486] Thucyd. iii, 98. The epibatæ, or soldiers serving on
shipboard (marines), were more usually taken from the thetes,
or the poorest class of citizens, furnished by the state with a
panoply for the occasion,—not from the regular hoplites on the
muster-roll. Maritime soldiery is, therefore, usually spoken
of as something inferior: the present triremes of Demosthenês
are noticed in the light of an exception (ναυτικῆς καὶ φαύλου
στρατιᾶς, Thucyd. vi, 21).
So among the Romans, service in the legions was accounted higher
and more honorable than that of the classiarii milites (Tacit.
Histor. i, 87).
The Athenian epibatæ, though not forming a corps permanently
distinct, correspond in function to the English marines, who
seem to have been first distinguished permanently from other
foot-soldiers about the year 1684. “It having been found
necessary on many occasions to embark a number of soldiers
on board our ships of war, and mere landsmen being at first
extremely unhealthy,—and at first, until they had been accustomed
to the sea, in a great measure unserviceable,—it was at length
judged expedient to appoint certain regiments for that service,
who were trained to the different modes of sea-fighting, and also
made useful in some of those manœuvres of a ship where a great
many hands were required. These, from the nature of their duty,
were distinguished by the appellation of _maritime soldiers_, or
marines.”—Grose’s Military Antiquities of the English Army, vol.
i, p. 186. (London, 1786.)
Here however was the term of his good fortune. The mountains round
Ægitium were occupied not only by the inhabitants of that village,
but also by the entire force of Ætolia, collected even from the
distant tribes Bomiês and Kalliês, who bordered on the Maliac
gulf. The invasion of Demosthenês had become known beforehand to
the Ætolians, who not only forewarned all their tribes of the
approaching enemy, but also sent ambassadors to Sparta and Corinth to
ask for aid.[487] However, they showed themselves fully capable of
defending their own territory, without foreign aid: and Demosthenês
found himself assailed, in his position at Ægitium, on all sides
at once, by these active highlanders, armed with javelins, pouring
down from the neighboring hills. Not engaging in any close combat,
they retreated when the Athenians advanced forward to charge
them,—resuming their aggression the moment that the pursuers, who
could never advance far in consequence of the ruggedness of the
ground, began to return to the main body. The small number of bowmen
along with Demosthenês for some time kept their unshielded assailants
at bay; but the officer commanding the bowmen was presently slain,
and the stock of arrows became nearly exhausted; and what was still
worse, Chromon, the Messenian, the only man who knew the country, and
could serve as guide, was slain also. The bowmen became thus either
ineffective or dispersed; while the hoplites exhausted themselves
in vain attempts to pursue and beat off an active enemy, who always
returned upon them, and in every successive onset thinned and
distressed them more and more. At length the force of Demosthenês
was completely broken, and compelled to take flight; but without
beaten roads, without guides, and in a country not only strange to
them, but impervious from continual mountain, rock, and forest. Many
of them were slain in the flight by pursuers, superior not less in
rapidity of movement than in knowledge of the country: some even
lost themselves in the forest, and perished miserably in flames
kindled around them by the Ætolians: and the fugitives were at
length reassembled at Œneon, near the sea, with the loss of Proklês,
the colleague of Demosthenês in command, as well as of one hundred
and twenty hoplites, among the best-armed and most vigorous in the
Athenian muster-roll.[488] The remaining force was soon transported
back from Naupaktus to Athens, but Demosthenês remained behind, being
too much afraid of the displeasure of his countrymen to return at
such a moment. It is certain that his conduct was such as justly to
incur their displeasure; and that the expedition against Ætolia,
alienating an established ally and provoking a new enemy, had been
conceived with a degree of rashness which nothing but the unexpected
favor of fortune could have counterbalanced.
[487] Thucyd. iii, 100. Προπέμψαντες πρότερον ἔς τε Κόρινθον καὶ
ἐς Λακεδαίμονα πρέσβεις—πείθουσιν ὥστε σφίσι πέμψαι στρατιὰν ἐπὶ
Ναύπακτον διὰ τὴν τῶν ~Ἀθηναίων ἐπαγωγήν~.
It is not here meant, I think—as Göller and Dr. Arnold
suppose—that the Ætolians sent envoys to Lacedæmon before there
was any talk or thought of the invasion of Ætolia, simply
in prosecution of the standing antipathy which they bore to
Naupaktus: but that they had sent envoys immediately when they
heard of the preparations for invading Ætolia,—yet before the
invasion actually took place. The words διὰ τὴν τῶν Ἀθηναίων
ἐπαγωγήν show that this is the meaning.
The word ἐπαγωγὴ is rightly construed by Haack, against the
Scholiast: “Because the Naupaktians were bringing in the
Athenians to invade Ætolia.”
[488] Thucyd. iii, 98.
The force of the new enemy whom his unsuccessful attack had raised
into activity, soon made itself felt. The Ætolian envoys despatched
to Sparta and Corinth found it easy to obtain the promise of a
considerable force to join them in an expedition against Naupaktus:
and about the month of September, a body of three thousand
Peloponnesian hoplites, including five hundred from the newly-founded
colony of Herakleia, was assembled at Delphi, under the command of
Eurylochus, Makarius, and Menedemus. Their road of march to Naupaktus
lay through the territory of the Ozolian Lokrians, whom they proposed
either to gain over or to subdue. With Amphissa, the largest Lokrian
township, and in the immediate neighborhood of Delphi, they had
little difficulty,—for the Amphissians were in a state of feud with
their neighbors on the other side of Parnassus, and were afraid that
the new armament might become the instrument of Phocian antipathy
against them. On the very first application they joined the Spartan
alliance, and gave hostages for their fidelity to it: moreover, they
persuaded many other Lokrian petty villages—among others the Myoneis,
who were masters of the most difficult pass on the road—to do the
same. Eurylochus received from these various townships reinforcements
for his army, as well as hostages for their fidelity, whom he
deposited at Kytinium in Doris: and he was thus enabled to march
through all the territory of the Ozolian Lokrians without resistance;
except from Œneon and Eupalion, both which places he took by force.
Having arrived in the territory of Naupaktus, he was there joined
by the full force of the Ætolians; and their joint efforts, after
laying waste all the neighborhood, captured the Corinthian colony of
Molykreion, which had become subject to the Athenian empire.[489]
[489] Thucyd. iii, 101, 102.
Naupaktus, with a large circuit of wall and thinly defended, was
in the greatest danger, and would certainly have been taken, had
it not been saved by the efforts of the Athenian Demosthenês, who
had remained there ever since the unfortunate Ætolian expedition.
Apprized of the coming march of Eurylochus, he went personally to
the Akarnanians, and persuaded them to send a force to aid in the
defence of Naupaktus: for a long time they turned a deaf ear to his
solicitations, in consequence of the refusal to blockade Leukas, but
they were at length induced to consent. At the head of one thousand
Akarnanian hoplites, Demosthenês threw himself into Naupaktus;
and Eurylochus, seeing that the town had thus been placed out of
the reach of attack, abandoned all his designs upon it,—marching
farther westward to the neighboring territories of Ætolia, Kalydon,
Pleuron, and Proschium, near the Achelôus and the borders of
Akarnania. The Ætolians, who had come down to join him for the common
purpose of attacking Naupaktus, here abandoned him and retired to
their respective homes. But the Ambrakiots, rejoiced to find so
considerable a Peloponnesian force in their neighborhood, prevailed
upon him to assist them in attacking the Amphilochian Argos as well
as Akarnania; assuring him that there was now a fair prospect of
bringing the whole of the population of the mainland, between the
Ambrakian and Corinthian gulfs, under the supremacy of Lacedæmon.
Having persuaded Eurylochus thus to keep his forces together and
ready, they themselves with three thousand Ambrakiot hoplites invaded
the territory of the Amphilochian Argos, and captured the fortified
hill of Olpæ immediately bordering on the Ambrakian gulf, about three
miles from Argos itself: this hill had been in former days employed
by the Akarnanians as a place for public judicial congress of the
whole nation.[490]
[490] Thucyd. iii, 102-105.
This enterprise, communicated forthwith to Eurylochus, was the
signal for movement on both sides. The Akarnanians marched with
their whole force to the protection of Argos, and occupied a post
called Krênæ in the Amphilochian territory, hoping to be able to
prevent Eurylochus from effecting his junction with the Ambrakiots
at Olpæ. They at the same time sent urgent messages to Demosthenês
at Naupaktus, and to the Athenian guard-squadron of twenty triremes
under Aristotelês and Hierophon, entreating their aid in the present
need, and inviting Demosthenês to act as their commander. They had
forgotten their displeasure against him arising out of his recent
refusal to blockade at Leukas,—for which they probably thought that
he had been sufficiently punished by his disgrace in Ætolia; while
they knew and esteemed his military capacity. In fact, the accident
whereby he had been detained at Naupaktus, now worked fortunately for
them as well as for him: it secured to them a commander whom all of
them respected, obviating the jealousies among their own numerous
petty townships,—it procured for him the means of retrieving his
own reputation at Athens. Demosthenês, not backward in seizing this
golden opportunity, came speedily into the Ambrakian gulf with the
twenty Athenian triremes, conducting two hundred Messenian hoplites
and sixty Athenian bowmen. He found the whole Akarnanian force
concentrated at the Amphilochian Argos, and was named general along
with the Akarnanian generals, but in reality enjoying the whole
direction of the operations.
He found also the whole of the enemy’s force, both the three thousand
Ambrakiot hoplites and the Peloponnesian division under Eurylochus,
already united and in position at Olpæ, about three miles off. For
Eurylochus, as soon as he was apprized that the Ambrakiots had
reached Olpæ, broke up forthwith his camp at Proschium in Ætolia,
knowing that his best chance of traversing the hostile territory of
Akarnania consisted in celerity: the whole Akarnanian force, however,
had already gone to Argos, so that his march was unopposed through
that country. He crossed the Achelôus, marched westward of Stratus,
through the Akarnanian townships of Phytia, Medeon, and Limnæa, then
quitting both Akarnania and the direct road from Akarnania to Argos,
he struck rather eastward into the mountainous district of Thyamus,
in the territory of the Agræans, who were enemies of the Akarnanians.
From hence he descended at night into the territory of Argos, and
passed unobserved under cover of the darkness between Argos itself,
and the Akarnanian force at Krênæ; so as to join in safety the three
thousand Ambrakiots at Olpæ; to their great joy,—for they had feared
that the enemy at Argos and Krênæ would have arrested his passage;
and feeling their force inadequate to contend alone, they had sent
pressing messages home to demand large reinforcements for themselves
and their own protection.[491]
[491] Thucyd. iii, 105, 106, 107.
Demosthenês thus found an united and formidable enemy, superior in
number to himself, at Olpæ, and conducted his troops from Argos and
Krênæ to attack them. The ground was rugged and mountainous, and
between the two armies lay a steep ravine which neither liked to
be the first to pass, so that they lay for five days inactive. If
Herodotus had been our historian, he would probably have ascribed
this delay to unfavorable sacrifices (which may probably have been
the case), and would have given us interesting anecdotes respecting
the prophets on both sides; but the more positive and practical
genius of Thucydidês merely acquaints us, that on the sixth day
both armies put themselves in order of battle,—both probably tired
of waiting. The ground being favorable for ambuscade, Demosthenês
hid in a bushy dell four hundred hoplites and light-armed, so that
they might spring up suddenly in the midst of the action upon the
Peloponnesian left, which outflanked his right. He was himself on the
right with the Messenians and some Athenians, opposed to Eurylochus
on the left of the enemy: the Akarnanians, with the Amphilochian
akontists, or darters, occupied his left, opposed to the Ambrakiot
hoplites: Ambrakiots and Peloponnesians were, however, intermixed in
the line of Eurylochus, and it was only the Mantineans who maintained
a separate station of their own towards the left centre. The battle
accordingly began, and Eurylochus with his superior numbers was
proceeding to surround Demosthenês, when on a sudden the men in
ambush rose up and set upon his rear. A panic seized his men, and
they made no resistance worthy of their Peloponnesian reputation:
they broke and fled, while Eurylochus, doubtless exposing himself
with peculiar bravery in order to restore the battle, was early
slain. Demosthenês, having near him his best troops, pressed them
vigorously and their panic communicated itself to the troops in the
centre, so that all were put to flight and pursued to Olpæ. On the
right of the line of Eurylochus, the Ambrakiots, the most warlike
Greeks in the Epirotic regions, completely defeated the Akarnanians
opposed to them, and carried their pursuit even as far as Argos.
So complete, however, was the victory gained by Demosthenês over
the remaining troops, that these Ambrakiots had great difficulty in
fighting their way back to Olpæ, which was not accomplished without
severe loss, and late in the evening. Among all the beaten troops,
the Mantineans were those who best maintained their retreating
order.[492] The loss in the army of Demosthenês was about three
hundred: that of the opponents much greater, but the number is not
specified.
[492] Thucyd. iii, 107, 108: compare Polyænus, iii, 1.
Of the three Spartan commanders, two, Eurylochus and Makarius, had
been slain: the third, Menedæus, found himself beleaguered both by
sea and land,—the Athenian squadron being on guard along the coast.
It would seem, indeed, that he might have fought his way to Ambrakia,
especially as he would have met the Ambrakiot reinforcement coming
from the city. But whether this were possible or not, the commander,
too much dispirited to attempt it, took advantage of the customary
truce granted for burying the dead, to open negotiations with
Demosthenês and the Akarnanian generals, for the purpose of obtaining
an unmolested retreat. This was peremptorily refused: but Demosthenês
(with the consent of the Akarnanian leaders) secretly intimated to
the Spartan commander and those immediately around him, together
with the Mantineans and other Peloponnesian troops,—that if they
chose to make a separate and surreptitious retreat, abandoning their
comrades, no opposition would be offered: for he designed by this
means, not merely to isolate the Ambrakiots, the great enemies of
Argos and Akarnania, along with the body of miscellaneous mercenaries
who had come under Eurylochus, but also to obtain the more permanent
advantage of disgracing the Spartans and Peloponnesians in the
eyes of the Epirotic Greeks, as cowards and traitors to military
fellowship. The very reason which prompted Demosthenês to grant a
separate facility of escape, ought to have been imperative with
Menedæus and the Peloponnesians around him, to make them spurn it
with indignation: yet such was their anxiety for personal safety,
that this disgraceful convention was accepted, ratified, and carried
into effect forthwith. It stands alone in Grecian history, as a
specimen of separate treason in officers, to purchase safety for
themselves by abandoning those under their command. Had the officers
been Athenian, it would have been doubtless quoted as an example of
the pretended faithlessness of democracy: but as it was the act of a
Spartan commander in conjunction with many leading Peloponnesians,
we can only remark upon it as a farther manifestation of that
intra-Peloponnesian selfishness, and carelessness of obligation
towards extra-Peloponnesian Greeks, which we found so lamentably
prevalent during the invasion of Xerxes; in this case indeed
heightened by the fact that the men deserted were fellow-Dorians and
fellow-soldiers, who had just fought in the same ranks.
As soon as the ceremony of burying the dead had been completed,
Menedæus, and the Peloponnesians who were protected by this secret
convention, stole away slyly and in small bands under pretence of
collecting wood and vegetables: on getting to a little distance,
they quickened their pace and made off,—much to the dismay of the
Ambrakiots, who ran after them and tried to overtake them. The
Akarnanians pursued, and their leaders had much difficulty in
explaining to them the secret convention just concluded. Nor was
it without some suspicions of treachery, and even personal hazard,
from their own troops, that they at length caused the fugitive
Peloponnesians to be respected; while the Ambrakiots, the most
obnoxious of the two to Akarnanian feeling, were pursued without any
reserve, and two hundred of them were slain before they could escape
into the friendly territory of the Agræans.[493] To distinguish
Ambrakiots from Peloponnesians, similar in race and dialect, was,
however, no easy task, and much dispute arose in individual cases.
[493] Thucyd. iii, 111.
Unfairly as this loss fell upon Ambrakia, a far more severe calamity
was yet in store for her. The large reinforcement from the city,
which had been urgently invoked by the detachment at Olpæ, started
in due course as soon as it could be got ready, and entered the
territory of Amphilochia about the time when the battle of Olpæ was
fought, but ignorant of that misfortune, and hoping to arrive soon
enough to stand by their friends. Their march was made known to
Demosthenês, on the day after the battle, by the Amphilochians; who,
at the same time, indicated to him the best way of surprising them
in the rugged and mountainous road along which they had to march, at
the two conspicuous peaks called Idomenê, immediately above a narrow
pass leading farther on to Olpæ. It was known beforehand, by the
line of march of the Ambrakiots, that they would rest for the night
at the lower of these two peaks, ready to march through the pass on
the next morning. On that same night, a detachment of Amphilochians,
under direction from Demosthenês, seized the higher of the two peaks;
while that commander himself, dividing his forces into two divisions,
started from his position at Olpæ in the evening after supper. One of
these divisions, having the advantage of Amphilochian guides in their
own country, marched by an unfrequented mountain road to Idomenê;
the other, under Demosthenês himself, went directly through the pass
leading from Idomenê to Olpæ. After marching all night, they reached
the camp of the Ambrakiots a little before daybreak,—Demosthenês
himself with his Messenians in the van. The surprise was complete;
the Ambrakiots were found still lying down and asleep, while even
the sentinels, uninformed of the recent battle,—hearing themselves
accosted in the Doric dialect by the Messenians, whom Demosthenês
had placed in front for that express purpose, and not seeing very
clearly in the morning twilight, mistook them for some of their own
fellow-citizens coming back from the other camp. The Akarnanians
and Messenians thus fell among the Ambrakiots sleeping and unarmed,
and without any possibility of resistance. Large numbers of them
were destroyed on the spot, and the remainder fled in all directions
among the neighboring mountains, none knowing the roads and the
country; it was the country of the Amphilochians, subjects of
Ambrakia, but subjects averse to their condition, and now making
use of their perfect local knowledge and light-armed equipment, to
inflict a terrible revenge on their masters. Some of the Ambrakiots
became entangled in ravines,—others fell into ambuscades laid by the
Amphilochians. Others again, dreading most of all to fall into the
hands of the Amphilochians, barbaric in race as well as intensely
hostile in feeling, and seeing no other possibility of escaping
them, swam off to the Athenian ships cruising along the shore.
There were but a small proportion of them who survived to return to
Ambrakia.[494]
[494] Thucyd. iii, 112.
The complete victory of Idomenê, admirably prepared by Demosthenês,
was achieved with scarce any loss: and the Akarnanians, after
erecting their trophy, despoiled the enemy’s dead and carried off the
arms thus taken to Argos.
On the morrow they were visited by a herald, coming from those
Ambrakiots who had fled into the Agræan territory, after the battle
of Olpæ, and the subsequent pursuit. He came with the customary
request from defeated soldiers, for permission to bury their dead who
had fallen in that pursuit. Neither he, nor those from whom he came,
knew anything of the destruction of their brethren at Idomenê,—just
as these latter had been ignorant of the defeat at Olpæ; while,
on the other hand, the Akarnanians in the camp, whose minds were
full of the more recent and capital advantage at Idomenê, supposed
that the message referred to the men slain in that engagement. The
numerous panoplies just acquired at Idomenê lay piled up in the
camp, and the herald, on seeing them, was struck with amazement at
the size of the heap, so much exceeding the number of those who were
missing in his own detachment. An Akarnanian present asked the reason
of his surprise, and inquired how many of his comrades had been
slain,—meaning to refer to the slain at Idomenê. “About two hundred,”
the herald replied. “Yet these arms here show, not that number, but
more than a thousand men.” “Then they are not the arms of those who
fought with us.” “Nay, but they are; if ye were the persons who
fought yesterday at Idomenê.” “We fought with no one yesterday: it
was the day before yesterday, in the retreat.” “O, then ye have to
learn, that _we_ were engaged yesterday with these others, who were
on their march as reinforcement from the city of Ambrakia.”
The unfortunate herald now learned for the first time that the large
reinforcement from his city had been cut to pieces. So acute was his
feeling of mingled anguish and surprise, that he raised a loud cry of
woe, and hurried away at once, without saying another word; not even
prosecuting his request about the burial of the dead bodies,—which
appears on this fatal occasion to have been neglected.[495]
[495] Thucyd. iii, 113.
His grief was justified by the prodigious magnitude of the calamity,
which Thucydidês considers to have been the greatest that afflicted
any Grecian city during the whole war prior to the peace of Nikias;
so incredibly great, indeed, that though he had learned the number
slain, he declines to set it down, from fear of not being believed,—a
scruple which we, his readers, have much reason to regret. It appears
that nearly the whole adult military population of Ambrakia was
destroyed, and Demosthenês was urgent with the Akarnanians to march
thither at once: had they consented, Thucydidês tells us positively
that the city would have surrendered without a blow.[496] But they
refused to undertake the enterprise, fearing, according to the
historian, that the Athenians at Ambrakia would be more troublesome
neighbors to them than the Ambrakiots. That this reason was
operative, we need not doubt: but it can hardly have been either the
single, or even the chief, reason; for, had it been so, they would
have been equally afraid of Athenian coöperation in the blockade of
Leukas, which they had strenuously solicited from Demosthenês, and
had quarrelled with him for refusing. Ambrakia was less near to them
than Leukas, and in its present exhausted state, inspired less fear:
but the displeasure arising from the former refusal of Demosthenês
had probably never been altogether appeased, nor were they sorry to
find an opportunity of mortifying him in a similar manner.
[496] Thucyd. iii, 113. πάθος γὰρ τοῦτο μιᾷ πόλει Ἑλληνίδι
μέγιστον δὴ τῶν ~κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον τόνδε~ ἐγένετο. Καὶ ἀριθμὸν
οὐκ ἔγραψα τῶν ἀποθανόντων, διότι ἄπιστον τὸ πλῆθος λέγεται
ἀπολέσθαι, ὡς πρὸς τὸ μέγεθος τῆς πόλεως. Ἀμπρακίαν μέντοι
~οἶδα~ ὅτι, εἰ ἐβουλήθησαν Ἀκαρνᾶνες καὶ Ἀμφίλοχοι, Ἀθηναίοις
καὶ Δημοσθένει πειθόμενοι, ἐξελεῖν, αὐτοβοεὶ ἂν εἷλον· νῦν δὲ
ἔδεισαν, μὴ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἔχοντες αὐτὴν χαλεπώτεροι σφίσι πάροικοι
ὦσι.
We may remark that the expression κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον τόνδε, when it
occurs in the first, second, third, or first half of the fourth
Book of Thucydidês, seems to allude to the first ten years of the
Peloponnesian war, which ended with the peace of Nikias.
In a careful dissertation, by Franz Wolfgang Ullrich, analyzing
the structure of the history of Thucydidês, it is made to appear
that the first, second, and third Books, with the first half of
the fourth, were composed during the interval between the peace
of Nikias and the beginning of the last nine years of the war,
called the Dekeleian war; allowing for two passages in these
early books which must have been subsequently introduced.
The later books seem to have been taken up by Thucydidês as a
separate work, continuing the former, and a sort of separate
preface is given for them (v, 26), γέγραφε δὲ καὶ ταῦτα ὁ αὐτὸς
Θουκυδίδης Ἀθηναῖος ἑξῆς, etc. It is in this later portion that
he first takes up the view peculiar to him, of reckoning the
whole twenty-seven years as one continued war only nominally
interrupted (Ullrich, Beiträge zur Erklärung des Thukydidês, pp.
85, 125, 138, etc. Hamburgh, 1846).
Compare ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τῷδε (iii, 98), which in like manner means
the war prior to the peace of Nikias.
In the distribution of the spoil, three hundred panoplies were
first set apart as the perquisite of Demosthenês: the remainder
were then distributed, one-third for the Athenians, the other
two-thirds among the Akarnanian townships. The immense reserve,
personally appropriated to Demosthenês, enables us to make some
vague conjecture as to the total loss of Ambrakiots. The fraction of
one-third, assigned to the Athenian people, must have been, we may
imagine, six times as great, and perhaps even in larger proportion,
than the reserve of the general: for the latter was at that time
under the displeasure of the people, and anxious above all things
to regain their favor,—an object which would be frustrated rather
than promoted, if his personal share of the arms were not greatly
disproportionate to the collective claim of the city. Reasoning upon
this supposition, the panoplies assigned to Athens would be eighteen
hundred, and the total of Ambrakiot slain, whose arms became public
property, would be five thousand four hundred. To which must be
added some Ambrakiots killed in their flight from Idomenê by the
Amphilochians, in dells, ravines, and by-places: probably those
Amphilochians, who slew them, would appropriate the arms privately,
without bringing them into the general stock. Upon this calculation,
the total number of Ambrakiot slain in both battles and both
pursuits, would be about six thousand: a number suitable to the grave
expressions of Thucydidês, as well as to his statements, that the
first detachment which marched to Olpæ was three thousand strong, and
that the message sent home invoked as reinforcement the total force
of the city. How totally helpless Ambrakia had become, is still more
conclusively proved by the fact that the Corinthians were obliged
shortly afterwards to send by land a detachment of three hundred
hoplites for its defence.[497]
[497] Thucyd. iii, 114. Diodorus (xii, 60) abridges the narrative
of Thucydidês.
The Athenian triremes soon returned to their station at Naupaktus,
after which a convention was concluded between the Akarnanians
and Amphilochians on the one side, and the Ambrakiots and
Peloponnesians—who had fled after the battle of Olpæ into the
territory of Salynthius and the Agræi—on the other, insuring a safe
and unmolested egress to both of the latter.[498] With the Ambrakiots
a more permanent pacification was effected: the Akarnanians and
Amphilochians concluded with them a peace and alliance for one
hundred years, on condition that they should surrender all the
Amphilochian territory and hostages in their possession, and should
bind themselves to furnish no aid to Anaktorium, then in hostility
to the Akarnanians. Each party, however, maintained its separate
alliance,—the Ambrakiots with the Peloponnesian confederacy, the
Akarnanians with Athens: it was stipulated that the Akarnanians
should not be required to assist the Ambrakiots against Athens, nor
the Ambrakiots to assist the Akarnanians against the Peloponnesian
league; but against all other enemies, each engaged to lend aid to
the other.[499]
[498] Thucyd. iii, 114. Ἀκαρνᾶνες δὲ καὶ Ἀμφίλοχοι, ἀπελθόντων
Ἀθηναίων καὶ Δημοσθένους, τοῖς ὡς Σαλύνθιον καὶ Ἀγραίους
καταφυγοῦσιν Ἀμπρακιώταις καὶ Πελοποννησίοις ἀναχώρησιν
ἐσπείσαντο ἐξ Οἰνιαδῶν, οἵπερ καὶ μετανέστησαν παρὰ Σαλυνθίον.
This is a very difficult passage. Hermann has conjectured, and
Poppo, Göller, and Dr. Arnold all approve, the reading παρὰ
Σαλυνθίου instead of the two last words of this sentence. The
passage might certainly be construed with this emendation, though
there would still be an awkwardness in the position of the
relative οἵπερ with regard to its antecedent, and in the position
of the particle καὶ, which ought then properly to come after
μετανέστησαν, and not before it. The sentence would then mean,
that “the Ambrakiots and Peloponnesians, who had originally taken
refuge with Salynthius, had moved away from his territory to
Œniadæ,” from which place they were now to enjoy safe departure.
I think, however, that the sentence would construe equally well,
or at least with no greater awkwardness, without any conjectural
alteration of the text, if we suppose Οἰνιαδῶν to be not merely
the name of the place, but the name of the inhabitants: and the
word seems to be used in this double sense (Thucyd. ii, 100). As
the word is already in the patronymic form, it would be difficult
to deduce from it a new _nomen gentile_. Several of the Attic
demes, which are in the patronymic form, present this same double
meaning. If this supposition be admitted, the sentence will mean,
that “safe retreat was granted to Ambrakiots and Peloponnesians
from the Œniade, who _also_—καὶ, that is, they as well as the
Ambrakiots and Peloponnesians—went up to the territory of
Salynthius.” These Œniadæ were enemies of the general body of
Akarnanians (ii, 100), and they may well have gone thither to
help in extricating the fugitive Ambrakiots and Peloponnesians.
[499] Thucyd. iii, 114.
To Demosthenês personally, the events on the coast of the Ambrakian
gulf proved a signal good fortune, well-earned indeed by the skill
which he had displayed. He was enabled to atone for his imprudence
in the Ætolian expedition, and to reëstablish himself in the favor
of the Athenian people. He sailed home in triumph to Athens, during
the course of the winter, with his reserved present of three hundred
panoplies, which acquired additional value from the accident, that
the larger number of panoplies, reserved out of the spoil for the
Athenian people, were captured at sea, and never reached Athens.
Accordingly, those brought by Demosthenês were the only trophy of
the victory, and as such were deposited in the Athenian temples,
where Thucydidês mentions them as still existing at the time when he
wrote.[500]
[500] Thucyd. iii, 114. Τὰ δὲ ~νῦν ἀνακείμενα ἐν τοῖς Ἀττικοῖς
ἱεροῖς~ Δημοσθένει ἐξῃρέθησαν, τριακόσιαι πανοπλίαι, καὶ ἄγων
αὐτὰς κατέπλευσε. Καὶ ἐγένετο ἅμα αὐτῷ μετὰ τὴν ἐκ τῆς Αἰτωλίας
ξυμφορὰν ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς πράξεως ἀδεεστέρα ἡ κάθοδος.
It was in the same autumn that the Athenians were induced by an
oracle to undertake the more complete purification of the sacred
island of Delos. This step was probably taken to propitiate Apollo,
since they were under the persuasion that the terrible visitation
of the epidemic was owing to his wrath. And as it was about this
period that the second attack of the epidemic, after having lasted a
year, disappeared,—many of them probably ascribed this relief to the
effect of their pious cares at Delos. All the tombs in the island
were opened; the dead bodies were then exhumed, and reinterred in
the neighboring island of Rheneia: and orders were given that for
the future no deaths and no births should take place in the sacred
island. Moreover, the ancient Delian festival—once the common point
of meeting and solemnity for the whole Ionic race, and celebrated
for its musical contests, before the Lydian and Persian conquests
had subverted the freedom and prosperity of Ionia—was now renewed.
The Athenians celebrated the festival with its accompanying matches,
even the chariot-race, in a manner more splendid than had ever been
known in former times: and they appointed a similar festival to be
celebrated every fourth year. At this period they were excluded both
from the Olympic and the Pythian games, which probably made the
revival of the Delian festival more gratifying to them. The religious
zeal and munificence of Nikias was strikingly displayed at Delos.[501]
[501] Thucyd. iii, 104; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 3, 4; Diodor. xii,
58.